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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the growth of product market regulation in France and
Germany from 1970 to 1990. It finds that these countries have pursued divergent
strategies for regulating their domestic product markets. France has treated consumers as
citizens, granting them special political protections against product risk. Germany has
treated consumers as producers, emphasizing consumer information as a means of
combatting market failure. This policy divergence resulted from the different institutional
contexts in which the issues of consumer policy were first raised and resolved. As a
consequence of these broad institutional differences, France and Germany have put in
place divergent national consumption regimes, in which different sets of consumer and
producer interests are systematically emphasized in government regulation. Such national
divergence in consumption regimes is important because it will increasingly influence
consumer and producer decisions about product choice, and these choices in turn set the
terms of national variations of capitalism.
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"It is a matter of knowing to what extent we should encourage the
production and distribution of products in large quantity, permitting a
certain number of defects for which the consumer will suffer the
consequences, and to what extent we should place a heavier weight of
responsibility on producers and distributors in order to pressure them to
produce less, bat also to produce better. Such a choice, whose
economic and social consequences can be considerable, is essentially
political." 1
-- Jacques Ghestin, Le Monde, 28 May 1975.
Introduction. The Politics of Consumer Market Regulation
Consumers make their selection of products for purchase within market
institutions that have political origins. Non-physical characteristics of consumer products
such as risk and information are increasingly controlled by national regulations designed
to protect consumers against the potential hazards of new technologies, products, and
product designs. These regulations have emerged from political struggles in which
consumer and producer interests confronted one another over the degree of burden that
should be borne on the one hand by industry and on the other hand by individual
consumers. How these conflicting interests have been resolved has dictated the broad
strategy of product market regulation that different countries have adopted. The
"I s'agit de savoir dans quelle m6sure il convient soit d'encourager la fabrication et la
distribution de produits en grandes quantit6s, quitte a admettre certains d6fauts dont
l'acheteur subira les cons6quences, soit de fair peser sur les producteurs et distributeurs
une responsabilit6 plus lourde afin de les inciter a produire moins, mais a produire mieux.
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combined impact of these new regulations within each country has been to generate
distinctive national consumption regimes. These differing consumption regimes, in turn,
are exerting an increasingly heavy influence on the design and production strategies of
upstream industries through their impact on the consumer marketplace.
This focus on the institutions that define national consumption regimes adds a
new avenue of research to political analysis of the economy. Researchers who have
studied national varieties of capitalism have tended to focus either on production, with an
emphasis on labor2 and capital3 markets, or on distribution through the welfare system.4
Those researchers who have considered the role of consumption have tended to see it as
derivative either of production5 or of distribution.6 Yet these approaches belie the
classical economic view that consumption, rather than production, drives the free market
economy.7 They also ignore recent findings in business management that consumer
demand determines important aspects of business strategy.8 By focusing political analysis
on product market regulations, the current research takes a first step in re-integrating
consumption into our analysis of contemporary capitalism.
Un tel choix, dont les cons6quences 6conomiques et sociales peuvent 8tre consid6rables,
est essentiellement politique."
2 David Soskice, German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional
Frameworks, Discussion Paper FS I 96-319 (Berlin: Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin, 1996).
3 John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983).
4 Gosta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990).
5 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1985).
6 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1965).
7 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), book 4.
8 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press,
1990), p 87; Horst Albach, Culture and Technical Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Analysis
and Policy Recommendations (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), pp 269-287.
14
Beginning in the 1970s, European consumers developed new patterns of
consumption that led to a rapid growth in the total number of products on the market and
a relative decline in demand for traditional mass-produced goods. This change has been
interpreted as a major turning point in the history of production.9 But consumers did not
act in a vacuum. In adopting new purchasing preferences, they took cues from the
institutional context in which they functioned. On the one hand, the marketing industry
was working to sell a conception of how new kinds of products should be integrated into
the middle-class lifestyle. On the other hand, a combination of new government
regulations and a growing consumer activism was helping to set the terms on which
consumers perceived their interests. New forms of consumption tended to reflect the
interests elicited by these policies. Sartori Gervasi writes: "New choices about
consumption are not made at random. They conform to norms that guide behavior in
every society. When the individual is uncertain about what choices are appropriate, he or
she will look for guidance. The social cues surrounding every norm provide that
guidance....The real problem, therefore, is to explain the emergence, development and
elaboration of the various norms of consumption in society."'0 By examining the political
debates at the origins of national product market regulations, this dissertation offers one
important answer to that problem.
9 See for example: Michael J. Piore, and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide:
Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp 189-191; Torben Iversen,
and Anne Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the
Service Economy," World Politics 50 (July 1998), pp 507-546.
10 Sartori Gervasi, "Changes in the pattern of demand, consumer learning and firm
strategies: An examination of postwar economic growth in the United States and France,"
in Technology and Productivity: The Challenge for Economic Policy (Paris: OECD,
1991), pp 94-95.
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My research focuses on the development of product market regulations in France
and Germany beginning in the 1970s. Both countries created a broad range of regulations
governing product information, product safety, and product design. Yet distinctive
national styles emerged across this range of regulations. These differing but coherent
national strategies of consumption regulation, or consumption regimes, have become an
important source of diversity in the face of growing pressures for regulatory integration
that are associated with European unification. Germany's consumption regime, which
emphasizes accurate product information and strong industry prerogatives, has been
called an information model of regulation. France's consumption regime, which
emphasizes strong consumer protections and weak industry prerogatives, could be called
a protection model of regulation.
Behind these different models of consumption regulation lay very different
conceptions of the role and position of the consumer in society. German consumers were
understood to be market participants with a status equal to that of producers. Consumer
protection in the Germaan context thus implied improving the information deficit that the
consumer faced in the marketplace. French consumers were understood to have a political
rather than a market status. Consumer protection in the French context thus implied
insulating and protecting consumers from the risks inherent in the marketplace. These
divergent ideas concerning the national consumer identity resided at the core of the
divergent regulatory strategies that France and Germany adopted.
One of the contributions of the research presented here is the explanation it offers
of the mechanisms by which new and contrasting areas of regulation emerge from
contrasting national constellations of interests and institutions. We commonly think of a
16
national consumer identity as a reflection of deeper cultural traditions of a country. Yet
the cases of French and German consumer policy suggest that national conceptions of the
consumer identity had their origins in a political struggle waged in the 1970s and early
1980s over the identity and social status of the consumer. At stake was the degree of
burden that consumers and producers would bear for product-related risks. If consumers
were seen primarily as economic actors in society, with a status similar to that of
producers, it then followed that they should bear their share of the market risk. If, cn the
other hand, consumers were seen primarily as political actors, understood as consumer-
citizens, then there was a strong case for insulating them entirely against market risk.
Because each conception of the consumer entailed a distinctive, coherent set of policy
prescriptions (what I call a policy model), early initiatives in consumer protection in
France and Germany took the form of a political struggle between producers and
consumers over what conception of the consumer would prevail in society.
How this struggle was resolved depended in large part on the way in which
consumers and producers organized to pursue their interests. Interest organization played
three distinct roles. First, in the case of consumer groups, strategies of organization
determined their policy preferences. In France, beginning in the early 1970s, consumer
groups pursued a strategy of grass-roots mobilization and popular demonstrations such as
boycotts, price surveys, and political rallies. In Germany, consumer groups shunned
individual membership and instead cultivated a technical competency that allowed them
to participate constructively in technical policy debates. The French consumer movement
was populist, whereas the German consumer movement was essentially technocratic.
These stylistic differences affected the policy preferences of the consumer movement in
17
the two countries. In France, consumer groups favored policies that took advantage of
their organizational strengths. They portrayed the consumer as politically active and
sought policies that gave their own organizations a central role in consumer protection. In
Germany, by contrast, consumer groups were unable to mobilize effectively and therefore
favored policies that emphasized their technical knowledge and expertise.
But preferences alone did not generate policy outcomes. The second role of
interest organization was to determine the relative political power of consumer and
producer groups. In Germany, where producers have traditionally enjoyed a strong
capacity for co-ordination, and where consumer groups did not pursued grass-roots
mobilization, policy makers favored the preferences of producers over those of
consumers. In France, by contrast, producers traditionally have exhibited little
organizational capacity. Thus as consumer groups became progressively more organized,
policy makers increasingly favored consumer preferences over those of industry. The
populism of the French consumer movement gave French consumer groups a political
weight that the German consumer movement did not have.
The third and final role of interest organization in consumer policy formation was
in the capacity of consumers and producers successfully to implement their preferred
policies. In both France and Germany, for example, businesses preferred to negotiate
directly with consumer groups rather than to subject themselves to direct government
regulation. They saw that this negotiation approach implied less government intrusion
into business prerogatives. Yet it also required a level of business coordination that
French industry was unable to achieve. Between 1978 and 1983, French consumer groups
signed hundreds of agreements with industry associations treating issues of product
18
safety, quality, labeling, and price. Yet while business leaders advocated this negotiation
approach as being preferable to direct government regulation, individual French
companies commonly ignored the agreements for fear that compliance would place them
at a competitive disadvantage with their non-complying competitors. Without stronger
associational ties between companies, French industry was unable to achieve its own
preferred policy goals.
In sum, this research project suggests that the tools of institutional analysis that
have been deployed in comparative politics to explain periods of policy continuity can
also be applied to understand periods of radical policy innovation. In such new areas of
policy, competing ideas about regulatory solutions become politically contested. Interest
groups struggle over which idea, or policy model, will eventually characterize and
dominate the policy process. The way in which these competing interests are organized
then shapes the nature and outcome of this struggle. One implication is that in entirely
new areas of policy, the organization of interest groups rather than the regulatory form of
the state decides what policy models becomes dominant.
The Economic Impact of National Varieties of Consumerism
Systematic national differences in consumption regimes matter not only because
they set the context in which consumers shop, but also because of their likely impact on
the production sphere. Dimensions of product design and manufacturing that were
previously set entirely by private industry have increasingly become subject to public
inspection and regulation. Risky products such as pharmaceuticals and food now face
regulatory scrutiny at all stages of manufacturing and distribution. Even through the
deregulatory efforts of the 1990s, and the push for regulatory harmonization in the
19
context of European integration, the number and distinctiveness of national consumption
regulations has steadily grown. Indeed what we observe today as a deregulation of the
business environment in advanced industrial countries might more accurately be
understood as a transition away from regulation of the production sphere and towards a
more detailed regulation of the national consumption sphere.
Through their impact on product markets these consumption regulations play a
formative role in product manufacturing and trade. The goal of these regulations is
consumer protection. But regulations that shape the consumer market for goods also
necessarily influence the production sphere. Bruce Kogut writes, for example, that
"across-country variation in demand characteristics...generates a parallel variation in
product types. The cumulative capabilities of firms, developed in response to their home
markets, provide the competitive basis for expansion overseas, yet at the same time, limit
the feasible range of products." l' National regulations that favor consumer demand for
higher-quality goods, for example, are also likely to encourage production strategies
incorporating more highly trained labor. In this way regulatory differences in the
consumption sphere may thus work to perpetuate the distinctiveness of national
approaches to production.
Why have national consumption regulations remained distinctive in spite of the
pressures of globalization and European integration? One reason is that all consumption
regulation is at once consumer protection and industry protectionism. Paul Pierson has
observed that new kinds of regulation create their own constituency, not only among the
regulators, whose employment depends on their continued application, but also among
20
the regulated parties, who make investments to accommodate the new regulation.'2 This
kind of audience formation has been particularly important for consumer protection.
Although consumption regulations are typically implemented for reasons of consumer
protection, they are often maintained, sometimes beyond their usefulness, because of the
protectionism they provide to domestic industries.'3 Initially unpopular with industry,
distinctive national regulatiuns designed to protect the consumer eventually create a
constituency among producers that have adapted to meet the new requirements. Indeed,
given the protectionism that consumption regulations can provide to domestic industry in
the form of non-tariff barriers to trade, the growth of globalization might be expected to
increase rather than decrease industry support for this kind of national distinctiveness.
The cumulative impact of distinctive national consumption regulations on
industry may also play an increasingly important role in the macro-economy. In a recent
cross-sectional analysis of European countries, Kees Koekijk, Zhen Kun Wang, and Alan
Winters find that product-market regulations have a far greater impact on a country's
economic performance than do, for example, national labor-market regulations.'4 This
study opens a new area of economic research. It suggests that a closer look at the origins
and functioning of product market regulations may yield important insights into the
sources of national prosperity. This sort of aggregate economic analysis is beyond the
" Bruce Kogut, "Country Capabilities and the Permeability of Borders," Strategic
Management Journal 12 (1991), p 36.
'
2Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p 43.
13 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global
Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), p 150.
14 They estimate that product market regulations are twice as significant to growth as are
labor market regulations. Kees Koekijk, Zhen Kun Wang, and L. Alan Winters, "Market
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scope of my research. But a sound understanding of the political origins of consumption
regulations should offer a basis from which broader economic implications can be
explored.
The Rise of French and German Consumerism
Beginning in the 1970s, Germany and France experienced a rapid growth in
political activity focused on consumerism. This activity took the form of new legislative
initiatives, new institutions within government to pursue the consumer interest, and a new
mobilization by consumers in pursuit of a broad range of consumer protections. In
Germany, for example, the number of consumer-related laws grew from a total of only 25
enacted in the post-World War II period up to the end of 1970, to a total of 338 through
1978.15 In France the number of laws and ministerial decrees relating to consumption
increased from a total of only 37 to the end of 1970, to a total of 94 through 1978.16
These laws covered all aspects of consumer interests, including broader rights to
consumer groups, better information to consumers, easier access to justice and to the
policy-making process, and a higher level of product safety. In Germany both the Social
Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties created sub-committees to write and
promote consumer legislation, in 1972 and in 1973 respectively. In France, the ruling
conservative coalition in 1976 created a new Secretariat for Consumption within the
Opening, Regulation, and Growth in Europe," Economic Policy 23 (October 1996), pp
443-467.
15 Willi Laschet, "Verbraucher sind auch Kunden," in Hartwig Piepenbrock, Conrad
Schroeder editors, Verbraucherpolitik Kontrovers (Kolrt: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag,
1987), p 60.
16 "La Protection et l'information des consommateurs: des progres decisifs," Les Notes
Bleues (Paris: Service de l'information du ministre de l'6conomie et des finances, 1978),
pp 14-20.
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Economics Ministry, charged with designing new consumer protection laws. Two years
later the government had even sponsored a political consumer organization, the Young
Consumers. The opposition Socialist party, perceiving the electoral appeal of consumer
defense, quickly created its own working group to draft and present alternative law
proposals in the National Assembly.
Economics ministries in both France and Germany argued that better protected
and better informed consumers would make wiser decisions and thereby would help to
hold down price inflation. 17 Governments had also grown concerned that producers,
facing increasingly saturated markets, were designing obsolescence into their products. In
France, the government called for consumers to keep products longer and to emphasize
repair over replacement.' 8 It also called for companies to create consumer relations
departments (Monsieurs Consommateur) within the company to respond to consumer
complaints.'9 Jacques Delors wrote in 1981 that "...consumer politics is inseparable from
the broader politics of our economy and society, it is an essential component of the
politics of defense of purchasing power."20 In a similar vein, Hans Friedrich, the German
Economics Minister, wrote in 1974 that "Competition requires active consumers....But if
the consumer decides without sufficient perspective on the market to make a purchase,
the competition becomes empty. What is the use - from the ordoliberal perspective - of a
17 Luc Bihl, "Le contre-pouvoir des consommateurs," Le Monde, 5 Dec 1979; "BeschluB
zur Berbraucherpolitik," 10. ordentlichen Bundeskongresses des DGB, 1975.
18 Jos6e Doyere, "Les acheteurs sont mal prot6g6s contre les d6fauts de fabrication," Le
Monde, 28 May 1975.
19 "Un consommateur dans 'entreprise," Figaro, 21 Feb 1978.
20 "La politique de la consommation est inseparable d'une politique 6conomique et sociale
d'ensemble, elle est un volet essentiel de la politique de d6fense du pouvoir d'achat."
B6n6dicte Epinay, "Le lobby consommateurs veut monter au filet: ses nmoyens le
contraignent en fond de court," Les Echos, 3 October 1996.
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higher quality refrigerator, if the consumer cannot recognize it before buying."2' Thus
consumer education became an important priority in both countries. France turned to its
centralized control over the curriculum to insert consumer instruction into primary
education. Germany created and funded the Stiftung Verbraucherinstitut in Berlin to train
educators in issues of consumer protection.
Recognizing that government legislation alone could not solve the problems
consumers faced, governments in both France and Germany also extended support to
private groups acting in the consumer interest. Government financial support to these
consumer groups grew strongly over this period. In France, for example, funds given by
the government to consumer groups grew from 3.7 million francs in 1970 to 6.4 million
francs in 1972. They doubled again in 1976, in 1977, and in 1980. Government support
had grown over ten times in as many years. German government funding to consumer
groups grew nearly as rapidly: from 12 million DM in 1970, to 33 million DM in 1975,
and to 48 million DM in 1980.22
Consumer representatives were also granted access to the policy process within
the government. Both countries created new agencies to advise the government on how to
pursue consumer-friendly legislation. Germany in 1972 created a Consumer Advisory
Board to the government (Verbraucherbeirat). Any new legislation that might have an
21 "Der Wettbewerb braucht den aktiven Verbraucher. Dies ist fur ihn eine Chance, bringt
aber auch Verantwortung mit sich....entschliesst sich der Verbraucher aber ohne
ausreichende Marktuibersicht zum Kauf, so luft der Wettbewerb praktisch leer. Was
niitzt -- ordnungspolitisch gesehen -- die bessere Qualitit eines Kuhlschranks, wenn sie
der Verbraucher vor dem Kauf nicht erkennen kann?" Dr. Hans Friderichs
(Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft), "Aufgaben der Verbraucherpolitik," Bulletin des
Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 146 (5 December 1974), p 1465.
22 Jurgen Bornecke, Handbuch der Verbraucherinstitutionen (Bonn: Verlag Information
fur die Wirtschaft, 1982), p 230.
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impact on the consumer was referred to this boa-d and was required to include a
description of its probable impact.2 3 In addition to creating a new ministerial position
oriented towards consumer interests, France also incorporated a discussion of consumer
policy into the French Plan. France's National Consumption Committee (CNC), first
created in 1960, became active in advising the government on new initiatives. The French
government even created the position of Consumer Mediator to deal specifically with
consumer grievances against the government itself2 4
Consumer groups, enabled in part by growing support from the government,
organized consumers on the model of student and labor mobilizations of 1968.
Conferences, consumer training sessions, product evaluations, and consumer boycotts
abounded. Central funding for consumer associations grew dramatically, and along with
this funding came a greater role for consumer representatives in the government. In
Germany, for example, the 1976 law regulating the content of consumer contracts relied
explicitly on the action of consumer groups to enforce the law. In France, consumer
groups were increasingly called upon to represent the consumer interest in direct
negotiations with industry.
But consumer group activism was not solely a revolution from above. Consumers
themselves were expressing a growing interest in consumer issues. The growth in
circulation of magazines that published the results of comparative product tests offers one
indicator of the new interest. Like Consumer Report in the United States, these
publications used advanced engineering techniques to evaluate product characteristics
23 "Zwei DGB-Vertreter im Verbraucherbeirat," Informations Dienst, Bundespressestelle
des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (11 August 1982), pp 1-2.
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that would be of interest to the consumer. In France, the combined distribution of the
journals Que Choisir? and 50 Millions de Consommateurs grew from 50,000 in 1970 to
over 700,000 in 1975. In Germany, circulation of the journal Test grew from 120,000 to
510,000 over the same period.25 See Figure 1 below. These major publications were
supplemented in both France and Germany by a smaller press that advocated policy
positions and warned consumers of potential dangers or of duplicity. The proliferation of
consumer publishing was particularly marked in France, where each new consumer
organization tended to produce its own serial publication. By 1975 France had a total of
15 popular national consumer publications with a combined distribution of over 2
million.
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Figure 1. Product test magazine circulation in France and Germany, 1970-1990.
24 "Les structures du consum6risme dans les 6tats membres de la Communaut6
6conomique Europ6enne," INC Hebdo 729 (7 June 1991): 3-16.
25 Hans B. Thorelli and Sarah V. Thorelli, Consumer Information Handbook: Europe and
North America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); Business International, Europe's
Consumer Movement: Key Issues and Corporate Responses (Business International:
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Consumer groups also began a set of outreach programs in order to make more
direct contacts with consumers. In Germany this effort primarily took the form of
consumer information centers that proliferated through the 1970s. These centers, staffed
by volunteers and coordinated by state-level consumer associations
(Verbraucherzentralen), provided detailed product information and offered advice on
future purchases. In France, consumer outreach also had as one of its goals the
dissemination of accurate product information. In an early success for the consumer
movement, over 200,000 people, including the Prime Minister, attended a five-day
"Salon Consommateurs" in Paris in 1972, organized by the National Consumption
Institute (INC).26 But French consumer groups were more militant than their German
counterparts and became increasingly effective at mobilizing consumers to participate in
boycotts, price surveys, and political rallies. The French Consumer Union (UFC), to take
one of many examples, managed over the course of the 1970s to establish a base of 170
local consumer unions with a total active membership of 50,000.27 These unions exerted a
strong scrutiny and control over product markets in France. Mobilizations by the
Marseilles union of the UFC, for example, forced General Foods to have Space Dust, a
candy marketed in the United States under the name Pop Rocks, withdrawn from the
French market even before the Ministry of Health was able to evaluate complaints.28
1980), pp IV/5-IV/27; "La Politique d'information des consommateurs dans les 6tats
membres," INC Hebdo 729 (7 June 1991), pp 23-6.
26 "Defense timor6e du consommateur ais6," Libderation, 29 May 1975.
27 Jos6e Doyere, "Les associations de consommateurs," Le Monde Dimanche, 16
November 1980.
28 Franqois de Muizon, "L'Union fd6rale des consommateurs demande l'interdiction des
bonbons p6tillants Space Dust," Le Matin, 23 Feb 1979.
The reason for the growth of a consumerist agenda in France and Germany and
the explanation of its timing in the early 1970s is a complex question that this research
does not directly address. As in most countries where a consumerist politics has arisen,
the proximate focus of this new activism was a set of product failures. The product
failures that accompanied the arrival of consumerism in Europe were indeed dramatic. In
1962 the German-manufactured sleeping pill Contergan (marketed as Thalidomide in the
United States) was shown to cause birth defects when taken by pregnant mothers. It is
now estimated that Contergan caused more than 12,000 birth defects around the world, a
large percentage in Europe. In 1972 a French baby powder marketed as Talc Morhange
was found to have been improperly manufactured, leading to the death of 36 children and
injuries to another 240. Of these, 5 suffered permanent brain damage.2 9 Spain's consumer
protections, which have been incorporated as a basic right in the country's constitution,
were stimulated in large part by the marketing of industrial machine oil as Colza cooking
oil in 1981. The product killed 650 people and injured an additional 25,000 before it was
taken off the market.30 Yet these product tragedies were also not the sole cause of
national consumer protection movements. Germany's mobilization around consumer
issues, for example, followed the revelation of the Contergan tragedy by a full decade.
This lag requires an explanation.
29 e6rard Cas, La dfense du consommateur (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1980), p 23.
30 "Espagne" le proces des huiles frelat6es," INC Hebdo 641 (2 June 1989), p 25.
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Figure 2. Manufacturing profitability in France and Germany, 1952-1987.31
A second underlying cause for the rise of consumer protectionism appears to have
been the decline in business profitability in the early 1970s. See Figure 2 above. George
Stigler has argued that all government regulation of industry has the goal of increasing
company profits.32 This insight appears to hold true for product market regulation. French
and German companies, facing a dramatic fall in profitability in the wake of the 1973 oil
embargo, came to feel that the fate of future profitability lay in part with the consumer.
Business associations in both countries called on the government to intervene to help
better inform consumers. In 1976, Jean Levy, former president of the cosmetics company
l'Or6al and president of France's largest professional association, the Conseil National du
Patronat Frangais (CNPF), wrote: "Even if, with rediscovered growth, the French take up
31 Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, Capitalism Since 1945 (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994), p 352.
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again for a time some of their old [shopping] habits, industry and retailing should have no
illusions. The consumer in crisis is the consumer of tomorrow."33 Germany's peak
industry association, the Bund Deutscher Industrie, called on the government in 1974 to
intervene in the consumption sphere in order to educate consumers.3 4 Business also
recognized that industrial products could be dangerous, and producers were on the whole
no longer confident of their own ability to provide adequate consumer protection. In a
1980 survey of companies across Europe, Business International found that only 34
percent of respondents felt that market forces would operate to protect consumers at least
to the same degree as would government regulation. Indeed 66 percent of producers felt
that market forces would provide less protection.3 5 Producers seemed to feel that new
kinds of product market regulation could help to stabilize demand for, and increase
consumer confidence in, their products.
Summary of the Argument and Findings
This dissertation rests on three separate research findings that are discussed in
detail in the three chapters in Section I below.
32 George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science 2 (spring 1971), pp 2-31.
33 "Meme si, avec l'expansion retrouvee, les Francais reprennent, pour un temps, certaines
de leurs anciennes habitudes, industriels et commercants ne doivent se faire aucune
illusion. Le consommateur de la crise est bien le consommateur de demain." In "Accord
Patrons-Consommateurs," Information Consommation OR-GE-CO 16 (May-June 1976),
p6.
4"[Consumers] sind gegen modischen Wechsel sichtbar unempfindlicher geworden und
messen der langeren Lebensdauer von Produkten in der Rangfolge der Kaufmotive einen
h6heren Stellenwert bei." BDI Jahresbericht 1973/4 (Kln: BDI 1974), pp 45, 68.
35 Europe's Consumer Movement: Key Issues and Corporate Responses (Business
International, 1980), pp I-6-7.
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The first chapter (Chapter 1. National Approaches to Product Market Regulation)
presents empirical evidence for the recent emergence of a large and growing body of
national regulation that focuses on product markets and characteristics rather than on the
production process itself. In both France and Germany, this new body of regulation was
introduced beginning in the early 1970s. Despite the plural institutional forms and
regulatory goals of these new policies, France and Germany have adopted systematic,
nationally distinctive approaches to product market regulation. These consistent
constellations of product market regulations constitute national varieties of consumerism.
The second chapter in this section (Chapter 2. The Political Struggle Over
Consumer Policy) proposes that the nature of these consumption regimes emerged from a
policy struggle in which the organization of producer and consumer interests was
decisive. Consumption regulation constituted a new area of policy for both France and
Germany. Policy formation in this new area should therefore be understood not in terms
of policy continuity, but instead as an instance of radical policy innovation. In new areas
of policy, ideas play a central role in policy formation. Consumers and producers in this
context competed to determine which policy ideas would dominate.
The third chapter (Chapter 3. How National Varieties of Consumerism Drive
Product Choice) proposes that the national consumption regimes that emerged from this
policy contest have a powerful and growing impact on national production strategies.
This is consistent with economic and management theories that posit consumer
sovereignty, and it suggests that producer decisions concerning labor force requirements,
product quality, and product innovation depend increasingly on the consumption regime
in which producers sell their goods. The German consumption regime, for example,
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which emphasizes protection through accurate product information, has also come to
reinforce a competitive dynamic that favors high-quality production and an incremental
approach to innovation. The French consumption regime, by contrast, which attempts to
insulate consumers from product-related risk, generates demand for lower quality
products and a more radical style of product innovation. Empirical evidence for the
impact of product-market regulations on product choice focuses on the cases of risk
regulation through product liability law, and information regulation in the area of
comparative product testing.
Section II (Chapters 4 and 5) of this dissertation describes the evolution of two
interest groups in society-retailer and consumer associations-that played important
roles in pushing for a particular social identity of consumers in France and Germany. The
experience of these groups suggests that national consumption regimes were not merely
imposed from above, but also emerged from interest groups acting independently within
society.
Chapter 4 investigates how consumer associations, during a period of rapid
expansion in the 1970s, pursued different organizational strategies in France and in
Germany. French consumer groups came to favor grass-roots mobilization, strikes, and
confrontation with industry; German consumer groups had few individual members but
cultivated a high level of technical expertise that permitted them to engage with industry
on specific issues of design.
Chapter 5 describes how traditional retailers in both countries responded to the
pressures exerted by modem styles of distribution. French retailers rallied around the
interests of consumers in opposition to the growing power of industry. German retailers
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favored a close alliance with industry that put consumers at a disadvantage but ensured a
stable rate of profit. These different strategies reflected different societal conceptions of
the consumer interest. Whereas French retailers emphasized protecting consumers by
insulating them from industry, German retailers understood their own interests and those
of consumers to be an extension of production interests. Hence emergent national
consumer identities were grounded not exclusively in government regulatory treatment
but also in the formation of the consumer identity by interest groups in society.
Section III (Chapters 6 through 8) presents the core empirical findings of my
research concerning eight areas of product market regulation in France and Germany.
They reveal the dynamic of policy formation in what were for both countries new areas of
policy.
Chapter 6 describes approaches to product information regulation in France and
Germany. Germany has intervened forcefully in its economy to ensure a high level of
reliable product information to consumers. In France, early efforts to impose an
information approach to consumer protection faltered in the early 1980s, leading to a
heavy reliance on industry self-regulation.
Chapter 7 describes French and German approaches to risk regulation in the areas
of product liability law and national product safety standards. France has placed a heavy
legal burden of responsibility for product safety on the shoulders of industry. Germany
has promoted a strategy of industry self-regulation that has enforced high standards of
product quality by making industry-wide standards of design and production mandatory
for all manufacturers.
33
Chapter 8 describes cases of direct regulation of product standards, product
pricing, and of the terms of sale for consumer goods. France and Germany have proved
equally willing to intervene in the economy in order to support consumer interests, but
Germany has focused on measures that encourage high quality, whereas France has
focused on measures that lower price.
The cases presented in Section III reveal that policy-makers in almost all
instances proceeded tentatively, and policy approaches changed over time as important
economic actors came to understand their interests in relation to the new consumer
politics. The cases also reveal the way in which diverse policy decisions, made by a
variety of actors, have nonetheless come to produce a systematic set of consumer market
outcomes that, taken together, have generated well-developed but differing national
consumption regimes. These cases make a compelling argument for the role of politically
contested ideas in generating divergent strategies of product market regulation, at least in
France and Germany and probably generally.
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Section I. National Varieties of Consumerism
Research in the field of political science is strangely silent on the politics and
national institutions of consumption. Where they are invoked, consumer interests are
typically adduced in a simplistic manner. Trade theories that address the consumer
interest, for example, typically focus on price preferences without looking at competing
risk or quality preferences.3 6 Interest group theorists have pointed to the diffuse interests
of consumers as a problem of collective action, but they have also tended to overlook the
powerful political impact of the consumerist agenda.37 As Steven Vogel has demonstrated
in the case of Japanese consumerism, simplistic assumptions about consumer preferences
are likely to be misleading.3 8 Like national approaches to meeting the interests of
production, national approaches to meeting the interests of consumers tend to be highly
distinctive.
Given the importance of consumers as both economic and political actors, why
have they received so little systematic study? Jonathan Frenzen et al. suggest propose the
lack of academic concern for the consumer arises from the historical situation of the
social sciences. The fields of economics, sociology, and political science, they argue,
were created at a time when industrial production was maturing and consumer demand
36 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global
Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995).
37 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); Roberta Sassetilli,
Power Balance in the Consumption Sphere: Reconsidering Consumer Protection
Organisations (Florence: European University Institute Working Paper, 1995).
38 Steven Vogel, "When Interests Are Not Preferences: The Cautionary Tale of Japanese
Consumers," Comparative Politics (forthcoming).
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seemed to be monolithic, uncritical, and unsaturated. 39 The study of consumption, where
it existed, was understood to be largely derivative of the social situation of production,
with consumer preferences emerging directly from income level or class identity. One
recent scholar of consumption, Grant McKracken, in attempting to trace the history of
national consumer cultures, laments that "the history of consumption has no history, no
community of scholars, no tradition of scholarship."4 Given the lack of scholarship upon
which to build, one of the important goals of this research has been to create a useful
theoretical framework for understanding the political context of national consumption
regulation.
This section presents a theoretical account of the nature, origin, and likely
economic impact of distinctive national consumption regimes in France and Germany.
Chapter one proposes a typology of product market regulations and argues that France
and Germany have pursued systematically divergent strategies for product market
regulation. These different national approaches to regulation constitute distinctive,
coherent national consumption regimes. Chapter two explores the origins of this policy
divergence. It argues that consumption regulation in the 1970s constituted an entirely new
nexus of public policy. The differing conceptions of the consumer interest that came to be
embraced at that time in France and Germany derived in large part from the way in which
consumer and producer interests were organized. Chapter three explores the economic
impact of different national consumption regimes on consumer and producer product
39 Jonathan Frenzen, Paul M. Hirsch, and Philip C. Zerrillo, "Consumption, Preferences,
and Changing Lifestyles," in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, eds. Niel J. Smelser
and Richard Swedberg (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p 414.
36
strategies. It argues that the German approach has reinforced consumer demand for
traditional high quality goods, while the French approach has created a market for lower
quality but more innovative goods.
37
40 Grant McKracken, Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic
Character of Consumer Goods and Activities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1988), p 28.
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Chapter 1. National Approaches to Product Market Regulation
Faced with similar pressures, different countries have adopted different strategies
for supporting consumer interests in the domestic economy. A survey of eight specific
areas of consumer policy in France and Germany shows a systematic variation in the way
these countries have regulated consumer product markets. France has adopted an
approach that emphasizes product safety, embodied in the principle caveat venditor (let
the seller beware), a relatively low level of product information, and significant
government intervention in the production process. Germany has adopted a caveat
emptor (let the buyer beware) standard that places greater product risk on the consumer,
and emphasizes a relatively high level of product information and a higher degree of
industry self-regulation than in France. Because the product market regulations that
constitute these national approaches are diverse in subject and application, any political
analysis must begin with a typology.4 '
Product market regulations as a whole fall conceptually into two categories:
market regulations and direct product regulations. Because consumer purchases are
commonly too small to warrant individually negotiated contracts and extensive
information seeking, most advanced industrial societies have moved to regulate the way
in which information and risk should be distributed in all consumer transactions. Hence
41 Researchers focusing on the trade impact of these policies typically distinguish
between regulatory barriers, those created by positive government action, and structural
barriers that result from a lack of government action. Researchers studying regulation
more generally typically distinguish between economic and social regulations. Because of
the political focus of this research, I have created a typology that I feel best distinguishes
the politically-relevant goals of product market regulations.
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market regulations set the general conditions of exchange for any consumer purchase by
distributing the burden of risk and information between producer and consumer. Product
risk is distributed via regulatory policies such as product liability law, standards of
product safety, and product recall requirements. Product information is distributed
through the application of standards of advertising, content labeling, and the diffusion of
technical product information.
Direct product regulations, by contrast, focus not on the market in which
consumers operate but on the qualities of consumer products themselves. These qualities
include standards of design, product pricing, and terms of sale specifying what services
and post-distribution assistance will accompany the product. Unlike market regulations,
which establish the general context in which consumers and producers interact, direct
product regulations intervene to set consumer-friendly standards in production and
distribution. They typically have implications both for consumer information and for
consumer risk. These direct product regulations may be elaborated and imposed either by
industry associations, as in Germany, or through intervention by consumer groups and the
government, as in France.
All countries rely on a combination of market regulations and direct product
regulations to protect consumer interests, but not necessarily to the same degree. The
extent to which one or the other approach is emphasized as a policy tool depends on the
perceived identity of the consumer in society. In Germany, where the consumer is
understood to be primarily an economic actor, sharing the same kinds of rights that
producers and distributors enjoy, consumer regulation tends to emphasize market
regulation. Roberta Sassetilli has labeled this emphasis on market-based protection a "fair
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trading package. " 42 In France, by contrast, where the consumer is perceived to have
special political rights that derive from the conception of the consumer citizen, the
government has been more inclined to rely on direct product regulation.
Apart from this difference in emphasis, however, different conceptions of the
consumer identity in France and in Germany have also generated divergent approaches to
regulation within the separate areas of market regulation and direct product regulation. In
the realm of market regulation, France has tended to interfere minimally to ensure the
quality of product information available to consumers, while aggressively pushing the
burden of product risk onto producers. Germany has taken the opposite strategy, favoring
a high standard of information combined with a more even distribution of product-related
risk between producers and consumers. The French approach compels the producer to
guard the interests of the customer. The German approach offers the consumer a high
level of information in order to guard her own interest.
France Germany
market regulation emphasizes emphasizes
risk reduction information provision
direct product ends (consumer) process (industry)
regulation focused focused
Figure 3. Strategies of market regulation and direct product regulation in France
and Germany.
42 Roberta Sassetilli, Power Balance in the Consumption Sphere: Reconsidering
Consumer Protection Organisations (Florence: European University Institute Working
Paper, 1995), pp 26-28.
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In the realm of direct product regulation, Germany has worked to set standards of
design within the production sphere, and industry has been given broad leeway to
stipulate the design, price, and terms of sale for its products. France, by contrast, has
tended to impose standards on industry either directly from the government or through
negotiations with consumer associations. When the safety of a particular product is at
stake, for instance, Germany encourages industry to solve the problem on its own,
whereas French industry typically looks to the state to set appropriate safety
requirements. These national differences in market regulation and direct product
regulation are recapitulated in Figure 3 above.
My research focuses on the formation of eight areas of consumer policy that
appeared at approximately the same time in both France and Germany. This sample of
policies by no means exhausts the extraordinary variety of consumption regulations that
have been created in the past thirty years, but they were selected to be representative.
Within market regulation, three policy areas focus on product information: product
advertising, product labeling, and product testing. Two other policy areas focus on
product risk: product liability, and product safety standards. Within direct product
regulation, three policy areas have been studied: product design standards, product price
setting, and terms of sale.43 Each of these eight areas of regulation operates at a general
level, with application to all types of products.44
43 These areas of regulation stipulate design features of the product, the non-physical
services that accompany the product, and the price at which the product is sold.
44 Some industrial sectors have developed their own specific regulations. The
pharmaceutical and agricultural industries, for example, have been the focus of especially
detailed sector-specific regulation. While this study limits its scope to general product
regulations, its conclusions will offer useful hypotheses about how specific product
sectors have been regulated and why.
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Market Regulation Focused on Product Information
Product information is a form of consumer protection employed in all advanced
industrial countries. But systematic differences in the purpose and standards of product
information have emerged in France and Germany. Germany imposes a higher standard
of product information than does France, and enforces this standard more rigorously. In
Germany, product information is perceived to meet the joint interests of industry and
consumers. German regulations have in general worked to protect the rights both of
consumers and of industrial producers to accurate information in the consumer
marketplace. France, by contrast, enforces a lower standard of product information that
typically ignores potential information needs of consumers and producers.
Product Advertising. Product advertising is one of the important channels of
information dissemination in any economy. France and Germany have adopted different
standards for truth in advertising. In France, advertising must meet a standard of factual
truth that has been interpreted to allow generous leeway for creativity and humor.4 5 In
Germany, advertising is judged both on its factual truth and also on its actual tendency to
mislead. Through legal interpretation, even factual advertisement can be construed as
misleading by German standards if it would mislead more than 10 percent of the
population.4 6 The standards enforced by the two systems are different as well. Misleading
advertising in France is punishable as a criminal offense with up to two years in prison
45 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publiciti (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986), p 79.
46 Gerhard Schricker, "Soll der einzelne Verbraucher ein Recht zur Klage wegen
unlauteren Wettbewerbs erhalten?" Zeitschriftfiir Rechtspolitik 8 (1975), p 195.
43
and a fine of 250,000 francs.4 7 In Germany, by contrast, advertising regulation is
governed by competition law enforced through a combination of self-regulation by the
advertising industry and legal oversight by registered consumer associations.4 8
Product Labeling. Product labeling is another area of consumer policy in which
France and Germany have applied different standards. In France, professional and
consumer associations came together in 1970 to collaborate on a new organization, the
French Association for Labeling Information ('Association frangaise pour l'6tiquetage
d'information, or AFEI). AFEI undertook to design and disseminate product labels that
combined accuracy with usefulness to consumers. Their first label was issued in 1972. By
1980 AFEI had created labels for 1,300 different kinds of products.49 This collaboration
between consumers and producers has resulted in information standards dictated by the
actual needs of consumers. In Germany, by contrast, labeling for consumer products is
controlled from within Germany's Standards Institute (Deutsches Institut fur Normung, or
DIN). This was not always the case. In 1974 the independent benchmarking group,
Deutsches Institut fur Giitesicherung und Kennzeichnung (RAL), attempted to created a
board of consumer and producer representatives to set labeling standards. DIN worried
that control of product labels was tantamount to standard setting and would undermine
their own authority. Seeing competition from RAL, they had the project eliminated by the
47 Jean Beauchard, Droit de la distribution et de la consommation (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1996), pp 314-316.
48 Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, or UWG.
49 AFEI was eliminated in 1984. Pierre Frybourg, (president of AFEI) "L'Etiquetage
d'Information," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 12 (1980): 14-16;
"L'Etiquetage informatif vous aide dans vos achats," Information Consommation Or-Ge-
Co 27 (Mar-April 1978), pp 3-4; Jacques Dubois, "L'affichage des prix...ne doit etre
qu'un premier pas," Information Consommateur 1 (1972), pp 3-4.
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Economics Ministry. DIN instead created its own product information system operated
from within DIN, consistent with DIN product standards.50
Product Testing. A final source of product information for consumers comes from
organizations that publish the results of comparative product tests. France began
providing public funds for product testing in 1970, Germany in 1974. The results of the
tests were published in monthly magazines similar to the US Consumer Union's
Consumer Reports. A survey of European consumers found that 26 percent of German
consumers and 13 percent of French consumers changed their purchasing decisions based
on these test results.5 1 But the manner in which the tests have been conducted is different
in the two countries. In general, the German tests are considered to be a tool for
consumers and producers alike. Indeed producers whose products receive very low
grades often remove those products from the market before any are sold.52 In France, by
contrast, product tests are seen as a consumer counter-force against producers.53 This
difference of emphasis has affected the standard of information required of the product
tests. In France these publications commonly evaluate the aesthetic qualities of products,
50 "Grundsatze fur Giitezeichen," Bundesanzeiger, 23 March 1974.
51 George H. Gallop, The International Gallop Polls: Public Opinion 1978 (Wilmington,
Deleware: Scholarly Resources, 1980), p 366; The actual question read: "Have you ever
heard of laboratory tests carried out to compare the price and quality of various brands of
goods on sale to the public? To what extent do you think the organizations that cary out
these product comparison tests and publish their results can be trusted? Speaking for
yourself and your family, would you say that because of your knowledge of the results of
such tests on any products, you have changed your buying habits?"
52 "Verbraucheraufklrung zur Gewinnung von Markttransparenz uneriislich ist, und
zwar nicht nur im Interesse der Verbraucher, sondern schlechthin unter
volkswirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten." Stiftung Warentest, Zeichen setzen fiir
Verbraucher (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest, 1996), p 14.
53 "Seuls les essais comparatifs sont susceptibles de gener [bold in text] veritablement les
producteurs et distributeurs et donc de permettre une defense efficace du consommateur."
45
including the results of reader surveys of champagnes and perfumes. German tests, by
contrast, only address measurable physical properties of goods. The difference in
emphasis is also reflected in the legal standard of truthfulness that is applied to the tests.
If a French company feels that its product has been wrongly criticized in a product test, it
must show not only that a factual error was made but also that the error was intentional
and therefore defamatory. 5 4 In Germany, producers participate in the testing process and
are able to contest errors at several stages during the evaluation itself.5 Hence not only
does Germany maintain a higher standard of factual information in product testing than
does France, but it also perceives the tests as aiding both consumers and producers.
Market Regulation Focused on Product Risk
In the absence of regulation, the burden of risks deriving from defective or
dangerous products typically falls on the consumer. So long as products were simple and
familiar, this principle of caveat emptor required only that consumers pay close attention
to what they purchased. With the evolution of more complicated and highly engineered
products, however, and with the greater differentiation of production and consumption
spheres, the consumer lost the ability to evaluate product risk effectively.56 Faced with
Jacques Dubois, "L'Etiquetage d'information et les essais comparatifs," Information
Consommateur 4 (1970), p 2.
54 "...une charte des bonnes relations entre les organismes d'essais comparatifs, les
producteurs et les consommateurs." Claude Duchamp, "Les essais comparatifs," Revue
des etudes cooperatives 186 (1977), p 77.
55 The test would be illegal when "...das Vorgehen des Testveranstalters 'als nicht mehr
vertretbar (diskutabel)' erscheint'." Werner Brinkmann, "Rechtsprobleme des
vergleichenden Warentests in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Zeitschriftfiir
Verbraucherpolitik 1 (1977), p 257.
56Claus Offe, "Ausdifferenzierung oder Ingegration - Bemerkungen uiber strategische
Alternativen der Verbraucherpolitik," Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 5/1+2 (1981), p
120.
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this change, most advanced industrial countries have created regulations to distribute the
cost of unexpected product-related loss more equitably. Countries differ substantially in
the way in which they allocate responsibility for product-related loss to consumers and
producers.
In France, product risk is assumed to lie exclusively with the producer. Safe
products are understood to have the status of a political right for consumers, and the state
has traditionally taken that as a mandate to regulate product safety very closely. In
Germany, by contrast, product safety is viewed primarily as a procedural matter, meaning
that any product that has been designed and produced in the appropriate way is
understood to have met the producer's obligation to safety. While the German approach
may appear to favor industry, it takes advantage of and reinforces the quality orientation
of the German production system in a way that ultimately benefits the consumer through
the provision of high quality goods. Hence product risk in Germany is shared between
producers and consumers, and the government has traditionally been reluctant to interfere
in this balance of risk.
Product Liability. The legal standard for distributing the burden of product-related
loss is addressed in product liability law. Product liability appeared as a distinctive area
of law in France and Germany only in the 1960s. Even the term product liability came
into use in Europe only in 1964.57 Over the course of the 1960s, France evolved a strict
standard of liability, similar to that employed in the United States, which required only
that the plaintiff show damage, and prove that the damage was caused by a defect in the
product. Under this strict standard, producers, and in many cases distributors, are held
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liable for product-related loss even if no amount of care could have prevented the
damage.5 8 Germany, by contrast, has applied a negligence standard of product liability to
producers. This means that companies were legally liable only if damage resulted from a
product defect and if that product defect was due to negligent behavior by the producer.
Negligence, moreover, has been defined in purely organizational terms. German
companies were not held responsible for a product defect if it resulted from a properly
trained employee working under the proper organization of management, even if the
worker did actually cause the defect.5 Stated otherwise, the German producer has an
obligation of means requiring that appropriate care be taken in production. The French
producer had a legal obligation of ends that cannot be diminished by any level of care in
production. 6 0
Product Safety. Product liability law can be effective when loss is reparable, or as
a form of compensation for personal injury, but in cases where damage is likely to be
devastating or irreversible, governments have commonly focused on the safety of
products before they come on the market in order to ensure an adequate level of
consumer safety. The patterns of responsibility found in product liability standards is
mirrored in national regulation of product safety. Thus Germany has helped to ensure the
safety of products by making standards established within the industry standard-setting
57 Borge Dahl, "An Introduction to the Product Liability Debate," Journal of Consumer
Policy 3/1 (1979), p 16.
58 Genevieve Viney, "The Civil Liability of Manufacturers in French Law," in
Comparative Product Liability, ed. C. J. Miller (London: Comparative Law Series, 1986),
p77.
59Henricus Duintjer Tebbens, International Product Liability: A Study of Comparative
and International Aspects of Product Liability (The Hague: Asser Institute, 1979), pp 74-
75.
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body (Deutsche Industrie Normung, or DIN) mandatory for all consumer products. In
France, by contrast, the state has mandated minimum standards for a wide range of
inherently dangerous consumer products, from toys to motorcycle helmets, and enforced
these standards through its Consumer Safety Council. Hence in Germany industry itself
sets the terms of product safety. In France this responsibility lies heavily on the
government.
These differences also carry over into other policies that relate to product safety.
French ministries have broad powers to recall products from the market if they find that
these pose a danger to consumers. The Germany government, by contrast, can only
recommend that products be withdrawn. Germany has also opposed participation in a
Europe-wide accident-reporting network championed by France as an early warning
system for dangerous products.6' Critics in German industry worried that this might lead
to a politicization of technical issues surrounding product safety.
National Approaches to Direct Product Regulation
The move to regulate consumption addressed not just market regulation of
information and risk, but also extended into the specifications of particular products on
the market. As with market regulation, French and German approaches to this sort of
direct product regulation have proceeded along different paths. In Germany, regulation of
product specifications has remained within the production sphere. In France, by contrast,
60 Oliver Berg, "La notion de risque de developpement en matiere de responsabilite du
fait des produits d6fectueux," La Semaine Jouridique 27 (1996), p 276.
61 Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, "Comparative Analysis of the National Country Reports on
Post Market Control and Perspectives for a European Setting of Post Market Control," in
Post Market Control of Consumer Goods, ed. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1990), p 418.
49
the government has imposed product specifications from the outside, either through direct
intervention, or by empowering consumers to negotiate directly with companies. These
different strategies have been driven by the divergent goals of direct product regulation in
France and Germany. For France, direct product regulation strove to impose consumer
interests on the product design process. In Germany, direct product regulation was
designed primarily by and for industry as a means of maintaining an industry-wide
standard of high-quality production.
Product Design. Both France and Germany during the 1970s took the
extraordinary step of integrating consumer interests directly into product design. Driven
in part by concerns over a move towards the planned obsolescence of products, consumer
advocates inside and outside the government became increasingly skeptical of the
efficiency of market mechanisms for transmitting genuine consumer interests to
producers. Germany proposed, in its First Consumer Report of 1971, that the consumer
interest be incorporated into the process of industrial standard setting by Germany's
standards-setting body, DIN.6 2 While industry initially opposed this "in-house solution"
to consumer representation, the government forced the issue by making it a requirement
for subsequent government support to DIN.6 3 The first Consumer Council
(Verbraucherrat) was incorporated into DIN in 1975. By 1982 consumer representatives
62 Verbraucherbericht. Bundestagsdrucksache VI/2724 (1971).
63 "partnerschaftliche Im-Hause-LUsung." Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-Wolfgang
Micklitz, and Gert Briiggemeier, Die Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung
der Europdischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p 186.
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were participating in the work of design committees for nearly two thousand different
consumer products.64
France pursued a different strategy for including consumers in the process of
product design. Rather than granting consumer representatives direct access to industry
associations, the Economics Minister Rene Monory called instead for consumer
associations to function as a counter force to industry: "The consumer counter-force must
be encouraged." 65 Beginning in 1978, consumer groups were encouraged to meet directly
with industry groups, who were newly organized in the Committee on Industry,
Commerce, and Consumption of the Conseil National du Patronat Fran;ais (CNPF-
CICC). Consumers and producers then negotiated so-called product accords that specified
aspects of product design, durability, and production for different industrial sectors. In
1982, consumer groups even began to negotiate quality contracts with individual
companies. Whereas the product accords had not been binding on producers, these new
quality contracts required that participating companies incorporate the negotiated
standards.66 Hence, in contrast to Germany, which incorporated consumer interests into
industry's standards-setting board, France supported negotiated agreements between
industry and consumer groups concerning product specifications.
Product Price Setting. Beyond setting the design specifications of products,
France and Germany have also regulated, directly or indirectly, the way in which product
64 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibult, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 216.
65 "Le contre pouvoir consommateur doit etre d6velopp6." Ren6 Monory, Inauguration
des Locaux de L'institut national de la consommation (Paris: Ministre de l'economie,
Service de l'information, March 1979), p 3.
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prices were determined. France relied until 1986 on a direct government regulation of
product pricing, whereas Germany gave manufacturers wide latitude to set product prices.
In France, beginning in 1973, all prices required approval from the government before the
product was placed on the market.6 7 By 1976 it had become clear that the government-
imposed prices were not holding down inflation, and a new system of negotiated price
ceilings was put in place. Under this scheme, price ceilings for each category of product
were negotiated between the government and responsible industry organizations. Once
the price ceiling was set, manufacturers wishing to sell their goods below the negotiated
price required no government approval. Those wishing to sell above the negotiated price
had to apply, as before, to the Economics Ministry.68
In Germany the government responded to the inflation caused by the first oil
shock by prohibiting resale price maintenance (RPM). This practice, banned in France
since 1960, had permitted manufacturers to stipulate the price at which retailers would
sell their goods. Expecting that the purchasing power of large retailers would help to keep
consumer prices down in the absence of RPM, the government attempted to eliminate the
practice in 1973.69 Yet other restrictions on retailing have nonetheless allowed
manufacturers to continue to dictate the resale price of their goods. Retailers, for
example, are still issued "recommended" price lists by manufacturers. These lists, which
are not made available to consumers, have been found by the Federal Cartel Office
66 Jean Calais-Auloy, Droit de la consommation (Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey, 1992), pp
49-50.
67 Herv6 Dumez, and Alain Jeunemaitre, Diriger l'conomie: L'Etat et les prix en France,
1936-1986 (Paris: Harmattan, 1989).
68 Reinhard Angelmar, and Bernard Yon, "New Product Price Controls in France" in
Journal of Consumer Policy 2/1 (1978), pp 43-49.
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(Bundeskartellamt, or BKA) to be tantamount to price fixing.70 Moreover, restrictions on
the size and competitive practices of retailers have worked to keep them weak in relation
to industry, giving producers further leverage to dictate resale prices.71 Whereas the
French government tightened its administrative control of price setting, Germany left
price setting primarily in the hands of industry and relied on wage bargaining to ensure
that higher prices would be reflected in higher salaries.
Terms of Sale. A final area of direct product regulation focuses on the terms of
sale for consumer products. Manufactured goods come bundled with a set of services that
includes repairs, replacement in the case of defect, prompt delivery, consumer financing,
and others. Unlike the product itself, these down-stream services are typically controlled
by the distributor rather than by the manufacturer. By the early 1970s governments in
both France and Germany had moved to regulate the general terms of sale for products.
Germany's Justice Minister first proposed regulating terms of sale in 1972.72 The
consumer agenda of France's Seventh National Plan advocated a similar kind of
regulation in 1974.7 3 But despite the similar initiatives, the goals and standards adopted in
the two countries were very different.
In France, a Commission on Abusive Clauses created in 1978 reviewed the terms
of consumer sales contracts and made recommendations on what types of terms should be
69 Norbert Reich, "Neue Tendenzen des kartellrechtlichen Verbraucherschutzes in der
BRD," Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 1/3 (1977), p 236.
70 Verbraucherbeirat Jahresbericht, 1977.
71 See, for example: Olaf Sosnitza, Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen durch die
Rechtsprechung: Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen auf dem Gebiet des Lauterkeitsrecht
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), p 144.
72 "Die Parteien entedecken die Verbraucher," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Thursday, 31
October 1972.
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proscribed.7 4 The explicit goal was to protect consumers against deceptive practices in
retailing. In principle, the recommendations of the commission would be applied through
regulations issued by the Economics and Finance Ministry.7 In fact, under pressure from
industry, the government issued only two such regulations during the next ten years,
acting on only 4 of the 30 recommendations generated by the Commission. 7 6 The extent
of France's regulation was to prohibit producers or distributors from exempting
themselves from legal liability.
In Germany, by contrast, the terms of sales specified in the 1976 Law on General
Business Conditions (Allgemeingeschaftsbedingungen Gesetz, or AGB-Gesetz) were
highly specific and were designed with the support and consultation of industry. The new
German law specified 17 terms of sale that were expressly forbidden in consumer
contracts (AGB-Gesetz § 11), plus an additional 23 terms that had to be explicitly agreed
to by the consumer (AGB-Gesetz § 10). 7 7 Whereas the French law was designed to protect
consumers against industry malfeasance, the German law was seen by industry as a
protection against the incursion of lower quality products into German distribution.7 8
73 Jacques Dubois, "Les consommateurs dans le 76me plan," Information Consommation
OR-GE-CO 15 (March-April 1976), pp 1-2.
74 Jean Marchand, "Le consommateur mieux prot6g6 contre les pieges des contrats," La
Croix, 1 Feb 1978.
75 Gilles Paisant, "Le point sur les clauses abusives des contracts," in Aprds le Code de la
consommation, grands problbmes choisis: Actes du colloque du 24fivrier 1994 de
l'Universite' de Rheims, ed. Jean Calais-Auloy and Herv6 Causse (Paris: Litec, 1995).
76 Bulletin officiel de la concurrence, la consommation, et de la repression des fraudes,
1978 to 1988.
77 Erika Schork, "GeschAft mit den Gesch'iftsbedingungen," Siddeutsche Zeitung,
Thursday, 13 July 1972.
7 8 Joachim Beimowski, Zur konomischen Analyse Allgemeiner Geschdftsbedingungen
(Munich: Verlag V. Florenz, 1989), p 15.
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Summary
Taken together, these eight policy areas reveal systematic variation in the French
and the German approaches to consumption regulation. Within market regulations,
Germany has enforced a stringent standard of information, while France has imposed a
particularly high burden of risk on producers. Within direct product regulation, Germany
has tended to rely on industry institutions, whereas France has attempted to create a
counter-force to industry by using a mixture of administrative oversight and empowered
consumer organizations. See Figure 4 below.
policy area France Germany
Market Reulation
Product Information:
Product Advertising
Quality Labeling
Product Testing
Product Risk:
Product Liability
Product Safety
Product Recall
standard of factual accuracy
designed in collaboration
with consumers
independent of industry and
subjective
strict standard
administrative oversight
controlled by ministries
Strict standard that does not
mislead the public
Designed within industry
Strictly objective with
industry collaboration
Negligence with reversed
burden of proof
Mandatory industry
standards
Voluntary for industry
Direct Product Regulation
Product Design negotiated with consumers Consumers participate on
Standards industry standard board
(DN)
Product Price Setting set though negotiation with set mainly by producers
the administration (until
1986)
Terms of Sale administrative initiative, Strict requirements set by
narrow scope of application law with a broad scope
Figure 4. Summary of Product Market Regulations in France and Germany.
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Product market regulation, taken as a whole, incorporates an extraordinarily broad
range of policies, of which our survey has described only some of the most prominent.
One author has estimated that France alone has generated over 300,000 different
government texts that define and regulate product markets.79 How can we have
confidence that the trends identified above hold true across the entire range of national
product market regulations? The following section argues that national consumption
regimes should be understood as general national strategies because they derive from
country-specific conceptions of the consumer interest, which in turn have their origins in
the political struggle between consumer and producer interests.
79 Alexandre Carnelutti, "Consommation et socit6," Revuefranfaise d'administration
publique 56 (October-December 1990), p 585.
56
Chapter 2. The Political Struggle Over Consumer Policy
The previous chapter has established that France and Germany have pursued
systematically different approaches to consumer protection. In Germany, the consumer is
seen as an economic actor. Consumer problems are understood in terms of market failure.
Appropriate solutions therefore stress restoring proper functioning of the market,
including correcting information asymmetries, enforcing an equitable distribution of
contractual risk, and encouraging competition in product quality. In France, the consumer
is seen as a political actor. Consumer problems are understood in terms of a failure of
political rights. Appropriate solutions therefore stress a better political representation of
the consumer interests, including consumer mobilization, government protection of
consumer rights, and an insulating of consumers from risks deriving from production. In
sum, the German consumer has the characteristics of a producer, while the French
consumer has the characteristics of a citizen. This chapter explores the origins of these
differing concepts of the consumer interest.
Because product market regulation emerged as a new area of policy in France and
Germany in the 1970s, debate over policy solutions took the form of a discussion of the
identity of the consumer in society that was unusually broad. French and Germany
policymakers faced a choice among competing conceptions of the consumer and of the
consumer's role in society. Was the consumer primarily an economic actor, an interest
group, or a political actor? While each of these views was in some sense true, each
conception entailed a different constellation of regulatory responses to consumer
grievance. Thus from each distinctive conception of the identity of the consumer emerged
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a coherent model of how consumer policy should be regulated. Each alternative policy
model was coherent in that it offered policy proposals for all areas of consumer
protection. But the policy models were also mutually exclusive. Because their
prescriptions were often contradictory, each country could espouse only a single policy
model for consumer protection, and that implied and required a single conception of the
consumer identity.
As we have seen, Germany came to adopt the information model, and France
came to adopt the protection model. These approaches did not emerge from deep national
traditions of consumer protection. Indeed in many areas of consumer regulation such
national traditions simply did not exist. Instead, the policy models that came to dominate
in France and Germany emerged from a heated political struggle that took place between
producers and consumers in the 1970s and early 1980s over the identity of the consumer.
At stake in this conflict was the degree of responsibility that consumers and producers
faced for product-related risk. If the consumer was understood as an economic actor, then
the consumer should rightfully face the full burden of market uncertainly. If instead the
consumer was understood as a political actor, then protection against product-related loss
could be understood as an absolute political right. Product market regulation in each
country emerged from a conflict over what policy model would prevail.
Who won and who lost this struggle depended on the relative capacity of
consumer and producer groups to organize in support of their interests. In France, where
consumer groups enjoyed a strong grass-roots mobilization and industry was poorly
organized to pursue its collective goals, policy outcomes tended to emphasize the
interests of consumers over those of producers. Indeed policymakers shifted their policy
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model away from the interests of industry as consumer mobilization grew. In Germany,
by contrast, where producers were well organized and consumer organizations did not
have a strong membership, policy outcomes instead emphasized the preferences of
producers. This situation suggests that even in periods of radical policy innovation,
interests and institutions may play a central role in determining what policy idea emerges
as the dominant regulatory model.
The first section below, titled "Three Conceptions of the Consumer", describes
three policy models from which France and Germany selected their distinctive strategies
of product market regulation. It also summarizes the way in which the organization of
consumer and producer interests in France and Germany led policymakers to select from
among these different models.
The second section, titled Explaining Regulatory Divergence in Radically New
Areas of Policy , steps back to discuss the theoretical challenges of explaining policy
divergence in an entirely new area of policy. It considers, and for the most part rules out,
alternative arguments for the way in which France and Germany have regulated product
market regulations. It then proposes an approach grounded in the notion of politically
contested ideas.
The third section, titled Policy Preference Orderings and the Role of Institutions,
describes how consumer and producer groups ranked the three available ideas concerning
the consumer identity and their corresponding policy models. It also describes three ways
in which the organization of producer and consumer interests influenced their ability to
pursue their preferred policy model.
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The final section, The Policy Conflict over National Models of Consumer
Protection, describes the historical process by which interests and institutions interacted
to favor an information model in Germany and a protection model in France.
Three Conceptions of the Consumer
Because consumer protection was a new issue in both Germany and France,
discussions about specific areas of regulation took place in the shadow of a broader
discourse about the nature of consumer identity. How was the consumer to be
understood? Was the consumer primarily an economic actor, or instead a political actor?
Did consumers constitute a new interest group, or merely a collection of unrelated
individuals with product grievances? Depending on how one answered such questions,
different kinds of policy solutions were likely to seem more or less appropriate in
addressing consumer demands. Because of their implications for policy, ideas about
consumer identity and the consumer's role in modem society became the focus of a policy
struggle between the interests of consumption and of production.
Three policy models in particular took center stage in the policy debates in France
and Germany. See Figure 5 below. The first, what might be called the protection model,
views consumers as an endangered group in society in need of protection against the
negative consequences of industrial production. This idea of the consumer drew on the
experience of the United States, where policies of the 1950s and 1960s had placed a high
burden of responsibility on producers. In this model, the consumer is seen foremost as a
citizen-consumer. Consumer protection in this view is understood as a basic right of
consumers. Solutions therefore focus on creating new consumer rights, on insulating
consumers from market risk, and on mobilizing consumers to protect what they perceive
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to be their political rights. Regulatory solutions under this protection model tend to focus
on the end goal of consumer safety rather than on intermediate procedural goals. This
protection model also tends to encourage private law approaches to enforcing individual
consumer rights. A strict standard of product liability, for example, is a hallmark of this
protection model of the consumer. In legal parlance, the fundamental principle of the
protection model is caveat venditor.
policy model protection negotiation informaton
country example United States Sweden Britain
consumer identity citizen interest group economic actor
analysis of problem expropriated rights lack of discussion market failure
proposed solution . create new . create forums . provide
rights for negotiation consumers with
* insulate * make outcome better
consumers of negotiations information
from market binding * reinforce quality
risk production
· mobilize
consumers
regulatory emphasis * focus on ends * focus on fair * focus on
. encourage discussions procedure
private law * encourage , encourage
enforcement mediation industry self-
enforcement
legal principle caveat vendor pacta sund caveat emptor
servanda
Figure 5. Three Policy Models for Product Market Regulation.
A second model, what has been called the information model, views the consumer
as an economic actor in society operating on a par with other economic actors, including
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manufacturers, suppliers, and workers. This idea of the consumer drew on consumer
protection policies that had been developed by the Labour government in Britain in the
1960s and that emphasized the need for better consumer information. In this information
model, the consumer is understood to have the status of another producer. Consumer
problems are interpreted in terms of market failure rather than as a breakdown in political
rights. Solutions therefore focus on overcoming information asymmetries between
producers and consumers, and on reinforcing the mechanisms of quality production in
order to offer consumers a better set of market options. Regulatory solutions under this
model focus on ensuring fair business procedures and encouraging industry self-
regulation. The fundamental legal principle of the information model is caveat emptor.
A third model of consumer protection, what might be called the negotiation
model, views consumers as a societal interest group capable of representing its interests
directly to other interest groups in society. This model is based on the experience of the
Swedish consumer movement in the 1960s and early 1970s, and it assumes that
consumers and producers share many common goals, and that through discussions they
can come to agreement on a mutually-satisfactory regulatory approach to consumer
protection. In this negotiation model, consumers are viewed as an important emerging
interest group in society. Consumer problems are understood to derive from a lack of
discussion between consumer groups and producers. Appropriate solutions consequently
emphasize the creation of forums in which fair negotiations can take place, as well as
state enforcement of the outcomes of such negotiations. Regulatory approaches in this
negotiation model tend to emphasize a standard of fairness and encourage mediation. A
distinguishing characteristic of this approach is the Consumer Ombudsman, an
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administrative position, first established Sweden in 1971, that has autonomy from the
government and is charged to spearhead the consumer interest in negotiations with
industry. The fundamental legal principle of the negotiation model is pacta sund
servanda, contracts are honored.
At the time when consumer-oriented policies were being created in France and
Germany, these competing conceptions of the consumer identity and interest served three
important roles. First, they helped to bring coherence to a broad range of policies that had
previously been seen as unrelated. Regulations in fields as diverse as advertising, product
standards, and retail contracts came to be understood in terms of a single broader debate
in society surrounding the interests and condition of the consumer. Second, each
conception of the consumer carried with it a coherent analysis of the problem and
appropriate solutions. Each conception thus acted as a policy model, a useful shorthand
for a broad set of coherent policy proposals spanning the range of consumer issues. Of
course, since consumer interests were in fact multiple and diverse, no single policy model
could be comprehensive. But each of the three conceptions had the advantage of
presenting a coherent policy program. Third, these ideas about consumer identity became
the focus of policy struggles among the major social actors in France and Germany.
Individual policy decisions that might otherwise have eluded public debate took place in
terms of broader conflicts over the relevant conception of the consumer identity. In sum,
these ideas about consumer policy drew attention to the new area that was policy,
provided a blueprint for coherent strategies of policy formation in this new area, and set
the broad terms on which political struggles over policymaking were waged. Which of
the three policy models was to emerge as the predominant model of consumer protection
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in each country depended on a political struggle between the interests of consumers and
producers.
Available evidence suggests that policymakers at the time genuinely came to
think of consumer regulatory issues in these terms. We know that French and German
policymakers were conscious of these three different options, first, because they
conducted detailed studies of the regulatory approaches adopted by other countries.
Because the United States, Britain, and Sweden all preceded France and Germany in
regulating consumer markets, they offered obvious models to draw from. In France, these
studies took place either in the context of the Consumer Committee for the French Plan,
or were initiated by consumer groups themselves.8 0 Ralph Nader was invited twice to
France in the early 1970s to introduce the US model of the consumer citizen. In
Germany, the Commission for Economic and Social Change undertook a five-year survey
of the entire German economy that included several studies of foreign approaches to
product market regulation.81 Evidence exists, for example, that German policymakers
very seriously considered adopting the negotiation model, or Swedish approach.8 2
In addition to these surveys of foreign regulatory approaches, French and German
policymakers met frequently in the context of European efforts to draw up common
standards for product market regulations within Europe. Consumer directives adopted by
the Committee of Ministers in the European Economic Community included those
80 See for example Michel G6nin, and Bernard Suzanne, "Les rapports de l'industrie de
consommation en Suede et aux Etats-Unis," Les Cahiers de 17'ILEC 7 (1963), pp 5-54.
81 For a summary of their findings see Kommission fiir wirtschaftlichen und sozialen
Wandel, Wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Gutachten der Kommission (G6ttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1977), Chapter 9.
82 Wolfgang Hoffmann, "Die Anwalte der Konsumenten: Viele Verbraucherverbinde-
wenig Erfolg," Zeit (Friday, 26 March 1971), p 29.
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devoted to door-to-door sales (1973), misleading advertising (1972), unfair clauses in
contracts (1976), after-sales service (1978), consumer representation in standardization
bodies (1979), consumer education and information (1971 and 1979), protection and
defense of consumer collective interests (1978), consumer legal assistance (1981), and
consumer access to justice (1981).83 Although none of these directives proved effective,
they did generate an ongoing debate on consumer issues among European policymakers.
Moreover, a new Committee on Consumer Policy in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development began publishing annual comparative studies on national
approaches to consumer policy in 1972.4 In sum, French and Germany policymakers
appear to have been extremely well informed about the policy alternatives they faced.
These three models of consumer protection were also not conceptually arbitrary.
Rather, they can be seen to map out the entire space of possible responses to consumer
grievance. Conceptually, a continuum exists between a pure information approach to
consumer protection, on the one hand, in which consumers are given the tools to make
wise purchases, and on the other hand a pure protection approach in which consumers are
entirely insulated from product risk. The resulting space of possible policy approaches to
consumer protection is depicted in Figure 6 below. The vertical axis expresses the degree
to which producers are themselves made responsible for product-related risk. In practice,
this dimension corresponds to mandatory safety requirements, product liability standards,
product recall programs, and such. The horizontal axis expresses the degree to which
83 Thierry M. Bourgoignie, "Consumer Law and the European Community: Issues and
Prospects," in Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience,
eds. Theirry Bourgoignie and David Trubek (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p 95.
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information about products is provided to consumers. In practice, this dimension
corresponds to standards of truth in advertising and labeling, comparative product testing,
consumer education, and such.
risk reduction
(burden on
producers)
model
information provision
(burden on consumers)
Figure 6. Three models of consumer protection.
The concave curve in Figure 6 describes the line of equivalent consumer safety.
Consumers, in other words, may be equally safe when faced either with a reduced burden
of risk and little product information, or with a high burden of risk and a high level of
information. In practice, of course, neither solution is entirely satisfactory. No matter how
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84 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Consumer policy in
member countries (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
well informed a consumer may be, certain risks necessarily remain unknown. Similarly,
no matter how assiduously product risks are assigned to producers, certain kinds of
losses, especially those to consumer health, can never be adequately avoided or
remunerated. The curve describing equivalent consumer safety therefore never fully
converges with either axis.
Different strategies of consumer protection impose different burdens on
consumers and producers. A strategy that emphasizes information provision places a high
burden on consumers. This strategy corresponds to the information model that came to
predominate in Germany. Conversely, a strategy that emphasizes risk reduction places a
high burden on producers. This strategy corresponds to the protection model that came to
predominate in France. But there also exists a third, compromise strategy, in which
consumers and producers can jointly benefit by sharing the burden of consumer
protection. This third option describes the negotiation model. By distributing the burden
of product safety between consumers and producers, this negotiation approach can also
lwer the o.'eraP!! social cost of consu-mer protectio. In sum, the plic j odc that
defined the policy debates in France and Germany were not merely ad-hoc borrowing
from foreign experience. Instead they appear to map out the full range of conceptual
solutions to the general problem of consumer protection.
Interest Organization of Consumers and Producers
Consumers face a collective action problem in protecting their interests. The
problem stems from their large numbers. The benefits of consumer protection are
diffused among all consumers, while the costs to industry are concentrated on individual
1972).
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sectors or even single companies. Because the benefits of consumer protection legislation
to any individual consumer are necessarily small, individual consumers have few
incentives to organize in order to protect their collective interests. Indeed, of all collective
actors, consumers face perhaps the greatest barriers to organization. Mancur Olsen
himself describes the problem clearly:85
"Let us now ask what would be the expedient course of action for
an individual consumer who would like to see a boycott to combat
a monopoly or a lobby to repeal the tariff, or for an individual
worker who would like a strike threat or a minimum wage law that
could bring higher wages. If the consumer or worker contributes a
few days and a few dollars to organize a boycott or a union or to
lobby for favorable legislation, he or she will have sacrificed time
and money. What will this sacrifice obtain? The individual will at
best succeed in advancing the cause to a small (often
imperceptible) degree. In any case he will get only a minute share
of the gain from his action. The very fact that the objective or
interest is common to or shared by the group entails that the gain
from any sacrifice an individual makes to serve this common
purpose is shared with everyone in the group."
Olsen (op. cit.) describes two broad strategies that permit individual actors to
overcome free-rider problems in order to pursue their collective goals. The first strategy
is for representative groups to offer selective benefits to individual members. In the case
of workers, who like consumers have faced important obstacles to organization, trade
unions are able to draw in members by offering them insurance policies or unemployment
85 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and
Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p 18.
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benefits. For consumer groups, the benefits of membership in a consumer association
usually include access to useful product information and technical or legal advice. This
was the approach adopted by French consumer groups. The large number of consumer
publications that emerged in France in the 1970s had the goal of drawing in individual
members through the information they provided. The early members of consumer groups
were not connected with trade unions.8 6 By the late 1970s, however, each of the large
French trade unions had created its own affiliated consumer groups. Trade union
experience with public actions and popular mobilization helped further to boost the grass-
roots membership of the consumer movement. Product boycotts, political rallies, and
price surveys all constituted typical consumer group activities in France. Chapter 5 details
the mobilization strategies of the French consumer movement.
The second strategy described by Olsen for empowering diffuse interests is to
devolve group decision-making powers to one or more representative bodies. These
representatives hold the legal right to speak on issues that bear on all consumers.
Collecti.ve .. g . -brga ...i g by trade unions is one insance of this +atcgy. For .iisumei
groups, privileged access granted by the government to policymaking forums within the
government and with business means that consumer groups do not need to seek an
increase in the number of their individual members in order to advocate consumer
protection policies. This approach was adopted by consumer groups in Germany. These
groups were technically specialized and enjoyed privileged access to technical and policy
discussions by business associations and government ministries. They thus did not work
to cultivate a grass-roots consumer membership. Rather than competing with each other
86 Michel Wieviorka, LEtat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements
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for consumer patronage, individual consumer groups specialized in specific activities,
such as product testing (Stiftung Warentest), consumer policy training (Stiftung
Verbraucherinstitut), and consumer legal protection (Verbraucherschutzverein). Because
each of these organizations were formed through legislative action, it is perhaps not
surprising that they focused on technical responsibilities and shied away from consumer
mobilization. But even regional consumer associations, which were not bound to a single
technical field, were wary that a grass-roots membership would unduly politicize
consumer protection and undermine the missions of their organizations.8 7 Most still do
not permit individual members. This lack of popular mobilization around consumerism is
puzzling in part because of the high level of political activism that Germany experienced
during this period around issues such as the environment and nuclear energy.8 8 But it was
also an important reason for Germany's adoption of the information model.
One German consumer group that did try to adopt the French approach of mass
membership and selective benefits was the Deutsches Verbraucherbund, created by Hugo
Schui in 1965. In return for a 6 DM annual fee, members received a copy of the magazine
Der Wecker ("The Alarm Clock"), legal protection against producers and distributors,
500 DM subsidy to pursue individual consumer law suits, and access to inexpensive
airline tickets to the United States. Der Wecker, as the name implies, was radical in
approach and launched heavy criticism at the government and parliament for their
de consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), p 73.
87 Hartwig Piepenbrock, "Die Legitimation der Verbraucherverbande zur Wahrnehmung
von Verbraucherinteressen," in Verbraucherpolitik kontrovers, eds. Hartwig Piepenbrock
and Conrad Schroeder (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987).
88 In comparison to France, where the consumer movement was strong and the
environmental movement relatively weak, Germany's consumer movement was weak and
its environmental movement was strong.
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complacency in relation to consumers.9 Moreover, because members of the
Verbraucherbund paid dues, Schui was able to offer legal support of the kind that
government-sponsored consumer groups were legally prohibited from offering. The
group had an impressive 50,000 members in 1970 (about 4,000 members per year took
advantage of the low airfares).9 0 This early success suggests that a grass-roots consumer
movement of the kind that emerged in France might have been possible in Germany. But
as government support to official consumer groups grew, membership in the Deutsches
Verbraucherbund declined. Eventually Schui moved to New York to create Consumers
International.
The different strategies by which French and German consumer groups overcame
their collective action problems was to play an important role in determining what model
of consumer policy would emerge in France and Germany. In France, where consumer
groups pursued a strategy of grass-roots mobilization, they also became politically
powerful. Because of their political influence they were able to push a heavy burden of
consumer protection onto industry. In Germany, where consumer groups pursued an
organizational strategy of devolved powers that freed them from the need to mobilize
individual consumers, consumer groups as a consequence had little political strength.
Instead they cultivated technical competencies that allowed them to participate fruitfully
in detailed production policy and decisions. This strategy meant that German consumer
groups did not have the political power to push a heavy burden of consumer protection
89 Wolfgang Hoffmann, "Die AnwAlte der Konsumenten: Viele Verbraucherverbinde-
wenig Erfolg," Zeit (Friday, 26 March 1971), p 29.
90 "Vebinde: Asoziale im Frack," Der Spiegel (Monday, 21 September 1970), pp 60-61.
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onto industry, but they did have the capacity to engage industry directly on technical
questions of consumer safety.
Consumer policy outcomes in both France and Germany, however, depended as
much on the organization of producers as on the organization of consumers. As David
Vogel has argued in the case-of the United States, businessmen face considerable
obstacles to organizing in order to pursue their collective interests in the political
sphere.9 As with consumers, the extent to which business interests were able to organize
played an important role in determining which conception of the consumer would
predominate in national policymaking.
In Germany, where producer groups enjoyed strong associational ties and were
organized under strong sectoral trade associations, industry was able to meet consumer
protection issues with a unified position. In France, where industry was less organized,
and individual companies were not bound by sectoral associations, industry came to the
policy table with a fragmented position and fewer capabilities for self-regulation. A more
detailed exposition of the role played by the organization of production interests in
France and in Germany appears in the discussion of policy preferences below. In general,
however, the result of the differing organizational forms of production was that German
producers enjoyed both a higher level of political power and also a greater capacity for
effective self-regulation than did their French counterparts.
91 David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of
American Corporate Executives," British Journal of Political Science (1978), p 72.
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Policy Models for Consumer Protection in Different National Contexts
In general, in countries like France in which consumers mobilized at the grass-
roots level and producers were disorganized, as they were in France, consumer policies
tend to reflect consumer interests rather than producer interests. Consumer groups with
strong membership could cultivate political interest in their cause by portraying the
interests of consumers as universal interests. Boycotts and rallies organized by consumer
groups demonstrated the political weight of these groups. Industry, for its part, was not
sufficiently organized to offer a viable alternative to the influence of consumer groups in
the form of self-regulation. This resulted in a political conception of the consumer
identity and a focus on a strategy of consumer protection that placed a high burden on
industry. This French approach drew heavily on the regulatory strategies adopted in the
United States, where a similar logic of consumer and industry organization predominated.
consumers
more mobilized less mobilized
more organized
producers
less organized
Figure 7. Interest organization and consumption regimes.
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negotiation model information model
(Scandinavia) (Germany)
protection model (low level of
(France, USA) protection)
Conversely, in countries such as Germany in which consumers did not mobilized
and producers were organized, as they were in Germany, consumer policies tended to
embody producer interests more than consumer interests. Industry associations were able
to coordinate their efforts in order to push for the idea of consumers as purely economic
actors. Consumers for their part were politically weak, and therefore unable to push for
the idea of distinctive consumer rights. Moreover, consumer groups were themselves
wary of a more confrontational approach to consumer protection, for fear that they would
lose their monopoly on representing the consumer interest in government and business
discussions. This combination of consumer group accommodation and industry initiative
resulted in an economic conception of the consumer identity and a focus on a strategy of
consumer information.
Alternative combinations of consumer and of producer organization strategies help
to shed light on the consumer policies adopted in other countries. Where consumers have
been mobilized and business is also organized, for example, as is the case in Sweden and
other Scandinavian countries, consumer policies have tended to rely on a strategy of
negotiation between consumers and producers in order to set consumer policies. Why did
consumers groups in these countries pursue a strategy of mass mobilization? The
consumer groups there were able to build on strong cooperative movements whose
members were already mobilized around consumer issues.92 Over 13 percent of all stores
in Sweden were cooperatively owned in 1960, compared to less than 3 percent of stores
92 In 1967 consumer cooperatives accounted for 18 percent of commerce de detail in
Sweden. M. T. Chevalier, "Protection du consommateur en Suede," Consommateurs
actualitJ 334 (28 May 1982), p 4.
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in both France and Germany.93 Because both consumers and producers were politically
strong, the government encouraged them to negotiate standards of consumer protection
that were binding on both parties.
The problem with this account is that it presents as afait accompli policies that
only emerged after being the subject of protracted and intensive political struggle in both
France and Germany. To elucidate the political struggles within each country, an
institutional explanation of this kind must also take seriously the interests of consumer
and producer groups. Taking interests seriously in this case means distinguishing among
three different roles that different institutional forms of interest organization have played
in the elaboration of consumer policies in France and Germany. First, institutions helped
to set the preference ranking of consumer and producer groups among different possible
models of consumer protection Second, institutions helped to determine the political
power wielded by consumer and producer groups in pursuit of their preferred policy
models. Finally, institutions also limited consumer and producer groups in their ability to
act on strategies that they decided were to their collective benefit. A central proposal of
my research is that in periods of policy innovation, institutions function in all three roles
to determine what policy model predominates in each country. The following section sets
out the conceptual framework for this analysis and considers the most compelling
alternative explanations. Following that is a detailed elucidation of the three roles that
institutions play in the determination of consumer policy outcomes.
93 James B. Jefferys, and Derek Knee, Retailing in Europe: Present Structure and Future
Trends (London: Macmillan & Co., 1962), p 65.
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Explaining Regulatory Divergence in Radically New Areas of Policy
The question of how one conception of the consumer identity has come to prevail
in France and another in Germany presents both challenges and opportunities for
comparative political analysis. One challenge is to explain divergence in an entirely new
area of policy. Steven Krasner has suggested a useful analogy between policy evolution
and the model of punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary biology. A punctuated-
equilibrium interpretation of policy formation implies that institutions and policies evolve
rapidly during unsettled times and then experience long periods of little or no change. As
in evolutionary biology, the punctuated-equilibrium analysis implies different
mechanisms of change from those employed in an equilibrium, or steady-state analysis.
The punctuated-equilibrium model of policy discontinuity appears to describe accurately
the transformation of French and German consumer identities in the 1970s, and the
elaboration of a broad range of new government institutions focused on protecting the
consumer. Yet Krasner himself does little to explain the mechanism by which these new
policies and institutions arise out of existing national frameworks. Where he does address
the mechanisms of institutional discontinuity, Krasner attributes the new forms either to
outside intervention in the form of foreign influence, or to chaotic mechanisms by which
important outcomes arise from small initial policy differences.94
Herein lies an important opportunity of studying the emergence of product market
regulations in France and Germany. This area of regulation offers us a view of an entirely
new area of policy in formation. In it, similar sets of issues generated systematically
different policy outcomes in each country. What these new product market regulations
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suggest is that different consumption regimes emerged in France and Germany as a result
of a complex interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions. In both countries, ideas about
the consumer identity and interest were politically contested by consumer and producer
groups. These contested ideas, and the policy models that they engendered, set the terms
of policy struggle in both countries. Which policy model finally emerged as the dominant
national strategy of consumer protection depended on the way in which consumer and
producer interests were organized to pursue their preferred model. A full account of
French and German consumer policy formation will be elaborated in the section titled
The Policy Conflict over National Models of Consumer Protection that starts on page
102. This section describes alternative explanations and sets a broad theoretical context
for this research project.
Alternate Explanations of New Policy Formation
Some of the most powerful explanations in comparative politics rely on a single
causal factor to explain policy divergence between different countries. This section
considers interest-based, institution-based, and ideas-based explanations of divergence in
consumer policy. Taken individually, none of these explanations offers a compelling
account of the differences that emerged in French and German consumption policies. The
following section therefore explores how combinations of these factors have been
brought together by other researchers to offer more compelling explanations of policy
divergence in new areas of policy.
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94 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16/2 (January 1984), p 242.
Interest-based influence on consumer policy. One of the most powerful kinds of
explanation in political science explains outcomes as a result of the interplay of economic
interests. A prominent set of arguments based primarily on economic interests posits the
priority of producer interests in all economic regulation.9 5 Anthony Giddens, to take one
example, has suggested that national consumer policies emerge from national production
interests.9 6 Michael Piore similarly has suggested that the national infrastructure of mass
consumption has worked to reinforce the Fordist model of production. The problem with
such explanations is that the interests of production are not necessarily unified. While
producers were in general opposed to product market regulation that impinged on their
economic autonomy, labor unions took different views of the consumer movement. On
the one hand, workers were also consumers. On the other hand, consumer protection in
the form of product recall actions or product boycotts could have negative repercussions
for the workforce. French and German labor unions resolved these conflicting interests
differently. In France, trade unions became strong allies of the consumer movement and
helped to mobilize a radical consumer base. German unions shied away from the
consumer movement, siding instead with the interests of German industry. Any
explanation grounded purely in economic interest cannot adequately account for these
differing economic interests of French and German unions.
On the other hand, different production sectors also did not have unified goals in
relation to product market regulation. David Vogel has argued that many national product
95 George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science (spring 1971) pp 3-21.
96 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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market regulations have been elaborated with the goal of impeding import competition.9
On this view, we should observe a conflict of producer interests between the tradable and
non-tradable sectors. Yet what we observe in both France and Germany is a broad
strategy of product market regulation imposed equally on tradable and non-tradable
sectors. Indeed, one of the strongest regulatory initiatives in both France and Germany
focused on the travel industry, where fraud over vacation packages led to strong
consumer mobilization. In 1976, France's Secretary of Consumption Christian Scrivener
put in place a program called "Vacances sans surprises" that created 225 information sites
and 14 commissions to deal with consumer vacation litigation Germany's Justice
Ministry pushed for similar protections against overbooked of tours and exorbitant travel
agent fees.9 9 Indeed, one finding of my research is that the politics of national product
market regulation were focused on domestic issues of consumer safety and competition
rather than on economic goals relating to trade.
A final problem with the purely interest-based argument is determining which
interests matter, for consumer interests were also becoming organized at this time. Albert
Hirschman has suggested that the emergence of consumer protection regulation in all
advanced industrial countries can be attributed to a mass wave of disappointment with
new durable goods. Frustrated with what the market offered, consumers turned to the
97 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global
Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995).
98 The title plays on the French homophones for "surprises" and "extra prices." Le Monde,
23 Jun 1976.
99 See for example: Hans de With (Parlamentarischer Staatssekretiir beim Bundesminister
der Justiz), "Verbraucherschutz-Politik wird konsequent fortgesetzt: Zahlreiche
Reformvorhaben in dieser Legislaturperiode," Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst,
P/XXXII/73 (18 April 1977), p 2.
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public sphere for redress. 100 On this view, national approaches to product market
regulation must be understood as the outcome of conflicting interests of consumers and
producers. The problem is that this insight quickly takes us beyond a purely interest-
based argument. First, consumer interests are themselves not necessarily unified.
Consumer protection policies draw from a combination of concerns over product price,
safety, information, fraud, quality, and convenience. Which of these interests were
emphasized in France and Germany depended to a large extent on how consumer
interests came to be organized in the two countries. Second, the relative ability of
consumer and producer groups to pursue their policy preferences also depended to a large
degree on how they were able to organize their members. Hence institutional factors
worked co dictate both the policy preferences of consumer groups and their ability to
pursue those preference when faced with opposition from industry.
Institution-based influence on consumer policy. A second common approach to
policy analysis explains current policies in terms of institutional continuities in which
past structures place constraints on current policy options. Scholarship on historical
institutionalism has tended to emphasize the role of institutions in maintaining policy
continuity. 10 1 An important source of this continuity is the mechanism by which
increasing returns to existing configurations of institutions tend to create path
dependencies. In Paul Pierson's terse formulation, "Once in place institutions are hard to
100 Albert O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p 65.
'01 Colin Hay, and Daniel Wincott, Interrogating Institutionalism Interrogating
Institutions: Beyond 'Calculus'and 'Cultural'Approaches, Program for the Study of
Germany and Europe, Working Paper 8.3 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for
European Studies, 1998).
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change."'0 2 Path dependency arguments within Political Science have tended to
emphasize the insight that institutions are hard to change. Theories such as that of path
dependency are important because they help us to understand how existing institutions
persist and evolve. But the theory of path-dependency is less applicable to the formation
of altogether new institutions. It tends to obscure the mechanisms of punctuation and the
details that lie behind the presumptive "Once in place...". In France and Germany, for
example, newly created product safety, product testing, and product advertising
regulations had no direct institutional antecedents.
One might imagine that French and German approaches to consumer protection
can be understood in terms of older, deeply rooted national regulatory institutions.
Germany's approach to product market regulation, for example, appears broadly
corporatist, with industry exercising a high degree of self-regulation. France's approach
appears broadly statist, with the government intervening to protect consumers against the
economic forces of production. Consistent with the bias of contemporary historical
institutionalism, however, this approach assumes a high degree of institutional continuity
over time. The problem in the case of consumer policies is that we also observe important
divergences from these national institutional archetypes. In a move that seems to borrow
from corporatism, for example, France came to rely on organized consumer interests to
negotiate product safety and quality standards directly with industry. Germany, in a move
redolent of French statism, relied on a high level of government intervention in the
economy in order to enforce standards of product information. My research suggests that
102 Paul Pierson, Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics,
Working Paper Series of the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe (Cambridge:
Center for European Studies, 1997), pp 15-16.
81
institutional analysis must play a central role in explaining national approaches to new
areas of regulation, but that broad national regulatory traditions alone are not decisive.
The role of institutions is discussed beginning on page 99below.
Ideas-based influence on consumer policy. Another policy explanation focuses on
the determining role of ideas in new policy formation. New areas of policy necessarily
rest on a conceptual rather than an empirical or intuitive understanding of the issues at
stake. This is especially true of product market regulations, where the scope of regulation
is broad and the details of regulation are often technical or arcane. But like interests and
institutions, ideas alone do not sufficiently explain divergent national policy outcomes.
To see why, consider two different interpretations of the role of ideas in new policy
formation. These might be called the strong and weak models of ideas.
The strong model sees ideas as encompassing and exclusive, and emphasizes the
cognitive constraints that national policy traditions can place on policy actors.'03 On this
view, policy makers are constrained by limited capacities to conceive of possible policy
solutions because they operate under the influence of unchallenged assumptions,
persistent discursive styles, unarticulated predispositions, even linguistic conventions.
Peter Hall suggests that such cognitive constraints have the character of paradigms in the
sense employed by Thomas Kuhn.04 "Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the
very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is
influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and is not amenable to
103 Junko Kato, "Review Article: Institutions and Rationality in Politics - Three Varieties
of Neo-Institutionalists," British Journal of Political Science 26 (1996), pp 573-581.
104 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970).
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scrutiny as a whole."'05 Moreover, Hall argues, this policy paradigm approach is
especially powerful in cases of radical-what he calls 'third order'-policy change.
Strong policy ideas are so powerful that they blind policymakers to other possible
alternatives.
The problem with this strong model for the role of ideas in the case of consumer
policy is that major policy innovators at the time show signs of actively searching for a
new conceptual framework in which product markets might be appropriately regulated.
France and Germany considered a broad set of regulatory options before pursuing
divergent policy programs. Government officials in both countries commissioned reports
on the strategies adopted in foreign countries, funded research on the potential impact of
different strategies at home, and convoked discussion groups at which domestic interests
groups could present their ideas and concerns. Far from being constrained by an
overarching policy paradigm, French and German policymakers appear to have been
consciously seeking to create a useful paradigm for the consumerist agenda. It therefore
seems more likely that policymakers were working from a palette of ideas. The role of
ideas in the case of consumer policy is closer to the role that Anne Swidler attributes to
culture. In times of policy innovation, ideas, like culture, act as a toolbox from which
policymakers make selections based on other considerations.06
An alternative conception of the role of ideas in policy formation that we may call
the weak model puts ideas in the hands of policy experts. Unlike the strong model, ideas
in the weak model do not suffuse society but instead are propagated from policymakers at
10s Peter A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of
Economic Policymaking in Britain," Comparative Politics (April 1993), p 279.
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the top. Hugh Heclo, for example, argues that policy formation during periods of policy
innovation relies on a process of "puzzling" by informed administrators trying to do what
is right. Ideas resolved within this policy setting then spread through society. This style of
explanation has been reprised by researchers who study policy networks as the source of
distinctive national policies.
The problem with this weak model of ideas in the case of consumption policy is
that elite government policy makers did not act together in France and in Germany.
Instead, new consumer policies rested on a conception of the social identity of consumers
that arose independently within different spheres of government. Whereas some
regulations were created through legislative action, others were imposed by government
ministries. Moreover a number of specific policy areas were decided almost entirely
through the courts rather than by legislative or ministerial initiative. Product liability is
one example of this kind of court-made regulation. Most striking is the fact that these
independent court decisions about consumers tended to pursue the same national
strategies of product market regulation as regulations promulgated by government
policymakers. The weak model of ideas, in which government policy makers propose ad-
hoc solutions to policy problems, fails to explain how these different policy actors arrived
independently at similar conceptions of the consumer interest.
Nevertheless, ideas about the consumer identity and interest did play a central role
in the formulation of consumption policies in France and Germany. As described above,
three different conceptions of the consumer came to constitute different possible
alternatives for how consumer demands should be met: consumer as economic actor
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similar to a producer, consumer as citizen, and consumer as interest group. These
conceptions of the consumer implied specific policy models for regulating product
markets. Similar to the policy-paradigm approach, each policy model entailed a
distinctive world-view about the condition and role of consumers in society. Yet at the
outset no single conception of the consumer appears to have been apparent either to
policymakers or to the general public. Instead, the politics of consumption regulation
took the form of a public debate about which conception of the consumer would emerge
as dominant in society.
Ideas, while critical to the emergence of distinctive national consumption regimes,
were therefore not decisive in determining which conception of the consumer would
emerge as dominant. The ramifications of this finding are potentially important. It
suggests that the consumer identities that we reflexively identify with particular national
cultures-mass consumerism in the United States, quality orientation in Germany,
aesthetic sophistication in France-may have emerged relatively recently from a political
struggle between emerging consumer interests and the economic interests of producers.
More locally, this finding suggests that an adequate explanation of consumption
regulations in France and Germany must draw on a combination of causal factors rather
than a simple mono-causal explanation.
The Contested Ideas Approach to Policy Formation
The results of this research project suggest that a combination of interests, and
institutions, and ideas must be invoked to explain radically new areas of policy formation.
In the initial stages of consumer policy formation, national conceptions of the consumer
Review 51 (April 1986), pp 273-286.
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identity and interests were politically contested. Moreover each distinctive conception of
the consumer identity implied a specific analysis of the problems consumers faced and a
coherent program of policy prescriptions. These conceptions of the consumer thereby set
the terms on which the political struggle between producers and consumers was waged in
both France and Germany. In this view, ideas can be understood to have played an
instrumental rather than a determining role.
This instrumental approach to policy ideas is not new to comparative policy
analysis. Other researchers have found that interests are often closely tied to ideas in the
regulation of new policy areas. Deborah Stone has argued that causal beliefs commonly
embody underlying conflicts of interest in debates about new policy. Thus interest groups
emphasize different kinds of causal beliefs depending on their strategic interests.'07
Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast have argued that ideas can help to encourage
cooperation in certain kinds of coordination games. When different strategies of
cooperation are possible, policy ideas can create "constructed focal points" that permit
actors to cooperate in achieving their collective goals.' 08 Finally, Pierre Muller has
suggested that new areas of policy should be seen as "ideas in action," meaning that ideas
about the social identity of a group set the terms on which group interests in society are
contested. 09 Each of these theories sits mid-way in the continuum between the
107 Deborah Stone, "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas," Political
Science Quarterly 104 (1989), pp 281-300.
108 Geoffrey Garrett, and Barry Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing
the European Community's Internal Marlet," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions and Political Change, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993).
109 Pierre Muller, "Les politiques publiques comme construction d'un rapport au monde,"
in La construction du sens dans les politiques publiques: ddbats autour de la notion de
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determinacy of ideas and of interests. Notice that the specific role of ideas differs in each
of these approaches. For Stone, ideas simply reflect underlying interests. For Garrett and
Weingast, ideas act as a catalyst that helps collective actors to realize their underlying
interests. For Muller, ideas restructure underlying interests by reconceptualizing the
economic role of important social actors.
In the case of consumer protection, ideas appear to have served each of these three
functions. First, consumer and producer groups advocated conceptions of the consumer
identity that best reflected underlying interests. Second, especially for consumer groups,
these conceptions also became the basis of a broader consumer mobilization in support of
their collective economic interests. Third, these conceptions also determined how
consumers and producers came to understand their own collective economic interests.
The multiple roles that ideas may play is central to the notion of ideas as policy models
that are politically contested. By creating systematic, coherent accounts of the consumer
identity, goals, and interests, ideas about the consumer have the effect of compelling
interest groups to choose from bundled policy solutions.
Of course not all kinds of ideas necessarily offer viable policy solutions. Many
researchers have stressed structural factors that determine which ideas are likely to
succeed in influencing policy decisions. In these interpretations, certain ideas become
privileged because of an institutional bias that works in their favor. In this connection,
Theda Skocpol has argued that the ideas policymakers generate are commonly
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constrained by the regulatory capacities of the state." 0 Nicholas Ziegler has argued that
the differing organizations of professional expertise in France and in Germany has led
policymakers to emphasize different kinds of policy approaches."'l And Chris Allen has
argued that Germany's orientation towards macroeconomic policy in the post-World War
II period were driven by deeply-embedded historical institutions.112 These accounts are
compelling because they trace the structural sources of continuity in national policy
thought and agendas. Indeed, they might be seen as the analytic basis of national cultural
traditions. The problem with such approaches, as with cultural explanations in general, is
that they may neglect the dynamics of raw political interest. By focusing on the
continuum of institutions and ideas, they risk overlooking the political melee from which
new policy solutions commonly emerge. As Jonas Pontusson notes: "Ideas may be very
important to the politics of change, but interests are also important and must be an object
of serious analysis."" 3
My research into the origins of national product market regulations attempts to
combine the benefits of the interest-based and the institutional approaches to policy ideas
by treating ideas as politically contested. Three distinct conceptions of the consumer
identity became the focus of political debate in both France and Germany: consumer as
0 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research," in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer,
and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
" ' Nicholas Ziegler, Governing Ideas: Strategies for Innovation in France and Germany
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p 34.
112 Christopher Allen, "The Underdevelopment of Keynesianism in the Federal Republic
of Germany," in The Political Power of Economic Ideas, ed. Peter Hall (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp 263-289.
113 Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting
Political Institutions in Their Place and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative
Political Studies 28/1 (1995), p 143.
88
economic actor with the same status as producers, consumer as citizen, and consumer as
interest group. Each of these conceptions of the consumer, understood as policy models,
provided a coherent interpretation of the consumer's condition, interests, and the kind of
solutions that were appropriate for consumer protection. Consumer and producer groups
then pushed for that conception of the consumer that best met their perceived interests. In
France, consumer policy came to reflect the conception of the consumer as citizen, which
worked to advance a protection approach to product market regulation. In Germany,
consumer policy came to reflect the conception of the consumer as economic actor,
which advocated an information approach to product market regulation.
Policy Preference Orderings and the Role of Institutions
Rather than viewing consumer and producer preferences as grounded in a single
policy idea, the contested-ideas approach assumes that each interest group worked from
an ordinal preference ranking of all three policy models (consumer as economic actor,
consumer as citizen, and consumer as interest group) for consumer protection. Each
interest group preferred one strategy the most, another second, and the remaining strategy
the least. Policy disagreements between consumer and producer groups arose from their
conflicting preference orderings. How such preference conflicts were resolved depended
in turn on the way in which consumer and producer interests were organized in France
and in Germany.
This section describes the arena in which consumer and producer interests
confronted each other in those two countries. It first presents the preference ordering of
producer and consumer groups in relation to three different conceptions of the consumer
interest Of course no consumer or producer statements explicitly lay out their underlying
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preference rankings in respect to these three policy models. Nonetheless, the preference
rankings of the three policy models by the consumer and producer groups emerge clearly
from their statements about different policy options. These statements show that French
and German production interests ranked the available policy models in the same way. On
the other hand, because French and German consumer groups represented newly
emerging interests in society, they came to espouse different preference rankings that
reflected their different organizational strategies. (These preference rankings are
described in Figure 8 below.) The fact that consumer groups had differing policy
preference rankings meant that the nature of the conflict between producers and
consumers in the two countries would be different.
How these conflicting policy preferences were resolved depended on the way in
which consumer and producer interests were organized in France and in Germany.
Institutions mediated the conflict over policy models in three ways. First, as described
above, the organization of consumer groups drove their ranking of policy preferences.
Second, for both consumers and producers, their degree of coordination determined their
ability to apply political pressure in favor of their preferred policy approach. Third, the
degree of coordination of producers in particular determined their ability to implement
certain strategies of consumer protection. The way in which consumer and producer
interests were organized thus set their preference rankings, their political power, and their
capacities to implement their preferred policies. It is this multifaceted interaction of
interests and institutions in the political struggle for a new conception of the consumer
that has generated distinctive strategies ofproduct market regulation in France and
Germany.
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In Germany, where producers were well organized and consumer groups had few
members, producers were able to secure their preferred option, the information model.
The information model was the second-ranked preference of consumer groups. In France,
where producers were loosely organized and consumer groups enjoyed a strong
mobilization, consumption policies shifted over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s
away from the policy preference of producers and towards the policy preference of
consumers. By the mid-1980s, France had adopted the protection model. This approach
was the least favored option for industry, and only the second option of most consumer
groups. In this specific sense, the product market regulations that emerged in Germany
can be called producer-oriented, as they favored the policy preferences of producers over
consumers. By contrast, French product market regulations can be called consumer-
oriented, since they favored the policy preferences of consumers over those of producers.
In order to see the political dynamic that led to these results, however, we must first
describe the interests and institutions that were in play.
Policy Preference Rankings of Consumers
Consumer interests are potentially, almost inherently, diverse. The policy-
preference ranking characteristic of French and of German consumer groups has tended
to emphasize those consumer interests that also reflect the organizational strategies of
consumer movements in the two countries. In France, where the consumer movement is
founded in grass-roots mobilization and political engagement, consumer groups have
favored approaches thai build on mobilization. Hence French consumer groups have
favored negotiations with industry and lobbying for further legal protections of
consumers, both activities that draw on their strengths in mobilizing consumers. They
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have been less enthusiastic about the information strategy, since that tends to treat the
consumer as an individual rather than as a political or group actor. In general, French
consumer groups prefer first tie negotiaton approach, then the protection approach, and
finally, in last place, the information approach.
This was true in product labeling, consumer contracts, advertising, and product
quality standards, where French consumer groups gave their strongest endorsement to
negotiated solutions. In 1975, the eleven major French consumer groups proposed a
general framework law ("loi cadre") that would permit them to negotiate binding
contracts with industry on a broad range of policy issues. 114 They also proposed the
formation of a "high council on innovation and safety," with an equal representation of
consumers, professionals, and government officials, with the goal of giving safety and
design input to manufacturers, and of identifying so-called "false innovations" that were
expensive for society and burdensome to consumers."5 The consumer group OR-GE-CO,
allied with the major French trade unions, strongly supported direct consumer group
negotiations with industry as a productive approach to consumer protection.l 6
The second most-favored option of French consumer groups, less-favored than the
information model but more favored than the negotiation model, was the strategy of
protection by the creation of special consumer rights. From an organizational logic, the
protection approach was less satisfying for consumer groups than the negotiation model,
since it did not draw on a vast organization of consumers. Nonetheless consumer groups
114 Un monde en mouvement: les organisations de consommation (Paris: Ministere de
l'conomie -- romit6 national de la consommation, September 1980).
115 "Onze organisations d'usagers proposent une charte nationale," Le Monde, 30 April
1975.
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lobbied hard for higher safety standards, better contractual terms, and greater industry
responsibility, all hallmarks of this approach. While they did not object to higher quality
information, especially when it resulted from negotiated agreements with industry, they
were skeptical that information alone could adequately help consumers. Truth in
advertising, for example, was not an important policy issue for French consumer groups.
When the government proposed a set of negotiated quality labels in 1976, the Federal
Consumption Union (UFC) objected on the grounds that it should not substitute for real
product quality." 7 As summarized in Figure 8 below, French consumer preference
ranking for strategies of consumer protection was first negotiation, then protection, then
information.
preference consumer groups consumer groups Producer interests
rankings French German France and Germany
First negotiation negotiation information
Second protection information negotiation
Third information protection protection
Figure 8. Policy preference rankings of consumer and producer groups.
German consumer groups have pursued an organizational strategy different from
that of their French counterparts, and this different strategy has generated a different
policy-preference ranking. German consumer groups had few individual members and
relied instead on privileged access to negotiations. They measured their success not in
116 Jacques Dubois, "Du Mepris a la Concertation," Information Consommation OR-GE-
CO 20 (January-February 1977), p 2.
117 "Contrats qualit6 et Production Nationale," Informations Indecosa-CGT49
(November 1984), p 3.
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terms of consumer support or their own weight as a political force, but instead in terms of
their expertise and their access to government and business decision-making. This
organizational strategy has caused German consumer group to emphasize technical skills
rather than mobilization. They have thus tended to favor both negotiation and information
models , since both strategies emphasize their organizational strengths. The protection
model was the least favored approach of the German consumer movement because by
making consumer issues political, it risked undermining the consumer movement's own
privileged access to policymaking. Consumer groups in Germany preferred first the
negotiation approach, as in France, then the information approach, and they preferred
least the protection approach.
While both German and French consumer groups preferred a negotiation
approach to consumer protection. The conception of negotiation of German consumer
groups was somewhat different from that of their French counterparts. French groups saw
their role in negotiation as that of aggregating broad consumer interests. German
consumer groups, by contrast, perceived at the outset that they simply did not have the
political power or popular legitimacy to negotiate on an equal political footing with
business. In the early 1960s, for example, Germany's leading consumer association, the
Association of Consumer Groups (AgV), had been pushing for the creation of a
Consumption Ministry within the government. This would have given the AgV authority
to speak on an equal footing with industry. But by the early 1970s the AgV had changed
its position, opposing a separate consumption ministry and pushing instead for access to
consumer policy committees within the economics and agriculture ministries.
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Because they had little membership and no independent basis of political power,
German consumer groups were dependent for their policy access on the good will of the
government. The Social-Democratic Party-dominated coalition of the 1970s proved
enthusiastically in favor of integrating consumer groups into policy circles. As examples
of this, in 1973, consumer groups were granted access to the multi-party Concerted
Action negotiations of wage and money supply levels. In 1974 they were given access to
technical committees within Germany's technical standards-setting body, Deutsche
Industrie Normung (DIN). And in 1976 they were given an important role in monitoring
standard consumer contracts.
In exchange for this access to government policy, German consumer groups
tended to avoid any confrontation with industry. This aversion led to strong consumer-
group opposition to the protection strategy. When the German trade-mark association
criticized the AgV for conducting comparative product tests, for example, the AgV
stopped. When the president of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) called for
the creation of a single office for consumer and competition policy, the president of the
AgV opposed the idea out of concern that the new body would undermine the status of
the AgV as an equal partner with industry."l 8 The AgV opposed any state-regulated
consumer politics, and strongly opposed a state-run consumer protection bureau." 19
Indeed, most of tne major consumer legislative initiatives in Germany were initiated not
118 Eberhard Guenther, "Verbraucherpolitik, ziele, Mittel und Traeger," Marktwirtschaft 2
(1973), p 39.
119 "Staatsunabhangige Verbraucherpolitik," Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (October 1973),
pp 665-666.
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by consumer groups, but instead by industry or by political parties.120 The conceptual
essence of the protection strategy is consumer confrontation with industry, to which
German consumer groups were entirely opposed.
The information model of consumer protection was the second-favorite option for
German consumer groups. Consumer information became the foundational activity of
consumer protection, especially for regional consumer associations
(Verbraucherverbande). But the AgV also participated. In 1973, for example, the AgV
send two buses on a tour through Germany under the slogan "together for reasonable
prices" ("Gemeinsam fur verniinftige Preise"). Brochures were handed out, educational
movies were shown, and computerized tests of consumer's knowledge of product prices
were offered. 21The primary focus of French consumer groups was to collect consumer
complaints and present them to industry, one of the main focuses of German consumer
groups was to gather product information and present it to consumers. As summarized in
Figure 8 above, German consumer preference ranking for strategies of consumer
protection was first negotiation, then information, then protection.
Policy Preference Rankings of Producers
As opposed to French and German consumer groups, French and German industry
had very similar ideas about consumer policy. In both countries, the primary concern of
business was to avoid government interference in production decisions. Hence businesses
evaluated the three policy models in terms of the level of regulatory intervention they
120 Heribert Schatz, "Consumer Interests in the Process of Political Decision-Making: A
Study of Some Consumer Policy Decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany," Journal
of Consumer Policy 6 (1983), p 388.
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were likely to generate. Among the three, the information model appeared the least
restrictive to business. Indeed businesses in general recognized that better informed
consumers could be more responsive consumers. For Germany's leading industry
association, the Bund Deutscher Industrie (BDI), the greatest goal of the government is to
help the consumer help herself to work through the enormous amount of information that
might otherwise leave her the weaker market partner. Industry groups favored
information strategies, such as product labeling and consumer education, that were
objective and neutral. They especially favored school education about consumer issues
and government support of product advisory centers. France's leading industry
association, the National Council of French Employers (CNPF), also emphasized the
usefulness of a program of consumer information: "consumer information is the condition
of a true freedom of choice: a poorly or insufficiently informed consumer has no real
freedom of decision."12 2
In second-place preference, after the information model, business in both France
and Germany preferred the negotiation model of consumer protection. While this put
them face to face with consumers, it had the benefit of avoiding direct government
intervention. Germany's standard-setting group, DIN, for example, accepted the creation
of a consumer advisory board within its administration in exchange for a high degree of
autonomy and freedom from government intervention. In France, the CNPF became an
enthusiastic proponent of the negotiation approach when faced with the probability of
121 Wolfgang H. Gl1ckner, "Aktion 'Gelber Punkt' - Ins Rote verfalscht," Vorwarts, 18
October 1973.
122 "Cette information du consommateur conditionne d'ailleurs en realite la liberte de
choix: un consommateur mal ou insuffisamment informe n'a plus d'autonomie de
decision." "Libre de son choix...," CNPF Patronat 370 (June 1976), p 15.
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direct government intervention. Indeed the CNPF created a special committee, the
Commission on Industry, Trade, and Consumption (CICC) with the explicit goal of
negotiating with consumers. In the case of consumer terms of sale, for instance, the CICC
negotiated with consumer groups for two years before their efforts were brought to a halt
by direct regulatory intervention by the government.12 3
The least desirable consumer policy for producers was the protection model. This
approach implied a high level of government intervention to enforce a new strong set of
consumer rights. In France, industry was extremely critical of the Consumer Safety
Commission (CSC) that was put in place in 1983 to regulate products in the interest of
consumer safety. They criticized the fact that any of several ministries could bring cases,
the fact that even trade unions could apply for product reviews, and the new
Commission's strong powers to investigate producers.' 24 Both French and German
industry opposed product recall actions, for example, because of concern that they could
be politically motivated and disruptive to industry.' 25 For industry in both countries, the
preference ranking for strategies of consumer protection was first negotiation, then
information, then protection. See Figure 8 above.
123 "Accord Patrons-Consommateurs," Information Consommation OR-GE-CO 16 (May-
June 1976), p 6.
124 Marcel Garrigou, L'Assaaut des Consommateurs pour changer les rapports
producteurs - vendeurs - consommateurs (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1981), p 11.
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, "Comparative Analysis of the National Country Reports on
Post Market Control and Perspectives for a European Setting of Post Market Control," in
Post Market Control of Consumer Goods, ed. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Schriftenreihe
des Zentrums fur Europiische Rechtspolitik an der Universitit Bremen (ZERP), Band 11
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), p 418.
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Three Roles of Interest Organization in the Formation of Product Market Regulation
The organization of producer and consumer interests in France and Germany
worked in three ways to influence their goals for policy formation. First, as described
above, the differing organizational strategies of consumer groups in France and in
Germany resulted in their having different preference rankings among the three policy
models. In France, where consumers organized around a grass-roots movement,
consumer groups pushed for strong political actions. In Germany, where consumers
c ganization was based on devolved powers, the most prominent associations
discouraged explicitly political actions as subversive to their own authority. Hence
institutional differences affected the underlying policy-preference ranking of consumer
groups.
Second, differing organizational strategies of consumer and producer associations
determlined the political weight of those groups. Whether consumer or producer group
preferences came to be emphasized in national policy depended in part on the political
weight these groups wielded. Because they were well organized, German producers and
French consumers were able to exert political pressure in favor of their preferred policies.
In France, the relative political strength of industry declined over time as the consumer
movement grew. This shift caused a change in policy emphasis away from the regulatory
strategy preferred by industry and toward the strategy preferred by consumer groups. In
Germany, by contrast, the lack of a grass-roots membership in the consumer movement
put severe limits on the political weight of Germany's leading consumer associations in
pursuing their goals.
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Third, the organization of consumer and of producer interests placed limits on the
kinds of policies that could be successfully implemented in the two countries. While
producers in both countries preferred minimal interference in their production decisions,
the ability of producers to pursue theirs interests was constrained by significant
collective-action problems within the production sphere. The high level of coordination
among German producers permitted them to pursue their interest in an information model
of consumer protection with a high degree of credibility. By contrast, the low level of
coordination among producers in France gave them less capability to pursue their
preferred strategy. For example, both producer groups and consumer groups in France
preferred the negotiation model to the protection model. Yet attempts to implement the
negotiation model failed because industry was insufficiently organized to negotiate with
consumers in a coordinated way. The core problem was that France's leading industry
associations did not have the authority to negotiate agreements that would be binding on
their members. Hence, while the CNPF pushed for negotiated agreements, individual
companies were hesitant to participate in them without the certainty that other companies
would participate as well.
These organizational capacities of producers were particularly important in the
case of labor unions. Because workers were in a sense both producers and consumers,
labor unions could potentially identify themselves either with consumer groups or with
producer groups. In some countries, such as Sweden and Austria, trade unions were even
granted the official status of consumer groups. In other countries, such as the United
Kingdom and Germany, trade unions identified themselves far more with production than
with consumption. The allegiances that trade unions formed, whether with the consumer
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movement or with the interests of production, depended to an important degree on the
way in which production was organized.
In Germany, for instance, where patterned wage bargaining and works councils
give workers a strong input into production decisions, unions shied away from the
consumer movement. When women in the German workforce, for example, called for
union support of longer store hours, the unions rebuffed their proposal. Indeed, German
trade-union preferences in relation to product market regulations have closely mirrored
those of producers on a broad range of policies.
In France, by contrast, where trade unions have little institutionalized access to
wage formation or company management, workers have typically pursued their interests
through strikes and protests. Because of this confrontational approach to labor relations,
French trade unions came to see consumers as brothers in arms. Workers and consumers
saw themselves as sharing a common status as victims of big industry. French labor
unions thus began in the mid-1970s to create their own affiliated consumer movements.
These union-consumer groups encouraged grass-roots membership, conducted product
boycotts and price surveys, and collaborated with workers to negotiate quality contracts
with producers. Hence the way in which production was organized in France led producer
groups to lose the support of unions for their consumer policy preferences.
In sum, the institutional form of interest groups may have an effect on the
underlying preference rankings of those groups, on their political strength to pursue a
particular set of preferences, and on the organizational capacity of those interest groups
successfully to implement a preferred policy strategy. These three institutional factors
have contributed both to the preference ranking of consumer groups, and to the ability of
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consumer and producer groups to pursue their preferred policy options. The following
section describes the way in which the organized interests of consumers and producers
confronted each other in France and in Germany.
The Policy Conflict over National Models of Consumer Protection
We have seen that the way in which producer and consumer interests were
organized in France and Germany played three different roles in policymaking,
determining preference ranking, political weight, and capacities to implement policies.
These three different roles interact in a complex way to generate policy outcomes.
Because of this complex interaction, policy formation in new areas of policy often has an
internal dynamic. In France, for example, , the process of consumer policy formation
lasted for nearly ten years before a stable policy model emerged. In Germany, a different
set of institutional constraints allowed policymakers to arrive at a stable policy solution
after only a short period of deliberation. By paying close attention to the different roles of
interest organization we can gain an understanding of the internal dynamics by which
even radically new areas of policy are formed.
One way of mapping the political dynamic of new policy formation is to employ
an asymmetric preference game based on the preference rankings of consumer and
producer groups. From the policy preference rankings of those groups we can adduce an
ordinal payoff schedule (see Figure 8 above). The lowest policy preference of each actor
receives 0 points, the second policy preference receives 1 point, and the highest policy
preference receives 2 points. Since French and German consumer groups had different
preference rankings, emerging from their different strategies of organization, their
payoffs are accordingly different. Producer preference rankings, and policy payoffs, are
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the same in both France and Germany. Consumer and producer policy payoffs are
summarized in Figure 9.
preference consumer groups consumer groups Producer interests
rankings French German France and Germany
information 0 1 2
negotiation 2 2 1
protection 1 0 0
Figure 9. Policy payoff schedule for consumer and producer groups in France and
Germany.
In Germany, both consumers and producers had a common lowest preference, the
protection model. Conflict therefore emerged only over which interest group would
achieve its higher-ranked option.'2 6 In this conflict the weak organization of the consumer
movement placed limits on its ability to achieve its preferred policy, the negotiation
approach. Moreover, the strong organizational capacities of industry in Germany
permitted them industry to make the information strategy an effective policy tool for
consumer protection. German policy therefore came to favor producer over consumer
policy preferences.
In France, by contrast, where the first preference of producers - the information
model -corresponded to the third preference of consumers, the process of policy
formation was more dynamic. Early consumer protection initiatives favored industry by
adopting the information model. As consumer mobilization increased the political
influence of consumers, however, this information model became contested. The policy
model therefore shifted to negotiation. This negotiation model, representing the first
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preference of consumers and the second preference of producers, was the socially optimal
policy in that it offered the greatest combined payoff. Yet this strategy also failed,
primarily because of the inability of French industry associations to impose negotiated
solutions on individual companies. As a consequence, France shifted to its final position,
the protection model. Because it was the second preference of consumers and the third
preference of producers, this policy can be seen as a victory for the consumer movement.
Interestingly, however, the protection model also represented the worst social outcome
(that is, the worst combined score) for producers and consumers.
The Evolution of Consumer Policy in France
French consumer policy proceeded in three stages. In the first stage, from roughly
1970 to 1978, consumer policies focused on the information strategy. This was the
particular emphasis of policies under the first Secretary of Consumption, Christiane
Scrivener, from 1976-1978. This policy approach represented the best payoff for
producers and the worst payoff for consumers. As consumers mobilized over the course
of the 1970s, they became unsatisfied with this information model. The third Barre
government of 1978 began the second stage of French consumer policy, in which
consumers and producers espoused the negotiation model of consumer protection.
Consumer and professional groups met to work out standards for all aspects of consume
protection policy. By 1983, however, both sides had become disenchanted with the
negotiation approach. The core problem was that French businesses were unable to
negotiate agreements in a collective way. So long as all companies were not bound by
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126 This kind of struggle, in which the group payoff is the same but individual payoffs
differ, is referred to generically as a "battle of the sexes" game.
agreements, individual companies were hesitant to participate for fear of suffering a
competitive disadvantage. Hence in 1983 French policy moved to the third stage, in
which policy reflected the protection strategy. New government policies attempted to
push full responsibility for product-related risk onto producers. They also began to
encourage private legal enforcement of these new consumer protections. Figure 10 below
describes the payoff levels of these different stages for consumers and producers.
organized
producers
not organized
mobilized
Figure 10. Consumer Policy Payoff Matrix
consumers
not mobilized
for producers and consumers in France.
France's early initiatives in consumer protection, in the first policy stage, focused
on providing consumers with accurate information. This policy approach was pushed
most strongly by France's first Secretary of Consumption, Christiane Scrivener, appointed
to the position in 1976 under the second government of Raymond Barre. Scrivener, who
had just returned from the Harvard Business School with a mid-career MBA degree, was
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negotiation model information model
(1,2) (2, C)
stage 2 (1978-83) stage 1 (1970-78)
protection model
(0, 1)
stage 3 (1983-)
focused on the economic role that consumers should play in the economy. 127 "Their
information," she wrote, "determines the very orientation of our economy."'2 8 Her
program for consumer protection included four "axes of action" that embodied the
information model: (1) incorporate durability into the design of products, (2) give
consumers more information regarding durability, which manufacturers collect, (3)
require improved documentation and construction that allows consumers to keep their
product longer, and (4) create regulations to help the second-hand market function
properly.' 29
Some of Scrivener's specific policy initiatives for improving consumer
information relied on market mechanisms. She pushed to legalize comparative
advertising in France, for example, on the grounds that this could provide consumers with
valuable information. She also called for French companies to create their own consumer
relations offices that could communicate individually with consumers.'3 0 But Scrivener
also felt that in many cases the strategy of consumer protection through accurate
information required direct state intervention. 31 She pushed policies that targeted both
information and education. Information policies included a new standard for quality
certificates, with the Ministry of industry imposing a minimum standard of quality for all
127 Margaret de Miraval, "France's consumer minister," The Christian Science Monitor,
14 Feb 1977.
128 Christiane Scrivener, "Le droit des consommateurs a l'information," Allocutions
ministrielles (Secr6tariat d'Etat a la consommation, 11 October 1976), p 2.
129 Christine Scrivener, "La durabilit6 des produits, une exigence dont les industriels
doivent davantage tenir compte," Les _ 'tos, 6 Mar 1978.
130 Christiane Scrivener, "Pour un 'service consommateurs' dans les entreprises," Les
Notes Bleues du Service de l'informatiort du Ministere de l'6conomie et desfinances (6
April 1977).
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products. 3 2 In 1977, Scrivener introduced consumer education into the elementary school
curriculum. 133 A law with similar effect, the reforme Haby, called for consumer
education in technical schools. The curriculum of this education had a strong commercial
content, including such topics as the way to distinguish a real Camembert.' 3 4
Yet this information strategy that Scrivener had come to represent was being
challenged by a very different conception of the consumer interest group. Writing in
1977, Michel Wieworka noted that French consumerism at the time seemed to have two
modes: "On the one hand, [product] scandals that by their high social visibility give a
sudden importance to general consumer themes and to groups dedicated to consumers; on
the other hand, a sustained effort, much less popular, tending towards informing middle-
class consumers. "'135 This emerging conception of the consumer as having a collective
interest was already latent in society. As early as 1973, the loi Royer had proposed
granting consumer groups the right to file class action suits, although this law was later
diluted through court interpretation.'36 Indeed business had proved quite open to
negotiating directly with consumer groups on issues that related to consumer
131 Christiane Scrivener, "Pour un 'service consommateurs' dans les entreprises," Les
Notes Bleues du Service de l'information du Minist6re de lconomie et desfinances (6
April 1977).
132Gisele Prevost, "Qualification de produits industriels," Les Echos, 27 Sep 1979.
133 Garrigou, Marcel. L'Assaaut des Consommateurs pour changer les rapports
producteurs - vendeurs - consommateurs. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1981), p 93.
34 Claudie Bert, "La consommation et les enfants," J'lnforme, 18, Nov, 1977.
135 "...d'une part, des scandales qui par leur forte visibilite sociale donnent une
importance soudaine aux themes generaux du consumerism et aux organisations qui s'y
consacrent; d'autre part, un effort soutenu, nettement moins poluaire, axe sure un effort
d'information sur la consommation de couches petites-bourgeoises." Michel Wieviorka,
L 'Etat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements de consommateurs,
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), p 245.
136 "Les organismes de consommateurs peuvent se porter partie civile," La Croix, 29 June
1974.
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information.13 7 Already in 1970 the CNPF had collaborated with the state-run consumer
group INC to negotiate standard product labels. In 1976 the Consumption Committee of
the French Seventh Plan proposed the creation of an ongoing dialogue between
consumers and producers, including representation of consumer groups in the
associations that manage product information (France's standard setting body AFNOR,
the labeling body AFEI, etc). The Consumption Committee also suggested that this
negotiation approach might be employed to eliminate abusive contract clauses and to
simplify consumer litigation. 138
This negotiation approach to consumer protection became the orthodoxy of the
Third Barre Government, which was inaugurated in 1978, and was especially
championed by the new Economics Minister, Ren6 Monory. Monory's tenure marked the
beginning of the second stage of French consumer protection. He was an economist by
training, and believed that the best approach to consumer protection was not through
greater government regulation but instead was through empowering consumers to
represent their interests directly to business. To symbolize this view, he eliminated the
position of Secretary of Consumption. Instead, he publicly referred to himself as the
"Minister of Consumption," and advocated that government financial support to
consumer groups be quadrupled in his first two years in office.' 39 "We need to make
producers and distributors realize," Monory wrote, "that the consumer should become a
partner in all things, and who participates at all levels: from product manufacturing to
137 "Opinions sur la fonction consommation et la libre entreprise," Humanisme et
Entreprise 102 (April 1977), pp 13-19.
138 Jacques Dubois, "Les consommateurs dans le 76me plan." Information Consommation
OR-GE-CO 15 (March-April 1976), pp 1-2.
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price setting." 14 0 He felt that even inflation might be held down if the two million current
members of consumer groups in France were to join in a single organization.'4 '
The negotiation approach, which had been proposed by consumer groups in
1975,142 was also increasingly accepted by business as a useful alternative to direct
government intervention. Ambroise Roux, the head of the CNPF, felt that consumer
groups "should be encouraged and developed."' 4 3 From November 1979 to 1981 the
CNPF met monthly with consumer groups to discuss consumer issues as diverse as
advertising, automobile sales, after-sale service, and others.'44 Between 1980 and 1983,
the newly created Conseil National de la Publicit6 (CNP) negotiated with consumer
associations to set standards for advertising. The Conseil contained represeentatives of 11
consumer organizations and 1 1 representatives of the media.'4 5 Similar efforts to have
consumer and professional interests negotiate agreements were being undertaken at the
regional and local level throughout France.
By the beginning of 1980, however, French consumer associations had become
frustrated that industry was not actually abiding by negotiated standards. In a letter of
January 1980, the 11 major national consumer associations renounced participation in all
139 "Ren6 Monory: davantage de moyens pour informer les consommateurs," Dimocratie
Moderne, 22 November 1979.
140 "II faut faire comprendre aux producteurs et distributeurs, explique M. Monory, que le
consommateur doit devenir un partenaire a part entiere, qui participe A tous les niveaux:
la fabrication des produits comme la formation des prix." Jean Marchand, "M. Monory
veut des consommateurs puissants," La Croix, 28 September 1979.
141 "Un hypersyndicat?" Le Nouveau Journal, 28 Sep 1979.
142 Jacques Dubois, "Du Mepris a la Concertation," Information Consommation OR-GE-
CO 20 (Jan-Feb 1977), p 2.
143 "...devraient etre encouragees et developpees." Ambroise Roux, (President of the
CNPF), "La r6forme de l'entreprise," CNPF Patronat (Feb 1976), p 29.
144 G6rard Lavergne, "Eux, les clients," CNPF Patronat 429 (November 1981), p 22..
145 "La guerre est finie," CNPF Patronat 447 (July 1983), p 71..
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collective agreements with the state and with business until an enforcement mechanism
was established. 146 Their answer came with the 1981 Socialist victory of Francois
Mitterrand. Mitterrand proposed in his campaign platform, the 110 Propositions for
France, that "consumer associations must be supported."'4 7 Emphasizing the importance
of the consumer, Mitterrand created a Ministerial-level position dedicated to the
consumer interest, and with the explicit goal of promoting negotiations between
consumer groups and professional interests.'4 8 In September of 1981, the newly
appointed Minister of Consumption, Catherine Lalumiere, said in an interview: "I believe
that we can do nothing with individual consumers in the state of nature, nor if all effort is
concentrated at the state level."' 4 9
The solution that the government proposed was that consumer groups be treated
as were labor union. By this analogy, industry should be given the responsibility of
making binding agreements with consumer groups. Consumer advocates felt that the
interests of consumers deserved a legal status similar to that of labor interests.150 To this
end, Lalumiere appointed the consumer activist Jean Calais-Auloy head of a committee to
rewrite the consumer law so as to incorporate existing regulation into a negotiated
146 Didier Ferrier, La Protection des Consommateurs, (Paris: Dalloz, 1996), p 80.
147 I faut renforcer les associations de consommateurs. C'est une des priorit6s de mon
action car je crois que l'on ne peut rien faire avec des consommateurs atomises dans la
nature et qu'on ne peut rien faire si tout est concentr6 au niveau de l'Etat." Alain Poir6e,
Les Discours consum6ristes et leur perception par les Frangais (Paris: I.C.C.-C.N.P.F.,
1984), p 36.
148 Decree NO 81-704 of 16 July 1981 "Relatif aux attributions du minstre de la
consommation." (cited in "le ministere de la consommation," Consommateurs Actualites
297 (4 sept 1981), pp 5-6.
149 "Je crois qu'on ne peut rien faire avec des consommateurs atomis6s dans la nature et
qu'on ne peut rein faire si tout est concentr6 au niveau de l'Etat." Jos6e Doyere, "Un
entretien avec le ministre de la consommation," Le Monde, 17 September 1981.
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framework. 1' 5 This corporatist solution was applauded by consumers but strongly
opposed by industry. The Paris Chamber of Trade and Industry (CCIP) criticized the
Calais-Auloy committee for its lack of industry representatives.' 52 The CNPF strongly
opposed treating consumer relations in the same way as labor relations.' 53 They argued
that professional associations could not sign binding agreements with consumers because
consumer groups were not truly representative, and because consumer groups did not
have the technical training properly to consider the issues that would be involved.'5 4 The
Ministry of Justice sided with industry, arguing that the analogy between consumers and
labor unions was not legally valid.'55 Finally, the financial crisis of 1983 put an end to
Lalumiere's corporatist aspirations. French business was simply not sufficiently organized
to negotiate on an equal footing with consumer groups. Business foresaw correctly that
the diversity of their interests would put them at a disadvantage to consumers.'5 6
This policy collapse signaled the move to the third Stage of French consumer
policy, in which consumers would be protected through state regulations and
interventions designed to shift the burden of product-related risk fully onto producers.
150 "N6gociation collective: le point de vue des juristes," Que Savoir 43-44 (June-July
1982), p 53.
'51 Jos6e Doyere, "Des 'conventions collectives' de la consommation rendront obligatoires
les engagements des professionnels," Le Monde, 5 December 1981.
152 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris. La Politique de la Consommation.
Rapport pr6sent au nom de la Commission du Commerce Interieur par Messieurs
Lefeubvre et Blat (Adopted 14 January and 11 March 1982), p 16.
153 Elisabeth Rochard, "Le CNPF ne veut pas de conventions collectives de la
consommation," Le Matin, 19 February 1982.
154 Maria Aubertin, and Edmond Robin, Les Nouveaux Rapports entre producteurs et
consommateurs, (Paris: La Mission a l'innovation, Report No 6, November 1981).
155 Ministere de la Justice, "Observations sur l'eventualit6 de conventions collectives entre
les organisations de consommateurs et les professionnels," Paris, 14 march 1980.
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This policy was embodied in the 1983 law for consumer protection that created the
Consumer Safety Commission (Comission pour la S6curit6 des Consommateurs, or
CSC), modeled on the US Food and Drug Administration. 57 Government Ministries were
granted extraordinary rights to survey the consumer market and to call for products to be
withdrawn. In 1985 France endorsed a state-sponsored consumer defense by joining the
functions of consumer protection, competition, and repression of fraud in the new
General Direction of Competition, Consumption and the Elimination of Fraud (Direction
G6n6rale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la R6pression des Fraudes, or
DGCCRF).' 58 It is this protection model that remains the dominant strategy of consumer
protection in France today.
Stasis in Consumer Policy in Germany
Because German consumer groups ranked their preferences for the different
consumer protection models differently, the payoff matrix for the German policy game
looks different from that in France. See Figure 11 below. Two general observations can
be made. First, because the protection model was the lowest preference both of consumer
groups and of producer groups, it never came into play as a viable policy alternative in
Germany. 59 This means that most policy debates in Germany took the form of conflict
156 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris, La Creation du Conseil National de la
Consommation, Rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par
M. Gaucher (Adopted 19 may 1983), p 10.
157 Frangoise Vaysse, "Les anges gardiens de la s6curit6," Le Monde, 14 April 1992.
158 Anne Fily, and Philippe Guillermin, "Les politiques de la consommation dans les Etats
membres de la CEE," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 70 (November-
December 1992), pp 43-50.
159 Indeed, when the protection strategy was proposed in European[be more specific here
by naming the European organization related to negotiations, Lotsa << European >> things
in this world. You are too non-specific.] negotiations, for example in the negotiations for
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between the negotiation strategy and the protection strategy. Second, while the
information model favors producer preferences and the negotiation model favors
consumer preferences, the combined payoff of the two models are the same. Given the
weak mobilization and political force of the German consumer movement, and the strong
organization and political weight of German industrial associations, Germany's adoption
of the information strategy followed nearly as a matter of course. Critical to this outcome
was both the weakness of Germany's consumer movement, and the strength of Germany's
industrial associations.
organized
producers
not organized
mobilized
consumers
not mobilized
Figure 11. Consumer Policy Payoff Matrix for producers and consumers in
Germany.
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a product liability directive, German consumers and producer concurred in their
opposition. Cannot find where this footnote is hanging from.
In part because of these different consumer group preferences, and in part because
of the different organizational strategies of consumers and producers, the German
product- market regulation process is nearly static over time German consumer protection
policy began with and has maintained an emphasis on the information model of consumer
protection. Consumer input into policy making, in this approach, has taken the form of
technical advice rather than strong interest representation. In 1973, for example, the
German Ministry of Justice convened a discussion group to decide a course of action for
regulating consumer contracts. Nearly 150 of the most prominent production and labor
associations attended. Consumer groups were invited, and half a dozen also attended.
However the strong attendance by industry and labo- representatives simply
overwhelmed the consumer advocates, so that consumer interests did not have a strong
input into the final proposed legislation. The resulting law on standard contract terms
(Gesetz zur Allgemeingeschiftsbedingungen, or AGB-Gesetz) thus closely reflected
these industry interests. 160 Without greater mobilization, Germany's consumer groups
were unable apply political pressure for policies they favored.
The negotiation approach was not entirely abandoned, however.. In regulations
that treated product information, for example, it was often possible to accommodate the
interests both of industry in the information model and of consumer groups in the
negotiation model. Yet regulators stopped short of giving consumer groups a truly equal
position in relation to producers. In advertising, for example, consumer groups were
160 Heribert Schatz, Verbraucherinteressen im politischen Entscheidungsproze
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1984), p 68.
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given a policing role in ensuring that Germany's high standard of advertising was met.16 1
But legislation blocked consumer groups from seeking remuneration for consumers who
had been deceived by illegal advertising. 62 As the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
explicitly warned, that kind of class action suit focused on consumer claims would be
unacceptably profitable for consumer groups.'63 A similar dynamic emerged in product
labeling in Germany. In 1974, Germany's labeling organization (Deutsches Institut fur
Guitesicherung und Kennzeichnung) proposed that minimum acceptable safety standards
for products be negotiated outside of the industry standard-setting organization, DIN, by
a committee composed of equal members from consumer and producer groups. While
industry favored labeling, they objected to the influence that this arrangement would give
consumers in setting product standards.'64 Under pressure from industry, the Economics
Ministry refused to support the project, and a new Produktinformation (PI) system was
created by the Association of German Industry (BDI) that effectively removed
government and consumer influence from labeling decisions. 165 In sum, industry accepted
collaboration with consumer groups in the interest of pursuing an information strategy of
product market regulation, but in each case stopped short of acceding to equitable
negotiations with consumers.
161 Schricker, Gerhard. "Soll der einzelne Verbraucher ein Recht zur Klage wegen
unlauteren Wettbewerbs erhalten?" Zeitschriftfiir Rechtspolitik 8 (1975), pp 189-190.
162 Alex Stein, "Die Verbraucheranspriiche und ihre Geltenmachung durch
Verbraucherverbande nach der UWG-Novelle," Journal of Consumer Policy 3 (1979), pp
29-40.
163 "Mehr Schutz vor unlauterem Wettbewerb," Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 Jan 1982.
164 "Grundsitze fur Giitezeichen," Bundesanzeiger, 23 March 1974.
165 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe HeibUlt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 86.
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German product market regulation favored the interests of industry not only
because of the political weight of producer groups but also because they were committed
to a strategy of producing high- quality goods that made the information model an
attractive approach to product safety. As David Soskice and Wolfgang Streeck have
argued, the structure of relations between producers and their suppliers, workers, and
capital in Germany have pushed German producers towards a production strategy that
emphasizes high-quality products and incremental innovation. 66 Not only has this
strategic bias towards quality given German industry a genuine interest in an information
solution to consumer protection, it has also made the information model a highly
attractive solution for German regulators. After all, the information solution to product
risk depends not only on providing consumers with accurate product information, but also
on the availability of high quality goods capable of lowering consumer risk.
Consistent with the information approach, Germany has given industry a high
degree of autonomy. Germany's Equipment Safety Law (Geratsicherheitsgesetz, or GSG),
for example, does not itself specify minimum safety standards, but instead makes
standards established by industry, in the context of DIN, mandatory for all producers.167
The Economics Ministry did force DIN in 1974 to accept consumer representatives on
technical standards committees relating to consumer products. But these representatives
act in a technical rather than in a representative fashion. They are outnumbered on these
166 David Soskice, German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional
Frameworks, Discussion Paper FS I 96-319 (Berlin: Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin, 1996);
Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Preconditions of Diversified Quality
Production," in Social Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. Wolfgang Streeck
(London: Park Sage Productions, 1992).
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committees by representatives from industry, and have no formal veto power over
decisions on standards.' 68 Similarly, the negligence standard that Germany applies to
cases of product liability provides for producer exculpation if the company can show that
accepted manufacturing practices were followed.'69 The goal of German risk regulation,
in other words, is to enforce industry standards of product design and manufacturing on
all producers, in the understanding that industry itself held the greatest knowledge and
capability to ensure that high quality goods came to market. Product standards in this
approach could not be subjected to negotiations between producer and consumer groups,
as the negotiation model advocated.
Lessons from French and German Product Market Regulation
In radically new areas of public policy, alternative ideas about how the new policy
should be addressed become the focus of political contestation. Such alternative ideas
have the status of policy models, in that they imply comprehensive but exclusive
conceptual frameworks for regulation. Which policy model came to dominate policy-
making in each country depended on the interests and institutional form of the important
economic actors in each society. Especially in new policy areas, group interests are linked
to their institutional form in at least three ways. First, the way in which group interests
are organized can affect their policy preferences. We observe this in the different
16 7 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibuilt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 101.
168 Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Gert Briiggemeier, Die
Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p 186.
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preference ranking of French and German consumer groups. Second, a greater capacity to
organize group membership confers a greater political weight. We observe, for example,
the growing political weight of French consumer groups as they increase their grass-roots
membership. Third, the institutional capacity of interest groups places constraints on the
kinds of policies they can successfully pursue. German industry, for example, was well
coordinated to pursue an information strategy to consumer protection, whereas French
industry lacked sufficient coordination among individual companies. Thus economic
interest groups confronting radically new areas of policy resolve their conflicting
preferences among policy models through a political contest, the outcome of which is
strongly influenced by the way in which their group interests are organized.
In the area of product market regulations in particular, the contested-ideas
approach helps to explain why different countries have adopted different regulatory
strategies. In general, when consumers are mobilized and industry is disorganized, as in
France, we should expect a protection approach to consumer policy to emerge. This
model also appears to represent the approaches adopted in the United States and in
Canada. When consumers are not mobilized and industry is organized, as in Germany, we
should expect an information approach to consumer policy to emerge. This model
appears to represent the approaches adopted in Spain and in Austria. Finally, when
consumers are mobilized and businesses are organized, the situation emerges in which a
negotiation strategy prevails. This model appears to describe the consumer policy setting
in Sweden and indeed in all of Scandinavia. Those countries enjoyed strong cooperative
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169 Henricus Duintjer Tebbens, International Product Liability: A Study of Comparative
and International Aspects of Product Liability (The Hague: Asser Institute, 1979), pp 74-
75.
movements early in the century that formed the basis of a strong consumer mobilization.
Producers too are highly organized, and enjoy amicable relations with trade unions.
Finally, in the case where consumers are not mobilized and business is disorganized,
consumer policy is likely to be haphazard and weak. This model appears to prevail in
Britain today.
This strategy of explanation does have two significant limitations. First, it does
not conceptualize the institutional context of policy making, but instead treats the policy
process as a black box. This approach therefore ignores policy theories that focus
attention on the structure of the state such as bureaucratic phenomena, agenda-setting, or
veto points.'70 But this blindness to the functioning of the state also has advantages. In the
case of product market regulation, for example, my research finds that the parliament, the
ministry of economics, and the court system all contributed substantially to the shape of
product market regulations in both France and Germany. Any theory based on close
institutional analysis of the state would have to explain how such different institutions
consistently pushed for a similar regulatory strategy. The contested-ideas approach
assumes that government policies reflect the preferences of societal interests in
proportion to the political power and organizational capacity of their advocates. This
simple model also helps to explain how countries with such different government
structures, such as France and the United States, have adopted very similar strategies of
product market regulation.
170 Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964); Ellen Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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The second limitation of the contested-ideas approach is that it does not address
the origins of consumer and producer organizational strategies. French and German
industrial organizations have roots in their nineteenth-century experience of
industrialization. As such, they precede the debate on consumer protection by nearly a
century. But the different organizational strategies of French and German consumer
groups had a far more recent origin, emerging only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In
this context, the contested-ideas approach artificially separates the question of consumer
group organization from the broader question of product market regulation. Chapter 5
below addresses the origins of German and French consumer group strategies. The
research described there shows that consumer groups in fact adopted their organizational
strategies in large part in response to existing government and industry institutions.
Despite these limitations, the contested-ideas model of policy formation offers
important advantages for comparative policy analysis. First, it suggests that institutional
analysis need not limit its explanatory scope to instances of policy continuity, but that it
can also offer powerful insights into periods of radical policy change. If policy evolution
is understood as a process of punctuated equilibrium, this research suggests that the field
of comparative politics can apply the tools of institutional analysis to explain not just the
equilibrium but also the punctuation. Second, it suggests that the core role of ideas in new
policy formation is to elaborate coherent regulatory strategies, not to blind policymakers
to possible alternatives. Ideas in this model work to clarify rather than to obscure. Third,
this research suggests that any analysis of nascent policy areas must be able to integrate
the insights of rational-choice institutionalist and historical institutionalist approaches in
order to capture the political dynamic of new policy formation in which both interests and
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institutions are not yet fixed. This study of product market regulations has suggested at
least one way in which the rational-choice and the historical approaches can be
integrated.
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Chapter 3. How National Varieties of Consumerism Drive Product Choice
The different regulatory strategies employed in France and Germany have
important implications for the kinds of products that are produced and consumed.
Germany pursues what might be called a means-based approach to consumer protection,
in which existing industry capabilities set the terms of consumer protection. France, by
contrast, pursues an ends-based approach in which consumer priorities dictate industry
regulation. This chapter describes the impact that this policy difference has on the
product choices of consumers and producers.
Before proceeding, it important to emphasize that the arguments of this chapter
remain hypothetical. The focus of my research has primarily been on the causes of
divergent national product market regulation rather than on the economic consequences
of this divergence. As will become clear, the impact of product market regulations is
potentially great, but also complex. Many of the theoretical issues lie beyond the
primarily political emphasis of this thesis. The secondary literature on this subject offers
little recourse. Indeed, few of the policy areas that I study have been the subject of useful
empirical economic analysis. These limitations have constrained the scope of my own
treatment. First, this chapter focuses only on the regulation of product risk and product
information. While direct product regulations (see Chapter 8) have arguably had a greater
impact on producers than have risk and information regulation, their impact depends to
an important degree on the details of implementation and is therefore difficult to present
in summary. Second, I offer supporting evidence of the impact of market regulations
from only two policy areas. For product information I present findings from studies of
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comparative product testing. For product risk I present findings from studies of product
liability. Again, because of the dearth of empirical data, these case studies are suggestive
but not definitive. Nonetheless, these cases do suggest that market regulations, those that
set the risk and information context of consumer transactions, have a powerful impact on
the product strategies of consumers and producers.
Information, Risk and Market Failure
One of the first economists to point out the independent impact of market setting
on consumer and producer decisions was George Akerlof. In his 1970 article "The
Market for Lemons" he explained why price information alone frequently does not
provide adequate information for a market to function efficiently. 171 He describes the
situation of a used car lot, in which the consumer cannot know the actual condition of the
car on sale, and the salesman has no incentive to provide the consumer with accurate
information. In this setting buyers must assume that they are being cheated. Used cars
that actually are in good condition nonetheless sell below their real value because
consumers cannot know their condition is in fact good. This means that car owners
wishing to resell are likely to do so only if their cars are already damaged in some way.
Otherwise they would not receive the true value of the car. This results in a smaller used-
car market than would exist in the presence of better information, and a preponderance of
hidden defects in the cars that are traded.
This kind of information asymmetry in the market for used cars helps to explain
why new cars fall drastically in value as they leave the dealership. It is the reputation of
171 George Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84
(1970), pp 488-500.
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the manufacturer and their liability for the car, reinforced by warrantees and lemon laws,
that ensure that the price of a new car reflects its true value. Once the car has left the lot,
the information and legal protection that accompany a new car are lost. The combined
value of this information and legal protection is exactly equal to the immediate drop in
value of a newly purchased automobile.
The information asymmetries that Akerlof describes are not limited to markets for
used goods. A manufacturer that invests highly in technical aspects of a product that are
not immediately visible to the consumer, for example, will be able to recover the cost of
this additional investment only if the consumer is adequately informed about the value of
these hidden improvements. This kind of investment may therefore only make sense for a
marketplace in which consumers are extremely knowledgeable about the products they
purchase. In the absence of such an informed consumer base, producers can only compete
effectively on product characteristics that consumers can understand and evaluate. In this
way the market setting can generate a competitive dynamic in which Akerlof's market for
lemons emerges even among new products. In general, when strong information
asymmetries prevail between producers and consumers, higher quality goods sell below
their actual value (that is, the value they would have given complete information).
Companies producing higher quality goods must therefore either leave the market, or
shift production to lower quality goods. By analogy to Gresham's Law, information
asymmetries in national product markets can cause bad products to drive out good.
The consumer is not always the party facing an information deficit. Information
asymmetries may also work to the detriment of producers. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew
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Weiss describe this kind of market failure in their study of credit rationing by banks."'7
Like the car dealer, the money borrower has better information than the bank about
whether or not she is likely to default.' 73 Yet it is the bank that takes on the risk of a
possible default. The problem is that the bank in this situation is unable to distinguish
between those borrowers who accept to pay higher premiums because they genuinely
face higher risks, and other borrowers who accept to pay higher premiums because they
already know that they plan to default. This uncertainty leads banks to ration their credit.
Without more information about the intentions of borrowers, banks offer fewer loans than
would be economically optimal. In the absence of better information, the market for
loans, like the market for used cars, remains smaller than it might be.
As the case of credit rationing makes clear, information asymmetries can also be
conceived as risk asymmetries. Market failures arise not just when one party knows more
than the other, but when the ignorant party also bears the burden of risk. In the case of the
used car lot, the problem is not just that the consumer is ignorant of possible mechanical
failures, but also that the consumer bears the full burden of risk for these failures.
Markets function efficiently when the knowledgeable party also bears the risk. This
means that market failures of the sort described by Akerlof are always open to two kinds
of solution: either information redistributing, or risk reallocating. These two approaches
correspond the information and protection models described in Chapter 2 above.
172 Joseph Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information" American Economic Review 71, 3 (June 1981), pp 393-410.
173 To see the similarity to Akerlof's analysis, think of the borrower as selling the right to
future earnings, with the bank as buyer.
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Figure 12. National approaches to consumer protection.
Conceptually, four distributions of product risk and information are possible. See
Figure 12. The situation we observe in France is represented in the lower right square,
where product market regulations are characterized by inaccurate product information
and where consumers bear a low burden of risk. The situation we observe in Germany is
represented in the upper left square, where product market regulations are characterized
by accurate product information and where consumers bare a relatively high bx:c;en of
risk. The scenario foreseen by Akerlof, in which information is poor and liability resides
with the consumer, is described by the lower-left square. This combination of low
product information and high consumer risk describes nearly all national product markets
during industrialization and continues to characterize many developing economies today.
The final square, in which consumer risk is low and consumer information is high,
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describes a perfect consumer market, in which buyers have full knowledge of products
and product-related risks are negligible. This perfect consumer market rarely exists in
practice, since consumer grievances can generally be met either through information or
through protection alone. The countries that come closest to achieving the perfect
consumer market are in Scandinavia, where a negotiated approach to consumer protection
combines information and protection strategies.
Market Rules Drive Product Choice
Both the German strategy of increased consumer information and the French
strategy of increased producer responsibility for product-related risk succeed in
addressing the problems of market failure arising from information and risk asymmetries.
Yet these different strategies are not neutral in respect to product choice, either for the
consuming public or for producing companies. Each strategy works to eliminate market
failure, but each also generates a different competitive dynamic in the consumer
marketplace. In general, solutions of the kind adopted in Germany that focus on
consumer information favor a competition for high-quality production and gradualist
innovation. Conversely, solutions of the kind adopted in France, as well as in the United
States, focus on allocating product-related risk to producers, and favor a competition for
lower-quality production and radical forms of innovation.
All products combine a set of hidden qualities with other visible qualities. Hidden
qualities include aspects such as internal engineering, safety features, and extensive
laboratory testing. These are qualities of the product that the consumer cannot assess by
simple inspection without specialized knowledge. By contrast, visible qualities are those
that all consumers naturally evaluate as they purchase, including product traits such as
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aesthetics, taste, and feel. Different kinds of products naturally incorporate different
proportions of visible and hidden qualities. Traditional products such as clothing and
leather goods all have a high level of visible qualities and a relatively low level of hidden
qualities. Other products such as pharmaceuticals and sophisticated "black-box"
equipment have a high level of hidden qualities and a relatively low level of visible
qualities. All products lie at some point in the space that defines their degree of hidden
and visible qualities. See Figure 13 below.
Visible Qualities
low high
high
Hidden
Qualities
low
Figure 13. Examples of Hidden and Visible Qualities of Products.
The information strategy of consumer protection works by revealing to consumers
some of the hidden qualities of products. Among those hidden qualities lie aspects of the
product that are relevant to consumer safety. Also among these hidden qualities lie
features such as durability, design, engineering, company experience, and workmanship.
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Thus along with information about consumer safety comes information about other
qualities of the products such as durability, design, and engineering. In this way the
information strategy provides consumers with a broad insight into the hidden qualities of
products. Moreover, because consumers in the information model face a relatively high
burden of risk from product-related failure, they have an incentive to take this
information into account as they make their purchasing decisions. Consumers in this
information model thus protect themselves against product risk by purchasing higher
quality goods. The higher price they pay can be seen as a form of insurance against
unsafe products. Producers accordingly come to compete for a high level of the hidden
product qualities that consumers prefer.
The protection model, by contrast, protects consumers by assigning product-
related risk to producers. This model also leads to a high level of consumer safety
because it groups product risk and product information in the same actor, namely the
producer. Producers in this model absorb the full cost of product-related risk, which they
pool and pass on to consumers in the form of a price premium on their products. To take
an extreme example, 95 percent of the cost of children's vaccines is estimated to pay for
liability insurance and legal fees. 17 4 This risk premium that producers bear must be
divided between a combination of product safety design and liability insurance measures.
Unlike the information strategy, this protection approach creates incentives for both
consumers and producers to favor lower quality goods.
For consumers, the protection strategy means that more expensive products are
not necessarily safer. That is because consumers cannot know whether each additional
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unit of product price reflects better safety and design, or simply the additional cost
premium from insurance against product failures. Similar to the case of loan rationing
described above, the consumer in the protection model is unable to distinguish between
higher prices that reflect the cost of better hidden qualities and higher prices that reflect
higher product risk. Without information that would allow them to distinguish between a
quality premium and a risk premium, the consumer will ration demand for higher-priced
goods.
For the producer, the protection strategy means that consumers have no incentive
to inform themselves about their products, because, in principle, consumers face a low
legal burden of risk. Consumers therefore have a low recognition of hidden qualities.
Moreover, producers face a high burden of product risk and have strong incentives to
ensure that the products they sell are safe. Thus the protection model leads the producer
to invest in consumer safety. But companies do not have any incentive to improve other
hidden qualities of products, such as design or durability, since their consumers are not
informed to recognize these improvements. Producers in the protection model therefore
invest heavily in safety measures but minimize investment in other hidden qualities such
as engineering and durability.
The market rules governing the context in which consumers shop have an effect
not only on product quality, but also on strategies of product innovation. In markets
governed by the information model, consumers and producers are likely to emphasize
gradual kinds of innovation to existing products. Producers have strong market incentives
to invest in innovations that improve the hidden qualities of existing products, since they
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know that consumers recognize and favor this kind of quality emphasis. What has made
the German automobile industry so successful, for example, is not just the skill of
German engineers, but also the knowledge and quality emphasis of Germany's consuming
public. The down-side of this quality emphasis is that German consumers face new kinds
of products with a strong skepticism. This skepticism is not just cultural; it is built into
Germany's market rules. German consumers protect themselves in the marketplace
through accurate information that allows them to purchase high-quality goods. For
radically new kinds of products, though, accurate information is generally unavailable.
Faced with this uncertainty, consumers avoid radical innovation. For German industry,
this conservative kind of demand makes radical innovation a bad business strategy.
If the information strategy favors gradual product innovation, the protection
strategy favors radical product innovation. One of the problems with radically new kinds
of products is that they carry greater uncertainty and correspondingly higher risks than
conventional products. Radically innovative products may not work as well as expected,
or they may be turn out to be harmful. In the protection model, however, the consumer
enjoys, at least in principle, the same high level of protection against risk from all kinds
of products. Thus the consumer in the protection model is not strongly deterred by the
potential higher risk of radically new kinds of products. Furthermore, radically new kinds
of products differ from existing products in ways that are immediately visible to any
consumer. Recognizing radically new products does not require detailed knowledge of
their hidden qualities. Because consumers in the protection model do not have a high
level of information about the hidden qualities of products (nor a strong risk-driven
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incentive to secure this kind of information), they have a comparative advantage in
products with visible qualities. This creates a competitive dynamic that favors not only
traditional kinds of products, whose qualities are apparent to all, but also radically new
kinds of products, for which the innovation is immediately apparent to the consumer.
Risk Allocation Through Product Liability Law
Product liability laws in France and Germany have contributed to these patterns of
producer and consumer product choice. The legal standards of both countries embrace a
broader goal of consumer protection, but they function in different ways. German product
liability law encourages product safety by reinforcing the institutions of quality
production.17 5 It does so in part by exculpating companies that adopt accepted industry
product standards, worker training programs, and management strategies. This so-called
negligence standard of product liability ensures that all companies operate in conformity
with the perceived best practice of the industry at any given time. French product liability
law, by contrast, places the full burden of product-related damage on the producer and
distributor. Instead of providing incentives for uniform industry standards of practice, this
strict approach to product liability encourages companies to seek out innovative design
solutions to problems of product safety. If Germany can be said to pursue safety through
quality, France might be said to pursue safety through innovation.
175 At the time of writing, the impact of the 1985 Product Liability Directive on national
standards of product liability remains ambiguous. The Directive closely reflects the
existing German strategy of product liability, and was adopted in France only in 1998
under threat of fines from the European Court of Justice. Moreover, because product
liability law relies heavily on case law history, the implications of the new Directive may
not be understood for many years. This research focuses on national standards of liability
prior to the Directive.
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The way in which product risk is allocated between producer and consumer
conditions market competition for product quality and for product innovation. Faced with
high product risk, and assuming adequate product information, consumers are likely to
pay more for higher quality products that are less likely to be dangerous. This premium
for higher quality is a sort of insurance against product failure. Hence, when risk lies with
consumers, competition for their patronage requires competing at the high end of the
product range. Moreover, because these consumers rely on their knowledge of products
to assure their safety, radically new kinds of products fare poorly in Germany.
Conversely, when product liability lies heavily on the producer, consumers face
diminished incentive to seek high-end products. Indeed, they have little incentive even to
collect the kind of information that would allow them to distinguish the advantages of
high-end products. Faced with this prospect, producers experience a tension between the
need for safety and the need to compete in a low price range, even if this comes at the
cost of overall product quality. Companies in this competitive setting tend to focus design
efforts on specific safety features instead of pursuing a general strategy of high quality
production. Furthermore, because French consumers in this setting have to worry less
about product risk, they are more likely to experiment with new kinds of products.
Responding to this acceptance of experimentation, companies too have directed research
toward radically new product areas.
Strict Liability Standard Favors Lower Price and Radical Innovation
Strict product liability does not allow for exculpatory evidence for product-related
damage. It thereby places an absolute responsibility on industry, and this has an impact
on both consumers and producers. For consumers, strict liability reduces the duty of care.
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Because product risk is incorporated into the price of the good, all products at all price
levels are assumed to represent the same (economically optimal) level of safety. High-end
goods, in other words, may offer additional quality, features, or durability, but the higher
price does not signal a higher level of safety. Hence under the system of strict liability,
the consumer has no safety-related incentive for preferring higher quality over lower
quality goods. "With the customer facing a lower probability of being liable [under strict
liability], relatively hazardous designs would be less unattractive to him, and the demand
curve for such products would rise relative to the demand curve for comparatively safe
products."' 76 Consumers in this regulatory environment face no safety-related incentives
to avoid low-end purchases.
For producers, this strict standard of liability has an impact both on product price
and on product innovation strategies. The most striking evidence of the impact of strict
liability comes from the United States, where industry faces a strict liability standard
similar to that applied in France. While similar evidence has not been collected in France,
the effect of US product liability may be expected to have a similar if less intensive
impact there. 77
Because under a strict standard of liability the price of each product reflects the
full cost of its associated risk, liability tends to make up a large portion of product cost. In
a 1986 US survey, 38 percent of large firms and 61 percent of small firms reported a
176 McKean, Roland N., "Product Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property
Rights," The Economics of Legal Relationships, ed. Henry G. Manne (St. Paul:West
Publishing Company, 1975), p 267.
177 The extremely high value of punitive damages awarded in the United States has been
attributed to court procedures that are not used in France, including jury trials for product
liability cases and contingency fees for lawyers.
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major impact of product liability on direct costs.17 8 The price of US automobiles, for
example, includes about $500 for the cost of product liability insurance, compared to
roughly $50 for automobiles in other countries. The OECD has estimated that US product
liability costs are twenty to fifty times higher than the world average.' 79 In principle such
differences should not matter to competitiveness, since foreign companies exporting to
the United States face the same standard of liability as do domestic companies. In
practice it appears that foreign companies may enjoy a short-term advantage in the United
States because many domestic firms face the burden of lawsuits from older products still
being used by consumers. 180
This higher level of responsibility for product-related loss in the United States
does appear to have encouraged companies to engage in more research and innovation.
One study finds that this higher liability burden has translated into additional product-
related research. 8' It has also driven company decisions about what kinds of products to
develop and distribute. In 1985-6, 47 percent of all manufacturers in the United States
reported removing product lines from the marketplace, 25 percent reported discontinuing
product research, and 39 percent reported deciding not to introduce new products, all
because of the threat of increased product liability exposure.'82
178 E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact of Product Liability, Reseach Report No. 908 (New
York: The Conference Board, 1988), pp 13, 32.
179 Product Liability Rules in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1995), pp 40-41.
180 Victor E.Schwartz, "Making Product Liability Work for You: A Path Out of the
Product Liability Jungle," in Product Liability and Innovation: Managing Risk in an
Uncertain Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994), p 35.
181 W. Kip Viscusi, and Michael J. Moore, "An Industrial Profile of the Links between
Product Liability and Innovation," in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on
Safety and Innovation.(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1991), p 84.
182 Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp 407-408.
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In some cases, extremely high levels of liability have driven US firms out of
entire product markets. US private aircraft production, for example, fell from 17,000
planes in 1979 to 1,085 in 1987 because of the cost of liability coverage. Claims rose
from $24 million in 1977 to $210 million in 1985.183 One result was to push private plane
manufacturers to innovations in kit airplanes, which face a lower liability exposure
because they are assembled by the user. While this trend has made the United States the
world's largest kit-plane producer, it has come at the cost of progress in traditional
aviation. "Kit planes have pushed general aviation back into becoming a cottage industry
again, essentially reversing the last 150 years of progress made in production techniques
for this industry."'8 4 Other high-risk equipment has faced similar pressures. The United
States no longer produces anesthesia gas machines, for example, because the risk
associated with their use has become unacceptably high for US firms.'85
Negligence Liability Standard Favors Higher Price and Gradual Innovation
Under the negligence standard of product liability-the standard that has been
applied in Germany-the consumer shares some of the burden of product risk with the
producer. In this system, therefore, the consumer plays a role in product safety.
Consumers can select higher priced products in the expectation that their higher level of
quality also reflects a greater degree of safety. To purchase low-end products is to accept
a greater degree of product-related risk, since that risk has not been fully incorporated
183 Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp 408-409.
4Frederic B. Sontag, "Indirect Effects of Product Liability on a Corporation," in
Product Liability and Innovation: Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994), pp 69-70.
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into the price of the product. Hence a negligence standard allows consumers to allay
concerns about product safety by purchasing more expensive, higher quality goods. A
strict standard of liability, by contrast, ensures that the cost of product risk is always fully
incorporated into the price of the product, thus offering no safety advantage to higher-
quality goods.
Beyond this indirect impact on product design through consumer product choice,
the negligence standard of product liability as applied in Germany has worked to
reinforce industry-wide standards of quality production. It has done so in two ways. First,
producers are generally exempted from liability claims based on product design if they
have followed industry standards. Typically this means standards set by the industry
standards body DIN. Second, industries are exempted from liability for accidents caused
by their employees if these employees are hired and managed in appropriate ways.
Specifically, companies hiring union labor with recognized technical training are not
liable for accidental damage caused by the fault of these employees, so long as they can
show that these workers have been managed responsibly (for more details on these
requirements see Chapter 7 below).
By using product liability law to enforce industry-wide standards of design and
production, Germany has in effect equated product safety with product quality. So long as
companies comply with industry-wide design and production norms, they face a
diminished threat from product liability suits. The shelter provided by conformity with
industry standards thereby places a strong pressure for a uniform and high level of design
and production quality in industry. "Faultbased liability...gives an additional quality
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incentive because it opens the exculpation door to avoid liability, provided the product
was blameless." 18 6
This high quality comes with a cost in terms of innovation. Companies are
encouraged to pursue common, or collective, approaches to product safety, but this can
stifle innovative efforts by smaller companies. Industry technical standards, for example,
are set by DIN technical committees with the participation of industry representatives.
Product liability standards enforce compliance with DIN technical standards on all
producers. Yet because participation in DIN technical committees demands company
resources and technical expertise, only large, established companies tend to participate.
This means that both small and new producers enjoy limited access to technical standard
setting in Germany.'8 7 Because new designs frequently emerge within new companies,
this system of liability grounded in collective quality standards tends to favor traditional
products and inhibit innovative products.
Product Information Through Comparative Testing
Regulations governing the provision of product information also have an impact
on consumer and producer strategies. Accurate product information helps consumers to
ensure they get what they pay for. It also encourages companies to offer high quality
products in the knowledge that consumers will recognize the additional quality and take it
into account when purchasing. Yet highly accurate product information reporting may
Damages Versus New Products," Science 246 (15 December 1989), p 1397.
186 Bernd Hohlbein, "Product Safety and Product Liability: The Relevance of Insurance,"
in National and European Law on the Threshold to the Single Market, ed. Ginter Weick
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993), p 262.
139
also run counter to radical product innovation. Manufacturers that know the criteria by
which consumers will be judging their products tend to invest so as to improve their
products along these dimensions. Consumers, similarly, are more likely to purchase
products that fit existing criteria because they can be confident about getting what they
pay for. This can mean that new kinds of products that cannot be evaluated according to
existing standards will be avoided. When product information about existing kinds of
products is good, the relative risk of new kinds of products is high. Thus as consumers
and producers become more reliant on institutional sources of technical product
information, new products that do not coincide with existing information sources are
unlikely to flourish. This describes the consumer information setting in Germany.
In France, product information is more impressionistic and conveyed primarily
through packaging and advertising. This emphasis makes it easier for companies to vaunt
totally new kinds of products than to describe complicated technical advances to existing
one. Similarly, consumers are less likely to perceive detailed technical improvements
than they are to appreciate totally new products. New products must be radical simply to
catch the consumer's eye. Hence both consumers and producers will tend toward more
radical kinds of products rather than toward refinement of traditional products.
What impact do comparative product testing organizations such as Germany's
Stiftung Warentest, France's INC and UFC, or the American Consumers Union have on
consumers and producers? One characteristic of comparative product tests is that they
reach a relatively small segment of the population. See Figure 14. Subscriptions and news
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Context," in National and European Law on the Threshold to the Single Market, ed.
Guiinter Weick (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993), p 246.
stand sales of comparative testing magazines in 1990 reached 4 percent of the population
in the Netherlands and Belgium, and about 2 percent in the Scandinavian countries,
England and the United States. Circulation in Germany was lower, at 1.2 percent, but this
was half again as much as sales in France, Portugal, and Italy. In Spain, Greece, and
Ireland, less than one half of one percent of the population reads such consumer
magazines. These figures do not take into account the cost of subscription, which varies
somewhat from country to country. Also, the narrow segment of the population that
subscribes to or buys product test magazines is overwhelmingly middle class, with a
relatively high level of education.
1970188 19809 1990190
Norway 4.4 6.1 n/a
Belgium 1.9 4.2 n/a
Netherlands 2.0 3.4 4.0
Denmark 1.3 n/a 1.9
Sweden 1.3 n/a 1.9
USA 0.8 n/a 1.9
UK 1.1 1.2 1.7
Germany 0.4 1.2 1.2
Italy 0.2 0.2 0.9
France 0.3 1.1 0.8
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.8
Spain 0.0 0.1 0.4
Austria 0.3 0.7 n/a
Figure 14. National Sales of Consumer Reports
Population, 1970-1990.
as a Percentage of the Total
188 Hans B. Thorelli, and Sarah V. Thorelli, Consumer Information Handbook: Europe
and North America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
189 Business International, Europe's Consumer Movement: Key Issues and Corporate
Responses (Business International: 1980), pp IV-5-27.
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Such raw circulation figures tend to under-represent the true readership of
comparative product test results. Consumer reports are often passed from one consumer
to another, and many countries have encouraged alternative channels for the distribution
of test results. Germany, for example, has long allowed product test results to be
incorporated into product packaging and advertising. In a 1984 survey German
consumers reported that they were more likely to encounter the results of Warentest
product evaluations in any of six alternative ways than from reading the magazine Test
itself. These more common channels were, beginning with the most pervasive, product
packaging, advertisements, newspapers, personal contacts, television, and radio.'9
Hence, in countries that do not permit product test results to be diffused via alternative
channels such as product packaging and advertising, the economic impact of product tests
is likely to be reduced, even when levels of circulation are the same.
A survey conducted in Europe in 1978 helps to approximate the actual impact of
product tests on consumer choices. Figure 15 shows that Germans at the time reported
using product test results twice as often as their French or British counterparts when
deciding what to buy - 26 percent of the population in Germany compared to 13 percent
in France and 12 percent in Britain, respectively. This high level of German dependence
on product test results is partly confirmed by another survey of consumers of household
equipment, photographic equipment, audio equipment, and men's watches that found that
190 "La Politique d'information des consommateurs dans les 6tats membres," INC Hebdo
729 (7 June 1991), pp 23-6.
191 Gunter Silberer, Friedrich F6rster, Hans Raff6e, Wolfgang Fritz, and Harald Hilger,
"Kontakte mit Testergebnissen der Stiftung Warentest und deren verwendung im
Konsumentenbereich - Ergebnisse Verschiedener Umfragen," in Warentest und
Konsument: Nutzung, Wirkungen und Beurteilung des vergleichenden Warentets im
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27 percent used Warentest results in making their purchases.192 The difference between
Germany and France and Britain is particularly striking given that 1980 circulation
figures for product test magazines in the three countries are nearly equivalent in
proportion to the size of the population (Figure 14). In Germany and England, 1.2 percent
of the population purchased Which and Test in 1980, and 1.1 percent of consumers in
France purchased either 50 Millions de Consommateurs or Que Choisir? This suggests
that not just the volume of comparative product tests, but also the context in which they
are made and distributed, can work to determine their impact on the economy.
Aus Bel Den Ger Fra Ire Italy Lux Hol UK
Awareness of 52 47 63 65 51 25 39 48 64 49
tests
Considerable or 45 41 56 59 47 22 30 45 57 43
some trust of
results
Changed buying 15 10 17 26 13 3 8 12 19 12
habits
Figure 15. Consumer awareness, trust, and reliance on comparative product tests in
Europe, 1978.193
Konsumentenbereich, ed. Gunter Silberer and Hans Raff6e (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
1984), pp 25-106.
192 Guinter Silberer, Friedrich Fdrster, Hans Raff6e, Wolfgang Fritz, and Harald Hilger,
"Kontakte mit Testergebnissen der Stiftung Warentest und deren verwendung im
Konsumentenbereich - Ergebnisse Verschiedener Umfragen," in Warentest und
Konsument: Nutzung, Wirkungen und Beurteilung des vergleichenden Warentets im
Konsumentenbereich, ed. Gunter Silberer and Hans Raff6e (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
1984), p 69.
193 George H. Gallop, The International Gallop Polls: Public Opinion 1978 (Wilmington,
Deleware: Scholarly Resources, 1980), p 366. The actual question read: "Have you ever
heard of laboratory tests carried out to compare the price and quality of various brands of
goods on sale to the public? To what extent do you think the organizations that cary out
these product comparison tests and publish their results can be trusted? Speaking for
yourself and your family, would you say that because of your knowledge of the results of
such tests on any products, you have changed your buying habits?"
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In principle, the goal of product tests is fully compatible with industry interests,
because better informed consumers tend to be more loyal. Companies can have greater
confidence that new technical developments they introduce into their products will be
acknowledged by the public and reflected in their purchasing decisions. But these
advantages also occasionally bring perils for the producer. Companies that have invested
heavily in a product may lose part of their investment due to a critical product test that
undermines their sales. What producers dislike is not the fact of evaluation, but the
uncertainty of its impact on sales. In order to retain the benefit of an informed consumer,
but avoid the problem of surprise test results, companies in both France and Germany
have called for greater industry participation in the evaluation process. If companies
know in advance the criteria by which their products will be evaluated, and if they are
able to monitor the process of evaluation, then the results that the audience reads will not
come as a surprise to industry.
The results of business participation in product testing in Germany are striking.
According to a survey of producers in 1984, over two-thirds of manufacturers of products
that have been tested by Warentest incorporated Warentest's own test criteria into their
design of new products. Sixty-seven percent of washing machine and compact stereo
manufacturers in Germany, for example, report using Warentest criteria when developing
their machines. 19 4 Over half of all companies used test results to improve their products.
194 Wolfgang Fritz, Harald Hilger, Hqans Raff6e, Gunter Silberer, and Friedrich F6rster,
"Testnutzung und Testwirkungen im Bereich der Konsumgiiterindustrie," in Warentest
und Unternehmen: Nutzung, Wirkungen und Beurteilung des vergleichenden Warentests
in Industrie und Handel, ed. Hans Raff6e and Gunter Silberer (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
1984), p 46.
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One third use the test criteria of Warentest for their own quality control.'"9 A different
survey in 1994 found that 80 percent of manufacturers rely in some way or another on
Warentest information.' 96 Seen in this light, industry participation in comparative product
testing appears to encourage a kind of post-hoc standardization that pushes producers
towards technically sophisticated products that emphasize consumer usefulness.
The downside to industry participation in product testing is that it can place
breaks on the speed of product innovation. This occurs in two ways. First, producers
prefer to extend the duration of any product evaluation so that they can meet criticisms
before the evaluations reach consumers. This helps companies to control the economic
impact of negative reviews. In Germany, product tests require an average of two years
from product selection to publication. While this sluggishness gives companies time to
respond to poor reviews, it also means that older products with good reviews are likely to
overshadow new products that have not yet been reviewed. Retailers confirm this slowing
effect. In a survey of 13 department stores and 146 specialty retailers in Germany in
1984, 32 percent reported ordering outdated products that had received the 'good' Test
score in the past, even though new versions were available. Twenty-five percent reported
keeping high-scoring products in their inventory longer than usual.'97 One effect may be
to slow the cycle time of innovation in industry.
195 Hans Raffe and Wolfgang Fritz, "The Effects of Comparative Product Testing on
Industry and Trade: Findings of a Research Project," Journal of Consumer Policy 7
(1984), p 427.
196 Die Welt, 2 December 1994.
197 "Die diffusion von Innovationen wird dadurch von Seiten des Handels verlangsamt."
Harald Hilger, Wolfgang Fritz, Gunter Silberer, Hans Raffle, and Friedrich Forster,
"Testnutzung und Testwirkungen im Bereich des Konsumguiterhandel," in Warentest und
Unternehmen: Nutzung, Wirkungen und Beurteilung des vergleichenden Warentests in
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The second impediment derives from industry's participation in product selection
and evaluation. Germany's Warentest does not evaluate products such as perfume and
champagne, for example, because their qualities are not easily susceptible to technical
measure. Yet the French UFC and INC regularly evaluate such products through
consumer surveys. More significantly, producers in Germany help to set the criteria by
which products are to be judged. The problem is that particularly innovative qualities of
new products are unlikely to be appreciated by conventional evaluation schemes. Indeed,
because many companies report incorporating Warentest evaluation criteria into their
product design, the likelihood of radically new products even leaving the drawing board
may be reduced. In other words, industry participation in the evaluation process may
create a bias against new kinds of products as well as radical innovations in existing
products.
Comparative product tests appear not to have the same impact on all companies.
First, comparative product tests appear to create a systematic bias in favor of domestic
producers. A comparison of 6 years of Warentest results with survey responses from
product manufacturers reveals that equally positive Test results tend to increase demand
for domestic products more than they do for foreign products (81% versus 59%).
Conversely, negative Test scores tend to decrease demand for domestic products only half
as much as they decrease the demand for foreign products (19 % versus 41%).198 In sum,
Industrie und Handel, ed. Hans Raff6e and Giinter Silberer (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
1984), p 191.
198 Wolfgang Fritz, Harald Hilger, Hqans Raffle, GUnter Silberer, and Friedrich Firster,
"Testnutzung und Testwirkungen im Bereich der Konsumgiiterindustrie," in Warentest
und Unternehmen: Nutzung, Wirkungen und Beurteilung des vergleichenden Warentests
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positive evaluations tend to confer greater advantage to domestic producers, while
negative evaluations tend to confer greater disadvantage to foreign producers.
Second, it is commonly pointed out that comparative product tests, because they
reach only a small segment of the consuming public, tend on average to advantage
smaller producers.' 99 To see why, consider the case in which product evaluations reach 5
percent of the population (Stiftung Warentest claims that Test is actually read by 5
percent of the population). Imagine now two companies: one large company that controls
30 percent of a particular product market, and one smaller company that controls only 10
percent of the same market. Taking the extreme case, in which product reviews are
absolutely convincing to their readers, both companies stand to lose 5 percent of their
customers from negative reviews. Hence the impact of negative reviews does not depend
on company size. The impact of positive reviews, by contrast, depends on the size of the
consumer population that does not already purchase a company's product. For the large
company, which already controls a third of the product market, an extremely positive
review could only draw in 5 percent of the remaining consumers. It would, in other
words, increase their current sales by 12 percent (i.e., an additional 5% of the remaining
70% of the market equals a growth of 3.5% of the total market, which would increase
their actual sales by 12%). For the small company, by contrast, a positive review could
increase their sales by as much as 45 percent, assuming that it won over 5 percent of the
remaining 90 percent of the market (i.e., 5% of the remaining 90% of the market equals a
growth of 4.5% of the total market, which would increase their actual sales by 45%).
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Structured Markets for Consumer Goods
The cases of product liability and product testing offer a window onto the specific
impact of product market regulations on producer strategies. They suggest that the
contractual terms of product exchange can have a significant impact on the strategies of
consumers and producers alike. Consumer decisions are guided not only by price and
underlying preferences, but also by the context of information and risk that they confront
in the marketplace. Where consumer risk and information are both high, consumers are
likely to use the better information to purchase higher quality goods as a way of off-
setting the risk they face. Conversely, where consumer risk and information are both low,
consumers can safely purchase low-end goods, both because the risk they face is low, and
because they lack the necessary information to confidently purchase higher quality goods.
One conclusion, therefore, is that higher quality consumer information generates a
demand for higher quality goods. The emphasis in German advertising on the provision
of highly accurate information, for example, works to emphasize the technical qualities of
products. French advertising, by contrast, offers a broad leeway for creativity in
advertisements that address the imagination but does not help the consumer to select
products on objective qualities. Different national approaches to product labeling also
have strong effects on producer strategies. The Produktinformation (PI) labeling system
in Germany, which is run by the industrial standard setting body DIN, offers consumers
information about those technical characteristics of products that producers feel are most
relevant to product choice. France's AFEI system, by contrast, which is negotiated
between consumers and producers, reflects consumer concerns rather than technical
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standards that industry wishes to emphasize, thereby reducing incentives for a strategy of
highly technical innovation in industry.
A second lesson is that formal legal or administrative protection from product-
related risk encourages customers to be more experimental in their product selection. This
trend can be observed not only in product liability standards, but also in government
product safety standards. In France, where the government intervenes aggressively to set
and enforce minimum safety levels for all kinds of products, the greater uncertainty that
normally accompanies new kinds of products is less dissuasive for consumers. French
consumers thus face weaker incentives to stress technically refined, high quality products.
In Germany, by contrast, where industry itself sets minimum safety standards for
consumer products, risk tends to be shared more evenly between producer and consumer.
In this German market setting consumers therefore face a genuine risk in purchasing
entirely new kinds of products. German consumers instead prefer to purchase high
quality, existing products as a way of counteracting the market risk to which they are
exposed.
The impact of product market regulation on production strategies extends beyond
regulations governing product risk and product information in the consumer marketplace
to include many areas of direct product regulations. One example of the impact of direct
product regulations is the case of terms of sale. German regulation of standard terms of
sale for consumer purchases enforces a high standard of retail support to consumers
purchasing goods. These rigorous contractual standards were favored by German
industrial producers, who worried that downward competition among retailers interested
cooperatives 186 (1977), p 81.
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in limiting their responsibilities to consumers would create a market dynamic focused on
price rather than on quality competition. 200 Regulation governing terms of sale thus
helped to restrict retail competition in a way that emphasized quality over price. In France
by contrast, the regulation of consumer terms of sale was politically popular but met
strong industry opposition. The resulting weak limitations on terms of sale appear to have
generated a competition for weaker contractual standards.
high
Hidden
Qualities
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Figure 16. National Trends Toward Hidden and Visible Qualities of Products.
The findings presented in this chapter permit us to make predictions both about
the sorts of products that French and German consumer regulations are likely to favor, as
200 Joachim Beimowski, Zur 6konomischen Analyse Allgemeiner Geschiftsbedingungen
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well as the kind of product innovation they are likely to sponsor. See Figure 16 above. In
Germany we should observe trends toward products that emphasize hidden qualities and
de-emphasize visible qualities. This view suggests that German industrial success in
producing highly engineered products has stemmed in part from market pressures that
have pushed them in that direction. In France, by contrast, we should observe trends
toward products that emphasize visible qualities and de-emphasize hidden qualities. This
suggests that French production emphasis both on traditional artisanal product markets,
such as perfumes and fashion, as well as on radically new kinds of product markets, such
as Minitel, have their roots in part in a common emphasis on products with a high degree
of visible qualities. In this light, differences in product market regulation might be viewed
as an ongoing source of comparative advantage for domestic producers.
(Munich: Verlag V. Florenz, 1989), p 15.
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Section II. Organized Interests and Consumer Identity
During the 1970s both France and Germany came to reconceptualize the role of
the consumer in their societies. Consumer interests were potentially diverse, including
issues like product quality, safety, price, and selection, as well as access to political and
legal recourse, and special shelter for vulnerable groups of consumers. Chapter 2 above
argued that contested ideas about the consumer identity in France and Germany drove
policymakers to emphasize different sets of consumer interests. But the consumer
revolution in France and Germany was not simply imposed from above. New conceptions
of the consumer identity also emerged through different strategies of consumer interest
organization that set the context for consumer interaction with producers. This section
focuses on two groups in society that helped to organize and mediate this interaction:
consumer associations and retailers.
Pierre Muller has argued that the formation of any radically new social policy
entails a reconceptualization of the identity of the target group.2 01 While this new identity
is created in part by elites within the government policy apparatus, it is also constituted
through the evolving understanding of critical groups within society as a whole. In the
case of consumer policies, the organizational strategies of consumer associations and of
retailers in France and Germany have proved an important creative force in the
elaboration of a new national consumer identity. Like consumers themselves, each of
201 Pierre Muller, "Les politiques publiques comme construction d'un rapport au monde,"
in La construction du sens dans les politiques publiques: debats autour de la notion de
riferentiel, ed. Alain Faure, Gilles Pollet, and Philippe Warin (Paris: ditions
L'Harmattan, 1995), p 162.
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these groups was undergoing dramatic change in the early 1970s. Consumer groups were
rapidly expanding their membership and competencies. They were also shifting away
from broad family themes and toward a focus on the individual consumer. Traditional
retailers during this period were in decline and coming under growing economic and
political pressure either to rationalize their businesses or to close shop. The number of
retail stores had been falling in both France and Germany since the 1950s as new chain
and discount stores expanded their customer base. At stake for the success both of
expanding consumer groups and of declining retailers was a newly emerging conception
of the national consumer interest.
Consumer associations pursued different organizational strategies in France and
Germany. In France, consumer groups adopted a strategy of mass mobilization and
radical opposition to industry. Individual consumers participated in extensive price
surveys, political rallies, and product boycotts. In Germany, by contrast, the consumer
movement eschewed grass-roots mobilization and instead cultivated a strong technical
competency that permitted it to sit as an informed participant in detailed policy and
technical committees. To understand the origins of these different policies, Chapter 4
below explores the way in which consumer groups came to interact with the government
and with industry. It finds that groups in both countries adopted organizational strategies
that offered them the greatest policy leverage given the existing national setting into
which they were attempting to integrate.
Retailers also played an important role in defining the nature of new consumer
interests in society. Faced with growing competition from large-scale retailers, smaller
shop-keepers repositioned themselves in relation to consumers. In France, shopkeepers
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portrayed themselves as a critical ally to consumers against the growing market control of
large producers. New large stores argued that only their large purchasing power would
allow consumers to negotiate on an equal footing with producers for lower priced goods.
In each case retailers portrayed themselves as consumer advocates and opponents of
industry. In Germany, by contrast, retailers saw themselves as an extention of the national
production system. Retail workers invoked solidarity with industrial workers to
successfully lobby for short store hours. Retail management has continued to set product
prices based on price lists distributed by manufacturers. Thus unlike in France, where
retailers allied themselves with consumers, retailers in Germany allied themselves more
closely with industry and in opposition to the interests of consumers.
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Chapter 4. Two Strategies of Consumer Group Organization
Consumer groups underwent a period of rapid expansion from 1970 to the early
1980s in both France and Germany. New consumer groups in both countries attempted to
match their own evolving organizational strategies to newly emerging consumer
concerns. Because consumer groups in the two countries emphasized different strategies
of organization, they also emphasized different sets of goals, actions, and priorities for
consumers. In this way, national priorities for consumer protection that were favored by
consumer groups in each country did not necessarily reflect pre-existing differences in
the priorities of individual consumers. Rather, their policy positions favored the
organizational imperatives of the consumer groups themselves.20 2 This chapter describes
the origins of the different organizational strategies of French and German consumer
groups.
Consumer groups represented an emerging set of societal interests, but the
institutional setting in which they pursued their goals was by no means new. The nature
of their relation to individual consumers was driven in large part by the context of their
interaction with industry and with the government. In France, consumer groups took on
the status of a watch-dog to industry, looking out for transgressions, mobilizing against
high prices and dangerous products, and filing frequent law suits. In Germany, relations
between consumer groups and producers were more amicable. German consumer groups
consulted with industry, participated on technical committees, helped to enforce
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competition and cartel regulations, and disseminated technical product information to
consumers.
Consumer group interactions with their governments were also nationally
distinctive. The French consumer movement took on a political valence. Each of the
major labor unions created its own consumer group, as did some political parties. These
groups were given policy access at the ministerial level, so that consumerism quickly
became a new arena for political struggle. In Germany consumer groups avoided
politically polarized issues and party affiliations. Their contribution to debates occurred
within individual ministries rather than at the ministerial level, and was normally
technical rather than political in substance. French consumer groups took on the manners
of a political and social movement; German consumer groups comported themselves as a
group of technical professionals with a strictly advisory role in government.
The Organizational Imperatives of Consumer Groups
The distinctive strategies of French and German consumer associations emerge
from their organizational forms. Superficially the o;ganization of consumer groups in the
two countries looks similar. Both have a single peak-level consumer association, a
collection of nation-wide consumer associations, and myriad regional and local affiliates.
But important differences appear at each level. Germany's peak-level consumer
association, the Council of Consumer Groups (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
Verbraucherverbande, or AgV) represents all other consumer groups in national debates.
France's peak-level consumer association, the National Consumption Institute (Institut
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202 Sapolsky, Harvey M., "The Politics of Product Controversies," in Consuming Fears:
The Politics of Product Risk, ed. Harvey Sapolsky (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p
national de la consommation, or INC), acts independently of other groups as a technical
resource on consumer questions, serving the government, business, and consumers.
Whereas Germany's AgV embodies the principle of corporatism applied to consumer
interests, France's INC functions primarily as a technical resource and provides no
coordination or representation of other consumer groups.
The role of national-level consumer groups also differs importantly in France and
Germany. In Germany, these groups are functionally distinct. Specific consumer
protection goals such as consumer education, product testing, and legal defense are each
taken up by a dedicated national organization that specializes solely in that area. In
France, by contrast, national consumer groups tend to offer a combination of services to
consumers, competing directly with one another for consumer recognition, membership,
and public influence. Because they often provide competing or overlapping services,
France's national-level consumer groups have commonly been criticized for their
conflicts and lack of coordination.
The most striking difference between France and Germany, however, appears in
consumer groups organized at the regional and local levels. In France, these groups work
to mobilize consumers in order to pursue specific consumer goals. Regional and local
consumer groups, which are generally affiliated with national consumer associations,
participate regularly in price surveys (releves de prix), consumer boycotts, and protests
against specific retailers and producers. In Germany, by contrast, regional and local
consumer groups (Verbraucherverbinde) have focused their activity almost exclusively
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on providing consumers with accurate technical information about individual products
through a network of consumer advisory centers (Verbraucherstellen).
The different orientations of consumer groups at all levels in France and Germany
emerges most strikingly from their record of individual consumer membership. The level
of national consumer participation in such groups has been a source of long-standing
misunderstanding in comparitive studies of consumer mobilization. In 1978, Jacqueline
Poelmans estimated that 45 percent of German families and 25 percent of French families
were affiliated with consumer groups.20 3 Estimates by consumer groups themselves found
that French consumer groups had a total of 2 million members in the late 1970s, and that
German consumer groups had as many as 8 million members in the mid-1980s. 204 Yet
these estimates by consumer organizations contrast strikingly with what individual
consumers in France and Germany have reported. In a survey conducted in 1978,
consumer were ask whether they were members of organizations "...that have no links
with manufacturers or traders and whose specific aim is to inform and defend the
consumer." It found that a statistically insignificant number of German's identified
themselves as current members of consumer groups, thus defined, compared with 3
percent of the French population. Furthermore, only 8 percent of Germans reported that
they would even be willing to become members, compared to 27 percent in France. Yet
in apparent contradition to these membership numbers, 55 percent of Germans reported
having heard of this kind of consumer organization, while only 44 percent of French
203 Jacqueline Poelmans, L 'Europe et les consommateurs (Bruxelles: Editions Labor,
1978), p 140.
204 "Un hypersyndicat?" Le Nouveau Journal, 28 Sep 1979; Hartwig Piepenbrock, "Die
Legitimation der Verbraucherverbande zur Wahmehmung von Verbraucherinteressen," in
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respondents reported having heard of them.205 The difference in participation thus
appears to stem not from different levels of consumer awareness but instead from an
entirely different strategy of consumer organization in the two countries.
The range of variation in these estimates is in itself fascinating. It reveals, at the
least, a high degree of uncertainty about what kinds of organizations should count as
consumer organizations. Germany has a large collection of powerful family and women's
groups that are members of the peak consumer association (AgV) even though their own
members do not identify them as consumer groups.206 Moreover, the fact that so few
Germans self-identify as members of consumer groups reflects a fundamental difference
between the strategies of the French and German consumer movements. Whereas
France's consumer associations genuinely constitute a movement, Germany's consumer
associations have cultivated little grass-roots support.
Technical Specialization in the German Consumer Movement
Germany's consumer groups have discouraged individual membership at both the
national and regional levels. At the national level, the peak consumer association AgV
has less than 100 individual members. These are people who, as described in § 4
paragraph 1 of the by-laws of the AgV, are particularly suited to furthering the goals of
the organization. These members also help to meet a legal requirement of accreditation
necessary for the AgV to bring legal suits in cases of misleading advertising or unfair
Verbraucherpolitik kontrovers, ed. Hartwig Piepenbrock and Conrad Schroeder (Koln:
Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987), p 102.
205 George H. Gallup, The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion 1978 (Wilmington,
Deleware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1979), p 365.
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sales contracts. Accredited consumer organizations must have at least 60 individual
members. (France, by comparison, requires that consumer groups have at least 10,000
members in order to receive a similar legal accreditation!) Following the popular
mobilizations of the late 1960s, the AgV came under public criticism for this lack of
individual members. In response, the AgV in 1971 changed its name from the Working
Group of Consumer Associations (Arbeitgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverb/inde) to the
Working Group of Consumers (Arbeitgemeinschaft der Verbraucher). Yet no new
membership was encouraged, few consumers mobilized themselves to join, and the old
name was re-adopted in 1986.
One possible explanation for this lack of popular participation might be the
corporatist status of the AgV. As a peak-level organization with corporatist deliberative
rights, the AgV has a dual goal of coordinating the interests of its member consumer
organizations, and of representing the general consumer interest to the government.
Admitting individual members might therefore be seen to undermine the corporatist
formula of group representation. Yet even consumer groups at the regional level do not
have an extensive tradition ot individual membership, and these groups are not bound by
corporatist goals. Of the 11 state-level consumer centers (Verbraucherzentralen) in West
Germany, only 5 have permitted individual membership in their by-laws, and even these
have done so only in limited numbers. In Hessen, for example, the Verbraucherzentrale
permits 6 individual members. States like Berlin and Hamburg, which do allow unlimited
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206 Hartwig Piepenbrock, "Die Legitimation der Verbraucherverbande zur Wahmehmung
von Verbraucherinteressen," in Verbraucherpolitik Kontrovers, ed. Hartwig Piepenbrock
and Conrad Schroeder (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987), pp 101-107.
individual membership in their consumer centers, have generally experienced only low
levels of participation.'
Another possible explanation is the fact that German consumer groups receive
their funding almost exclusively from state and federal sources and therefore have little
organizational need to cultivate individual membership. National and regional consumer
groups in Germany have consistently received nearly four times as much government
support as have French consumer groups. See Figure 17 below. The role of this kind of
government support is perceived differently in the two countries. Government funding to
consumer organizations in France is viewed by many as a compensated weakness
("faiblesse compens6e") that keeps consumer groups from achieving their full
organizational capacity. German government funding, by contrast, is seen as legitimate
remuneration for consumer groups that have taken on duties that would otherwise have to
be performed by the state.20 8 Moreover, while German government funding to consumer
groups is indeed higher, there is also a strong variation in funding levels across
Germany's federal states. Much of government spending on consumer associations comes
from state-level governments, with different states placing more or less emphasis on
consumer protection. See Appendix 3. Bavaria in 1980 spent only 0.19 DM per person on
consumer groups, compared to 1.28 DM per person in Bremen.2' 9 Hence while some
federal states far outspent France on consumer groups, others also spent far less per
207 Hartwig Piepenbrock, "Die Legitimation der Verbraucherverbande zur Wahrnehmung
von Verbraucherinteressen," in Verbraucherpolitik kontrovers, ed. Hartwig Piepenbrock
and Conrad Schroeder (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987), pp 101-107.
208 Alexandre Carnelutti, "Consommation et soci6te," Revue franfaise d'administration
publique 56 (October-December 1990), p 584.
209 Handbuch der Verbraucherinstitutionen.
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capita. Yet there is no sign that consumer groups in the less generous states attempted to
pursue more extensive grass-roots organizational strategies.
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Figure 17. Government support to consumer organizations in France and Germany,
1970-1990 (millions of US dollars).210
The dearth of individual consumer eroup membership in Germany has less to do
with the corporatist structure of the consumer movement, or with the level of government
funding it receives, than with the way in which consumer groups interact with the
government and with industry. The nature of this interaction is evoked in two common
criticisms of Germany's low-membership strategy. The first criticism is that consumer
groups without individual members do not have the popular legitimacy to negotiate
directly with industry on behalf of consumers. In the absence of mobilization it is difficult
to focus consumer interests on particular issues, so that many consumer interests, which
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are necessarily diffuse interests, are likely to go unheeded.2 Yet there are signs that this
was also precisely the goal of both the government and of business. The CDU and SPD
both opposed the use of individual consumer members out of concern for the
ramifications of a politicized consumerist agenda. Industry was also strongly opposed to a
politically-powerful consumer movement, primarily out of concern that aspects of
production would become politicized and then regulated. Indeed the centrist FDP was the
lone political voice advocating individual members in consumer groups.21 2
A second criticism of Germany's low-membership strategy was the concern that
the interests represented by groups without members were unlikely to reflect the real
concerns of working-class consumers. These critics have lambasted German consumer
groups, for example, for a lack of creativity in the strategies they have employed for
defending the interests of consumers.2 1 3 Consumer groups, they have argued, follow a
conformist agenda that risks to diverge from actual consumer interests. Yet within the
German institutional context, this lack of representation was also commonly understood
to be a desirable outcome. Because individual members in consumer groups were likely
to be of a higher socio-economic level, it was feared that their participation would skew
the representation of consumer interests in that direction. Consumer groups themselves
argued that admitting individual members into German consumer organizations could
210 Compiled by author, data incomplete.
211 Roberta Sassetilli, Power Balance in the Consumption Sphere: Reconsidering
Consumer Protection Organisations (Florence: European University Institute Working
Paper, 1995).
212 Christine Czerwonka, and Gunter Shippe, "Verbraucherpolitische Konzeptionen und
Programme in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 1/3
(1977), pp 286-287.
165
bias their representation towards the interests of the middle class.21 4 The consumer center
of Northrhein Westfallen wrote in 1985: "In the context of socially oriented consumer
work we must consider the problems and information needs of specific minorities that are
possibly not represented, or even opposed, by the majority or average citizen."215
German consumer groups instead cultivated a technically sophisticated staff and
leadership that have enabled them to advise consumers on technical dimensions of
product choice and to consult on committees within industry. These staff members,
usually hired with technical training, generally have neither interest nor facility in grass-
roots mobilization. Consumer groups at the national level are functionally specialized and
tend to hire and train employees in their particular area of specialization. The Stiftung
Warentest, for example, hires employees with technical training suited to organizing and
analyzing the results of product testing. Consumer groups at the local and regional level
(Verbraucherzentralen) also focus their activities primarily on providing accurate product
information to consumers. The core of this activity is a system of consumer information
offices (Verbraucherstellen) that provide product advice free of charge to the general
public. Consumers interested in buying a camera, for example, can call or visit a
consumer center to discuss possible options, specifications of particular brands and
models, and considerations that they should take into account when purchasing. The
213 Reinhard Rock, Bernd Biervert, and Wolf F. Fischer-Winkelmann, "A Critique of
Some Fundamental Theoretical and Practical Tenets of Present Consumer Policy,"
Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 4/2 (1980), p 98.
214 Christine Czerwonka, Gunter Schoppe, and Stefan Weckbach, Der aktive Konsument:
Kommunikation und Kooperation (G6ttingen: Verlag Otto Schwarz, 1976), p 193.
215 "Im Bereich sozialorientierter Verbraucherarbeit miissen Probleme und
Informationsbefuirfnisse spezifischer Minderheiten beriicksichtigt werden, die
m6glicherweise von der Mehrheit, also auch vom Bev6lkerungsdurchschnitt, nicht
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results of comparative product tests are distributed for free to visiting consumers. These
advisory centers have proved very popular. Between 1973 and 1974 alone, the number of
consumer visits to these centers grew by 30 percent from 540,000 to 700,000.216 By 1995
total instances of consumer advice by the Verbraucherstellen across Germany-including
visits, phone conversations and correspondence-exceeded 4 million per year.2 17
Information centers in Nord-Rhein Westfallen alone were contacted by consumers
860,000 times.218
The advice offered by these centers has been viewed favorably both by consumers
and by producers. In a 1984 evaluation of consumer centers conducted for the
Verbraucherzentrale in Hamburg, 200 visitors to their centers were surveyed and a further
300 were given surveys to complete 6 weeks later.219 Of these visitors, 35 percent
reported that they were fully satisfied ("voll und ganz zufrieden") with the advice they
had received; 66 percent reported that they were at least partly satisfied ("teileweise
zufrieden"). For 29 percent of respondents, this was their first visit to a
Verbraucherzentrale. The largest portion sought information about small and large
household equipment (45.6 %), with another sizeable group interested in phonographs
and televisions (23 %). Only 3.7 percent were interested in information about services.
Over 90 percent said they would go back to the consumer center for future purchases.
Only 3.7 percent said they would not return. Those surveys that were returned six weeks
empfunden oder sogar kontrar beurteilt werden," in Die Verbraucherberatung in
Nordrhein-Westfalen aus Sicht der Bevolkerung 1984/5 (Bielefeld, 1985), p 1.
216 Kommission fr wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wandel, Wirtschaftlicher und sozialer
Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Gutachten der Kommission (G6ttingen:
Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1977), p 4'17.
217 Calculated by author from annual reports of consumer centers.
218 Verbraucherzentrale NRW, Das Jahr '95 (1996), p 5.
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later showed that 44 percent of consumers bought the product they had sought advice
about.2 2 0
Producers also favored consumer advice centers, precisely because they helped to
educate consumers about new products. Albrecht Schultz, former member of the board of
directors at Braun, explains that brand name manufacturers had a strong interest in
consumer advising because accurate information helped keep consumers from being
disappointed, thereby encouraging repeat purchases.2 21 Moreover, content analysis of
advice given at consumer advisory centers shows that price is rarely if ever discussed,
and that advisors working at the centers also rarely mention where products can be
bought cheaply.22 2 Hence advice from the centers informs about quality without
emphasizing the need to shop for lower prices.
Popular Mobilization in the French Consumer Movement
Unlike in Germany, consumer groups in France have been the focus of a high
level of popular interest and membership. Surveys confirm that French consumers have
shown enthusiasm for consumer associations as a whole. A 1971 survey conducted by the
National Consumption Institute (INC) found that 20 percent of French over 15 years old
219 160 responded, for a response rate of 53%.
220 Lothar Maier, "Zur Wirksamkeit der Produktberatung in Verbraucherzentralen:
Ergebnisse einer Umfrage," in Die Qualitdt von Beratungen fur Verbraucher, ed.
Volkmar Libke and Ingo Schoenheit (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1985), p 189.
221 Albrecht Schultz, "Das Interesse der Industrie an adiquater Beratung des
Verbrauchers durch Handel und Verbraucherberatungsstellen," in Die Qualitdt von
Beratungen fiir Verbraucher, ed. Volkmar Liibke and Ingo Schoenheit (Frankfurt:
Campus Verlag, 1985).
222 Udo Beier, "Schwachstellen einer mit vergleichenden Warentestberichten arbeitenden
Produktberatung: Eine Obersicht ufiber empirische Untersucheungsergebnisse," in Die
Qualitdt von Beratungenfiir Verbraucher, ed. Volkmar Liibke and Ingo Schoenheit
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1985), p 189.
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said they were "ready to belong" to a consumer organization.223 Another poll three years
later found that 75 percent of the population felt that the government should support
consumer organizations and give them input into government policy making.22 4 This high
level of popular support has been maintained through today. A 1996 survey found that
74% of all French pay attention to the recommendations of consumer organizations.2 2 5
French consumer groups experienced an enormous growth beginning in the early
1970s. With this growth came a fragmentation of organizations and interests that has
become an enduring feature of the French consumer movement. There are about 13 major
national consumer associations in France today. In general, these groups emerged from
four different sources. Family groups that arose during the Vichy occupation under the
Petainist mantra of "travail, famille, patrie" evolved in the 1970s towards consumer
concerns. Trade unions in the 1970s began to form their own consumer associations as
they realized that consumerist politics were in effect class politics by other means. The
French cooperative movement also took on the consumer interest as their own, publishing
for a short time the results of comparative product tests in their publication Labo-coop.
Finally, a small group of organizations, including the Federal Union of Consumers (UFC)
emerged in the late 1960s with a broad constituency and an exclusive focus on the
consumer interest. Many of these groups published their own consumer protection
magazines. The total circulation of these publications grew to over 2 million by 1980. See
Appendix 2.
223 "Prets a adherer." Dominique Pons, Consomme et tais-toi (Paris: Epi, 1972), p 97.
224 G6rard Cas, La Ddfense du Consommateur (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1975), p 82.
225 B6n6dicte Epinay, "Le lobby consommateurs veut monter au filet: ses moyens le
contraignent en fond de court," Les Echos, 3 October 1996.
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Figure 18. Major National Consumer Associations in France, 1970-1980.
Beginning in 1968, France also experienced a rapid growth in local consumer
unions affiliated with the national associations and oriented towards grass-roots
mobilization. The UFC, for example, which had acted primarily as an information center
during the 1960s, began to take on affiliated local unions beginning in 1971.227 Over the
next ten years the number of these local unions grew to 170, and the number of union
militants grew to 50,000.228 See Figure 19 below. This level of mobilization allowed the
UFC and other consumer groups with similar grass-roots support to undertake public
efforts unimaginable in the German context. In 1979, for example, 110 of the local UFC
affiliates were able to survey 27,735 stores in order to assess compliance with price
labeling laws.229 This sort of mobilization has been a central component of French
226 created by the Union Nationale des Jeunes Consommateurs, headed by Henry
Estingoy.
227 Michel Wieviorka, LIEtat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements
de consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), pp 71-73.
228 Josde Doyere, "Les associations de consommateurs," Le Monde Dimanche, 16
November 1980.
229 "Une enquete de 'Union fd6rale des consommateurs," Le Monde, 12 Dec 1979.
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consumer group activities. But such activism has often come at the cost of technical
expertise. Jean-Claude Jacquet, a consumer representative to France's National Council
on Consumption, acknowledged the need for greater technical competency among
France's consumer representatives, but warned that this competency must "be grounded
in a dense associational life, at the risk of failing to translate the real hopes and needs of
consumers." 230
197423 1976232 1978233 1980234
local unions 28 80 117 170
members 5,000 20,000 32,000 50,000
Figure 19. Growth in local consumer unions affiliated with the UFC.
The organization of French consumer groups, grounded in a competition over the
provision of consumer services and with a strong emphasis on consumer mobilization,
has worked to cultivate a distinctive identity for the French consumer as politically active
and economically threatened. As in Germany, the organizational priorities of consumer
groups in France derived from the institutional context in which they evolved.
Competition among consumer groups for broader legitimacy pushed them towards efforts
230 "s'appuyer sur une vie associative intense, sous peine de ne plus pouvoir traduire les
aspirations et besoins reels des consommateurs." "Le financement des organisations de
consommateurs," Inc Hebdo 583 (26 February 1988), p 5.
231 Jean-Marc Biais, "L'Etat s d6pense pour les consommateurs," La Vie Franfaise, 30
January 1978.
232 "C'est Schweppes!" Rouge, 1 Dec 1976.
233 Claude Boris, "Les consommateurs entrent en politique," Politique Hebdo, 5 Feb
1978.
234 Josee Doyere, "Les associations de consommateurs," Le Monde Dimanche, 16
November 1980.
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at consumer mobilization. This kind of mobilization focused on protest actions, and the
consumer identity in France came to be identified with these activities.
Consumer Groups in Institutional Context
Consumer groups emerging in France and Germany had different organizational
priorities, and these differences led them to emphasize different kinds of consumer
interests. This contributed, in turn, to different popular conceptions of the consumer
identity in the two countries. Why, it should be asked, did French and German consumer
groups pursue such different organizational goals? The answer lies in the pre-existing
institutional setting in which these groups grew and matured. In particular, the political,
legal, and industrial context in which consumer groups functioned worked to wean them
in ways that guided their organizational interests.
The Political Context of Consumer Activism
French consumer groups saw politics as a route to organizational expansion.
Political parties mobilized around consumer issues. The government worked to
incorporate consumer interests into policy formation. Soon the political spectrum came to
be represented in miniature within the consumer movement itself. By contrast,
Germany's consumer groups shied away from politicizing the consumer interest. Because
both the peak consumer group, the AgV, and the regional consumer associations
(Verbraucherzentralen) had an effective organizational monopoly on engaging the
consumer interest, they appear to have feared that a move towards a more radical politics
of consumption would undermine their status. One consequence was that French
consumer groups were willing to engage heavily in politics, while German consumer
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groups have avoided an explicitly political consumerist agenda. The details of
government interaction with consumers will be elaborated in the case studies below, but
some generalizations can be made about the political context in which consumer groups
have matured in France and Germany.
The French government has undergone a number of institutional changes
designed to integrate consumer interests into government policymaking. The first such
move was the creation of the National Consumption Council (Conseil national de la
consommation, or CNC) on 19 December 1960, at the instigation of Jean Fontanet. 235 It
was created to pursue three goals: to create a meeting place for consumers and a forum
for them to interact directly with the government, to contribute to the growing cohesion
of consumer groups, and to bring together ministries whose work bore on consumption.
Composed of fourteen ministerial members and fourteen consumer representatives, the
CNC met every six weeks.2 3 6 The fact that the newly created CNC incorporated family
groups (UNAF, UFCS, CNAPF) is generally thought to have made it more difficult for
consumer groups to consolidate and become professional, contributing to the later
fragmentation of the French consumer movement.23 7
Beginning in 1976 with the creation of the Secretariat of State for Consumption
within the Economics Ministry, consumer interests have generally been represented
within the French government. The first Secretariat, led by Christiane Scrivener, focused
on employing government regulatory powers to provide better information to consumers.
235 Jacques Dubois, Les structures administratives de la consommation (Doctoral Thesis.
Paris: Universit6 Paris II, 1984), p 216.
236 Marcel Garrigou, L'Assaut des consoinmateurs pour changer les rapports producteurs -
vendeurs - consommateurs (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1981), pp 32-33.
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"On the general economic plan, consumers cannot play a decisive role in assuring that
production is better adapted to their real needs unless they are better informed and are
better able to express themselves. Their information will eventually condition the
orientation of our economy."2 38 Scrivener's proposals reflected traditional 6tatist
solutions to new consumer problems. Consumers with grievances against businesses
could submit these to the government sponsored "postal box 5000," which helped to
resolve conflicts. A newly created Committee on Abusive Clauses studied consumer
contracts in order to eliminate contract clauses that worked to the disadvantage of
consumers. And on 28 February 1977 the government created an interministerial group to
coordinate consumer politics.2 3 9
In 1978 the Secretariat of Consumption was abolished, but the new Minister of
Economics and Finance, Ren6 Monory, favored a strong consumerist agenda and even
referred to himself informally as the "Minister of Consumption." Monory argued that
inflation might be held down if the 2 million members of consumer organizations joined
under one umbrella organization.240 In 1979 he encouraged the formerly neutral National
Consumption Institute (INC) to develop "a consumer counterforce to counterbalance the
237 Jacques Dubois, Les structures administratives de la consommation (Doctoral Thesis.
Paris: Universit6 Paris II, 1984), p 274.
238 "Sur le plan de '6conomie g6n6rale, les consommateurs ne pourront jouer un r6le
d6cisif pour que l'outil de production soit mieux adapt6 a leurs besoins rels que s'ils sont
mieux inform6s et s'ils peuvent mieux s'exprimer. Leur information conditionne a terme
l'orientation meme de notre economie." Christiane Scrivener, "Le droit des
consommateurs a l'information," Allocutions ministdrielles, Secr6tariat d'Etat la
Consommation (11 October 1976), p 2.
239 Marie-Elisabeth Bordes, and Sylvie George, Politique de la Consommation dans la
Communaute Europiene, (Memoire, Universit6 de Droit, d'conomie et de Sciences
Sociales de Paris, 1982), p 45.
240 "Un hypersyndicat?" Le Nouveau Journal, 28 Sep 1979.
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technical skills and advertising of producers." 241 In line with this goal, he expanded
government funding to consumer organizations. This move was adamantly opposed by
the largest employers' association, the CNPF, on the grounds that the INC should not
combine the rolls of information provision and market control.
Despite their fragmentation, French consumer groups did manage to act together
in order to intervene in government policy making. As early as the late 1960s consumer
groups participated in the Consumption Committee of the Sixth French Plan.242 On 8
May 1972, eleven of France's national consumer associations created the Coordination
Committee for Consumer Organizations (Comit6 de coordination des organizations de
consommateurs, or CCOC). The group was not long-lived, but they did push for
consumer protection legislation - permitting a 7 day grace period for door-to-door sales,
and allowing advertisements to include company names - that was eventually enacted.2 43
On 29 April 1975 the same eleven consumer groups published a comprehensive proposal
for a new package of consumer legislation.244 In a 30-page charter they called for the
abolition of the National Consumption Institute (INC) and the creation in its place of a
technical organization dominated by consumer representatives and oriented towards
serving consumer associations. They also proposed the creation of a High Council on
Innovation and Safety (Conseil sup6rieur de l'innovation et de la s6curit6) where
consumers, professionals and government officials could meet on an equal footing in
241 "un contre-pouvoir consommateur [pour] contrebalancer la technicit6 des producteurs
et I'action de la publicit6." Gisele Prevost, "Consommation: 'I'agressivit6' de I'INC
preoccupe de plus en plus le CNPF," Les Echos, 28 May 1979.
42 Claude Romec, "Organisations de consommateurs," Reforme, 15 Dec 1975.
243 "Onze associations nationales cr6ent un conseil de coordination des organisations de
consummateurs," Le Monde, 16 May 1972.
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order to give consumer input into product materials and production, to detect so-called
"false innovations," and to avoid the waste that resulted from them. A special tax on
industry would finance commissions to promote consumer education and competition
policy.24 5 These initiatives were not in the end successful, but the effort did introduce
consumer groups to high politics and they would continue to speak out in the political
arena.
A common denominator of German consumerism was the reticence of consumer
groups to advocate new consumer protections.24 6 Moves for reform came instead from a
combination of business interests, political parties, government bodies, and experts in the
field. Political parties created specialized consumer working groups. First the SPD, then
the CDU, created working groups on consumer politics within their parties. The SPD
group was led by Anke Riedel-Martiny, the CDU group was led by Walter Picard.247
New initiatives sometimes created unusual alliances. The centrist Free Democratic Party,
for example, allied with the Germa1 Confederation of Labor (DGB) to call for the
creation of a consumer academy.24 8 The peak industry association, the Bund Deutscher
Industrie (BDI), called for the government to support better consumer information
244 Marcel Garrigou, L'Assaut des Consommateurs pour changer les rapports producteurs
- vendeurs - consommateurs (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1981), p 238.
245 "Onze organisations d'usagers proposent une charte nationale," Le Monde, 30 April
1975.
246 Heribert Schatz, "Consumer Interests in the Process of Political Decision-Making: A
Study of Some Consumer Policy Decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany" Journal
of Consumer Policy 6 (1983), p 388.
247 Wolfgang H. Glickner, "Aktion 'Gelber Punkt' - Ins Rote verfalscht," Vorwdrts, 18
October 1973.
248 Christine Czerwonka, and Giinter Shbppe, "Verbraucherpolitische Konzeptionen und
Programme in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 1/3
(1977), p 286.
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through improved consumer education and more consumer advisory centers.2 49 Indeed
the peak consumer group, AgV, had been so passive in its support of new consumer
policies that the CDU, pushing for office in 1981, criticized it as an organization "whose
services are so little demanded in the free market that it must be supported almost
exclusively through state support."
The AgV appears to have feared that any move into politics would undermine its
own authority. Whereas the AgV prior to 1969 had called for consumers to be
represented by their own consumer ministry, they changed their position in the 1970s to
favor a conssumer advisory role within existting ministries.250 In 1973, for example, the
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, or BKA) called for competition and consumer
policy to be merged into a single national office modeled on the US Federal Trade
Commission. While this would have increased political scrutiny of consumer issues, the
AgV opposed the project, both for fear that they would lose control of the consumer
agenda, and because they genuinely doubted the utility of one central office in furthering
consumer interests.251 Instead, individual ministries began creating committees to
consider consumer issues. The Economics Ministry created a Consumer Advisory
Council (Verbraucherbeirat) in 1972. This Consumer council included 6 members of
consumer associations, 3 government representatives, 3 academics, 3 union
249 BDI, Jahresbericht 1973/4 (K61n 1974), p 45.
250 Klaus Wieken, Die Organisation der Verbraucherinteressen im internationalen
Vergleich (Gttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), p 27.
251 Eberhard Guenther, "Verbraucherpolitik, ziele, Mittel und Traeger," Marktwirtschaft 2
(1973), p 4.
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representatives, and member of the press.252 The Ministry of Food, Land, and Forest
created its own Consumer Committee (Verbraucherausschuss) in 1975.253
The Legal Context of Consumer Activism
The legal framework in France and Germany has formed an important context for
the manner in which consumer groups came to interact with industry. In both countries
the law shaped the way in which consumer groups could represent collective consumer
interests. In neither country was the law particularly friendly to the consumer interest. But
whereas German law worked to contain and structure the kinds of opposition that
consumer groups could raise against industry, French law became the arena in which
consumer groups proved their autonomy and mettle.
France and Germany have both encouraged legal action by consumer groups
against transgressions by industry, but the nature of the legal action differs in the two
countries. Neither country yet allows class action suits as employed in the United States.
Each has instead granted limited rights to consumer groups to protect consumers. In
Germany, collective suits (Verbraucherverbandklagen) are limited to two areas of law in
which consumer group legal actions have been explicitly permitted. The 1965
amendment to the Law on Unfair Competition (Gesetz fiber unlauteren Wettbewerb,
UWG) established a high threshold for misleading advertising and empowered consumer
groups to help enforce that standard. Approximately 1,000 UWG cases were brought by
252 "Zwei DGB-Vertreter im Verbraucherbeirat," Informations Dienst (Diisseldorf:
Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 11 August 1982), pp 1-2.
253 Katherina Focke (Bundesminister ffir Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit),
"Verbraucherpolitik in der Marktwirtschaft," Bulletin des Presse- und Infonnationsamtes
der Bundesregierung 65 (30 May 1973), p 645.
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consumer groups between 1965 and 1977, and 516 were brought in 1979 alone.2 5 4 The
1976 law on standard terms of sale (Gesetz fiber Allgemeingeschliftsbedingungen, AGB)
also granted consumer groups the right to file suits against companies employing unfair
terms of sale. A smaller but important number of AGB cases are brought by consumer
groups.
These laws, while drawing on the institutional capacities of consumer groups to
enforce certain consumer policies, did little to extend the legal action of consumer groups
in general. First, the collective legal suit was not extended to other kinds of legal action.
Hence consumer groups could not weigh in on liability suits, warranty disputes, or other
kinds of consumer grievances. This restriction was unusual from a legal perspective in
the German context since Germany, unlike France, has a long tradition of recognizing
group legal suits (Verbandklage), at least as that has applied to labor and producer
associations. Moreover, consumer group legal actions were restricted to blocking illegal
activity, but did not, except under extraordinary circumstances, extend to compensating
consumers for losses.2 55 Neither of these provisions worked to generate legal dynamism
within the consumer movement.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that until 1980, consumer advisory centers
faced a statutory limitation on the kinds of legal advice that they could offer consumers.
While they were allowed to broach matters bearing on contract law, Germany's Law on
Legal Consultation (Rechtsberatungsgesetz) did not permit them to give free advice on
254 European Consumer Law Group, Reports and Opinions -- September 1977-March
1984 (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Cabay, 1984), 278-279.
255 Individuals received compensation only if it could be shown that they would not have
purchased the product if the company had acted lawfully - a burden of proof that was in
practice rarely met.
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tort law. Because product liability in Germany falls primarily under tort law, advisory
centers could often not discuss legal recourse for product damage. Even those consumer
associations charged explicitly with pursuing legal action against companies that
contravened consumer laws, such as the Consumer Protection Union
(Verbraucherschutzverein, VSV), were not allowed to give legal advice to consumers,
since such free legal advice was prohibited.256 A 1980 change in the statutory lawyer fee
scale (Rechtsanwaltsgebiihrenordnung, BGB I, 1507) made possible a more liberal
treatment of consumer advisory centers under the Rechtsberatungsgesetz.25 7
In France, the 1973 loi Royer granted consumer groups the right to represent
consumer interests in the courts, but this right was quickly curtailed by a restriction on
the kinds of damages that they could claim. Unlike class action suits pursued on behalf of
consumers in the United States, French consumer groups were not permitted to act on
behalf of specific consumer interests. Instead, they were permitted to recover only for
damages to the general interests of consumer organizations. In practice, consumer groups
have often pursued their own cases alongside individual consumer cases in order to offer
legal and technical support. One consequence of this limitation is that French consumer
groups were unable to rely on high legal damages and fees to defray the costs of their
legal actions, as US consumer groups commonly do. Of the 1,300 lawsuits brought by
consumer associations from 1973 to 1982, 87 percent resulted in rewards of less than
256 Armin Schoreit, "Zur Rechtsberatung des Verbrauchers in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland," Journal of Consumer Policy 1/2 (1977), p 118.
257 Norbert Reich, "Rechtsberatung im Verbraucherschutz" Zeitschriftfiir Rechtspolitik 3
( 1981), pp 53-54.
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5,000 francs.258 Moreover consumer groups wishing to pursue legal suits had to be
accredited by the French government. Accreditation required proof that a consumer group
had at least ten thousand members and that consumer protection was its primary function.
This high threshold gave consumer groups strong incentives to attract individual
members. By 1979, 12 national and 62 regional consumer groups had been accredited to
pursue civil actions. Yet even given this high level of accreditation, the 450 consumer
groups cases filed in 1979 generated combined damages of only 440,000 francs.25 9
Consumer group litigation remains a staple of French consumer association
activity. In a 1989 survey of French consumers, 76 percent reported that consumer
associations were either very or fairly accessible for help with consumer litigation,
whereas only 29 percent felt that the government administration was equally capable.
And whereas only 2 percent of respondents reported that they personally would rely on
the government for support with a consumer grievance, 17 percent reported that they
would use consumer associations.2 60
In December 1985 the National Consumption Council (CNC) considered the
creation of a true class action suit ("action de groupe"). The move was proposed by the
new State Secretariat for Consumption, Henri Emmanuelli. Industry representatives on
the CNC opposed the move, citing the experience of other countries, notably the United
States, that employ class actions suits. "Can we support a project that will be only a lure
258 Anne Morin, "L'Action d'intret collectif exercee par les organisations de
consommateurs avant et apres la loi du 5 janvier 1988," Group Actions and Consumer
Protection, ed. Thierry Bourgoignie (Brussels: Story Scientia, 1992), p 65.
259 European Consumer Law Group, Reports and Opinions -- September 1977-March
;984 (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Cabay, 1984), pp 272-273.
260 "Les Franqais et les organisations de consommateurs," Inc Hebdo 633 (7 April 1989),
pp 9 -1 3.
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and source of disillusion for the consumer and that will entail grave economic
consequences for French enterprises?"2 61 After the elections of 1986, the new Minister of
Consumer Affairs, Jean Arthuis, expressed support for class action suits, but on the
condition that it be imposed at the European level.262 Given the probable preferences of
other European countries, especially Germany, this eventuality appears unlikely.
Outside of the courtroom, consumer groups in both countries have resorted to
boycotts to protest dangerous or highly-priced goods. French boycotts have been greeted
with strong popular acclaim, and often with support from French trade unions. But if
France's experience with product boycotts has been extensive, it has not always been
successful. In 1978, for example, the UFC called for a boycott of the Shell company in
response to the wreck of the Amoco-Cadiz oil tanker. The courts found in Shell's favor,
but fines were eventually suppressed by the appeals courts.263 Consumer groups were also
commonly more focused on confrontation than on technical analysis. On 16 June 1975,
for example, the Villejuif Association populaire de families (APF) distributed brochures
to a hospital warning, based on a report from the Ministry of Health, that Schweppes
added the chemical E330 to their beverages. Schweppes sued the group on the grounds
that E330 was simply the designator for citric acid.264
261 "Peut-on en effet soutenir un projet qui ne sera pour le consommateur qu'un leurre et
une source de d6sillusion et qui va entrainer de graves consequences 6conomiques pour
les entreprises franqaises?" "Action de groupe," Consommateurs Actualit6s 494 (31
January 1986), p 18.
262 Agnes Chambraud, Patricia Foucher, and Anne Morin, "The Importance of
Comlnunity Law for French Consumer Protection Legislation," Journal of Consumer
Policy 17 (1994), p 29.
263 La cour d'appel confirme l'interdiction du boycottage des produits Shell," Le Monde,
15 June 1978.
264 "C'est Schweppes!" Rouge, 1 Dec 1976.
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German product boycotts were less common than their French counterpart, but
they also typically achieved a greater level of success, especially in cases of dangerous
products or excessive prices. In 1971 a boycott against real estate agents for the excessive
fees they charged (Vorab-Maklergebuhren), in which consumers stood before real estate
offices and handed out leaflets to potential customers, resulted in a law one year later
making such fees illegal. The first large-scale consumer boycott, which occurred in
September 1973 in protest against the high price of meat, was supported by trade unions
and was relatively successful.265 A 1980 boycott against estrogen in veal, in which France
also participated, was the first in which environmental and consumer protection groups
worked together. Nestl6 and Lacroix took their veal products off the market.266 In 1982,
the Consumer Center of Stuttgart launched a boycott of Aral and BP because of their high
oil prices, and managed to have the prices reduced.267
Unlike French courts, the German legal system has been more permissive with
boycotts that do not have explicitly competitive goals. This difference in the courts'
stances toward consumer boycott drew in part from the perceived technical competency
of these groups. In Germany, where consumer centers had cultivated a high level of
familiarity with product markets, boycotts they launched were typically well-informed
and targeted at flagrant transgressions. In France, where consumer groups had little
technical expertise, courts sided systematically with business in boycott cases, although
265 Wolfgang H. Glockner, "Verbraucherpolitik im Aufwind," Die Neue Gesellschaft 5
(May 1974), p 424.
266 "Autofahrer gegen ilkonzeme -- Boykott letzte Waffe der Konsumenten," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 24 July 1982.
267 Wolf Renschke, "Der Boykott -- sein Miglichkeiten und sein Grenzen," Verbraucher
& Markt '82 (Bonn: 4 November 1982).
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higher courts typically reduced fines to a token I franc on appeal.2 68 These court
conflicts, which became increasingly common between French consumer groups and
industry, grew into a symbol of autonomy for these groups, advertising that they had not
been co-opted and were at the leading edge of the consumer struggle.
The Industrial Context of Consumer Activism
Not all interaction between consumer groups and producers was conflictual. In
tandem with the mobilization of consumer groups, the 1970s also saw the rise of
extensive collaborations between producers and consumers. French and German
consumer groups worked together with industry to elaborate standards for product sales
and design that would be mutually acceptable. Yet, again, the nature of this collaboration
was different in the two countries. In France, consumer groups negotiated directly with
industrials sectors, and later with individual producers. In Germany, by contrast,
consumer groups supported technical representatives to sit on product design committees
in which consumer goods were discussed. The legitimacy of Germany's consumer
representatives derived from their technical knowledge and ability to interact with
industry experts. The legitimacy of French consumer groups derived precisely from their
wide popular support and broad membership.
In 1975, France's largest employer association, the CNPF, created a new
Committee on Industry, Commerce, and Consumption (CICC) to coordinate business
interaction with consumers groups. Paul Simonet, the head of the new committee,
declared that they were "...very open to all forms of concertation, especially in the
268 Roger-Xavier Lanteri, "Prix: que peuvent faire les consommateurs?" L'Express, 20
September 1976.
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domain of information."2 69 They felt that consumer groups should be encouraged and
developed, although they argued against funding them through a tax on advertising, ti
some consumer advocates had proposed.2 70 Simonet felt that consumerism was "...a
profound and lasting movement that corresponds to the evolution of life in society, and
with which we [business] should establish an open and constructive concertation." 2 71 This
opinion appears to have been shared by many of France's companies as well. A 1977
survey of producers found that 24 percent had already held at least one dialogue with a
consumer association. Consumer groups, for their part, were more than willing to join in
such discussions. The same survey found that 81 percent of consumer associations
wished for a consultative role with industry.2 72
Early efforts at concertation were aimed primarily at standardizing sales practice
in particular sectors. In 1974, for example, the president of the National Council on
Consumption (CNC), Francis Pecresse, called for the formation of a trial forum for
negotiations between consumers and retailers. This led to the creation in 1975 in
Toulouse of a trial Committee for Recourse and Information on Sales and Consumption
(Comit6 de recours et d'information commerce consommation, or CRICC). Consumers
were represented by the consumer groups FFF and the UFCS. The more radical UFC
refused to sit down in any context with professionals. On 24 March 1976, the first
meeting took place with the new Secretariat for Consumption, Christiane Scrivener,
269 "...nous sommes tres ouverts a toute forme de concertation, plus particulierement dans
le domaine de l'information..."; "Opinions sur la fonction consommation et la libre
entreprise," Humanisme et Entreprise 102 (April 1977), p 16.
270 Ambroise Roux, (President CNPF), "La r6forme de l'entreprise," CNPF Patronat
(February 1976), p 29.
271 G6rard Lavergne, "Eux, les clients," CNPF Patronat 429 (November 1981), p 22.
272 "Le Consumerisme," Libre Service Actualitis 632 (30 June 1977), pp 134-6.
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attending. This was the first strictly equal meeting of consumers and producers, and
resulted in agreements about the sales of furniture and dry cleaning.27 3 In another
instance, in 1975, consumers groups and the food industry created the Communal
Organization of Consumers, Workers and Farmers (Organisation commune des
consommateurs, travailleurs, agriculteurs, or OCCTA) to set labeling standards for food
products.2 74 And in 1976, the French standard setting body AFNOR created experimental
standard X 50.002 based on negotiations between consumers and producers concerning
after-sales service for kitchen products.27 5 All of these agreements, and there was a very
large number of them, were strictly voluntary for producers.
Consumer negotiations with industry were not always amicable. In 1975, for
example, at a meeting convened by AFNOR on the subject of "The Quality Challenge"
("Le Defi de la qualit6"), the union consumer group ORGECO suggested applying the
notion of consumer-producer concertation in order to improve product quality. The CNPF
greeted the idea with hostility.27 6 While they welcomed consumer input in selling
products to consumers, they opposed any direct consumer participation in product design.
They also opposed any government intervention in their negotiations with consumers for
fear that the negotiations might spread to questions of design and production.277
Consumer groups, for their part, soon became frustrated that the negotiated agreements
273 Marcel Garrigou, L'Assaut des Consommateurs pour changer les rapports producteurs
- vendeurs - consommateurs (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1981), p 162.
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(April 1975), pp 1-2.
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were not being adopted by industry. As early as 1976, during the negotiations of the
Consumption Group of the 7th French Plan, the business contingent complained of a
"certain climate of hostility and tartness that...impregnated the meetings of the
Commission and of the working groups." 278 Finally, in an open letter published on 11
January 1980, the 1 1 major national consumer associations renounced participation in all
collective agreements with business until some form of enforcement mechanism could be
established.
The new Socialist Gcvernment saw consumer organizations as an indirect means
of regulating business practice, and considered making the outcome of negotiations
between business associations and consumer groups binding on all businesses affected by
the decision. The CNPF strongly opposed this corporatist solution, and the government
was eventually forced to back down. In its place they pursued two new strategies. The
first strategy was to transform the National Consumption Committee (CNC), formerly a
forum for consumer groups to express their interests to the government, into a tripartite
negotiating table at which not only consumer groups and the government but also
professional groups would be present. It was called, somewhat confusingly, the National
Consumption Council (Conseil national de la consommation, or CNC). Decisions arrived
at in this new forum would not be binding, but the presence of the government went a
long way to alleviate the frustrations expressed by consumer groups.2 79
277 G6rard Lavergne, "Eux, les clients," CNPF Patronat 429 (November 1981), p 23.
278 "sensibles a un certain climat d'hostilit6 et d'aigreur qui a, dans l'ensemble...impregne
les runions de la Commission et de ses gropues de travails"; Commisariat General du
Plan, Rapport du comite Consommation: Preparation du 7e plan (Paris: Documentation
Franqaise, 1976), p 69.
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The second strategy was to permit consumer groups to negotiate binding
contracts, so-called "quality contracts," with individual companies for a limited time
irame. Unlike earlier agreements between consumer and professional groups, these
quality contracts were company-specific and legally enforceable. Company participation
was strictly voluntary, but those companies that did sign agreements could advertise this
as an advantage of their products. Not all consumer groups participated in the program.
The UFC, for example, felt that quality contracts did little to improve product quality, and
because they were only negotiated with French firms, the UFC felt that they would hurt
French consumers in the long run by excluding foreign products.280 Labor-oriented
consumer groups such as INDECOSA-CGT, by contrast, favored quality contracts as an
additional forum for negotiating with employers. Indeed quality contracts were often
initiated through discussions with local labor unions, which called on the government to
push nationalized industries into quality contracting. 28 l
Unlike French consumer groups, which negotiated with industry outside of any
formal setting and without their agreements being generally binding, German consumer
groups contributed to producer decisions from within industry associations that set
product standards. The most prominent case of this was the introduction in 1975 of a
consumer council to German industry's main standard setting body, Deutscher Industrie
Normung (DIN). Consumer representatives, with political backing from the Economics
Ministry, were admitted to those technical standard setting committees that dealt directly
with consumer product safety. Over 200 consumer representatives thus gained access to
280 "Contrats d:. qualit6: 3 questions - 3 rponses," Informations Indecosa-CGT 29
(January 1983), p 4.
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over 10 percent of all DIN technical standard writing bodies. These safety standards were
in turn made mandatory on all producers by a 1980 ammendment to the Equipment
Safety Law (Geratsicherheitsgesetz, or GSG). The details of this process are discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 below. For consumer groups, the effect was to channel their efforts into
the training of technically sophisticated representatives who could contribute directly to
industry standard setting.
Summary
Claus Offe and Philippe Schmitter have both observed that corporatist institutions
of interest representation such as those found in Germany may fail to grant adequate
access to new kinds of interests that arise in society because these new interests go
unrepresented at important bargaining tables.282 The case of consumer interest
representation in Germany suggest that this criticism, at least for emerging consumer
interests, is not accurate. In fact, consumer groups were able to gain access to important
bargaining tables in Germany. The institutions of corporatist interest representation
actually legitimated the integration of consumer interests into industry decision-making
on a par with other economic interests. The legitimacy of consumer input was not
contested by industry, and a variety of forums were established in which consumer
interests could be expressed. German consumer representatives were even admitted,
2S1 "Contrats qualit6 -- Des questions srieuses," Informations Indecosa-CGT 14 (March
1986), p 2.
282 Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Mediation and Regime Governability in
Contemporary Western Europe and North America," in Organizing Interests in Western
Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics, ed. Suzanne Berger
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 285-327.
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beginning in 1973, to the "Concerted Action" negotiations at which wage and money
supply levels were set in Germany.283
It is not the lack of policy access, but instead the fact of automatic access to
policy forums, that has had a decisive impact on the kinds of consumer interests that have
been emphasized in Germany. Consumer groups have tailored their organizational
strategies towards issues and competencies that suited the bargaining-tables to which they
were granted access. These groups felt no strong need to organize individual consumers
because the principle of corporatism alread legitimated their access to important policy
forums.
In France, by contrast, where consumer groups focused their efforts on political
action and member mobilization, consumer interaction with industry became radicalized.
French producers complained that the "strong and imperative language" employed by
consumer groups reflected a tendency to exaggerate problems in a way that undermined
the integrity of the consumer movement as a whole.2 84 But this exaggeration was
precisely the goal of French groups, which were forced to cultivate interest among
consumers in order to pursue the consumer interest.
283 Hanna Gieskes, "Gesucht wird der miindige, nicht der vevormundete Verbraucher,"
Die Welt, 25 October 1978.
284 Alain Poiree, Les Discours consum6ristes et leur perception par les Franqais (Paris:
I.C.C.-C.N.P.F., 1984), pp 45-46.
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Chapter 5. Retailer Regulation and the Identity of the Consumer
During the period in which consumer groups were mobilizing in France and
Germany, the retail sector was waging a struggle that would determine the fate of small-
scale retailing. Since the 1950s small and family stores had progressively been driven out
of business by larger stores and chain stores that were able to undercut smaller
competition through lower operating costs and a greater purchasing power with
producers. Small store owners in both countries mobilized in the 1970s to resist this
threat to their livelihood and managed to curb what had been a long-term trend of decline
for small retailers and of growth for large retailers and chain stores. The strategy of
small-retailer mobilization took different forms in the two countries, however, and this
difference was to have implications for emerging national conceptions of consumer
interests and identity. After all, retailers were one of the only large economic interests in
society that had as one of their explicit goals the shielding of the interests of consumers.
Small retailers in particular, because they typically enjoyed long-term economic and
social contact with their customers, were in a strong position to mold the societal
conception of what consumers needed and wanted. In this way the fate of consumers in
France and Germany was closely tied to the aspirations and survival strategies of small
retailers.
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Figure 20. Retail density in France and Germany, 1955.1995.285
At the core of this struggle was an effort to reframe the consumer interest in both
countries in a way that highlighted the specific contribution of small retailers to consumer
welfare. Protection for small store owners in Germany took the form of maintaining
restrictive conditions in retailing that placed practical limits on the growth of larger
distributors. The most important restriction of this kind has been the Store Closing Law
(LadenschluBgesetz) which created an important barrier to large stores relying on volume
sales. Stole hour restrictions were championed by a left-alliance among retailers and trade
unions grounded in a common concern to limit working hours. The German trade union
movement backed this approach on the grounds that no workers, including retail workers,
should be forced to work late into the evening or night. Producers acceded to these
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restrictions because they recognized both that small retailers with weaker market share
had less power to negotiate for lower product prices, and that small retailers tended to
emphasize quality in their sales. Quality products and knowledgeable service were seen
to be one of the important advantages of small over large retailers.
In France, small retailers drew on a different set of political affiliations,
mobilizing alongside artisans to win political and public support for a limitation on
licenses to new large retailers. Such store surface-area restrictions have been championed
most forcefully by an alliance between the political Right and an independent middle
class constituency embodied in traditionally conservative shopkeepers. Shopkeepers
portrayed themselves as a critical counterforce to the danger of the marketplace, and a
tonic against the negative impact of monopoly capital in the retail sector. Consumer
groups argued that small retailers helped to maintain a healthy competition in retailing,
and that a mixture of large and small retailers was indispensable in order to protect
consumer choice. "What matters," in the words of Henri Estingoy, president of the
National Consumption Institute, "is the maintenance of competition among the diverse
kinds of distribution." 286 The French response thus reflected a deep skepticism that a
laissez-faire approach to retailing could result in fruitful competition, or that consumer
interests would necessarily be protected in an unfettered business environment.
These national strategies of shopkeeper protection cannot be understood merely as
the perpetuation of traditional, pre-industrial commercial patterns. In fact France and
Germany both had endorsed mass distribution throughout the 1960s. Echoing the earlier
285 Compiled by author from national statistical yearbooks.
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Poujadist shopkeeper movement of the 1950s, the Royer Law limiting new store licenses
appeared in the early 1970s in response to tax and lending policies that had been intended
explicitly to favor modem over traditional forms of retailing. In Germany, similarly, the
goal of the Store Closing Law (Ladenschlufigesetz) as originally conceived in 1956 was
to extend modem production techniques to the retail sector by promoting rational
employment practices among shopkeepers. It did this by ensuring that larger stores with
trained employees would not be at a competitive disadvantage to traditional family
retailers that could keep long hours with low labor costs. Only in the 1970s was the goal
of early store closing reconceived as a protection of traditional neighborhood retailers
against mass-distributors.
This protection of traditional retailing in France and Germany was also by no
means a foregone conclusion. Traditional retailers in the United States, for example, fared
poorly against large distributors competing on lower prices, greater accessibility, and
wider selections. The average US store in 1990 employed 12 sales and support staff-the
average German store employed only 5.4 staff and the average French store only 4.5
staff. German and French retailing have compensated for this smaller store size by their
greater density. France has over eight stores per thousand inhabitants, compared to seven
per thousand in Germany and six per thousand in the United States. Hence the survival of
small retailers in both France and Germany did not reflect a broader international trend.
Success in both cases depended on political initiative and policy innovation.
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286 "Ce qui importe est le maintien d'une concurrence entre les divers types de
distribution." "Les associations de consommateurs restent prudentes face aux actions du
grand commerce," Les Echos, 14 April 1972.
Yet even in these cases of policy innovation, shopkeepers operated in ways that
responded to the institutional context in which they found themselves. Just as consumer
groups pursued different organizational strategies, so too did small retailers with similar
kinds of goals pursue different means of protection in the two countries. In both cases the
institutional framework in which new policies emerged shaped the strategies that actors
pursued. And in both cases this generated distinctive interpretations of the consumer
identity and interest.
The loi Royer and Store Size in France
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, French consumer groups tended to support
large scale retailers against the interests of small shopkeepers. Consumer groups
commonly came to the aid of large distributors such as the Centres Leclerc and Centres
Lemaire in their attempts to secure business licenses to open new stores, often rallying
before the licensing offices to encourage the local governments to approve new
hypermarket sites.287 Price surveys, conducted frequently by consumer groups,
emphasized the lower prices that these larger stores offered.288 Larger retailers also
provided strong backing for the consumer movement. The FNAC music and book
retailer, for example, twice brought Ralph Nader to come speak in France. They also
offered the building for their new Montparnasse store as the site of a formative
"Consumer Salon" in 1972, which an estimated 200,000 people attended.289 The new
287 Dominique Pons, Consomme et tais-toi (Paris: Epi, 1972), p 98.
288 Pierre Combris, J. Hossenlopp, and Elise Zitt, "Evolution des associations de
consommateurs et leurs impact sur les industriels," Problemes tconomiques (11 January
1978), p 10.
289 Michel Wieviorka, LEtat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements
de consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), p 131.
195
Printemps 2000 store that opened in Rennes in 1973 made room for a Morris column at
the center of the store on which consumer groups were encouraged to post product
information and warnings. 290
Consumer support for large retailing was initially accompanied by antagonism
towards small retailers. When food and vegetable retailers went on strike in 1973, for
example, protesting government tax increases, consumer groups opted for a punitive
consumer strike against these stores for having closed. In November 1973 the regional
consumer group APF led the so-called "Three-Six-Nine" boycott against the high prices
of small retailers in which consumers were asked to boycott meat for three days, fruit for
six days, and mineral water for nine days.29' This antagonism was reflected in the
formulation of the 1973 loi Royer, which granted control over new store licensing to
Departmental Commissions of Commercial Town-Planning (Commisions
d6partementales d'urbanisme commercial, or CDUC). As originally conceived, these
CDUCs were intended to have equal numbers of local businessmen and consumers. Small
shopkeepers, however, fearing the antagonism of consumer groups, successfully lobbied
to reduce consumer representation to a token 2 members per commission. 2 92
In 1969 French small shopkeepers mobilized around G6rard Nicoud, the
charismatic 23 year old caf6 owner and founder of the Committee for the Information and
Defense of Retailers, Artisans, and the Liberal Professions (CIDCAPL).2 93 Their
grievances were focused not explicitly against large distributors, however, but against
290 Michel Wieviorka, L'Etat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements
de consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), pp 53-54.
291 Roger-Xavier Lanteri, "Prix: que peuvent faire les consommateurs?" L'Express, 20
September 1976.
292 Claude Romec, "Organisations de consommateurs," Reforme, 15 Dec 1975.
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what they perceived to be discriminatory tax and lending policies of the government. In
their first protest rally, for example, CIDCAPL took over the tax office of Tour-du-Pin
and threatened to dump all of their tax documents into the river.
Three government policies were of particular concern to small retailers. First, the
French government had increased sales taxes in 1968 as part of an austerity plan to
depress domestic consumption. However, in order to encourage investment and stimulate
exports, large companies were given tax concessions. In retailing, this meant that large-
surface-area and chain stores enjoyed a lower tax rate than small shopkeepers. Second,
the government had requested that banks not make loans to small store owners, in order
to discourage further growth in what was considered to be a declining sector.294 Finally,
traditional retailers complained that a local business tax, the patente, was being used by
the communities in which they worked to modernize distribution by financing the
construction of new suburban shopping centers.29 5 Shopkeeper grievances thus focused
not specifically on the economic threat from large stores, but instead on the political
threat from government support for modern distribution.
Nicoud took shopkeeper protest into the streets. He traveled France to meet with
groups of retailers and widen the membership of CIDCAPL. He called on retailers to
remove all of their savings from nationalized banks, post office accounts, and 'caisse
293 "Entretien avec G6rard Nicoud," L'Express, 1 June 1970.
294 Robert Lagre, "Giscard contre Nicoud ou la dernitre gal6jade de Valery," Rivarol, 2
April 1970.
Roger Eatwell, "Poujadism and Neo-Poujadism: From Revolt to Recognition," in
Social Movements and Protest in France, ed. Philip G. Cerny (London: Frances Pinter,
1982), pp 81-2.
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d'epargne' because of the government restriction on granting loans to small retailers.29 6
In March of 1970, he organized Paris retailers to close their shops and drive around the
peripheral motorway during morning rush hour at 3 miles per hour.297 When Pompidou
refused to meet with Nicoud to discuss the government's policies, Nicoud widened his
attack. In what became known as the April Fools protest, Nicoud's CIDCAPL blocked
roads all over France during spring vacation, a peak travel time. Shop owners blockaded
toll islands, scattering nails on highways, and in one case used chain saws to fell trees
across a road.2 98 In Paris, 500 retailers struggled with police from behind a flaming wall
of tires. 299 Finally, in 1971, Nicoud launched a hunger strike in an effort to have released
from prison two members of his organization who had been arrested during these
protests. 300
Nicoud's creative mobilizations increased the membership and popularity of his
group. CIDCAPL joined with another loosely formed organization of retailers to form
CID-UNAT!, and by 1971 CID-UNATI controlled 43 percent of the seats in local
Artisanal Associations (Chambres de m6tiers).30 Despite the disruptiveness of their
tactics, Nicoud's group also gained significant public support. A 1970 Gallop poll found
that 49 percent of the population sympathized with the shopkeepers' protest, while only
296 Robert Lagre, "Giscard contre Nicoud ou la dernitre gal6jade de Val6ry," Rivarol, 2
April 1970.
297 "Militant Shopkeepers," The Times, 11 March 1970.
298 "Barrages de routes et manifestations de commerqants hier dans tout le pays,"
Humanite, 24 March 1970.
299 Franqois Miralles, "Revendications legitimes et actions injustifi6es," Le Figaro, 24
March 1970.
300 "Le careme de M. Nicoud," L'Express, 22 March 1971.
301 Suzanne Berger, "Regime and Interest Representation: the French Traditional Middle
Class," in Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the
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39 percent disapproved.3 2 Consumer groups, too, began gradually to endorse the goals of
CID-UNATI.
The tide of government opinion turned in favor of retailer interests in 1972 when
Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas resigned under disclosures of personal tax fraud.
Shopkeeper discontent over government tax policies appeared to have been vindicated.
The National Assembly rallied to the support of shopkeepers, presenting a range of
possible solutions to shopkeeper resentment. Proposed legislation included federally
supported pension funds for small retailers, a new lending bank modeled on the 'Credit
agricole' that would be dedicated to retail development, and government compensation to
shopkeepers whose property lost value due to the growth of new large-scale retailing. All
were strategies for cushioning the fall of a declining sector, similar to agricultural
subsidies intended to ease the decline of France's small farmers. The future of retailing
was assumed to lie with large-scale distribution. A 1971 poll, for example, found that 83
percent of the French felt that the growth of large surface area stores was a necessity of
modern life-only 15 thought their growth should be stopped.303
It therefore came as something of a political novelty when the newly appointed
Minister of Commerce, Jean Royer, proposed actively to promote traditional retailing.
His 1973 Law for the Orientation of Trade and Artisans (loi d'orientation pour le
commerce et 'artisanat or loi Royer) delegated licensing decisions for new stores with a
sales area greater than 1000 m2 to corporatist decision-making bodies at the departmental
Transformation of Politics, ed. Suzanne Berger (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1981), p 94.
302 Eatwell, p 83.
303 Eric Langeard, and Robert Malsagne, Les Magasins de grande surface (Paris: Dunod,
1971), pp 12-13.
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level. Because local business interests would be strongly represented on these bodies,
called Departmental Commissions of Commercial Town-Planning (CDUC), the loi Royer
amounted to a moratorium on large store construction. Rather than easing traditional
shopkeepers out of business, the loi Royer proposed to protect them.
This strategy of shopkeeper protection had two advantages for the political Right.
First, by identifying modern mass distribution as the source of shop-keeper grievances, it
was able to deflect criticism that would otherwise have fallen on the government. Second,
by designating large retailers as a common enemy of all small retailers, the Right was
able to create a set of common political interests for artisans and retailers who otherwise
shared no common skills, workplace, consciousness, or culture.304 Ironically, it had been
the very antagonism of the previous government that, by mobilizing shopkeeper
opposition to their tax policies, had revealed the potential for organizing retailers in
support of the political Right.
The new protections that the government created for small shop-keepers
suggested that consumers and retailers shared an affinity as victims of big business. Both
were revealed as pawns in a larger struggle between producers and large-scale
distributors.30 5 Indeed the loi Royer, by combining a protection for small retailers with
provisions for consumer protection, helped consumer groups to identify with the plight of
small retailers. Jos6e Doyere, a long-time reporter on the consumer beat, recalls that
"...curiously, consumers have benefited from the wave of electoral demagoguery that
brought the members of parliament to the aid of small commerce ....They have made so
304 Berger, p 95.
305 "tout en laissant dans l'ombre la plus complete des producteurs, vertables beneficiaires
de ce texte!" Luc Bihl, Consommateur, Difends-toi! (Paris: Deno/l, 1976), pp 23-24.
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many speeches in their defense-on the left and the right as well as the center-that it
was difficult not to support a text in favor of consumers."306Following the loi Royer,
consumer groups became reluctant to make direct price comparisons between traditional
and large distributors, prefering instead to compare prices only among the large
distributors. Consumer groups also opposed the distribution of drugs by large chains, and
opted to grant small pharmacies a monopoly on the sales of drugs.307
The alliance forged by the loi Royer between shopkeepers and the political Right
has persisted in French politics. Indeed, one of the first moves by Jacques Chirac on
coming to power in 1995 was to place a moratorium on new retail construction. In 1996
Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the minister charged with artisans and retailers, called for the
threshold for approval of new retail sites to be lowered to 300 m2 in an effort to target the
so-called 'hard discounters' that have flourished even in small retail spaces. Similarly,
Raffarin sought to protect traditional French bakers by reserving the name "boulangerie"
exclusively for their use.308 Employing a political rhetoric that has linked consumer and
retail interests since the ear!y 1970s, this new disignation was justified as a form of
consumer protection against the threat posed by industrial bread.
306 "Curieusement, les consommateurs b6n6ficierent de la vague de d6magogie 6lectorale
qui porta les d6put6s au secours du petit commerce....On avait fait tant de discours dans
l'hmicycle pour leur d6fense-de la gauche a la droite en passant par le centre-qu'il
6tait difficile de ne pas sutenir un texte en faveur des onsommateurs." Jos6e Doyere, Le
Combat des consommateurs (Paris: tdistions du Cerf, 1975), pp 69-70.
307 Michel Wieviorka, L'Etat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs: Etude des mouvements
de consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), pp 53-54.
308 Emmanuelle R6ju, "Commerce <<dfendre le pain artisanal contre le pain industriel>>,"
La Croix, 4 January 1997.
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The LadenschluBgesetz and Store Hours in Germany
If store size regulations were the leitmotif of retail protection in France, strict
store closing requirements served as a similar focal point for the politics of retail
protection in Germany. German shop hour restrictions were imposed by the 1956 Store
Closing Law, or LadenschluJ3gesetz, which was itself derived from the 1938 regulation of
general working time (Arbeitzeitverordnung).309 Until the Store Closing Law was
liberalized in 1996, it imposed a 6:30 PM closing time on weekdays, a 2:00 PM closing
time on Saturdays, and a strict interdiction on Sunday opening. Permitting a total of 64.5
hours per week, the German law offered consumers the shortest shopping hours of any
country in Europe.
The persistence of the Store Closing Law was surprising primarily because of its
lack of support in the general public. Surveys conducted from the early 1960s to the mid-
1990s show that a majority of consumers has always favored store hour liberalization.
See Table 21 below. Political support for the policy has long been based on what critics
have called an unholy alliance between supporters on the left and right.310 The basis of
this alliance, however, has changed over time.
309 Bruno Tietz, Konsument und Einzelhandel: Strukturwandlungen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1970 bis 1995 (Frankfurt: Lorch, 1983), p 79.
310 Sighart Nehring, "Ladenschlussgesetz: Deregulierung auch im Einzelhandel?"
Wirtschaftsdienst 1 (1984), p 41.
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year favor liberalization
19633" 52 %
1964312 55 %
1969 74 %
1972313 62 %
1985314 77 %
1995315 74 %
1996316 60 %
Figure 21. Consumers favoring store hour liberalization in Germany, 1963-1996.
Early support for the store closing law coalesced around a bipartisan interest in
modernizing the retail sector. Trade unions saw that short store hours had the advantage
of placing retail employees on an equal footing with other industrial workers in
negotiating wage contracts. The peak retail trade union (Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken,
und Versicherung, or HBV) recognized that retailers could only participate in patterned
wage bargaining so long as work hours were limited and part-time labor kept to a
minimum. The law was also seen at the time to promote modern kinds of distribution by
insulating them against owner-operated family stores. Whereas family stores could
compete by extending their opening hours at little extra cost, larger stores were bound by
wage contracts and faced high labor costs if they wished to stay open particularly late.317
311 Jahrbuch der Offentlichen Meinung: 1965-1967, (Allensbach: Verlag fir
Demoskopie, 1967), p 126.
312 Klaus Reichert, Das Ladenschlufproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Vienna: Verlag Notring, 1971), p 38.
313 Jahrbuch der Offentlichen Meinung: 1968-1973 (Allensbach: Verlag fur Demoskopie,
1973), p 391.
314 Monika Ketterer, "Die Diskussion um den ladenschluB - eine Diskussion der
Theoretiker," Verbraucher und Recht 3 (1987), p 143.
315 "Kaufen ohne Ende," Focus, 14 August 1995.
316 The Reuter European Business Report, February 2, 1996.
317 Ladenschluf3 in Europa: Erfahrungen der Nachbarn - Konsequenzen fiir die
Bundesrepublik? (Konigswinter: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 34-24 October 1985), p 6;
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It was precisely to put larger stores on an equal competitive footing that the law was
applied not only to store owners with paid employees but also to family stores without
paid employees. Hence early supporters of restrictive store hours on the Left and Right
shared an interest in extending the modern organization of labor relations into
distribution. The Peak Association of Small Retailers (Hauptverband Deutscher
Einzelhandel, or HDE) recognized the negative impact that the law was likely to have on
its members and strongly opposed the project.31 8
By the early 1970s, however, the original arguments in favor of the Store Closing
Law appeared to have lost their substance. Many of the most traditional distributors had
already been eradicated. In 1955, for example, Germany boasted 622,000 retail stores
with an average of only 3 employees. 319 By 1972 Germany had only 350,000 stores with
over 6 employees per store.3 20 Furthermore, the Store Closing Law appeared increasingly
to conflict with broader union priorities. An important reason was the growing female
union membership. At the Ninth National Congress of Germany's peak labor association
(Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund, or DGB), two women from the metal-working industry
called for union support of longer store hours. They argued that, given recent price
increases, they required more time for comparative shopping.321 Women's organizations
Christian Uwe Tager, Kurt Vogler-Ludwig, and Sophia Munz, Das deutsche
LadenschlufJgesetz auf dem Priifstand: Binnenhandels- und wettbewerbspolitische sowie
beschiiftigungspolitische und arbeitsrechtliche Oberlegungen (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1995), p 75.
318 Bundestagdrucksache 10/517 (1955), question 23.
319 James B. Jefferys, and Derek Knee, Retailing in Europe: Present Structure and Future
Trends (London: Macmillan & Co., 1962).
320 Patrick Molle, Le Commerce et la Distribution en Europe (Paris: Editions Liaisons,
1992).
321 Andreas Fischer, DGB-Verbraucherpolitik zwischen Anspruch und politischer Praxis
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), p 165.
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such as the German Housewives' Association (Deutschen Hausfrauenbund) called
traditional union opposition to longer store hours "unfriendly to women"
("frauenfeindlich").3 22 Indeed Sweden, faced with similar pressures from women's groups
in 1972, eliminated its store hour regulations as part of a broader economic
rationalization program.3 23 Among German consumers, 62 percent favored such a
deregulation.
What saved the German Store Closing Law was a reconceptualization, first by
Germany's unions, then by the CDU, of the function of small retailers in Germany's
economy and of their contribution to consumers. On the left, support came from the
powerful retailing union (Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken, und Versicherung), which
argued that longer work days would hurt the interests of women who worked in retailing
as well as their families. Moreover, they argued, longer store hours were likely to mean
more part-time employment and a lower overall workforce skill level in the retail sector.
The goal of store hour regulation, was now recast as a protection for retail workers
against the social dislocation that modern distribution could cause. The relevant interest
of consumers, in other words, was not convenient shopping times, but a professional and
skilled retail sector.
With the fall of the SPD/FDP coalition in 1981 and the formation of the
CDU/FDP coalition, life became more difficult for small retailers. On the one hand, the
CDU embraced retailers as a natural constituency. Shopkeepers were traditionally
conservative, and short shopping hours were seen by the Christian wing of the
322 Fischer, p 171.
323 Boddewyn, Jean J., and Stanley C. Hollander, Public Policy Toward Retailing: An
International Symposium (Lexington, Mass.. Lexington Books, 1972), p 264.
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conservative party to offer needed protection for families. On the other hand, the FDP
coalition partner was pushing a strong deregulatory program, and the Store Closing Law
was high on its list of priorities.
The first attempt to lengthen store hours came in 1984 when Helmut Kohl, who as
recently as 1980 had proclaimed his support for the Store Closing Law, called for
liberalization.3 24 He was supported in this effort by the FDP, by the Association of
Consumer Groups (Arbeitgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbande, or AgV), and by the
peak industry association (Bund Deutscher Industrie, or BDI).32 5 The response from
retailers to this threat was swift and forceful. The Peak Association of Small Retailers
(HDE) voted unanimously to reject store hour liberalization, arguing that this would
increase product costs for consumers who would, in the end, bear the costs of additional
operating expenses. They also argued that liberalization would hurt single-family stores,
which would be forced to stay open longer to remain competitive.3 2 6 The Association of
Middle and Large Retailers (BAG) also opposed liberalization on the grounds that
increased wage costs would be likely to push a number of stores out of business.327
Larger stores located downtown feared that longer shopping hours would draw
consumers to new shopping centers located outside of town. Like Jean Royer in France a
324 GUnter Triesch, "Mehr Sachlichkeit in der LadenschluBdiskussion," BAG-
Nachtrichten 5 (1984), p 4.
325 "Eine liberalere LadenschluBregelung ist tiberfallig," Verbraucherpolitische
Korrespondenz 21 (22 May 1984), p 3.
326 "Das LadenschluBgesetz: Die Argumente des Einzelhandels," Hauptgemeinschaft des
Deutschen Einzelhandels, Press Release, 3/4 November 1983.
327 "BAG fUr sachliche Argumentation in der Ladenschlul3diskussion," Press-Information
(Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Grol3betriebe des Einzelhandels, 22 May
1984).
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decade earlier, Kohl quickly recognized the political imptortance of small retailers for the
Right and backed down from his liberalization project.
The next challenge to the Store Closing Law came in 1989, when, again under
pressure from the FDP, the governing coalition proposed the creation of a so-called
"service evening" (Dienstleistungsabend) that would allow stores and other service
providers to remain open until 8:30 PM on Thursdays. While apparently small in scope,
the new service evening proposal drew a line in the sand that mobilized forces on all
sides of the store hour debate. The Ministry of Labor argued that the extended Thursday
hours would be a boon to all, leading to a higher quality of life for consumers and new
job opportunities for the unemployed.32 8 The SPD raised vehement opposition, arguing
that women working in retailing would have even less time with their families on
Thursday evenings.329 The retailer union, HBV, argued that the benefit of two extra
shopping hours was risible compared to the damage that the service evening would do to
the families of shop workers.33 0 Retail employees took to the streets in protest, with over
200 retail firms with 30,000 employees participating in strikes during June 1989.33
When strikes failed to derail the legislation, retail unions across Germany
renegotiated their labor contracts to include a mandatory closing time of 6:30. They also
called for a 37.5 hour work week, and for part time workers to be hired for at least 4
hours per day and at least 20 hours per week.332 In some of Germany's federal states,
328 "Bluim: Dienstleistungsabend ein Gewinn fir alle," Siddeutsche Zeitung, 23 June
1988.
329 "Gesetz iiber Dienstleistungsabend gebilligt," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 3 June 1989.
330 "LadenschluB: die Stimmung ist geladen," Der Spiegel, 29 May 1989, p 105.
331 Hans Jiirgensen, "'Langer Donnerstag' auch in Warenhiusern?" Frankfurter
Allgemeine, 29 June 1989.
332 "'Langer Donnerstag' nur bei Konkurrenz," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12 July 1989.
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these new labor contracts specified that the stores could only stay open late if an early
closing would place the store at a competitive disadvantage (Rheinland-falz and
Saarland), or, stricter yet, if longer hours were necessary to ensure the survival of the
store (Bremen).33 3 And because these contracts were negotiated at the peak level, they
were binding on all retailers in the state in which they were signed. Retail employers,
who also generally opposed longer store hours, were content to assent to the restrictive
wage agreements. The SPD, in support of the retail unions, also called on its constituency
not to shop during the service evening.3 34 Thus once again middle class shop-keepers
were shielded by the protection that labor union solidarity afforded.
In 1996, the same year in which France further restricted large store licensing,
Germany amended its store closing law to allow stores to remain open until 8:00 PM on
all week nights. This change is difficult to explain based on the preferences of consumers.
Only 60 percent of consumers reported favoring store hour liberalization in 1996, fewer
than in the past.33 5 Among retailers, though, only 56 percent opposed liberalization in
1996336, compared to 79 percent who had opposed longer store hours in 1983.337 This
lower rate of retail opposition may have made store hour liberalization more politically
palatable on the right. But the real pressure for change came from the growth in
unemployment. In a study commissioned by the government, the Ifo Institut estimated
333 Hans Jiirgensen, "'Langer Donnerstag' auch in Warenhausern?" Frankfurter
Allgemeine, 29 June 1989.
334 Peter Gillies, "Die SPD im Kampf gegen den abendlich Einkauf," Die Welt, 5 October
1989.
335 The Reuter European Business Report, February 2, 1996.
336 Ifo Institut, Oberpruifung des LadenschluBgesetzes vor dem Hintergrund der
Erfahrungen im In- und Ausland (Munich: Ifo Institut, 1995), p 10.
337 Wilfred Paulus, LadenschlufJ (K6nigswinter: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 1985), p
140.
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that lengthening store hours to 8:00 PM would increase retail employment by at least
50,000.338 This argument was particularly persuasive given that Germany supported a
very low level of overall employment in the retail sector compared to other countries.
Shopkeeper Protectionism and Consumer Protection
The outcome of retail struggles in France and Germany has had a profound impact
on the image and status of the consumer in society. Small retailers in both countries were
able to win political support by portraying themselves as defenders of the consumer
interest. But the way in which that consumer interest was perceived differed significantly.
In France, small retailers portrayed themselves as a barrier against the forces of
monopoly capital, both in production and in distribution. Consumers, they argued, should
always retain the choice of shopping at artisanal stores. Only in this way could the risks
and disappointments inherent to mass distribution be countered. Large retailers too
recognized the need to express their claims in terms of the consumer interest. They
argued that only the collective purchasing power of large retailers was capable of
negotiating on an even footing with large industry. Large retailers could thereby secure
lower prices for consumers. In both instances, retailers portrayed their goals in terms of
the consumer interest, and that interest was understood by small and large retailers as a
form of opposition to the power of producers.
In Germany, small retailers found protection in the restriction of retail opening
hours. As in France, the arguments deployed for restricting store hours implied a
particular conception of the consumer identity. The basis of ongoing support for the
338 Ifo Institut fuir Wirtschaftsforschung, O'berprufung des LadenschluBgesetzes vor dem
Hingergrund der Erfahrungen im In- und Ausland (Munich: Ifo Institut, August 1995), p
209
LadenschluJigesetz came from a combination of producer and labor union interests.
Producers were concerned about the growing negotiating power of larger retailers,
especially in so far as they could negotiate for lower batch prices on products. Labor
unions too feared downward price pressure, as this would place limits on wage demands.
But they also supported short store hours as a form of solidarity with the retail union. If
manufacturing laborers enjoyed a short work week and had their evenings free, then
distribution workers should enjoy similar benefits. Undercutting the interests of the retail
union looked like the thin edge of the wedge of broader union concessions. The threat
was especially poignant for bank and insurance workers, who shared the same labor
union with retailers.
From this discourse on store hours and working time emerged a very different
conception of the consumer interest in Germany than in France. First, consumption, like
production, was understood as an economic activity that should take place during the
course of the work day. On this view, restricted store hours were seen to protect not only
retailers but also consumers, especially shopping mothers. Moreover, unionized retailers
were especially qualified to inform consumers. The average shop clerk in Germany has
over two years of retail training. If shop hours were lengthened, shopkeepers argued,
sales clerks worried that retail distribution would become a part-time profession in which
training and wages would suffer. For consumers, they argued, this would mean the loss of
a valuable source of information for product selection. Unlike France, where retailers
portrayed themselves as a buffer for consumers against the abuses of producers, German
retailers portrayed themselves as a professional advisory service for consumers, guides to
18.
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the marketplace, that would be undermined by longer store hours and a proliferation of
large distributors. In retailing, therefore, as in the consumer movement, French discourse
reproduced the theme of consumer protection, whereas German discourse reproduced the
theme of consumer information.
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Section III. Case Studies in Product Market Regulation
The previous section describes the role of consumer groups and retailers in
forging a new consumer identity in France and Germany. It argues that emerging
consumer policies in both countries were not simply imposed from above. Rather,
different societal actors came to a common understanding of the consumer identity and
interest that was grounded in a conflict between consumer and producer interests in the
two countries. The three chapters that follow present the case histories of eight areas of
product market regulation. These studies constitute the empirical core of my research.
They describe how coherent national regulatory patterns have emerged within diverse
areas of regulation. Following the typology of product market regulations elaborated in
Chapter 1 (see Figure 4 above), the chapters treat information regulation, risk regulation,
and then direct product regulation.
Chapter six surveys three areas of market regulation that focus on product
information: advertising, comparative product testing, and product labeling. Germany has
imposed a high standard of accuracy in product information. France has imposed a low
standard of accuracy in product information. The puzzle is that producers in both
countries called for an information strategy to consumer protection. Better informed
consumers, they reasoned, would be able to protect themselves by making wiser
purchasing decisions. The reason that this information approach prevailed in Germany
and failed in France rests in large part on the way in which consumers in the two
countries organized. In Germany, where the consumer was perceived as an economic
actor, better consumer information was seen as an appropriate solution to what looked
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like a market failure. Furthermore, accurate product information would abet competition,
which would in turn also benefit consumers. This economic view of the consumer was
consonant with the organization of production in Germany. Because German production
was already oriented towards high quality goods, accurate information would help to
reinforce the market for the kind of goods that industry was already producing. Moreover,
German industry enjoyed the associational capacities and expertise to collaborate with
consumer groups on product labeling and testing projects.
The opposite situation prevailed in France. Although industry saw an information
approach to consumer protection as preferable to direct product regulation by the
government, industry efforts to intervene in the provision of accurate product information
failed for two reasons. First, individual producers were not oriented towards producing
highly engineered goods and therefore had little real incentive to emphasize technical
product information. Second, consumer groups in general opposed the information
approach to consumer protection on the grounds that it would keep consumer interests
fragmented. As consumer mobilization grew, government policies increasingly attended
to consumers' policy preferences.
Chapter seven considers the distribution of product-related risk through product
liability law and national product safety regulations. France has emphasized consumer
protection through risk reduction and consequently imposed a high burden of product risk
on producers. Germany has downplayed product risk to consumers, focusing instead on
regulatory strategies that work to reinforce the quality orientation of production. Whereas
French risk regulation has typically focused on end results, the German approach has
focused on procedures. In product liability for example, France's strict standard of
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liability makes producers responsible for any defective product that causes damage.
Germany's negligence standard requires instead that manufacturers adhere to accepted
design and production standards. In product safety regulation, Germany has acted to
make industry standards mandatory on all producers. France has instead imposed
government safety standards on producers. As in the case of information regulation, the
reason for these differences lies in the organization of consumer and producer interests in
the two countries. Strong associational capacities in Germany have made industry a
valuable force for pursuing product safety. In France, by contrast, where individual
companies are not bound by industry-wide conventions, product safety standards had to
be enforced from outside of industry.
Chapter eight presents three areas of regulation that focus on specific
characteristics of consumer products: standard setting, pricing, and terms of sale. In each
case, Germany has pursued a strategy of regulation consistent with industry self-
regulation and a strong quality orientation of production. Price setting in Germany is
dominated by producers. Consumers participate in standard setting, but only within the
framework of Germany's industry-run standard setting body, DIN. Finally, German
terms-of-sale regulations have emphasized quality competition. In France, different
priorities emerge in these area of direct product regulation. Product price setting was,
until 1986, imposed by the government. Product standards have been negotiated between
consumer groups and individual producers outside of the formal context of technical
standard bodies. And terms of sale in France have been broadly permissive. Each of these
policies reflected a distinctive conception of the consumer. In Germany the consumer was
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understood as an economic actor with the same status as producers. In France, the
consumer was understood as a political actor with the same status as a citizen.
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Chapter 6. Consumer Protection Through Information Regulation
A fur 'amental strategy of consumer protection in all countries has been an
emphasis on providing consumers with accurate information about products. Of the wide
variety of means by which information is distributed, most have been subject to
regulatory scrutiny in an effort to improve the quality of information with which
consumers purchase. Both consumers and producers have shown an interest in providing
consumers with accurate information, and both groups have acted in different ways to
secure that information. For producers, who faced increasingly competitive, often
saturated consumer markets, better information was seen as a means of stimulating
demand for their products. For consumers, who faced an increasingly diverse and
complex set of products from which to choose, better information became the key to
making a good purchase. This growing need for information was intensified by trends
toward large-scale distribution and retailing. Whereas knowledgeable retailers had
previously served as information brokers between consumers and producers,
rationalization in the retail industry was reducing the amount of reliable information to
which consumers had access at the point of sale. When these long-term trends intersected
with the economic slow-down of 1973, governments stepped in to regulate consumer
information in an effort to improve the position of consumers in the economy.
My research has focused on three channels-advertising, product labeling, and
product testing-by which consumers and producers have met their needs for greater
information transparency in the consumption sphere. Industry has typically approached
the information needs of consumers through advertising campaigns. Consumers have, in
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turn, commonly resorted to third-party comparative testing-of the sort found in the US
publication Consumer Reports-in order to obtain useful, objective information about
products. Finally, in many cases producers and consumers have collaborated to improve
product information transparency by creating labeling systems designed to provide
accurate technical information of use to consumers in comparative shopping.
Within the common scope of government regulation to improve consumer
information, France and Germany have adopted different approaches. France has pursued
far more lenient standards of information content than has Germany. Whereas Germany
has focused on providing consumers with technically precise product information through
a strict set of regulatory policies that producers have strongly endorsed, France has
imposed relatively weak information requirements. Consumer information in Germany is
understood to help consumers by permitting them to recognize incremental product
quality. Once they can recognize higher quality, consumers can then rely on product
quality in order to reduce their risk in the marketplace. In France, although both
consumers and producers expressed an interest in a similarly strict approach to consumer
information, regulations that were put in place enforced a far lower standard.
The reason that such different outcomes emerged from broadly similar priorities
among consumers and producers rests with their organizational capacities. In Germany,
industry was genuinely interested in providing accurate product information and invoked
government regulations to enforce this standard. In France, industry also supported an
information solution to consumer grievances, since this approach was compatible with
continued industry autonomy. But French industry had neither the basic interest in
accurate product information, nor the organizational capacity to self-regulate that a strict
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standard of product advertising demanded. Moreover, French consumer groups were
skeptical that information alone would redress consumer grievances. Hence French
efforts to create a standard of accurate advertising information were undermined in large
part by the inability of industry to implement it, in part by a lack of interest from
consumer groups.
In this way, national approaches to regulation for advertising, testing, and labeling
reflect the organization of consumer and producer groups in France and Germany.
German consumer groups take the dissemination of technical product information as one
of their main goals. French consumer groups have tended to emphasize instead the
distribution of negative product information, in the form of warnings against dangerous
or faulty products. Moreover, a similar set of priorities had arisen within the retail sector
in the two countries. In German, retailers came to emphasize the role of their trained,
competent sales staff in giving consumers product-related advice. In France, small
retailers argued that their value lay instead in their independence from large economic
interests. If German retailers acted as guides to the marketplace, French retailers served
as an insulation against the marketplace. German concerns about technically accurate
information and French concerns about consumer freedom also reflected broader
strategies adopted by consumer groups and retailers in the two countries.
Truth in Advertising
Advertising is one of the most prominent channels for consumer information
about new products. Levels of advertising spending grew over the 1970s in both France
and Germany, with Germany consistently spending more than France on advertising. See
Figure 22 below. This rise in advertising brought with it a growing concern over the
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negative impact that advertising might be having on consumers. Beginning in the early
1960s, France and Germany had put in place advertising regulations that prohibited
flagrantly false advertisements. These early regulations had been aimed at cases of
obvious fraud. But by the 1970s both manufacturers and consumers in both countries
began to push for a higher standard of truth in advertising. Consumers groups supported
more accurate advertising as a source of consumer protection, since consumers would be
better informed about the products they purchased. Producers, recognizing a growing
political pressure for a consumerist agenda, saw regulations that focused on advertising as
a relatively painless strategy.
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Figure 22. French and German spending on major advertising media, 1970-1985.339
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Efforts were made in both France and Germany to impose strict standards of truth
in advertising. New regulatory bodies were created in both countries to oversee the new
standards. Yet the standards they applied were different. In France, courts interpreted
advertising standards loosely, granting advertisers a broad margin for creativity.
Advertising regulation rested largely in the hands of the advertisers, who set standards for
appropriate content. Furthermore, advertising in France was addressed under criminal
law, which limited the ability of consumer groups to bring direct suits against
transgressors. The application of criminal rather than civil law solutions also encouraged
judges to be lenient in marginal cases. In Germany, by contrast, courts held advertisers to
an extremely strict standard of truth in advertising that ensured that consumers would not
be misled. The law implementing strict advertising standards also granted consumer
groups a privileged position to bring legal suits against companies that transgressed. The
result was a lenient, creative environment for advertising in France and a rigorous
standard of truth in advertising in Germany.
German Advertising Regulation as Competition Policy
The basic law of advertising in Germany was established in the 1965 amendment
to the Law against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb, or UWG),
requiring that advertising not be misleading. The wording of the amendment states that
"...any person who in the course of business and for the purpose of competition makes
misleading statements about business related facts, in particular about the characteristics,
origin, mode of production or pricing of any goods or services...the mode and source of
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339 World Advertising Expenditures, 1981 Edition. Mamaroneck, New York: Starch Inra
Hooper, 1983; World Advertising Expenditures, 1986 Edition. Mamaroneck, New York:
supply, the possession of warrants...may be subject to an injunction."340 Because
Germany's advertising law resides within competition law rather than criminal law it
does not provide for imprisonment, as is the case in France, except in cases of gross
negligence. Moreover, the sense of the term "misleading" left significant room for
interpretation by the courts, and was initially viewed with leniency.
This lenient approach to German advertising policy changed in the wake of a
groundbreaking 1971 court ruling against the Company Philips. In this case, the German
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof) found the advertised claim that their electric razor
was "the world's most purchased" ("der meistgekaufte der Welt") to be misleading. The
court finding was striking because the razor did in fact have the highest total sales in the
world. The factual accuracy of the advertising was therefore not in question. Instead, the
court argued that the manner in which the information was presented might be interpreted
by consumers to mean that the Philips razor was also the most popular in Germnany, and
this was not the case.34' From this case emerged the rule of thumb, still applied today,
that any advertisement that is thought to deceive more than 10 percent of the population
is considered misleading in Germany. One of the reasons for setting the bar for public
credulity so high appears to have been a concern that advertisements would
disproportionately mislead the members of society that were less well educated.34 2
In response to this new standard of advertising, in 1972 Germany's
ZentralausschuB fr Werbewirtschaft (ZAW) created the German Advertising Council
Starch Inra Hooper, 1987.
340 Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, Section 3.
341 Gerhard Schricker, "Soll der einzelne Verbraucher ein Recht zur Klage wegen
ullh ruteren Wettbewerbs erhalten?" Zeitschriftfiir Rechtspolitik 8 (1975), 195.
342 Interview, HDE, August 1995.
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(Deutscher Werberat, or DWR). Organized similarly to the French BVP, the DWR had
the goal of helping German industry to meet the new regulatory standards for truth in
advertising. Both consumers and competitors were encouraged to bring complaints to the
DWR. The DWR was not legally bound to respond to these complaints, but it could at its
own discretion send notices of possible violation to companies that did not in its appraisal
appear to be meeting the strict standard of misleading advertising. While producers were
not legally bound to respect these notices, the probability of legal recourse by competitors
has caused German companies to respect the findings of the DWR.
Advertising is considered in Germany to be an important component of
competition policy. Many cases are also taken to court each year. Two-thirds of all court
cases against misleading advertising are brought by producers in direct competition with
the defendant. The remainder of these cases have been raised by consumer groups. The
1965 amendment to the UWG gave consumer associations the right to file legal suit
directly against companies that were not complying with the prohibition against
misleading advertising. Germany has long allowed professional associations to bring
legal suit under civil law (so-called 'Verbandklage'), although this right had in the past
been restricted to producer associations. The main consumer organization charged with
bringing suits for UWG infraction is the Consumer Protection Union
(Verbraucherschutzverein, or VSV), established in Hamburg in 1966 and moved to Berlin
in 1974. By 1981, the Verbraucherschutzverein alone had brought 577 suits against
companies for misleading advertising.34 3 These represented only a distillation of the most
common complaints that consumer groups receive. In 1977, for example, 80 thousand
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complaints were lodged with consumer organizations. Of these, 20 thousand fell under
competition law concerning advertising, 400 were addressed by the three main consumer
groups that typically take on UWG cases, and 150 reached the courts. Once in court,
consumer groups have enjoyed a success rate of 80 percent.344
Cases raised by consumer groups are typically focused on specific consumer
interests rather than impacts on competition, but their cases tend to be equally exacting.
In a typical case raised by consumer groups, a German biscuit company was brought to
court on the grounds that the slogan they employed to advertise their low-sugar biscuits,
"Nibbling allowed" ("Naschen erlaubt"), was misleading. Since the phrase implied that
nibbling was in general a bad thing, the plaintiff argued, it therefore implied that
something particular about these biscuits made them a unique exception in the
marketplace. But given that the competition also produced similar low-sugar biscuits, the
advertisement was deemed misleading by the courts. German courts try thousands of
similar cases every year. In Hamburg alone 1,000 such unfair-competition cases are tried
yearly. In an evaluation of business opportunities in Germany, the business newsletter
Lloyds List writes that German advertising regulation "...is based upon the idea of a
totally immature pathologically stupid and absent minded consumer."345
Because the emphasis of Germany's strict advertising regulation is on promoting
competition rather than explicit consumer protection, as in France, consumers have in
general been unable to recover financial damages resulting from misleading advertising.
343 Jurgen Bornecke, Handbuch der Verbraucherintsitutionen (Bonn: Verlag fur die
Wirtschaft, 1982), p 107.
344 Roland von Falckenstein, "Praktische Erfahrungen mit der Verbraucherverbandsklage
in Deutschland," Journal of Consumer Policy 1/2 (1977), pp 173-175.
345 Lloyds List, January 17 1992.
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The 1965 amendment to the UWG permitted established consumer groups to sue
producers, but not collections of consumers themselves. An amendment to the UWG
submitted by the government on 29 September 1978 placed strong limitations on suits
even by individual consumers, requiring that any consumer seeking damages show that
misleading advertising was the specific reason they purchased a product, and that they
would not otherwise have made the purchase. This raised significantly the barrier to
claiming compensation based on false advertising, as this burden of proof has proved
nearly impossible to meet.346 The bundling of consumer legal suits against misleading
advertisers is still not permitted in Germany. When in 1982 the newly elected Christian
Democratic Union proposed permitting class action suits of this kind, their Free
Democratic Party coalition partners blocked the move on the grounds that it would
simply provide a new source of income for consumer groups.347
German consumer groups have seen accurate consumer advertising as an
important pillar of consumer protection, and argued that Germany's strict standard of
advertising has not adequately been enforced. One researcher, for example, in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of Germany's self-regulatory Deutscher Werberat (DWR),
submitted 321 complaints based on advertisements of well-known companies from 30
popular German magazines published from June 1976 to 1978. This amounted to nearly
half of the DWR's yearly total of 670 complaints. Of the author's complaints, 74 percent
were simply rejected. The average time for processing the remaining complaints was 32
346 Alex Stein, "Die Verbraucheranspriiche und ihre Geltenmachung durch
Verbraucherverbande nach der UWG-Novelle," Journal of Consumer Policy 3 (1979), pp
29-40.
347 "Mehr Schutz vor unlauterem Wettbewerb," Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 Jan 1982.
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days, long when measured against the duration of an advertising campaign.34 8 A 1974
study commissioned by the AgV found that only 35 percent of all advertising in popular
magazines was not misleading to the consumer. Worst were advertisements for cleaning
chemicals, cosmetics, over-the-counter drugs, and erotica, for which the advertising was
found to be misleading in 90 percent of the cases. The study evaluated 2265
advertisements from 18 magazines: 46 percent made exaggerated claims, 6 percent
included double meanings, 6 percent left out basic information, and 7 percent included
deceiving information.349 More recent studies of advertising compliance have not been
conducted.
Expressive Freedom in French Advertising Regulation
The earliest law governing advertising in France, written in 1963, prohibited
advertising that was "created in bad conscience" ("faite de mauvaise foi"). Under this
standard, false advertising was punishable only if it was shown to be intentionally false.
As in Germany, France experienced a dramatic shift in the standard of truth in advertising
in the early 1970s. In 1973, Article 44 of the loi Royer replaced the lenient bad-
conscience standard with a broad proscription against any advertising "of a misleading
nature" ("du caractere trompeur"). The new standard depended not on the intention of the
advertiser, but instead on the actual impact on consumers. Its wording, as transcribed in
Law 121-1 of the Consumption Code, appears to make illegal an extraordinarily broad
range of advertising content:
348 Udo Beier, "Schwachstellen der Werbeselbstkontrolle: Aufgezeigt am Beispiel des
Deutschen Werberats," Journal of Consumer Policy 3 (1979), pp 300-313.
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"All advertising in any form is illegal that provides false or
misleading assertions, information, or provisions when it applies to
one or more of the following elements: availability, nature,
composition, substantial quality, active content, kind, origin,
quantity, means and date of production, ownership, price and
conditions of sale of goods or services that are the subject of
advertising, conditions of use, results that can be expected as a
result of their use, grounds for or means of sale or provision of
services, extent of responsibility assumed by the maker, identity,
size or ability of the producer, sellers, marketers or providers."350
Punishments were also harsh, with responsible parties subject to as much as two years in
jail, a 250,000 franc fine, and a responsibility to finance further advertising to rectify
misleading claims.35
While the 1973 law called for stringent restrictions on misleading advertising, it
was not interpreted strictly by the courts. In an early case, an advertisement for Samsonite
luggage showed bulldozers playing soccer with a suit case in order to demonstrate its
strength. A rival company argued that since in fact Samsonite had had to replace the
349 Arbeitgemeinschaft der Verbraucher, "Verbraucherschutz uberwiegend irrefiihrend,"
Verbraucherpolitische Korrespondenz, (April 1974); "Verbraucherverband: Zuviel
Irrefiihrung," Handelsblatt, Friday, 14 February 1975.
350 "Est interdite toute publicit6 comportant, sous quelque forme que ce soit, des
allegations, indications our presentations fausses ou de nature a induire en erreur, lorsque
celles-ci portent sur un ou plusieurs elements ci-apres: existence, nature, composition,
qualitas substantielles, teneur en principes utiles, esplce, origine, quantitd, mode et date
de fabrication, propri6tes, prix et conditions de vente de biens our services qui font l'objet
de la publicit6, conditions de leur utilisation, rsultats qui peuvent etre attendus de leur
utilisation, motifs our procedes de la vente ou de la prestation de services, portee des
engagements pris par l'annonceur, indentite, qualites ou aptitudes du fabricant, des
revendeurs, des promoteurs ou des prestataires."
351 Jean Beauchard, Droit de la distribution et de la consommation (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1996), pp 314-316.
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suitcase several times in making the commercial, the advertisement was misleading.
Courts found in favor of Samsonite on the grounds that "attractive advertising commonly
demands a certain use of fantasy."3 52 In a 1978 case against General Foods France, a law
suit was raised against their advertising claim that the drink Tang had "the taste of freshly
pressed oranges." General Foods France too was exonerated, on the grounds that there
was no fraudulent intent and that the statement itself was not purely false.353
The logic behind these cases was later spelled out by courts when the Wonder
battery company was sued for advertising with the slogan "loses its charge only when
used." Competitors brought suit against Wonder, arguing that this claim was simply
physically impossible, since all batteries naturally lost charge during storage. Yet the
Tribunal of Paris found that the slogan was not "of the nature to lead into error" ("de
nature a induire en erreur"), the standard set by the 1973 law, because the battery also
contained an expiration date. Consumers could therefore reasonably be expected to
understand that the claim was merely an exaggeration.3 5 4 Advertisements were not, in
other words, completely bound to a standard of factual truth so long as "an average
consumer with a normal intelligence" might reasonably understand the nature of the
exaggeration.3 55
352 "la publicit6 attractive se traduit fr6quement par un certain usage de la fantaisie."Jean-
Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicitd (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1986), p
79.
353 "de nature a induire en erreur le consommateur." "'L'affaire Tang' pourrait remettre en
cause la lutte contre la publicit6 abusive," les Echos, 22 Mar 1978.
354 "ne s'use que si l'on s'en sert!." Claude Vaillant, "La publicit6 mensongere et la
protection du consommateur en France: bilan d'application durisprudentielle," INC
Hebdo: Actes des VI Journies du droit de la consommation (12-13 December 1988), p
18.
355 "Publicit6 ,:omparative: Mensongere ou non?" Consommateurs Actualits 505 (18
April 1986), p 7.
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France's permissive standard for truth in advertising was enforced through a
strategy of self-regulation by industry that helped encourage a liberal interpretation of
what might be construed as misleading. France's Office for Advertising Verification
(Bureau de V6rification de la Publicit6, or BVP), created in 1954, began as a purely self-
regulatory body of the advertising industries. Its activities were expanded in 1971 to treat
truth in advertising, and it was reorganized to introduce the National Consumption
Institute (INC) onto its administrative council, which included 23 representatives of
announcers, advertising agencies, and the National Council on Commerce. But while in
principle the 1971 reform introduced consumer interests into advertising regulation in the
form of three seats on the board of directors allocated to the INC, in fact the INC was
wary of becoming too closely associated with any industry association, and opted to
occupy only one of these seats. 6 Moreover, BVP control over individual companies was
limited to a published admonishment and to the possibility of taking transgressors to
court.3 57 Because of its close ties with industry and its weak recourse in cases of
misleading advertising, the BVP has never been able to enforce a very strict standard of
truth in advertising.
A later attempt was made in France to introduce a more powerful oversight body
that could set and enforce stronger advertising standards. In 1976 the Consumption
Commission, organized by the new Secretary for Consumption (Secrtaire d'Etat la
Consommation) Christiane Scrivener to make suggestions on consumer-friendly policies,
356 J.J. Boddewyn, "Outside Participation in Advertising Self-Regulation: The Case of the
French Bureau de Verification de la Publicit6 (BVP)," Journal of Consumer Policy 7
(1984), p 51.
357 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicite' (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986).
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recommended that advertising standards be set through equitable negotiations between
consumer groups and advertisers. This proposal led to the creation in 1977 of the 28-
member National Advertising Council (Conseil national de la publicit, or CNP).358 The
new CNP included representatives from 11 national consumer organizations and 11
representatives of the media, plus expert witnesses from the government, the INC, and
the BVP. The CNP was organized into three permanent committees, focusing on ethical
"deontology" questions, concertation, and training, plus special working groups created
on an ad hoc basis. The council was funded through a levee on advertising earnings. All
meetings of the group were secret.359
Many of the industry participants in the CNP favored these discussions, saying
that it helped them to keep track of the interests of consumer groups on subjects that can
change over time. They also saw it as a way of reinforcing the mechanism of industry
self-regulation. 360 Between 1980 and 1983 consumer and professional representatives
negotiated within the CNP to set new standards for advertising. These discussions were
spurred on by the 1981 election of Fran:ois Mitterrand, who had proposed to make any
decision arrived at by consumer and professional members of the CNP binding on
industry.
With the economic crisis of 1983, however, this corporatist solution to advertising
regulation was abandoned, and concertation under the CNP halted. In the shadow of this
failure, French advertising returned to lenient standards set by, and enforced through, the
358 J.J. Boddewyn, "Outside Participation in Advertising Self-Regulation: The Case of the
French Bureau de V6rification de la Publicit6 (BVP)," Journal of Consumer Policy 7
(1984), pp 55-6.
359 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicite' (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986).
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courts. Behind this failure to enact more stringent standards of advertising lay the
opposition of French producers. The peak employer's association, CNPF, opposed state
enforcement of advertising standards negotiated with consumers on the grounds that it
would undermine the originality that they felt was fundamental to effective
advertisement. They argued instead for self-regulation (autodiscipline) by the advertising
industry.3 6 1 French unions, by contrast, understood that more accurate information about
products would encourage consumers to purchase higher quality goods, and that this
quality emphasis would favor union jobs. The consumer group that represented the major
French trade unions at the time, ORGECO, called for the government to provide greater
funding to consumer associations to help fight false advertising. In the words of Jacques
Dubois, president of ORGECO, "If one man warned is worth two, one consumer
informed is worth at least ten." 362 But in the end a lack of corporatist authority in French
industry combined with a strong opposition from France's peak employer association, the
CNPF, to undermine this effort at a system of advertising regulation that would be more
responsive to consumer interests and needs.
This lenience in relation to truth in advertising is particularly striking given that
France has not in general been opposed to restrictive regulation in the area of advertising.
Indeed this sort of intervention has been a staple of French competition and cultural
politics. In the area of competition, for example, France does not permit the
advertisement of product prices that, given the nature of the demand, are not expected to
360 "La guerre est finie," CNPF Patronat 447 (July 1983), pp 71-72.
361 "Le role de la publicit," CNPF Patronat 359 (May 1975), pp 47-8.
362 "Si un homme averti en vaut deux, un consommateur informe en vaut au moins dix."
Jacques Dubois, "La publicite contre le consommateur?" Information Consommateur 2
(1971), p 4.
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remain in stock. The law is intended to stop the practice of derivative sales ("derive de
ventes") in which retailers draw in consumers for a product that is quickly sold out, then
offer them competing products at higher prices. Legislators were particularly concerned
that less expensive French goods would be advertised, and more expensive foreign goods
sold in their place. Producers whose goods are thus advertised have the legal right to
refuse distribution to the abusing retailers, a practice that is otherwise illegal in France.363
Competitive concerns, too, have motivated advertising restrictions that
discriminate against foreign products. One example is the regulation of advertising of
alcoholic beverages, which are classified for this purpose on a scale of increasing strength
from 1 to 5. Higher values on the scale entail greater restrictions on advertising. Yet the
constitution of the scale is flagrantly discriminatory against foreign alcohols. Grade 5
alcohols, which include mainly aperitifs, cannot be advertised at all. Aperitifs, such as
whiskies, gins, and vodkas, are mostly foreign alcohols. Grade 4 alcohols, by contrast,
which includes digestifs, can be legally advertised. Digestifs, including rhums and
distilled alcohols such as brandy, contain no less alcohol than aperitifs but are primarily
French products. This sort of discrimination is in principle not permitted under the Treaty
of Rome, but it has not so far been corrected.364
France has also long condoned government restriction on advertising for cultural
reasons. The law requiring that the French language be used exclusively in advertising
has its origins in the 1510 ordnance of Louis XII, the 1539 ordnance of Viller-Cotterets,
and the law of 2 Thermidor in year 2 of the French Revolution. Practices that have been
363 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicite' (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986), p 65.
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found illegal under this law include the use of the words "new filter" in the advertisement
for French-made cigarettes, and the distribution of an English handbill by the Paris
Opera. The French language has frequently been augmented to provide French
equivalents for borrowed foreign words. On 25 March 1983, for instance, the "hit parade"
was rendered as palmares, and the newspaper "scoop" became exclusivit,.36 5
Finally, some kinds of advertising regulation have been put in place to manage
demand for dangerous or scarce products. Cigarette advertisements can contain images
only of the cigarette package itself. Lawyers, doctors, and pharmacies do not advertise for
"deontological" reasons, meaning in this case that advertising would undermine their aura
of professionalism. Other restrictions have specifically economic goals. In an effort to
keep down the price of government health care, for example, pharmaceutical products
reimbursed by social security are not allowed to be advertised. And in 1974, in response
to the first oil crisis, the government banned all advertising for energy. The goal of such
advertising restrictions is not to improve competition but rather to mitigate the deleterious
effects that advertising might have on consumption.
Comparative Product Testing
Advertising as a means of disseminating product information is necessarily
dominated by the interests and priorities of producers. Seeking a more objective source of
product information, consumers in most advanced industrial countries have also adopted
private solutions to information transparency. This has often taken the form of consumer
364 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicite (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986), p 73.
365 Jean-Jacques Biolay, Le Droit de la Publicite (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,
1986), p 66.
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publications, modeled on Consumer Reports in the United States, that distribute the
results of comparative product tests to the consuming public. France and Germany have
been relative late-comers to this activity, but the market has grown rapidly. The US-based
Consumers Union, which publishes Consumer Reports, began testing products in 1936.
Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all saw the creation of similar testing
organizations in the 1950s. Germany's Stiftung Warentest, by contrast, was established
only in 1966, and France's two product testing publications Que choisir? and 50 millions
de consommateurs were first circulated in 1961 and 1970, respectively. As circulation
figures suggest, consumer interest in these journals rose rapidly in both countries in the
first half of the 1970s. See Figure 23 below.
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By the 1980s these publications had become extremely popular, even by
international standards. A 1994 survey in Germany found that Stiftung Warentest was the
second most popular organization in Germany, behind only the Red Cross.366Consumer
groups in both countries saw comparative product tests as a source of valuable
information for consumers. But producers in both countries also expressed concerns that
independent product tests would be biased, inaccurate, or unfair to the interests of
industry. Early publishers of comparative product tests faced a barrage of lawsuits from
industry charging them with inaccuracy and defamation. As governments in France and
Germany recognized the potentially useful role of comparative product testing, they
stepped in to create and fund their own product testing organizations.367 Along with this
government support came public scrutiny of the kind and substance of product tests that
should be undertaken. With similar interests at stake, government policies that emerged
in the two countries in relation to comparative product testing showed important
differences. Germany has opted for significant producer participation at all stages of the
product evaluation process. France has granted a great deal of independence to product
testers, who have established a reputation for independence from producer influence.
366 Tagesspiegel, "Interview mit dem Chef der Stiftung Warentest, Roland Hiittenrauch,"
27 November 1994.
367 Because product testing is relatively expensive, funding can be problematic. By the
time Germany and France faced this problem, three different solutions had been
elaborated. The first approach, employed by Sweden, was to grant state subventions to an
independent testing organisation in order to defray the testing costs. The second
approach, adopted in Austria, was to encourage labor unions to finance and conduct
comparative product tests. The third approach, modeled on the experiece of Consumer
Reports in the United States, was to finance product testing exclusively through magazine
subscriptions. Both France and Germany have chosen the Swedish model, although
France also has an independent product testing organisation that functions on the U.S.
model. Klaus Wieken, Die Organisation der Verbraucherinteressen im internationalen
Vergleich (Gttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), p 22.
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Product Testing in Collaboration with Industry in Germany
Comparative product testing in Germany began with two false starts. In
September 1961 the publishing house Waldmar Schweitzer began publishing the results
of product tests in their monthly magazine DM - Deutsche Mark. Its circulation grew to
350 thousand by 1963, when its publication was changed to a weekly format, and reached
a peak of 800 thousand in 1964. Between January 1963 and December 1964 DM
published results on an astounding 215 product categories and 3000 product brands.368
Success proved transitory, however, as circulation fell to 450 thousand in 1965. In 1966
DM was discontinued.36 9 The core problem was that DM financed its product tests not
only through subscriptions, which were relatively inexpensive, but also by selling
advertising space in the magazine. This created a tangible conflict of interest that
undermined both public confidence in their reporting and the legal status of DM as a
neutral testing organization. DM was continually sued, beginning with a chocolate
manufacturer that received a negative evaluation in the first issue, and ending with a law
suit leveled by Volks Wagon that the Neue Zuricher Zeitung touted as the "greatest
industrial trial in Germany."370 DM's experience revealed both the potential size of public
demand for comparative product testing and the potential strength of industry opposition
to product testing by a for-profit organization.
368 Klaus Wieken, Die Organisation der Verbraucherinteressen im internationalen
Vergleich (Gttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), p 24.
369 Dieter Meiners, Ordnungspolitische Probleme des Warentests (Berlin: Duncker and
Humblot, 1968), pp 181-3.
370 "groiSte IndustrieprozeB der Bundesrepublik," cited in: Stiftung Warentest, Zeichen
setzen fiir Verbraucher (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest, 1996), p 7; Peter Ditgen, Der
vergleichende Warentest als Instrument der Verbraucherinformation (University of
Cologne: Doctoral Thesis, 1966), p 66.
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The second false start came from Germany's umbrella consumer organization
(Argeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverblinde, or AgV), which had already begun in
1959 to make critical product comparisons. In 1962 they created a product test center that
tested 8 product categories and 115 product brands in the next two years."'37 They too
were sued, in August 1962, but by the association of branded products (Markenverband)
for brand name defamation. In 1963 the AgV stopped their testing program, announcing
that they had decided "to conduct future tests not in opposition to industry, rather...to
carry them out in technical collaboration with branded products industries and
retailers."372 In fact they never again entered the field of product testing.
These early signs of industry opposition to comparative product testing contrasted
sharply with the political enthusiasm for this activity in Germany. As early as 1957
Ludwig Erhard had proposal for institutionalized consumer protection via product tests.
In 1962 Konrad Adenauer called, in his government's platform, for the creation as soon
as possible of a neutral testing body. At the same time, the Minister of Justice affirmed
that there was a sound legal basis for objective, technical, and neutral comparative
tests.373 The CDU under Adenauer called for the creation of a state-run testing facility for
products. The opposition SPD favored instead an independent public association.37 4
Under pressure from its FDP coalition partner, the CDU accepted the SPD proposal, and
371 Klaus Wieken, Die Organisation der Verbraucherinteressen im internationalen
Vergleich (Gittingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), p 22.
372 "Warentests in Zukunft nicht mehr in Frontstellung gegen die Industrie, sondern in
sachlicher zusammenarbeit mit der Markenartikelnindustrie und dem Handel durchfuihren
zu wollen." Peter Ditgen, Der vergleichende Warentest als Instrument der
Verbraucherinformation (University of Cologne: Doctoral Thesis, 1966), p 67.
373 "m6glichst bald die Errictung einer Korperschaft ffir newutrale Warentests"; Stiftung
Warentest, Zeichen setzenfiir Verbraucher (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest, 1996), pp 7-8.
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on 4 December 1964 the Bundestag voted unanimously for the creation and financing of
the Stiftung Warentest.37 5 By the organization's own account, its founding responded to
four emerging consumer concerns: the growing abundance of products, the increasingly
technical nature of products that often precluded expert advice at the point of sale, the
growth in advertising, and the time-consuming task of comparative pricing.37 6
The first test results appeared in the magazine Test in 1966. Government funding
for the program, which was originally intended as a five-year start-up grant, had to be
extended when sales remained disappointingly low. In 1970 Test became available at
newsstands. Circulation first reached 100 thousand in 1972, and in 1973 sales receipts
began to exceed government financial support.377 What followed was a boom in
circulation that appears to have been spurred in large part by a growing demand from
consumers under economic stress from the first oil embargo. Test has since been
extremely successful. Circulation reached one million in 1995, with government support
providing 13 percent of its operating expenses.
Unlike its failed predecessors, Warentest has never lost a law suit to the
companies that it evaluates. This record has rested on a ground-breaking 1975 ruling by
the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH). Ruling on a law suit filed
against Warentest's 1967 evaluation of ski bindings, the BGH defended Warentest,
finding that the organization served a valuable function of market transparency so long as
374 Dieter Meiners, Ordnungspolitische Probleme des Warentests (Berlin: Duncker and
Humblot, 1968), pp 60-63.
375 Stiftung Warentest, Das Wichtigste in Kiirze, (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest, July 1996).
376 Stiftung Warentest, Zeichen setzen fir Verbraucher (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest,
1996), p 6.
377 Klaus Wieken, Die Organisation der Verbraucherinteressen im internationalen
Vergleich (G6ttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), p 25.
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the tests were carried out in a fare way. The economic logic is stated explicitly in the
ruling: "Consumer enlightenment through an increase in market transparency is essential,
not only in the interest of the consumer, but plainly also from an economic
perspective."3 78 The goal of testing, in other words, combined consumer interests with the
interests of a more efficient industrial sector. Because product testing was also in the
interest of industry, the condition set by the court for fare testing was that industry itself
be allowed to participate in the evaluation process.3 79
The charter of the Stiftung Warentest provides for industry actors to participate in
product evaluation at least four different stages in the testing process.38 0 First, the board
of trustees (Kuratorium) of Warentest consists of five representatives from industry, five
representatives from consumer associations, and 5 neutral specialists. A three-quarters
vote of this board can veto any test proposal. About five percent of all proposals are
stopped in this way, usually because the board of trustees feels that the evaluation would
depend heavily on matters of taste. Champagnes and perfumes, for example, typically fall
outside of Warentest's purview.
Second, Warentest consults closely with industry and consumer associations in
choosing which brands to evaluate. Individual tests normally include about 20 similar
products. In order to select them, Warentest polls about 100 retailers to find out what
378 "Verbraucheraufklarung zur Gewinnung von Markttransparenz unerlaslich ist, und
zwar nicht nur im Interesse der Verbraucher, sondern schlechthin unter
volkswirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten." Stiftung Warentest, Zeichen setzenfiir
Verbraucher (Berlin: Stiftung Warentest, 1996), p 14.
379 The test would be illegal when "...das Vorgehen des Testveranstalters 'als nicht mehr
vertretbar (diskutabel)' erscheint'." Werner Brinkmann, "Rechtsprobleme des
vergleichenden Warentests in der BundeSrepublik Deutschland," Zeitschriftfiir
Verbraucherpolitik 1 (1977), p 257.
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brands they stock. Popular brands are usually included because their strong market share
renders them of greatest interest to readers. While some manufacturers do not want their
products evaluated, more often companies complain of not being included in the
evaluation. Once the test products are selected, manufacturers are then notified. This
gives them the opportunity either to suggest a different product in their product line
would be more suited to the evaluation, or to announce that a new and better product will
be coming out in the next few months.
Third, Warentest consults with industry and consumer groups to decide what
product properties to evaluate. Criteria proposed by engineers on the staff of Warentest
are discussed and amended by a special advisory council (Fachbeirat) with 5 to 10
representatives from industry, consumer associations, and retailers. The final testing
criteria are then distributed to all manufacturers whose products are being tested.
Manufacturers are encouraged to indicate whether any criterion has been omitted that
might show their product in a good light. This avoids an unfair advantage to firms who
happen to be participating on the Fachbeirdte.
Warentest has no test facilities of its own. It has relied instead on 90 different
organizations to carry out the actual evaluation, based on identified criteria. The actual
evaluation lasts from one to six months, depending on the characteristics of the product.
These raw results are then distributed to participating manufacturers for scrutiny. This
allows manufacturers to raise objections before publication. Once any objections are dealt
with, the Warentest staff then weighs the importance of the different test results and
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380 Roland Huittenrauch, "Zur Methodik des vergleichenden Warentests," Journal of
Consumer Policy 1/2 (1977), pp 143-150.
combines them to create an overall evaluation on a five point scale, running from 'very
good' to 'very unsatisfactory.'
Product Testing is Insulatedfrom Industry in France
Comparative product testing in France has long been divided between two
organizations that publish their own consumer magazines. The first group, the Federal
Consumers Union (Union f6d6rale des consommateurs, or UFC), began publishing the
results of product tests in its journal Que choisir? in 1961. The second group, the
National Consumption Institute (Institut national de la consommation, or INC) began
publishing the results of product tests in its journal, 50 Millions de Consommateurs, in
1970. While performing roughly the same function, the two organizations took markedly
different approaches. Whereas testing undertaken by the UFC is funded, like Consumer
Reports, exclusively through subscriptions to Que Choisir?, INC receives government
support in addition to subscription fees. The magazines also appear to enjoy different
reputations among the general public. In general, 50 Millions de Consommateurs is more
popularly oriented than Que Choisir?.3 81 The first product test reported by 50 Millions de
Consommateurs evaluated cleaning powders. The first test by Que Choisir? evaluated
tennis balls. A consumer survey commissioned by the employers association, the CNPF,
reported that consumers appreciate the impartiality of Que Choisir?, while regretting its
lack of finances. Conversely, consumers recognize the value of 50 Millions de
Consommateurs but regret its partiality towards nationalized industries.382
381 Michel Wieviorka, L 'Etat, le Patronat, et les Consommateurs (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1977), pp 146-7.
382 "[Ils] apprecient Que choisir? pour son impartialit6 mais d6plorent son manque de
moyens. Ils reconaissent l'ficacitM de 50 Millions de Consommateurs mais regrettent sa
241
The Union f6derale des consommateurs (UFC), a non-profit consumer association
created in 1951, published the first edition of Que Choisir? in December 1961. For the
first eight years of its distribution, circulation did not exceed five thousand copies. In
1969, the UFC opted to associate with the Association beige des consommateurs (ABC),
whose journal Test Achat enjoyed at the time a circulation of 100 thousand in Belgium.
Indeed in 1969 Que Choisir? began to appear in exactly the same format as Test Achat.38 3
The UFC later revealed that not only the tests themselves but also most of the production
work for Que Choisir?, including editing, layout, and printing, had been transferred to the
Belgian group.3 84 Yet by the end of 1973, as sales began to pick up with growing
economic stress to consumers, the UFC split from ABC. Running comparative product
tests proved an expensive activity, and despite the new subscribers Que Choisir? fell 3
million francs into debt over the course of the next year.385
Salvation for the UFC came, ironically, in the form of a law suit filed in
December 1973 by the Arthur Martin company for a false report in Que Choisir? about a
refrigerator they manufactured. In what appears to have been a typographical error, the
volume of the refrigerator was reported in Que Choisir? to be 226 liters instead of its
actual 266 liters. On 18 February 1974 the French Commercial Court, a body that
represents industry and retail interests, ruled that Que Choisir? would have to reimburse
Arthur Martin 310,000 francs for damages. Furthermore, they were required to pay for
partialit6." Alain Poire, Les Discours consumdristes et leur perception par les Franfais (
Paris: I.C.C.-C.N.P.F., 1984), p 16.
383 Hans B. Thorelli, and Sarah V. Thorelli, Consumer Information Handbook: Europe
and North America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
384 "Defense timor6e du consommateur ais6," Liberation, 29 May 1975.
385 Jean-Marc de Preneuf, "La crise de Que choisir?: Un triste gout d'6chec," La Croix, 15
Dec 1974.
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the publication of the court finding in five major newspapers. The decision was upheld on
appeal in 1975.386 This ruling, based on the advertising clause of the loi Royer of 1973,
established a particularly high level of responsibility for the publication of comparative
product tests. So long as product evaluations were treated with the same standards as
advertisements, defendants had only to prove that an error had been made, not whether
that error had been negligent.38 7
Unlike lawsuits against Germany's DM, however, the Arthur Martin proved
beneficial for Que Choisir?. They felt that they benefited from the law suit because it
proved that they were not under the influence of industry.388 This kind of antagonism
against industry became a central theme for Que Choisir?. In April 1977, finding that
many aerosol cans on the market exploded if heated to over 90 degrees Celsius, Que
Choisir? called for a consumer boycott of these products.3 s9 In February 1978, when Que
Choisir? evaluated doctors by sending them patients with constructed symptoms, Doctor
Albert Cohen brought a defamation suit against UFC.3 90 In December of the same year
eleven medical testing labs sued Que Choisir? for a critical report in their May 1978
edition entitled "Thirty-two laboratory tests, thirty-one errors." In these cases the appeals
court in Paris found against Que Choisir?, on the grounds that their methods were not
3 86 Mary Blume, "The Rocky Road of Consumerism in France," International Herald
Tribune, April 30 1977; "31 millions pour Arthur Martin," Liberation, 3 MPxch 1977.
387 Jean-Philippe Vidal, "Les organisations de consommateurs peuvent-elles revendiquer
le droit a l'erreur?" Les Echos, 25 Mar 1977.
388 Jean-Philippe Vidal, "Les organisations de consommateurs peuvent-elles revendiquer
le droit a l'erreur?" Les Echos, 25 Mar 1977.
389 "L'Union federale des consommateurs appelle au boycott des aerosols," Liberation, 5
April 1977.
39u Elisabeth Rochard, "Peut-on tester un m6decin?" Le Matin, 15 Nov 1978.
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"scientifically incontestable," but fines were kept relatively low and the publicity from
these cases spurred sales of Que Choisir?.39 1
Que Choisir? had by the end of the 1970s become the scourge of French industry.
In 1979, for example, Que Choisir? reported that in 750 different cases automobile tires
manufactured by the French K16ber-Colombes company had exploded when cars reached
120-130 kilometers per hour (80-86 mph). Kl6ber-Colombes at the time enjoyed sales of
2 billion francs, of which 36 percent came from foreign sales, and controlled 40% of the
French tire market. Michelin, the leading producer, held 48 percent of Kl6ber-Colombes
stock.392 In response to the criticism raised by Que Choisir?, Kl6ber-Colombes organized
on 28 November 1979 a "r6union d'information" at their testing center in Mirmas, where
some of France's best race drivers were invited to put the suspect tires, the models V10
and V 12, through a rigorous workout. One engineer giving a presentation to reporters
said: "Journalists, your attack is tragic. What you are attacking is the entire French
automobile industry. It is the backbone of France."3 93 Frangois Lamy, who had pursued
the case at Que choisir?, presented himself at the center but was not admitted. Asked why
Lamy was not allowed to participate, the CEO of Kl6ber responded: "We do not allow a
criminal to speak." 94
France's state-run product test journal, 50 millions de consommateurs (today
called 60 millions de consommateurs) was less militantly anti-industry than Que
391 Le Monde, 26 Dec 1978.
392 Frangois Bourbon Destrem, "K16ber-Colombes met toute la gomme," Quotidien de
Paris, 30 November 1979.
393 "Journalistes, l'attaque est malheureuse. Ce que vous attaquez, c'est toute l'industrie
automobile francaise. Qui fait vivre en epine dorsale la France..."
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Choisir?, but it nonetheless resisted pressures to be more responsive to industry interests.
The Institut National de la Consommation (INC), which publishes 60 millions de
consommateurs, was proposed by Minister of Economy and Finance Michel Debr in
article 34 of the 'loi de finances rectitative' and approved by a vote of the National
Assembly on 15 December 1966. Its organization and tasks were set by decree on 5
December 1967.395 Although its primary goal was to provide technical support on
consumer issues to the government as well as to consumer associations, the INC was also
charged in article 2 of its charter to conduct product tests at the request of these groups.
The first test results appeared in 1970 in the organization's monthly magazine, 50
Millions de Consommateurs. In 1970 the advisory group to the Sixth French Plan
recommended increasing funding to comparative product tests conducted by INC.3 96
Between 1971 and 1975 INC conducted 140 such tests.39 7
Today, renamed 60 Millions de Consommateurs, the publication has a circulation
of roughly 250,000 and shares the national market almost evenly with Que Choisir?. INC
also distributes its test results through other media. Each year INC broadcasts ten hours of
consumer programming in 126 television spots of the program D'accord pas d'accord
(OK not OK). In a 1986 survey, 88 percent of consumers knew of the D'accordpas
d'accord, 70 percent avowed interest in such television spots, although 71 percent of
394 "Nous ne donnons pas la parole a un criminel." Patrick Berthreu, "Kleber-Colombes
en rechappe," Liberation, 7 December 1979; Josee Doyere, "Information selective," Le
Monde, 1 December 1979.
395 Josee Doyere, "Le dixieme anniversaire de I'INC: Un outil au service d'une politique
liberale," Le Monde, 24 January 1978.
396 Jacques Dubois, "Les consommateurs et le VIe plan," Information Consommateur
70/5 (1970), p 5.
397 Claude Duchamp, "Les essais comparatifs," Revue des itudes cooperatives 186
(1977), p 81.
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viewers said they watched it simply because it happened to be on while they were
watching.39 8 INC test results also appeared in 1,400 external magazine and newspaper
articles in 1989, as well as in 75 external citations on television and radio. Since July
1989, all of INC publications have been available via Minitel from the service "BINC."
This service received 348,900 calls in 1989 alone.399
The INC's initial approach to product testing is similar to that employed by the
UFC. Products to be tested are purchased anonymously, with the test sample generally
amounting to thee quarters of the total selection of products available on the market.
When the price of products and tests permits, several products of each brand are included
in the testing sample. Labels are then removed from the products, which are then either
tested in-house or, for more complicated tests, sent to external testing labs. The raw test
results are generally sent to the companies whose products had been tested, but 50
Million de Consommateurs writers are not required to take into account company
responses. Tests last between six months and a year from the date of product purchase to
the date of publication.4 °
Government sponsorship of comparative product testing initially drew mixed
reactions from consumer and producer associations. ORGECO, the consumer association
representing the big French labor unions, favored product tests as a counter-force to
industry prerogative. They felt that "...only comparative tests are capable of truly
impeding producers and distributors and thus of permitting an effective defense of the
398 "Les 6missions tl1vis6es de I'INC 'D'accord pas d'accord'," Consommateurs
Actualitis 513 (13 June 1986), pp 3-6.
399 Marie-Hl6ne dos Reis, "L'Institut national de la consommation," Revue franvaise
d'administration publique 56 (October-December 1990), pp 659-660.
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consumer."401 While most family-oriented consumer associations also favored the INC
tests, the UFC voiced concern about the conflict of interest posed by the dual role of the
INC as both advisor to the government and evaluator of products. In part for this reason,
and in part due to the growing competition Que Choisir? faced from 50 Millions de
Consommateurs, the UFC withdrew in protest from the governing board of the INC in
1972.402
Producers generally opposed INC's move into product testing. CNPF president
Huvelin opposed all government support to comparative product testing.403 The Paris
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP) did not object to product testing per se, but
complained that industry had no input into the evaluations. Taking their cue from
Germany's Stiftung Warentest, they proposed that INC consult professional associations
in drawing up the list of brands to be tested, in studying the "physionomie" of the market,
and in establishing criteria for evaluating specific products. Results of product tests
should then be distributed to producers with enough lead time to allow for their responses
to be incorporated into the evaluations.4 4 The Minister of Economy and Finance, in a
letter to the President of the CCIP of 8 October 1973, rejected this German-inspired
400 Claude Duchamp, "Les essais comparatifs," Revue des 6tudes cooperatives 186
(1977), p 78.
401 "Seuls les essais comparatifs sont susceptibles de gener [bold in text] veritablement
les producteurs et distributeurs et donc de permettre une defense efficace du
consommateur." Jacques Dubois, "LEtiquetage d'information et les essais comparatifs,"
Information Consommateur 4 (1970), p 2.
402 Marie-H61lne dos Reis, "L'Institut national de la consommation," Revuefranvaise
d'administration publique 56 (October-December 1990), p 656.
403 Jacques Dubois, "LEtiquetage d'information et les essais comparatifs," Information
Consommateur 4 (1970), p 2.
404 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris. "Problemes de la consommation."
Rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par H. Ehrsam
(Adopted 24 May 1973), p 7.
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approach. Greater company participation in the preparation of comparative tests would,
he claimed, "...risk to accentuate the disequilibrium in favor of producers who would
rapidly become masters of what products were submitted to tests, of the choice of
laboratories, and of the results that were diffused." He proposed instead that product
testers be held to high standards of quality in product testing that could be contested after
a product test was published. The CCIP rejected this a posteriori solution as overly
burdensome for companies, testing organizations (which would face large fines), and
consumers.4 0 5
Responding to these criticisms from the business community, France's standard
setting organization AFNOR published in March 1975 an experimental standard, denoted
NF X 50-005, intended to provide "a charter of good relations between organizations
conducting comparative tests, producers, and consumers."406 The new standard called for
testing organizations to maintain financial independence from producers and distributors,
which precluded any form of advertising in the magazine where comparative test results
were presented. It also stipulated that tests should cover products from the entire price
range, that reviews of subjective qualities should be based on consumer surveys, and that
405 "risque d'accentuer le desequilibre en faveur des producteurs qui deviendraient
rapidement maitres de la selection des produits soumis aux tests, de la determinatnion des
methodes d'essai, du choix des laboartoires et des resultats diffuses." Chambre de
commerce et d'industrie de Paris, "Reglementation des essais comparatifs de produits,"
Rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par H. Ehrsam
(Adopted 6 December 1973), p 8.
406 "...une charte des bonnes relations entre les organismes d'essais comparatifs, les
producteurs et les consommateurs." Claude Duchamp, "Les essais comparatifs," Revue
des etudes cooperatives 186 (1977), p 77.
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companies implicated by comparative tests be consulted about the testing procedure and
its results.407
French business continued to put pressure on the government to incorporate
business input into INC's product testing program. In January 1978, for example, the
office of the Secretary of Consumption called for access to 50 millions de consommateurs
articles before they were published in order to avoid damage to certain companies.408
This proposal was dropped when the Secretariat itself was eliminated later that year. The
issue resurfaced again ten years later, in 1987, when the new right government endorsed
business interest in comparative product testing. In a sweeping indictment of both INC
and the UFC, the new Secretary of Consumption and Competition, Jean Arthuis, stated in
July 1987: "France is cruelly lacking a system of comparative product tests worthy of the
name... One need only observe the use made by our German neighbors of their Stiftung
Warentest to be persuaded that such an organization is an essential element for economic
performance, joining the aspirations of consumers and professionals alike."409 One of his
goals, drawn from the German experience, was to make INC results available for
producers to incorporate into their advertising. Yet producers were unlikely to accept this
407 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris, "Reglementation des essais comparatifs
de produits," Rapport present6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par H.
Ehrsam (Adopted 6 December 1973), p 6.
408 Pierre Pujol, "Un souch non desint6ress6 pour les 'consommateurs'," Quotidien die
Peuple, 25 jan 1978.
409 "La France manque cruellement d'un syst6me d'essais comparatifs digne de ce
nom.... l n'est que de voir l'usage que font nos voisins allemands de leur Stiftung
Warentest pour etre persuad6 qu'un tel organisme est un element essentiel d'une economie
performante, en meme temps qu'il f6dere les aspirations des consommateurs et des
professionels." "Intervention de M. Jean Arthuis, Secr'taire d'Etat charg6 de la
Consommation et de la Concurrence, devant le Conseil d'Administration de I'INC (26
juin 1987)," Consommateurs Actualitds 558 (10 July 1987): 2-3.
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change unless they also had more input into the process by which their products were
being evaluated.4 10
Consequently, in October 1987, the National Council on Consumption called for
the creation of an autonomous Authority on Comparative Tests (Autoritd des essais
comparatifs, or ADEC) to oversee the testing operations at INC. This new oversight body
included six members of consumer associations, six members of professional
associations, and four neutral professionals (drawn from AFNOR, LNE, INC, and
Qualitel). ADEC was assigned three functions in product testing. First, they would help
in the selection of the product categories to be tested, and product categories would be
selected two to three years in advance of publication so that interested industries could
register their opinions. Second, ADEC would participate in developing the testing
methodology, including setting the composition of expert groups to oversee particular
tests. Finally, ADEC would participate in the effort to draw conclusions from the test
results. 41 '
The CNPF vice-president in charge of consumer issues, Roger Cabal, favored the
creation of ADEC, and praised especially the longer development period for the tests.
This, he felt, would allow companies to change their product designs so that they would
better conform to the testing criteria.41 2 Whereas most consumer groups in the CNC also
assented to the change, the UFC stood in strong opposition to the creation of ADEC.
410 Professional representatives had been removed by the Socialist government in 1982
from the Advisory Council of the INC and placed instead in the National Council on
Consumption, formerly the National Committee on Consumption, in order to create a
high-level forum for concertation between consumers and producers.
41 "La r6forme des essais comparatifs." CNPF Patronat 499 (March-April 1988): 78-9.
412 "Mise en place d'une Autorite des essais comparatifs au sein de I'INC," INC Hebdo
563 (2 October 1987), p 5.
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Apparently at the UFC's behest, the new French testing authority was also condemned by
the European Office of Consumer Unions (Bureau europden des unions de
consommateurs, or BEUC) for permitting state intervention in the process of product
evaluation. BEUC found that the level of industry participation in ADEC far exceeded
even that in Germany's Stiftung Warentest, and warned that "...any direct or indirect
interference by the state or producers [in comparative product testing], in the rare cases
where that has occurred, throws discredit on product tests for many reasons: because of
an arbitrary choice of products to be tested, by the exclusion of foreign competitors, by
juggling the relationship between quality and price, by reference exclusively to national
standards, or by the uneven use of results by companies or the state." 413 Yet the activities
of ADEC have never attained the level of industry collaboration that lies at the center of
Germany's Stiftung Warentest. While industry representatives do sit on ADEC,
companies have been largely unwilling to contribute at different stages in the evaluation
process. ADEC today continues to set broad policies for product testing in 60 millions de
consommateurs, but it has not led to an integration of industry into the process of product
testing.
Quality Labels
Consumers and producers have in some instances collaborated to provide
consumers with accurate technical information about products. One case of this is product
413 it
413 "...toute interference directe ou indirecte des Etats ou des producteurs ou distributeurs
dans les rares cas oi cela s'est produit, jetait le discr6dit sur le test, par les risques
d'arbitraire dans le choix des produits testes ou d'exclusion de concurrents etrangers ou
d'escamotage de la notion de rapport qualite/prix, our par la r6f6rence exclusive a des
normes nationales, par des exploitations tronqu6es our in6gales des rsultats par les
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labeling. In both France and Germany in the early 1970s, governments worked with
producers and consumers to design informative product labels that would assist buyers in
comparing the relative qualities of products on the market. So long as these labeling
programs remained objective and voluntary, producers in both countries were staunch
advocates of the process. Following the early success of product labeling, however,
France and Germany both experimented with more comprehensive labeling projects that
sought to provide consumers with composite scales reflecting different aspects of product
quality. These new quality labeling initiatives were viewed with skepticism by industry,
and succeeded only in Germany.
French Product Labeling
In France, informative labeling for consumer products was launched as a
collaborative effort by the National Council of French Employers (Conseil national du
patronat frangais, or CNPF) and the National Consumption Institute (Institut national de
la consommation, or INC). In September 1970 they founded the French Association for
Product Labeling (Association franqaise pour l'6tiquetage d'information, or AFEI), a
non-profit organization in the public interest with the goal of designing and distributing
model product labels. The content of the labels was to be strictly factual, and negotiated
among consumer and industry representatives. Different kinds of labels were negotiated
for different product lines, and their use was strictly voluntary. The first product label
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producteurs out les Etats." "UFC-BEUC: pleins feux sur I'ADEC," INC Hebdo 578 (22
January 1988), p 3.
appeared in 1972. AFEI had issued 300 labels by 1974, 1000 by 1978, and 1300 by
1980. 4 14
Following on the success of AFEI, and amid growing concern over product
quality, an effort was made to extend the range of informative labeling beyond objective
product dimensions to include composite indicators that would approximate qualitative
characteristics of interest to the consumers, such as durability and usefulness. The model
for this initiative was the Swedish VDN-Skala (Varudeklarationsnimnd, or value
declaration office scale) established in 1951, that provided relative product quality
information on five-point scales. By 1971 the VDN-Skala had been successfully applied
to 110 different kinds of products.41 5 Following this lead, the French Ministry of Industry
and Research under Michel d'Ornano created in November 1975 a 'Service de la qualit6'
under the Direction des Mines.41 6 This Service de la qualit6 would work with AFEI to
create new qualitative product labels. The proposal was endorsed by the President, the
Ministry of Commerce, and the National Consumption Institute (INC). The association of
companies that produce electrical goods (CEDEF-GIFAM), which was likely to be
heavily influenced by the new label format, gave a restrained approval: "We accept this
414 AFEI was eliminated in 1984. Pierre Frybourg (president of AFEI), "L'Etiquetage
d'Information," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 12 (1980), pp 14-16;
"L'Etiquetage informatif vous aide dans vos achats," Information Consommation Or-Ge-
Co 27 (Mar-April 1978), pp 3-4; Jacques Dubois "L'affichage des prix...ne doit etre qu'un
remier pas." Information Consommateur 1 (1972), pp 3-4.
15 Adrian Weser, Warenkennzeichnung - ein Mittel der Verbraucherinformation (Verlag
Gottingen: Otto Schwartz & Co, 1976), pp 126-133.
4 16 Le Monde, 22 Nov 1975.
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project rather favorably but we remain concerned by the modality of the dialogue with
the consumers."4 17
In 1976 the project was taken on by the newly appointed Secretary of
Consumption, Christiane Scrivener, as a flagship for her campaign to promote consumer
interests. After protracted closed-door discussions with industry, she helped to write and
pass a law on consumer information on 10 January 1978 that provided for so-called
'Quality Certificates' (certificats de qualification). The content of the Quality Certificates
was to be negotiated between industry, consumers, and the administration. The first range
of products to be labeled under the new scheme, for example, was shoes. Each kind of
shoe would be described on three separate scales measuring comfort, durability, and a
third composite category called 'finition.' In addition to offering measures of quality, the
project also provided for enforcing a minimum level of guaranteed quality, to be set by
the Ministry of Industry.4 '8 Product testing to establish product quality levels was to be
carried out by the National Testing Laboratory (Laboratoire national d'essais, or LNE),
an organization that, with 350 employees and a 44 million franc budget, was probably not
prepared for the task.4 '9
French industry had neither the will nor the capacity to carry out such a broach
labeling project. First, French producers were not oriented towards producing the
qualities that were likely to be the basis of qualitative labeling. Because many products
were expected to fall short of the requisite level of quality specified by the Ministry of
417 "Nous accueilons plut6t favorablement ce projet mais nous demeurons pr6occup6s par
les modalit6s du dialogue avec les consommateurs." Rosemonde Pujol, "Protection du
consommateur: d'Ornano intervient," Le Figaro, 20 November, 1975.
418 Jean Calais-Auloy, Droit de la Consommation (Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey, 1992).
419 Gisele Prevost, "Qualification de produits industriels," Les Echos, 27 Sep 1979.
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Industry, it was projected that 280 product brands would disappear from the market if the
Quality Certificates program was initiated.4 20 Moreover, industry resisted participating in
many of the committees for setting labeling standards. The ambitious goal, to have all
products relabeled in this way by the end of 1981, was finally ruled out by the election of
Francois Mitterrand's Socialist government, which quickly eliminated the project. Rather
than pursue qualitative labeling further, the new government had a different idea for
promoting quality: they would attempt to engage consumer groups to negotiate quality
standards directly with industry. This approach is discussed in Chapter eight below.
German Product Labeling
Product labeling followed a more constructive trajectory in Germany. Informative
product labels were initiated in 1964 by the German Institute for Product Safety and
Labeling (RAL Deutsches Institut fur Giitesicherung und Kennzeichnung, formerly the
ReichsausschuB fur Lieferbedingungen). Founded in 1925 with the goal of certifying raw
materials for production, RAL was discontinued in 1942, when wartime production
conditions caused quality levels to sink below the acceptable threshold set by RAL. The
organization was resurrected in 1952 under the influence of Ludwig Erhard's Economics
Ministry as a committee of the German Standards Committee (Deutsches
Normenausschu, DNA), the precursor to the German Standards Institute (Deutsches
Institut fiir Normung, or DIN). The main goal of the new RAL was to create product
quality symbols for both industrial and consumer products that assured conformity with a
minimal level of safety and quality. RAL recognized 68 such symbols in 1960, 103 in
420 Elisabeth Rochard, "Pour informer les consommateurs: un 'certificat de qualification',"
Le Matin, 27 Jun 1979.
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1978, and 145 in 1995.421 Over half of these quality symbols applied to building
materials, with the rest going to consumer products and, to a lesser extent, to agricultural
products.42 2 Although RAL focused its efforts primarily on quality symbols, it also issued
standard specifications for product colors (RAL-Farben), and certificates of provenance
(Herkunftsgewihrzeichen, such as for Lubecker Marzipan).42 3
RAL began issuing a series of informative product labels under the name "RAL-
Testate" in 1964. Like the proposed French Quality certificates, these informative labels
included scales for those properties of the product that consumer and producer
representatives agreed would be helpful to the consumer. The characteristics of the
product being sold were marked on a scale that indicated its position relative to the full
range of products on the market. Companies interested in including an RAL-Testate on
their product packaging had to submit the product to a testing center for evaluation. Any
products that did not meet DNA minimum standards were not allowed to incorporate the
RAL-Testate on their packaging.
By 30 April 1974, RAL had created Testate for 122 product kinds, including
household electronics (vacuum cleaners were big users), cooking wares, metal goods,
plastic and leather goods, textiles, and cleansers. Heat storage units were required to be
sold with RAL-Testate because the electric companies allowed only products with this
marking to be installed. Interestingly, one in four RAL-Testate tests were requested by
mail order companies, who sought a means to convey more information to consumers
421 RAL Deutsches Institut fur Giitesicherung und Kennzeichnung, 70 Jahre RAL-
Gitezeichen: Eine moderne Ideefeiert Geburtstag (Sankt Augustin: RAL, 1995), p 22.
422 Adrian Weser, Warenkennzeichnung - ein Mittel der Verbraucherinformation (Verlag
Gottingen: Otto Schwartz & Co, 1976).
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who did not have direct access to their products. A survey by the University of Gie3en
reported that one in six housewives were familiar with the RAL-Testate label.4
Despite this early success, the RAL-Testate enjoyed a short life. On 26 August
1973, RAL separated from the DNA. The impetus came not from RAL or the DNA
administration, since they had worked well together and continued to collaborate after the
separation, but from pressure by Germany's peak association for the household
equipment industry (Hauptgemeinschaft der Deutschen Hausgerateindustrie, or HDHI).
As a member of DNA, the HDHI was concerned that the rising prominence of consumer
politics would soon draw political scrutiny to RAL activities. If RAL remained in DNA,
they argued, then the entire process of standard setting in consumer goods could become
politicized, with consumer groups and the government requesting input into the standard-
setting process. While most members of DNA made industrial products that would be
unaffected by consumer politics, they nonetheless acceded to the wishes of the HDHI and
banished RAL.4 25
Under its new charter as an independent organization, the RAL in 1973 invited
diverse participation in order to secure its neutrality and legitimacy. Consumer
organizations, trade unions, peak production associations, and chambers of commerce
now participated in RAL-Testate design. Consumer and producer groups met in a newly-
created RAL Committee on RAL-Testate (AusschuB RAL-Testate im RAL) to set
423 Jirgen Bornecke, Handbuch der Verbraucherinstitutionen (Bonn: Verlag Information
fiur die Wirtschaft, 1982).
424 Adrian Weser, Warenkennzeichnung - ein Mittel der Verbraucherinformation (Verlag
Gottingen: Otto Schwartz & Co, 1976), p 124-125.
425 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibuilt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984).
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priorities for products to be considered and product values to be included on labels. As
the HDHI had feared, this new negotiating table became a forum for imposing new
minimum quality and safety levels.426 The effect was to create a negotiating arena outside
of DIN for product standard setting. The business response to this move was hostile.
Even the Consumer Council (Verbraucherrat, or VR) of DIN opposed the new RAL-
Testate format. When RAL applied in 1974 for a contract from the Economics Ministry
to help finance the cost of the new RAL-Testate system, it was turned down. Under
pressure from industry and the Economics Ministry, RAL abandoned the RAL-Testate
program altogether in 1975 and returned to its original focus on content symbols.
Unlike France, however, Germany did not abandon all effort to create an
information labeling system that could address the specific quality needs of consumers.
When the Economics Ministry turned down RAL's request, it also approached
Germany's peak industry association (Bund Deutscher Industrie, or BDI) and other
economic groups for proposals for an alternative product information system. After two
years of discussions, the peak consumer association AgV, the Economics Ministry, and
Stiftung Warentest worked together with RAL to pass a 1977 law setting guidelines for
the provision of product information in Germany ("Richtlinien fur Produkt-Information
in der Bundesrepublik Dutschland").4 27
In order to implement this new set of guidelines, a working group of prominent
social and economic associations428 came together in 1977 to create an alternative set of
426 "Grundsatze fiir Gutezeichen," Bundesanzeiger, 23 March 1974.
427 Willi Laschet, "Verbraucher sind auch Kunden," in Verbraucherpolitik kontrovers, ed.
Hartwig Piepenbrock and Conrad Schroeder (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987).
428 The group included the Economics ministry (BMWi), RAL, the peak consumer
association (AgV), the Stiftung Warentest, the peak industry association (BDI), trade
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informative labels that would provide end-consumers with standard, objective measures
of the most important qualities of a product. This new Produkt-Informationssystem (PI)
was distinct from the RAL-Testate in that it focused on measurable qualities of products
rather than attempting to create a composite scale. To ensure that the information
provided was both accurate and useful to consumers, the PI comprised two standing
committees, each with representation from industry, consumer groups, and retailing. The
Community Board for Product Information (GemeinschaftsausschuB fur Produkt-
Information, or GA-PI) was responsible for setting the operating guidelines of the PI
system. A second Technical Committee for Product Information (FachausschuB fuir
Produkt-Information, or FA-PI) was responsible for the content and form of the PI, as
well as the enforcement of guidelines set down by the GA-PI.4 2 9 Both committees were
kept small so that they could work effectively.
In January 1979, RAL and DIN collaborated to created a private company, the
German Society for Product Information (Deutsche Gesellschaft ffir Produktinformation
GmbH, or DGPI) that took over management and promotion of the PI system in
Germany. This new management ensured that neither the government nor consumers
would interfere in PI labeling.4 30 In 1980 DGPI signed a contract with the Economics
Ministry to provide product information, and to transpose European level environmental
associations, DIN, and the Federal association for materials testing (Bundesanstalt fur
Materialprifung, or BAM).
429 Members included 5 producer representatives, 3 from BDI, 2 from retailing industries,
5 from AgV, 1 from DIN, and 1 from BAM. Jurgen Bornecke, Handbuch der
Verbraucherinstitutionen (Bonn: Verlag Information fir die Wirtschaft, 1982), p 326.
4 3 0 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibiilt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Nonnung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 86.
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quality requirements into German product information labels.431 By 1984, 20 PI labels
had been produced, and an additional 16 were in production. DGPI was later
amalgamated into DIN. The PI system continues to be used in Germany, particularly for
white wares, electronics, gas, oil and coal equipment, heating pumps, and solar panels.432
Divergent Policy Paths in Information Regulation
A common thread links these apparently disparate areas of policy relating to the
provision of consumer information in the marketplace. In France, ambitious plans for the
provision of accurate product information faltered through the objections of industry and
a lack of commitment on behalf of consumer groups and the government. In Germany,
industry itself has been a strong proponent of high quality consumer information, on the
condition that it retain control over the content of that information. This policy
divergence has generated a strong product information regime in Germany, by which
consumers have come to rely on and emphasize technical product information in their
purchasing decisions. Germann companies, confronting informed consumer demand, have
in turn focused on product quality and technical sophistication as the central arena of
competition and comparative advantage.
France, by contrast, has created a weak consumer information regime in which
consumers face difficulties in distinguishing incremental quality and technical advances.
Confronting consumer demand of this kind, French producers have oriented their
production strategy not primarily towards product quality, where marginal improvements
431 Reinhard Hector, "Verbraucherpolitische Aspekte aus Sicht der
Gebrauchsgiiterindustrie," in Verbraucherpolitik in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, ed.
Jirgen Bornecke (K6ln: Verein fr wirtschafliche und soziale Fragen, 1984), p 28.
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are unlikely to be recognized by consumers, but instead towards radically new kinds of
products that can be distinguished from existing products on the market even in the
absence of accurate technical information.
In the area of advertising, the policy divergence in France and Germany has led to
different national expectations in relation to advertising. In a study of European attitudes,
Franqoise Bonnal surveyed the qualities that consumers in different European countries
associated with good advertising. While all countries called for informative advertising,
the way in which the advertising should be informative differed importantly. France and
Germany in particular showed a marked divergence. France (and Italy) placed a strong
emphasis on the value of creative advertising. "The French...insist on defending the idea
of an inventive and aesthetic advertising that creates new languages, sometimes at the
risk of forgetting the needs of the product."433 In Germany (as well as in Denmark, the
UK, and Spain) informative advertising was seen as honest advertising: "The particularity
of German advertising is its severity. Ideal advertising must be honest, informative, and
in good taste."434
In the area of comparative product testing, the different national orientations are
evoked by the positions of trade unions in the two countries. In Germany, trade unions
sided with producers to request a business presence in the evaluation process. Their main
432 Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, "Three Instances of Negotiation Procedures in the Federal
Republic of Germany," Journal of Consumer Policy 7 (1984), p 213.
433 "Les Francais...s'obstinent a defendre une idee de la publicit6 inventive, esth6tique et
cr6atrice de nouveaux langages, au risque parfois d'oublier les exigences du
produit." Franqoise Bonnal, "Les Goats publicitaires des Europ6ens," in Six manres
d'etre Europeen, ed. Dominique Schnapper and Henri Mendras (Paris: Gallimard, 1990),
267.
4 "La particularit6 du public allemand est la s6v6rit6. La publicit6 rvee doit etre
honnete, informative et de bon goft." F. Bonnal, p 274.
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goal was to lower the risk to production lines by controlling the market uncertainty that
independent product testing could create. So long as producers had sufficient advanced
notice about poor test results, undue shocks to the labor force could be avoided. German
policy choices were, through the help of the Justice Ministry, held in close alignment
with these economic interests of trade unions and of industry. In France, by contrast,
unions felt that an independent testing authority was critical to counter-balance the power
of industry. Hence they favored both the total independence of Que Choisir? and the
absence of industry input into 50 Millions de Consommateurs. The result was a system of
product testing in which test results supported a strong consumer and union opposition to
the force of industrial capital.
Finally, the German and French experiences with product labeling reform in the
1970s reveal a similar divergence of interests in relation to consumer information. In
Germany, consumer product labeling grew out of RAL, an organization originally created
to provide a service to producers by ensuring the quality of raw materials. In France,
consumer product labeling began as an equal collaboration of producers and consumers
in a new organization, AFEI. RAL's attempt to negotiate minimum quality thresholds for
RAL-Testate was rebuffed primarily by industry, which was able to have the program
eliminated and the more business-friendly PI system erected in its place. In France, by
contrast, qualitative product labeling failed, due primarily to industry opposition. Product
labeling in Germany, in other words, proceeded by the grace of industry, whereas in
France it responded more closely to capacities and political interests of the government.
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Chapter 7. Consumer Protection Through Risk Regulation
An important stimulus for improving consumer information in France and
Germany grew out of a concern in the 1960s and 1970s over the social risk posed by
modern products. The new risks were partly real and partly subjective. On the one hand,
increasingly complicated products made it difficult for consumers to assess their safety or
design. As Horst Albach writes, "Buying a new product carries a risk for the consumer:
the new product may not function properly, and may even prove dangerous to the health
of the user."4 35 Dramatic product failures like Thalidomide dramatized this risk. On the
other hand, consumer fears also increased with affluence.436 Ulrich Beck has argued that
this growth in affluence stimulated a fundamental shift in public policy. Whereas
industrialization during periods of scarcity had been dominated by the theme of wealth
distribution, emphasis changed with the onset of prosperity to the theme of risk
distribution. Socially recognized risks became the new focus of politics. "Suddenly,"
Beck writes, "the public and politics extend their rule into the private sphere of plant
management -- into product planning and technical equipment."43 7
The new societal emphasis on product risk represented a change from risk
strategies that had evolved in earlier stages of industrialization. Faced with the risks
inherent to industrialization, most countries had responded by created broad social
435 Horst Albach, Culture and Technical Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Analysis and
Policy Recommendations (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), pp 282-284.
436 Harvey M. Sapolsky, "The Politics of Product Controversies," in Consuming Fears:
The Politics of Product Risk, ed. Harvey Sapolsky (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p
200.
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insurance schemes. These had the effect both of guaranteeing medical and social support
to workers and consumers injured by industry, and also of distributing the societal costs
of industrialization widely in society. By externalizing the risk of production, the social
insurance approach in effect provided a social subsidy to industry. The growing emphasis
on product risk in the 1960s and 1970s signaled a completely different approach to the
risks of industrialization. Instead of externalizing these risks through insurance schemes,
policy-makers moved to internalize product risks to the company.43 8 Product risks that
had previously appeared inevitable were now perceived to be the responsibility of
producers. This set a new standard for production, in which product safety was made an
abiding goal of product design and manufacture.
But the social perception of these risks differed significantly in different
countries. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky have argued that the perception of risk is
largely socially constructed, with countries tending to emphasize risks that reflect the
social organization of society: "Deep differences in attitudes toward risk derive from
insitutional life." In particular, they contrast hierarchical institutions with individual
market institutions. In hierarchical institutions, individuals attempt to limit radical action,
in the implicit understanding that this can lead to collapse. This leads them in turn to
emphasize long-term risks that are susceptible to system-level solutions. In market
organizations, by contrast, individuals see uncertainties as opportunities, and thus tend to
437 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications,
1992), pp 20-24.
438 Spiros Simitis, "Products Liability: The West-German Approach," in Comparative
Product Liability, ed. C.J. Miller (London: Comparative Law Series, 1986), p 100.
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focus social attention on short-term, dramatic risks.43 9 These categories do not map
directly onto the perceptions of product risk in France and Germany. But they do evoke
the way in which societal institutions work to constitute a social perception of risk.
This chapter describes the societal construction of consumer risk through the
elaboration of product liability law and product safety regulation in France and Germany.
In product liability law, France and Germany have adopted different standards of risk
allocation despite apparent similarities in their legal traditions. Whereas France has
pushes I the entire burden of product-related risk onto producers and distributors through a
strict standard of liability, Germany has applied a negligence standard of liability that
holds producers responsible only for those product failures that they could reasonably
have prevented. This divergence stems not from specific legal traditions or cultures, but
instead from broader national orientations toward product risk. The difference in national
attitudes towards product risk also characterizes French and German standards of product
safety. Whereas the French government has set mandatory safety standards for all goods
that pose a risk to consumers, the German government has acted to make industry-set
safety standards binding on all producers within the country.
Product Liability
While France and Germany share the common goal of consumer protection, they
pursue product liability in different ways that have depended upon the organization of
consumers and producers in the two countries. In Germany, where consumers have been
poorly mobilized, strong industry associations have managed to avoid a strict standard of
439 Mary Douglas, and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of
Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982),
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product liability. In France, where consumers enjoyed strong popular mobilization and
industry interests have been disorganized, courts have tended to push the full burden of
product-related loss onto producers and distributors. But this difference in policy derives
not only from the different political strength of consumers and producers in the two
countries.
Product liability is, after all, only one of a number of different approaches that
countries employ to secure the safety of consumers against product damage. Courts in
these countries have selected national standards of product liability that conformed with a
broader conception of the consumer interest, based in turn on the organizational context
of production. In Germany, product liability law enforces a collective approach to
product safety by giving producers incentives to participate in industry-wide product
standards and worker training. In France, by contrast, where the institutions of product
standardization and uniform labor training are not binding on individual producers, the
courts have instead placed the burden of product safety wholly on individual companies. I
argue that court decisions bearing on product liability law can best be understood, in both
France and Germany, as optimizing consumer safety by taken into account this broader
institutional context of protection in interpreting the appropriate national standard of
product liability to apply.
One implication of this research is that national legal traditions have played only a
small role in determining national product liability practice, despite the fact that national
product liability standards have been elaborated almost entirely through the courts.
France and Germany have indeed found different legal foundations for product liability
pp 87-96.
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law. Whereas France relies primarily on contract law, Germany relies primarily on tort
law. Yet comparison with the US and British cases suggests that such legal differences
have not played a decisive roll in the persistent divergence of national product liability
standards. It would therefore be inaccurate to attribute the difference of French and
German treatments solely to different legal cultures.
Strict Versus Negligence Standard of Product Liability
The core issue in product liability law is the standard of producer responsibility
that should be applied when a product defect results in injury or damage. France has
generally imposed a strict standard of product liability, meaning that companies are
strictly liable for damage caused by a product defect, even if no amount of care by the
company could have prevented the defect. Germany, by contrast, has applied a
negligence standard of product liability, meaning that companies are legally liable only if
damage has resulted from a product defect and that product defect is due to negligent
behavior by the producer. The German producer has, in other words, an obligation of
means, requiring that appropriate care be taken in production. The French producer has
an obligation of ends that cannot be diminished by any level of care in production.440
Prior to the 1960s, negligence was the common standard of product liability in all
industrialized countries. Under this standard, companies were held responsible for
product related damage only if the consumer, typically only the direct purchaser, could
prove that his or her loss was caused by a defect in the product, and that the defect
resulted from negligent behavior by the producer. Proving producer negligence outside of
440 Oliver Berg, "La notion de risque de developpement en matiere de responsabilit6 du
fait des produits d6fectueux," La Semainejouridique 27 (1996), p
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cases of obvious fraud was not only extremely difficult, but the legal standard of
negligence typically gave considerable leeway to producers. In a typical 1956 German
case in which a bicycle collapsed and injured its rider, the German Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichthof, or BGH) argued that "common experience...suggests that such
technical defects cannot be prevented."'441 Industrialization during this period was
understood to entail social costs. The European solution to these costs was to socialize
them through inclusive national insurance provisions such as universal health care and
social security.
Product liability as it is understood today arrived in Europe in the mid-1960s. The
German legal term, Produkthaftung, was coined only in 1968. The move to reform
product liability law reflected a critical re-evaluation of the cost and benefits of
industrialization. 44 2 This new skepticism was fed in part by a series of dramatic product
failures. The Thalidomide disaster, which struck Germany in the early 1960s, highlighted
the devastating damage that could accompany technical innovation. Ralph Nader's
Unsafe at Any Speed emphasized that many product-related accidents were due not just to
chance or user error but also to corporate indifference to the consequences of product
design. The popular indignation generated by these incidents was reinforced by a shift in
thinking about the economics of social cost. In his influential article, "The Problem of
Social Cost," Ronald Coase argued that social costs would be redistributed in an efficient
441 Geraint Howells, Comparative Product Liability (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth
Publishing Company, 1993), p 123.
442 Lynn J. Loudenback, and John W. Goebel, "Marketing in the Age of Strict Liability,"
Journal of Marketing 38 (January 1974), p 63.
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way through market mechanisms regardless of how those costs were initially allocated.443
Although commonly understood as an argument against government intervention in the
economy, for advocates of product liability reform the Coase theorem implied that the
costs of product damage could be placed entirely on producers without creating adverse
economic consequences.
Product liability can in general be understood to serve two economic functions.
First, it serves an insurance function, distributing the cost of product loss for a single
consumer across a large population of consumers by pushing some or all of that cost into
the price of the product. Construed as insurance, product liability operates alongside
national health care plans, social welfare provisions, and individual insurance policies of
consumers. Second, product liability serves as a form of deterrence. By holding
companies responsible for harmful products, product liability claims give manufacturers
an incentive to invest in safer products at a level that is proportional to the damage that
the products inflict. Construed as deterrence, product liability operates in conjunction
with national safety codes, voluntary industry standards, and local and regional product
inspection services to ensure a high level of product safety.44 4 Different countries
employed different rationales for reforming their product liability standards depending
upon whether they emphasized the insurance or the deterrence roll of product liability.
The United States, for example, was strongly motivated by arguments grounded in
443 Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3
(October 1960).
444 Product liability in the United States has increasingly served a punitive function to
chasten companies for past damage. Because this punitive function is virtually unknown
in European countries, it will not be considered as a factor in national policy making.
269
insurance, although deterrence did remain an important goal. France and Germany
pursued reforms primarily in order to enhance the deterrence roll of product liability.
Liability as Insurance. The insurance justification for reforming product liability
focused on the greater ability of companies than of individuals to acquire inexpensive
comprehensive insurance. This problem was highlighted as a main reason for reforming
product liability in the Unite States. In the 1944 case of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
Justice Traynor argued that, absent negligence on either side, manufacturers were better
able both to spread the risk (e.g. inexpensive insurance) and to invest in safety
precautions. "Tort law became, in effect, a vehicle by which public authorities and courts
created a private insurance scheme. Manufacturers insure product users-period."44 5 In
the context of the United States, where no universal healthcare program had been
established, the need to ensure an adequate private approach to insurance against product-
related damage was felt acutely.
Of course, individuals could have simply opted to pursue private insurance of
their own without relying on producers to, in effect, bundle insurance with their products.
A further insurance argument in favor of a strict standard of liability was that consumers
were simply not very good at estimating product risk. Psychological studies had found,
for example, that consumers tended to over-emphasize large but infrequent losses while
under-emphasizing frequent but smaller losses. Hence automobile deaths far outstrip
commercial aircraft deaths, yet travelers tend to fear the latter more than the former.
Given this apparent bias in consumer orientation, strict liability in the United States was
445 Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
p412-413.
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intended to help consumers make rational decisions about product risk by including the
entire cost of that risk in the price of the product.44 6
Liability as Deterrence. The insurance logic was not a strong incentive in France
or Germany, because both countries had already created strong national health care and
social security systems.447 In these couatries, the justification for product liability reform
was grounded instead on a deterrence argument.448 The difference in French and German
approaches to product liability today has its root in different strategies of deterrence. To
understand the reason for their different strategies, it is necessary to understand problem
with traditional private law solutions to product liability grounded in producer
negligence.
Traditional producer liability in both France and Germany had rested on a
negligence standard. Producers were legally liable when they did not take consumer
interests adequately into account in their production decisions. In economic terms, an
adequate level of safety by companies was understood to exist when a company had
pursued a socially efficient level of investment. That is, a company was not legally
negligent so long as total company investment in product safety exceeded the expected
value of consumer loss due to product failures.449 According to this economic definition,
a company was understood to have acted negligently if its marginal investment in
446 Anthony J. Duggan, "Saying Nothing With Words," Journal of Consumer Policy 20/1
(1997), pp 79-80.
447 Droste Killius Triebel (law firm), Business Law Guide to Germany, Third Edition
(Oxfordshire: CCH Editions, 1991), p 121; Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz,
"Produzentenhaftung - ein Problem des Verbraucherschutzes? Thesen zur Erganzung der
Reformdiskussion," Journal of Consumer Policy 3/3-4 (1979), p 330.
448 Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," The Economics of Legal Relationships,
ed. Henry G. Manne (St. Paul:West Publishing Company, 1975), p 216.
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prevention fell short of the marginal cost of product-related loss. The problem was that
this economic test for negligence placed an extremely high burden both on plaintiffs, who
had to demonstrate producer negligence, as well as on courts, which required a high level
of technical expertise to apply the negligence principle. Because it was difficult to apply,
this negligence standard of liability commonly permitted companies to shirk on
investment in product safety. It was in an effort to improve the deterrence effect of
liability law that both French and German courts reformed their approaches to product
liability in the late 1960s.
The French response ensured that companies faced the full costs of product-
related risk by imposing a strict standard of liability. In this approach, companies
themselves rather than courts would be left to judge whether the marginal expenditure on
product safety improvement met the marginal savings in the area of product-related
accidents. Companies would therefore be guided by purely economic goals to secure the
optimal combination of investment and insurance. A strict standard of product liability
thus forced companies to internalize the total cost of product risk. Faced with the actual
cost of the damage caused by its products, the producer could then invest in an efficient
combination of safer design and outside liability insurance in order to minimize the total
risk premium.
The Germany approach was to reverse the legal burden of proof in establishing
negligence. Under this new standard of evidence, a consumer had only to show that a
product defect had caused damage, then the legal burden fell to the producer to prove that
the product defect had not resulted from fault. By requiring that defendants prove that
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449 Christian Gollier, "Le risque de d6veloppement, est-il assurable?" Risque 14 (April-
they had not acted negligently, the courts were able to compel all producers to comply
with accepted standards of good practice. French courts changed the legal principle of
liability from negligence to a strict standard. German courts improved company
accountability under the negligence standard with a reversed burden of proof.45 0
Why did Germany and France pursue different solutions to the shirking
encouraged by a straight negligenlce standard of product liability? Such differences of
legal approach are typically attributed to differences in the legal systems of the two
countries. I argue instead that they arise out of broader national approaches to product
safety, premised on different conceptions of the consumer interest. These different
conceptions derive in turn from the distinctive institutional setting in which courts
addressed the problem of product liability.
It is worth noting that many countries did not rely at all on product liability law as
a form of consumer protection. In Britain, the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Personal Injury convened by Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1972
issued the Pearson Report advocating a move to strict liability similar to that pursued in
June 1993), p 51.
450 France and Germany have in fact applied different standards of liability for different
product dimensions, including design, manufacturing, product information, and the legal
requirement to survey the market after a product is sold. See the table below.
Surveying the market strict I negligence
Kalman Leloczky, "General and Specific Features of Certain European Product Liability
Laws," in Product Liability: Preventnion, Practice and Process in Europe and the United
States, ed. Rudolph Hlusenbek and Dennis Campbell (Boston: Kluwer, 1989), p 67;
Patrick Kelly, and Rebecca Attree, European Product Liability (London: Butterworths,
1992), p 138.
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France Germany
Design strict reversed burden
Manufacturing strict reversed burden
Information negligence negligence
I
the United States and in France. But this proposed reform was never adopted.45 In
Sweden, the Product Liability Committee proposed the adoption of a similar strict
liability standard for medicines in 1973. Here, too, the proposal was set aside when
pharmaceutical producers and importers established a system of collective insurance.4 52
These Britain and Sweden cases serve as a reminder that product liability reform was not
a necessary outcome in either France or Sweden.
A Small Rolefor National Law Traditions
Does the divergence in French and German responses to the product liability
directive have its origins in national legal traditions? A survey of national approaches to
product liability suggests that this factor alone did not constitute an overwhelming
constraint. Western legal traditions are commonly divided into those grounded in
common law, as in Britain and in the United States, and those grounded in civil law, as in
France and Germany. In general, civil law countries form and modify their civil codes
through legislative decision-making rather than by judicial interpretation. Product
liability is unusual as an area of law in that it has arisen in both France and Germany
almost exclusively through judge-made law based on the interpretation of legal case
history.4 53 In part for this reason, national standards of liability would not appear to
depend heavily upon the conventional distinction between civil law and common law.
Indeed, contrary to what this distinction might predict, France and the United States
451 Thomas V. Greer, "Product Liability in the European Community: The Legislative
History," The Journal of Consumer Affairs 26/1 (summer 1992), p 168.
452 Geraint Howells, Comparative Product Liability (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth
Publishing Company, 1993), pp 151-2
453 Germany's 1968 Drug Law, which imposes a strict standard of liability on
pharmaceutical companies, is the single exception.
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endorse a strict standard of liability, whereas Germany and Britain employ a negligence
standard. The OECD, in its survey of national approaches to product liability, finds no
practical link between types of national legal system and the standard of product liability
they adopt: "As a matter of practice, it appears that the distinction between civil law
systems and common law systems has little affect on those elements of liability important
to consumers." 454
This finding alone does not vitiate the argument for legal culture or legal
determinism in product liability. Indeed, the fact that product liability law has been
created in France and Germany through judge-made law rather than through legislation
should have helped to isolate these decisions from the logic of political and economic
interests. It should in other words strengthen the case for an explanation based on
distinctive national legal trajectories. This makes product liability law something of a
critical case for evaluating the independent role of historical institutions, embodied in this
case in legal traditions, in shaping national approaches to product market regulation. If
we find that deep national legal traditions were not decisive in this case, we can
reasonably conclude that such institutional legacies were not decisive in consumer
protection regulation overall. Evidence from this case shows that historical traditions did
influence the legal framework in which product liability was adopted but was not decisive
in setting the standard of protection that was applied.
Products liability doctrine has arisen in France and Germany through judicial
interpretation of existing contract law and tort law. The focus of these two areas of law is
quite different. Contract law addresses the qualities of the product itself, tort law focuses
454 Product Liability Rules in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1995), p 28.
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on the conduct of people.4 5 Although France and Germany have based product liability
in both areas of law, France has relied more on contractual product liability while
Germany has relied more on tortious product liability.
French product liability has primarily been grounded in contract law. The earliest
text in contractual liability in France is the 1 August 1905 law against hidden defects
('vises cach6s').4 56 The law was originally intended to apply only to producers who
knowingly sold goods with defects. This standard was gradually reinterpreted by the
courts. In 1965 manufacturers were presumed to know of the defect. In 1973, the
manufacturer was found to have a duty "to deliver an effective product appropriate for
the user's needs," creating a strict standard of liability.4 57 This case marks the transition
in France to a strict standard of liability.
Even with this new strict standard of contractual product liability, three legal
obstacles impeded effective consumer redress. Two of these were removed through case
law. First, contractual privity limited liability to those directly engaged in a contract. This
meant that any individual product defect would create a chain of law suits, in which the
consumer sued the retailer, the retailer sued the distributor, and the distributor sued the
manufacturer. In 1972, French courts permitted consumers to bring legal suits directly
against the manufacturer-so-called 'action-directe'-in cases based on the 1905 law.458
455 Christopher Hodges, Product Liability: European Laws and Practice (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1993), pp 3-6.
456 Luc Bihl, Une histoire du mouvement consommateur (Paris: Editions Aubier
Montaigne, 1984), p 214.
457 Genevieve Viney, "The Civil Liability of Manufacturers in French Law," in
Comparative Product Liability, ed. C.J. Miller (London: Comparative Law Series # 6.
1986), p 77.
458 Konrad Zweigert and Hein K6tz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), p 171.
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The 21 July 1983 law on product safety extended 'action directe' to all product liability
cases pursued under general contract law.459
A second obstacle to contractual product liability was the increasing incorporation
into consumer contracts of clauses to exclude producer liability. In 1966, such exclusions
were found not to apply in cases of gross negligence ('faute lourde') which were treated
under criminal law. In March 1983, a government decree declared contractual clauses
excluding product liability to be null and void.40
The third obstacle to contractual product liability, its extension to third parties,
has never been overcome in France. Such claims arise when a product injures anyone
who is not its owner. Because no contract exists, third party claims must be made under
tort law, based on § 1382 of the Code civile. While tort law is less commonly used in
France, primarily because of the clarity and high level of protection afforded by contract
law, it too has been extended from a negligence standard to a strict standard of liability.46 '
In 1962 courts first found that "the simple act of putting a defective product on the
market is considered an act of negligence." A 1975 ruling, based on § 1384 section 1 of
the code civile, found that manufacturers could be found liable without fault based on
their status as "guardian of the structure" ('guardien de la structure') of the product.4 62
459 Genevieve Viney, p 80.
460 Genevieve Viney, p 82.
461 In the French system, based on the principle of "non-cumul des responsabilites,"
plaintiffs are not allowed to bring suit under both tort and contract law for the same
grievance.
62 Agnes Chambraud, Patricia Foucher, and Anne Morin, "The Importance of
Community Law for French Consumer Protection Legislation," in European Consumer
Policy after Maastricht, ed. Norbert Reich and Geoffrey Woodroffe (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p 218.
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Germany, unlike France, has offered only narrow grounds for products liability
under contract law. Although German courts found in 1902 the basis for a positive breach
of contract analogous to the 1905 French law governing hidden defects, German law has
continued to require that the plaintiff demonstrate a fraudulent concealment of the defect.
Moreover, the plaintiff must have been in direct contractual relationship with the
producer.4 63 These restrictions place severe limitations on the applicability of contractual
solutions to product-related loss, although they are occasionally applied.
Instead of broadening the contractual obligations of producers, as France has
done, Gernman courts have instead grounded product liability reform in tort law
(Deliktrecht).46 4 The turning point for tortuous liability in Germany was the 1968 chicken
disease suit (Hiihnerpestfall), in which a chicken farmer lost several thousand chickens
due to a contaminated inoculation administered by his veterinarian. Because the farmer
was not in direct contractual relation with the inoculation producer, and because the
veterinarian could not have known of the contamination, the farmer had no recourse
under contract law. The farmer therefore sued the inoculation producer under tort law.
The court, recognizing that it was nearly impossible for an individual outside of a
company to evaluate whether a company has acted negligently or not, reversed the
burden of proof. Once the farmer had shown that a defect in the inoculation had killed his
chickens, the court then called on the producer to prove that it had not acted negligently
in producing the inoculation. Although reversing the burden of proof did not change the
463 Geraint Howells, Comparative Product Liability (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth
Publishing Company, 1993), p 124; Henricus Duintjer Tebbens, International Product
Liability: A Study of Comparative and International Aspects of Product Liability (The
Hague: Asser Institute, 1979), p 67.
464 Based on § 823 I of the Biirgerlichgesetzbuch (civil code).
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legal standard of negligence, it did mean that this standard could be broadly applied. In
1975 this presumption of negligence was extended to all manufacturers of industrial
products.465
Germany's presumption of negligence (reversed burden of proof) falls short of
strict liability because it admits several routes of exculpation for the producer. First,
German companies are not always responsible for defects caused by their employees.
Although Germany's civil code does call for vicarious liability by employers for product-
related damage caused by their employees,46 6 the courts have found that companies can
avoid this liability through proper organization of the workplace: "The duty to
compensate does not arise if the employer has exercised ordinary care in the selection of
the employee, and, where he has to supply appliances or implements or to superintend
work, has also exercised ordinary care as regards such supply or supervision." 46 7 This
interpretation has tended to favor union-sanctioned worker training programs, in the first
instance, and large companies with several levels of management in the second. One legal
scholar summarizes the practical consequence of this approach: "The risk of unexplained
runaway products [in Germany] fell upon the injured party when a large and duly
organized enterprise had manufactured them."46 8
465 Warren Freedman, International Products Liability (Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein,
1995), p 77.
466 BGB § 831 states: "A person who employs another to do any work is bound to
compensate for any damage which the other unlawfully causes to a third party in the
perfomance of this work."
7 Arthur Taylor Von Mehren and James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law System: An
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p 340.
468 Henricus Duintjer Tebbens, International Product Liability: A Study of Comparative
and International Aspects of Product Liability (The Hague: Asser Institute, 1979), pp 74-
75.
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A second grounds for exculpation in the German system is that companies are
held responsible only for those design defects that could be foreseen given the current
state of science and technology. This so-called "development defense," also elaborated in
the 1968 chicken disease case, exonerates producers when the present state of knowledge
would not have permitted them to foresee the damage caused by their product.469 This
development defense places pressure on companies to comply with voluntary industry
standards, as these are commonly, although not necessarily, accepted by the courts as
embodying the present state of knowledge.470
Other provisions in Germany limit the liability of producers under tort law even if
they have not been able to exculpate themselves. Their liability can be reduced, for
example, by showing a contributory negligence by the product user. Contributory
negligence is interpreted broadly in Germany, so that even an omission by the consumer
to mitigate the damage caused by a product can reduce the liability of the producer. 4 7'
Moreover, Germany has long imposed a financial ceiling both on the damages that can be
claimed by a single plaintiff, and on the total cumulative claims on a single product. This
ceiling, set now at 160 million DM per product, ensures that a single product defect will
not undermine a large company.
The emphasis on contract law in the French approach to product liability and tort
law in the Germany approach does appear to have its origins in a different historical
treatment of associational and contractual rights within the two systems. German law is
469 Oliver Berg, "La notion de risque de d6veloppement en mati:re de responsabilit6 du
fait des produits defectueux," La Semaine Jouridique 27/2945 (1996), p 273.
470 A third form of exculpation, the so-called Ausrei3er clause, exempts product defects
that occur as a normal result of mass production. This defense is rarely used today.
471 BGB § 254. Product Liability Rules in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1995), p 16.
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grounded in strict Roman law as interpreted and normalized by the 19 th century
pandectist ("all receiving" or comprehensive) school of legal history.4 72 French law, by
contrast, combines elements of Roman law ('droit ecrit') as applied in the south of the
country with a common law tradition ('droit coutumier') that was recorded and
consolidated by the long tradition of French legal nobility ('noblesse de robe') in the
north of the country.47 3 These different heritages are evident in the extreme formalism of
the German civil code (Burgerlichgesetzbuch, or BGB) as compared to the briefer and
more elegant treatment of the French civil code (Code civile).
In German law, as under Roman law, associations are treated as legal entities with
the same rights as individuals. French law, by contrast, assigns rights only to natural
persons. Moreover, contracts in the German legal system are not inviolable, as they are in
the French legal tradition, but must meet a legal standard of appropriateness that
precludes exploitative contracts. In effect, the Germany legal tradition draws a different
line between legal concepts of individual and contractual agency than does the French
legal tradition. The French legal individual is more narrowly defined, but her contractual
agency is greater. The German legal individual is construed more broadly to include
organized groups of people, but they enjoy a diminished set of contracting rights. It is
precisely this limited conception of contractual sovereignty that raised obstacles to
adopting a strict standard of liability under contract law in Germany. Yet a look to the
United States suggests that these different historical legal traditions did not necessarily
dictate different standards of product liability in France and Germany.
472 Konrad Zweigert, and Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), p 146.
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In the United States, strict liability has been grounded equally in tort and in
contract law. Contractual liability in the United States evolved, as in France, by extending
an implied warranty. Historically, this evolved in two stages. In the 1916 MacPherson v.
Buick case, contractual privity was abrogated by extending a duty of care to third parties.
This opened the way for liability claims for innocent bystanders injured by producer
negligence. Then, in the 1960 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. case, the court
found producer responsible based on an implied warranty against product-related
damage.47 4 This finding was standardized in the 1972 US Uniform Commercial Code and
has become the basis of strict liability in contract.475 But most US states have also found a
strict standard of product liability in tort law. The 1965 Second Restatement of Torts
imposed strict product liability by extending responsibility to "any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" (§402A).47 6 In this new
doctrine of 'res ipse loquitor' (let the thing speak for itself), the fact of a defective
product was taken to be sufficient evidence of producer negligence. This presumption of
negligence under tort was extended to wholesalers and distributors in the 1970 Price v.
Shell Oil case.
In sum, national legal traditions do appear to have influenced the legal approach
that France and Germany have taken to product liability, but they do not appear to have
473 Konrad Zweigert, and Hein K6tz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp 80-81.
474 Roland N. McKean, "Product Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property
Rights," in The Economics of Legal Relationships, ed. Henry G. Manne (St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1975), p 261.
475 Fred W. Morgan, "Marketing and Product Liability: A Review and Update," Journal
of Marketing 46 (summer 1982), pp 69-78.
476 Konrad Zweigert, and Hein K6tz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp 713-716.
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placed insurmountable barriers to the adoption of different standards of liability. The case
of the United States suggests that a strict standard of liability was in principle compatible
with the legal logic of either tortious or contractual product liability. Germany could have
adopted a res ipse loquitor doctrine under tort law that would have opened the door to a
strict standard of product liability.477 I argue below that the courts in France and Germany
have adopted different standards of product liability, not in order to conform with
national legal traditions, but rather to conform to a particular conception of the
consumer's role in the economy.
French and German Responses to the European Product Liability Directive
Because French and German product liability standards were established almost
exclusively within the legal sphere, it is difficult to assess directly what impact the
interests of economic and political groups in society may have had on this area of policy
formation. But in the case of product liability, a parallel surrounding the European
Product Liability Directive, first proposed in 1974 and adopted in 1985, has helped to
clarify the array of interests of different social actors in both France and Germany.
Extended negotiations over the terms of the European directive reveal that the legal
standards of liability adopted in France and Germany reflected broader societal strategies
for consumer protection. What has driven a wedge between the product liability policies
of France and Germany is not the divergent legal traditions upon which they are based,
but instead the different conceptions of and approaches to consumer protection within the
broader society. In Germany, where producer interests have been given preeminence, and
477 A contract approach does not necessarily imply a strict standard. England, which
employs a contractual approach to product liability, has nonetheless retained a negligence
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where the quality orientation of production affords a feasible approach to consumer
safety, courts have been willing to grant industry a diminished liability. In France, where
consumer interests have been conceived as a political right and industry has shown little
capacity to produce high-quality, safe consumer goods, courts have attributed to industry
the maximum possibility liability for product-related loss.
Although the Product Liability Directive was adopted in 1985, negotiation over its
content began a decade earlier when the proposal was first drafted in 1974. Unlike the
1985 draft, this original proposal endorsed a strict standard of liability that was
considered to be even more stringent than the US policy, as described in the Second
Restatement of Torts.47 8 This early European proposal, which closely resembled existing
French practice, met with vehement opposition from Germany.
The 1974 proposal was novel in two respects. First, at the same time that the
European Community proposal was being negotiated, the Council of Europe-European
Community and European Free Trade Area countries plus Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta-
was completing a similar product liability proposal, known as the Strasbourg Convention,
which was published in 1975.47 9 Given the work that had already begun in the Council of
Europe, it is surprising that the European Community set out to write its own proposal
from scratch. On the one hand, any countries that were joint signatories to the European
Community and the Council of Europe would face an inevitable conflict of law were both
proposals to be accepted. On the other hand, if the European Community did not feel that
standard of liability.
478 B0rge Dahl, "An Introduction to the Product Liability Debate." Journal of Consumer
Policy 3/1 (1979), p 20.
479 Council of Europe, European Convention on Products Liablity in Regard to Personal
injury and Death (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1977), pp 3-1 1.
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the Strasbourg Convention was going to be ratified by the members of the Council of
Europe, it was surprising that their own draft, once completed, so closely resembled the
Strasbourg Convention.4 80 In part, the European Community appears to have wanted to
claim full rewards for any successful agreement. They also appear to have felt that the
process of negotiation itself could help to create consensus among the member states.4 1
This device apparently failed, for only France, Belgium, and Luxembourg agreed to the
proposal.482
The second remarkable feature of the draft directive was that it remained
unaltered in the face of strong opposition when it was issued by the European
Community Commission in October 1976. Opposition came from within and without the
EC bureaucracy. The legal affairs committee of the European Community, for example,
argued that the goal of the draft was not regulatory approximation, as called for in the
Treaty of Rome, but instead a substantive change in the overall standard of consumer
protection in Europe. They advocated a negligence standard of liability that would be
more compatible with the current policies of member nations. The European Parliament
also voted for the Commission to incorporate a development defense into the draft
directive, a move that would have significantly lowered the threshold of producer
4 8 0 Christian Larroumet, "RMflexions ur la convention europ6enne et la proposition de
directive de Bruxelles concernant la responsabilit6 du fait des produits," Recueil Dalloz
Sirey 33 (1978), p 219.
481 Thomas V. Greer, "Product Liability in the European Community: The Legislative
History," The Journal of Consumer Affairs 26/1 (summer 1992), p 174.
482 France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria signed the Strasbourg Convention. Thierry
M. Bourgoignie, "Consumer Law and the European Community: Issues and Prospects,"
in Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, ed. Theirry
Bourgoignie and David Trubek (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p 95.
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responsibility for product-related damage.4 83 Neither recommendation was accepted by
the Commission.
Objections also came from a strong lobbying effort by industry. The Union of
European Community Industries argued that the proposal would raise production costs
and stifle innovation.44 German insurers estimated that industrial insurance fees would
increase by 15 to 40 percent if a strict liability standard were to be imposed. German
industry criticized the directive for drawing too heavily on the US experience. They also
disputed that competitive advantage was affected at all by different national product
liability laws, since companies selling in any given national market were bound by the
liability standard of that market, regardless of their country of origin.48 5 This opinion
appears to have been shared by France and Luxembourg who, because they already
employed a strict standard of producer liability, arguably stood to gain the most from a
level European playing field. But neither country pressed hard for passage.48 6 Had the
Commission heeded these objections and adopted a policy of approximation, whose goal
was to remove inconsistencies in national regulation without attempting a substantive
483 Thomas V. Greer, "Product Liability in the European Community: The Legislative
History," The Journal of Consumer Affairs 26/1 (summer 1992), pp 169-170.
484 Thomas V. Greer, "Product Liability in the European Community: The Legislative
History," The Journal of Consumer Affairs 26/1 (summer 1992), p 171.
485 Friedrich Ketschmer (BDI), "The Proposed EEC Directive on Products Liability: Is
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International Consumer Protection Laws in Europe: Proceedings of the Third
Internati&,,al Seminar on Product Liability (London: Institute of Quality Assurance,
1980), pp 85-89.
486 Thomas V. Greer, p 172.
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shift, the project would have been more successful. Instead harmonization took the form
of imposing a new standard on most member countries, and the project failed.487
When the newly negotiated product liability draft directive was finally reissued in
1985, Germany's earlier objections had been largely incorporated. A development risk
clause had been inserted at Germany's insistence, as well as a limit on total industry
liability, the exclusion of agricultural products, and the inclusion of the principle of
contributory negligence by consumers.4 8 8 Most of these new provisions had been drawn
directly from existing German practice.48 9 These exemptions were not binding on
member countries, which could choose whether or not to incorporate them as they saw
fit. Hence France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, which already embraced a strict liability
standard, were in principle able to retain this standard simply by excluding the new
exculpatory provisions. So far Luxembourg has been the only country to exclude the
development risk when transposing the Directive.4 90
Given the policy latitude afforded by the 1985 draft directive, why did France not
yet transcribed it into law until 1998? In principle, the standard of liability supported in
France today was already compatible with the EU Directive. The problem was that
harmonization within the European Union required that France's strict standard of
liability, which was established exclusively through judge-made law based on judicial
487 Anita Bernstein, "L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the
European Community," Virginia Journal of International Law 31 (summer 1991), p 676.
488 Oliver Berg, "La notion de risque de d6veloppement en matiere de responsabilit6 du
fait des produits d6fectueux," La Semaine Jouridique 27/2945 (1996), 271.
489 Warren Freedman, International Products Liability (Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein,
1995), p 78.
490 Oliver Berg, "La notion de risque de d6veloppement en matiere de responsabilit6 du
fait des produits d6fectueux," La Semaine Jouridique 27/2945 (1996), p 271.
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interpretation, be established in positive law. This effort to write legal precedent into law
raised two kinds of objections.
First, nearly all interest groups in France feared that transcribing the Product
Liability Directive will obscure a set of legal policies that were, if not simple, at least
clearly understood. Consumers, who under the existing system enjoyed a high level of
protection, worried that any change could only constitute a lowering of standards.49 But
even producers resisted adopting a new law because of the uncertainty of its impact.
France's main employer association (CNPF), for example, argued that while the Directive
might lower insurance premiums in the long run, the business community should be wary
of the uncertainty that the new proposal would introduce: " the juxtaposition of several
basic principles risk[s] to introduce incoherence and uncertainty into our law."49 2 This
view was supported by the French government, which argued that any change would
render France's existing policy "uselessly complex by integrating obscure rules."493
The second problem with adopting the directive centered specifically on the
development defense. Such-a defense was foreign to French precedent and apparently
contradicted the consumer protection law of 21 July 1983.494 While France was not
required to incorporate this provision, the EU Directive created a stormy debate that
491 "La responabilit6 du fait des produits," Consommateurs Actualitis 528 (30 July 1988):
9-12.
492 "Ces differences sensibles et la juxtaposition de plusiers fondements risquaient
d'introduire, dans notre droit, incoherence et insecurite." Dominique Rambure, "Le
nouveau droit de la r6sponabilit6 du fait des produits dffectueux," CNPF Patronat 497
(January-February 1988), p 75.
493 "le rendre inutilement complexe en y transposant des rgles absconses." "Des deput6s
RPR se rvoltent contre une directive europenne," Le Monde, 12 March 1997, p 11.
494 Genevieve Viney, "The Civil Liability of Manufacturers in French Law," in
Comparative Product Liability, ed. C.J. Miller (London: Comparative Law Series # 6.
1986), p 88.
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pitted consumers against producers over this issue. French industry argued that they
would suffer a competitive disadvantage if they were to exclude the development defense
that producers in other countries enjoyed.4 5 The Paris Chamber of Commerce, which
advises the government on business-related decisions, suggested that any problems
created by incorporating the development defense could eventually be solved through
negotiations among producer and consumer representatives.4 9 6 Consumer groups
adamantly opposed the admission of a development defense. The Federal Consumers
Union (UFC), for example, pointed out that Thalidomide producers would have been
exempted had such a development risk clause existed at the time.497 Such objections were
particularly poignant coming as they did in the shadow of France's 1985 scandal over
HIV-tainted blood transfusions.
Product Safety Regulation
Product liability law helped to set the terms by which product safety was
understood in France and Germany. But governments have rarely been content to rely on
the deterrence effect of private law solutions in order to keep producers from selling
dangerous goods. Both countries have therefore also acted to set general safety standards
that products must meet before they arrive on the market. They have also put in place
monitoring and recall systems for products that fell short of the necessary level of safety.
495 "Responsabilit6 du fait des produits: vers une conservation du 'risque de
d6veloppement," Consommateurs Actualites 607 (30 September 1988), p 15.
496 Cambre de Commerce de dlndustrie de Paris, L'Introduction en Droit Franais de la
Directive Communautaire dur la Rdsponsabilit du Fait des Produits Defectueux (Report
presented by M. Mercier and adopted by the General Assembly 7 January 1988), pp 25-
26.
497 "L'Europe et la responsabilit6 du fait des produits," Consommateurs Actualitis 621 (13
January 1989), p3.
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But the nature of product safety regulation has differed in a systematic way in the two
countries.
The French approach has been characterized by government input into product
safety. The German system granted industry a strong voice in ensuring the safety of
products. Christian Joerges writes that the "French product safety law is hard to fit into a
market oriented approach. The French analytical framework, conceived from a State or
administrative viewpoint...cuts straight across a German market-oriented category frame
of market-related rules, setting of standards and follow-up controls."4 98
French Product Safety through Administrative Intervention
Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s France experienced a shifting standard of
product safety. Early efforts at imposing product safety focused on surveying the
marketplace for dangerous products. Starting in the early 1970s, the French government
began to regulate individual classes of products that were felt to be especially dangerous.
This kind of legislation, targeting products such as toys or drugs, typically appeared in
response to a particularly public incident of product failure. Such administrative
intervention at the sectoral level constituted the major strategy of product safety in France
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Only in legislation of 1978 and 1983 did the French
government move to a general standard of product safety that applied to all products
placed on the market.
Beginning in the early 1960s, any product that was not specifically targeted by
government safety regulation was covered by general prohibitions against fraudulent
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business practice. This approach had its roots in a 1963 decree that extended the
competency of the Service for the Repression of Fraud, created in 1907 to implement the
1905 law prohibiting 'hidden defects,' to include the control of product quality.499 The
resources and impact of the Service for the Repression of Fraud were impressive. In 1971
alone, its 1,000 inspection agents evaluated over 400,000 products. Fifty regional
laboratories tested product samples removed during such inspections. Twelve thousand
products were found to be fraudulent or unsafe in that year, and half of these cases ended
up in court. 50 By the late 1970s, however, it became evident that a wide range of
products were potentially dangerous, and that a general standard of product safety should
be established.
The French government was not content merely to survey the market for
dangerous products, however, and in the early 1970s industries whose products were
particularly dangerous faced specific sectoral regulation, often in response to a
particularly dramatic instance of product failure. One such case was the Morhange talcum
affair of 1972, in which 36 children died, 167 were poisoned, and 8 remained crippled for
life after having been given a talcum powder containing too much hexachlorophene.501
498 Christian Joerges, Joseph Falke, and Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von
Konsumgutern und die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988),
Translated as a working paper of the EUI, Florence, Italy: IUE, 1991, Chapter 2, page 1.
499 Charles Castang, "Consommation: prevenir ou r6primer," Figaro, 4 march 1975.
500 Grard Cas, La defense du consommateur (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1975), p 70.
501 The Morhange case also highlighted problems of consumer access to justice in France.
In 1978, the families of the children hurt by the Morhange talcum powder were awarded
25 thousand francs for childen that had died, a few thousand francs for children that had
been incapacitated for up to a month, and 1.5 million francs for the four children who
survived but were considered 100 percent handicapped. Shocked by the small
remuneration, the families came together in 1979 to form the "comite des familles
victimes du talc Morhange" in order to launch a class action suit against the Morhange
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The US Food and Drug administration had already shown this chemical to be dangerous
in 1971, and these findings appear to have been known in France.502 The Morhange affair
led directly to the creation of the 10 July 1975 Law on Cosmetic and Hygiene Products,
requiring that information about all new product of this kind to be compiled and
distributed to antipoison centers across France.5 0 3 The products also had to be approved
by the Ministry of Health, after which the labeling of the product was determined by
subsequent decrees and regulations of 15 April and 28 December 1977. Non-compliance
was punishable with fines and imprisonment. 504
Similarly, for the drug industry, a Technical commission on Pharmaco-vigilance
(Commission technique de pharmaco-vigilance) was created on 2 October 1976. It's goal
was to "systematically collect in the greatest possible number of hospital locations
information on all dangerous accidents, apparently connected to the use of
pharmaceutical products, and certainly those incidents and accidents for which there is
reason to think that they are related to the use of a pharmaceutical product." It's members
were eminent professors. In 1978, under the influence of the Barre government, the
Ministry of Family Health created a new 'Liaison avec les organizations de
company. While such class action was in principle permitted under the 1973 law, the
courts ruled that the committee of families did not consitute an acceptible legal party.
Two consumer groups, the UFC and the UNAF, also brought legal suits against the
company, but were allowed to sue only for damages that the case had caused their
organisations, not the damage to consumers as a whole. The courts awarded them 40
thousand francs each. Denise Nguyen Thanh-Bourgeais, "La s6curit6 des consommateurs:
r6flexions sur l'affaire du talc Morhange," Recueil Dalloz Sirey 12 (1981), pp 89-94.
502 "L'Affaire du Talc Morhange," Le Monde, 1 Aug 1978.
503 Rosemonde Pujol, "Cosm6tique et sant6: nouvelle legislation," Le Figaro, 25 Jan
1979.
504 Rosemonde Pujol, "Cosm6tique et sant6: nouvelle legislation," Le Figaro, 25 Jan
1979.
292
consommateurs' in which the new Commission technique de pharmaco-vigilance would
be able to consult with consumer groups.505
A third example of direct government intervention was in children's toys. The toy
industry in France, the second largest exporter of toys in the world at the time, produced
6.6 billion francs and employed 10,500 workers. In a regulation of 22 June 1976, the
French government required that formerly voluntary AFNOR standards for toy
manufacture be made obligatory.506 This approach was particularly attractive to the
government because it permitted regulation to take into account the latest technical
developments without having to be redrafted. French toys had to be certified by a testing
laboratory to conform to AFNOR safety standards. This regulatory approach was similar
to that employed to enforce safety standards in Germany, but with the important
difference that certification in France was mandatory. This difference was highlighted
with the 1988 European Directive on toy safety. The Directive required that all toys
placed on the European market include a "CE" mark to indicate that they conform with
European toy safety standards. The problem was that the CE symbol relied on auto-
declaration by the producer rather than on systematic laboratory testing. Many toys from
China, for example, included the CE label but had no manufacturer's label on them. Alan
Bryden, general director of the French National Testing Laboratory (Laboratoire national
d'essais), warned that "the directive will afford a level of security equivalent to that
505 "...de receuillir syst6matiquement dans le plus grand nombre possible de services
hospitaliers, des informations sur tous les accidents graves, apparemment lies a l'emploi
de produits pharmaceutiques et surtout les incidents et accidents dont on est en droit de
soupqonner qu'ils peuvent 8tre en relation avec l'emploi d'un produit pharmaceutique."
Rosemonde Pujol, "Une antenne pour les consommateurs au ministere de la Sante," Le
Figaro, 8 Nov 1978.
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which we possess only if the administration exercises an extreme vigilance over the use
of the CE mark."50 7
Two pieces of legislation, adopted in 1978 and 1983, marked a transition away
from the selective regulation of dangerous products and toward a general standard of
product safety that would apply to all producers. The 1978 Law for the Protection and
Information of Consumers, or loi Scrivener, required that products be safe under
"conditions of proper use" ("conditions normales d'utilisation"). The more rigorous 1983
law on product safety extended that standard to include product safety given any
"reasonably foreseeable use." Producers were required to ensure safety not only when the
product was used properly, but also when consumers used the product in an incorrect way
that might reasonably have been foreseen by the producer.50 8 France remains the only
European country to explicitly incorporate foreseeable misuse into its general standards
of safety.509
Beyond setting general standards of product safety, the 1978 and 1983 laws also
extended the powers of the government to intervene in the market to enforce the new
standards. The 1978 loi Scrivener permitted the government to regulate dangerous
506 G6rard Cas, La defense du consommateur (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1980).
507 "La directive n'apportera...une scurit6 6quivalente a celle que nous possedions que si
I'administration exerce une extreme vigilance sur l'emploi a bon escient du marquage
'CE'." Frangoise Vaysse, "Jeux dangereux," Le Monde, 8 December 1992.
508 In parliamentary debate over the 1983 law, consumer groups pushed for a wording
that would have extended the standard of safety even further to include so-called
"improper misuse", which meant consumer misuse that was not foreseeable. While
industry was willing to accept a standard of foreseeable misuse, they strongly opposed a
further extension of their responsibility to include improper misuse.
509 Christian Joerges, Joseph Falke, and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von
Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988).
Translated as a working paper of the EUI, Florence, Italy: IUE, 1991, Chapter 2, page 5.
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products and even to have them removed from the market if they were found, by study of
an independent testing lab, to be dangerous "in their normal use."5 10 If a product
presented an immediate or serious threat to the health or safety of consumers, a
'procedure d'urgence' allowed the government to have the product immediately barred
from sale, import, or manufacture. This new right was used first in June 1978 when
pajamas treated with the chemical TRIS were removed from the market. The procedure
d'urgence cannot exceed one year. Hence in 20 June 1979 a specific decree was issued
prohibiting the treatment of pajamas with TRIS.5 l'
Such a high level of government intervention in production proved unpopular
with both the left and the right. The Communists, concerned that government recall
actions could lead to firings or workforce displacement, abstained from voting on the
1978 law.512 At the other end of the political spectrum, the conservative RPR objected
that manufacturers should have greater rights to oppose public intervention if they felt
that the criticism of their product was unjustified. But no legislator wanted to be seen
voting directly against consumer protection, and when Scrivener threatened to call for a
public referendum (scrutin public) on the issue, the RPR acceded.5 3
If the 1978 legislation introduced the notion of greater government intervention in
order to ensure product safety, the April 1983 law on product safety supplied the tool for
enforcing safety. It created a Consumer Safety Commission (Commission de la S6curit6
510 The first of the two Scrivener Laws treated consumer credit, granting consumers a 7
day grace period during during which consumers could opt to break off the agreement.
511 G6rard Cas, La defense du consommateur (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1980), p 27; also Journal Officiel, 24 june 1979.
512 Michele Thimert, "L'information du consommateur," L'Humanite', 28 Jul 1978.
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des Consommateurs, or CSC), modeled broadly on the US Food and Drug
Administration, that was charged with investigating products that posed a threat to public
safety. The CSC has been relatively successful. In 1991, the 7 h year of operation, the
CSC received 207 requests-of which 159 fell within its area of expertise-and gave 21
decisions. Of the requests, 31 percent came from consumer associations and 61 percent
from individual customers. The CSC itself does not have regulatory power, as does the
FDA in the United States, but its advice is followed closely. When they published a
warning against heating baby food in microwave ovens, warning that uneven heating
could burn children without the parents being aware, 30 manufacturers and importers of
baby foods included the warning in their user instructions.5 14
Industry opposed the new Consumer Safety Commission. Producers felt that it
granted government agencies too great an ability to investigate. They also expressed
concern that the CSC would become a further forum for employee opposition, with labor
unions filing complaints against management.51 5 In practice, the CSC was staffed by
impartial academic experts in an effort to insulate product studies from political or
economic pressures. 5 16 But it was a case in which ministerial initiative had imposed a
significant constraint on business that business itself was powerless to throw off.
513 "Par ce bias vous permettez le retour aux prix impos6s, ce qui est un facteur d'inflation
et une mauvaise chose pour les consommateurs." Patrick Frances, "La protection et
l'information des consommateurs," Le Monde, 12 Dec 1977.
5 1 4 Francoise Vaysse, "Les anges gardiens de la s6curit6," Le Monde, 14 April 1992.
515 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris, Projet de loi sur la securite des
consommateurs, Rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par
M. Devincre (adopted 21 april 1983), pp 8-11.
516 When the new members of the CSC were appointed by the administration on 17
November 1987, one member was not readmitted. Professor Fournier, head of the
antipoison center in Frenand-Vidal, had argued forcefully during his tenure to have have
Bergasol tanning cream removed from the market. INC lobbied hard to have him
296
German Product Safety Through Industry Self-Regulation
Consumer safety in Germany rests on a combination of food regulation and
equipment regulation, supplemented by additional regulations applying to particularly
dangerous sectors such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals. These two pillars of
consumer protection, enacted in 1975 and 1980, each embody a focus on market solutions
and producer sovereignty. They nonetheless operate quite differently. The law on food
reform (Lebensmittelreformgesetz), enacted in 1975, relies primarily on product labeling
and industry self-policing to ensure the safety of products. It imposes national safety,
quality, and information standards, but places enforcement with the federal states. The
1980 amendment to the Law on Safety of Equipment (Geritsicherheitsgesetz or GSG)
makes standards created by Germany's standardization board (Deutsche Industrie
Normung or DIN) effectively mandatory for producers of equipment used by consumers.
Hence both areas of regulation have tended to emphasize industry self-regulation. Neither
provides for a legai recall duty on the producer. Unlike French consumer safety
regulation, both German laws pursue consumer protection conceived as an economic and
not a political goal.
On 18 June 1974 the Bundestag unanimously passed the new Food and
Necessities Law (Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenstande-Gesetz), which became active
on 1 January 1975.5 17 The new law, seen at the time as the "basic law of consumer
protection," replaced a variety of national and state-level quality regulations. The new
retained, but without success. "La nouvelle Commission de la s6curit6 des
consommateurs," Consommateurs Actuaits 570 (20 November 1987): 1 1.
517 Formally the law was entitled 'Gesetz zur Neuordnung und Bereinigung des Rechts im
Verkehr mit Lebensmitteln, Tabakerzeugnissen, Kosmetischen Mitteln und sonstigen
BedarfsgegenstAnden' or simply 'Gesetz zur Gesamtreform des Lebensmittelrechts.'
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law was extraordinarily broad in scope, imposing standards on labeling, safety, and
sanitation for food, regulating additives and advertising, and extending not only to food
but also to tobacco and cosmetic products. Chemical tests for the safety and conformity
of food products today are carried out by 67 chemical testing labs throughout Germany.
The law also provides for foods that do not meet required safety standards to be kept
from distribution. 5 8 A new Food Labeling Law (Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsrecht)
passed in 1981 required that the full contents of food products be included on the
packaging, and that all perishable products include an expiration date.519
Unlike the French product safety laws, however, Germany never created a central
authority with a mandate and regulatory capacity to apply the new food law. Indeed all
enforcement was delegated to the federal states, which were, however, given no
additional funding for enforcement. One reason for this weak enforcement was the
opposition by both the FDP and the CDU to the legislation. The FDP argued that the new
law only multiplied the number of legal texts that would have to be enforced, and that the
same goals could be achieved by enforcing existing laws.520 The CDU argued that such
regulation was overly intrusive in the economy. For example, the CDU opposed any
advertising restrictions on tobacco products on the grounds that this would not, as the
SPD claimed, limit smoking. In the end, no member of parliament could be seen to
518 Susanne Langguth, and Matthias Horst, "Zum Schutz der Konsumenten," Verbraucher
& Markt '83 34 (18 Aug 1983), p 10.
519 Susanne Langguth, and Matthias Horst, "Zum Schutz der Konsumenten," Verbraucher
& Markt '83 34 (18 Aug 1983), p 10.
520 Gerhard Wilhelm Bruck, Perspektiven der Sozialpolitik: Synopse sozialpolitischer
Vorstellung der Bundesregierung, SPD, FDP, CDU, CSU, DAG, des DGB und der
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (G6ttingen: Otto Schwartz,
1974), pp 134-136.
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oppose such broadly popular legislation, although by the time the proposed law came to a
vote the Bundestag chamber was nearly empty.52 1
The lack of centralized enforcement of the new food law was due in part to CDU
opposition, but also to the way in which the SPD itself justified the legislation. Namely,
they focused on the economic advantages the law would bring by normalizing safety
standards across Germany's states. Until 1975, each state regulated foods in its own
traditional way. The new law, the SPD argued, made economic sense because it promoted
market transparency. Even the peak consumer association, the AgV, argued that one of
the big advantages of the new food law was that it would reduce the burden on retailers,
who until then had to track and apply over 200 different laws and regulations.5 2 2 Hence
the 1975 Food and Necessities Law, conceived as the "basic law of consumer protection,"
was pushed by the SPD on the grounds not specifically of consumer safety, but instead of
its unifying effect on the marketplace.
Regulation of consumer safety for equipment adopted a different strategy, one
that drew on a more extensive application of existing technical standards within industry.
Two government initiatives, in 1977 and 1980, were crucial. After seven years of trying
to establish a product safety standard, the Federal Minister of Labor created in 1977 the
"GS" (Geprufte Sicherheit - tested safety) label for products to indicate conformity with
all relevant (primarily DIN) technical standards. Permission to use the "GS" symbol is
granted today by over 80 test centers throughout Germany and, since 1985, in France.
Approximately 16-17,000 testing certificates are issued annually. In December 1985,
521 Ingeborg Jahn, "Neues Lebensmittelrecht soll die Verbraucher besser sch,tzen,"
Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 June 1974.
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85,000 kinds of equipment and machines carried the GS symbol.52 3 Companies that apply
for GS certification and fail are referred to the Trade Supervisory Offices (Gewerbe
Aufsichtsamter) for mandatory testing.
The government remained unsatisfied with the voluntary nature of the GS symbol,
and in 1980 moved to make industry standards of safety mandatory for all technical
products on the market. The core of this legislation, named the Equipment Safety Act
(Geratsicherheitgesetz, or GSG), was a general safety requirement (allgemeine
Sicherheitspflicht) that reads: "The producer or importer of technical equipment may only
display or circulate goods such that, in accordance with the generally recognized rules of
technology as well as the labor protection and accident avoidance regulations, the user or
third party to its specified application is protected against all kinds of risk to life and
health, as specified by the manner of its particular application."52 4 Thus unlike France's
1983 law, Germany's GSG employs a standard of safety based on the "specified
application" of a product, and hence is not intended to cover the "foreseeable misuse"
included in the French standard.
One impact of this narrower German interpretation of industry responsibility for
product safety has been a distortion of estimations of total product-related accidents in the
522 Katharina Olbertz, "Beim Verbraucherschutz hangt alles an der Kontrolle,"
Handelsblatt, 8 September 1975.
523 Josef Falke, "Post Market Control of Technical Consumer Goods in the Federal
Republic of Germany," in Post Market Control of Consumer Goods, ed. Hans-W.
Michlitz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), p 364-365.
524 "Der Hersteller oder Einfiihrer von technischen Arbeitsmitteln darf diese nur in den
Verkehr bringen oder ausstellen, wenn sie nach den allgemein anerkannten Regeln der
Technik sovie den Arbeitsschutz- und Unfallverhiitungsvorschriften so bschaffen sind,
daB Benutzer oder Dritte bei ihrer BestimmungsgemaBen Verwendung gegen Gefahren
aller Art fur Leben oder Gesundheit soweit geschiitzt sind, wie es die Art der
bestimmungsgemalBen Verwendung gestattet." GSG, Section 3, paragraph 1.
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country. One of the few studies of home and leisure accidents in Germany, conducted by
the Association of Liability Insurers, Accident Insurers, Automobile Insurers, and Legal
Cost Insurers (HUK-Verband), found that 99% of all such accidents resulted from
mistaken actions by consumers, and not by flaws of design or construction of the product
itself. The Stiftung Warentest has contested this finding. Joerges points out how
improbable this finding is, given that the Trade Inspection Offices in North Rhein-
Westphalia found in a 1984 study that nearly one quarter of all home appliances on the
market were in some way defective. 525 Indeed efforts to assess systematically the number
of product-related accidents in Germany have been discouraged, to the point that
accidents have become largely irrelevant to discussions of product safety.
The "generally recognized rules of technology" described in the law had the effect
of making industry standards quasi-mandatory. While the GSG does provide the
possibility for manufacturers to avoid existing standards in favor of new technical
approaches that offer equivalent or greater levels of safety, for most producers the effect
of the GSG has been to enforce compliance with DIN standards. By 1981, 637 DIN
standards as well as 101 other kinds of standards fell under the GSG.526 Why did German
industry accept this kind of intervention in their production decisions? Th reason is that
standards within DIN are set in technical committees comprising representatives from the
major manufacturers in the relevant field. Hence the effect of the GSG was to force all
525 Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Gert BrUiggemeier, Die
Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p 134.
5 2 6 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibfilt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 101.
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competitors in a particular market to compete on technical standards that had been set by
the industry leaders.
The GSG is applied by Trade Supervisory Offices (GewerbeaufsichAimter), of
which Germany had 71 in 1986, with a total staff of nearly 3000. With an estimated
180,000 new products coming on the market each year, the trade supervisory offices are
only able to evaluate a fraction of all products. Over half of these are tested at trade fairs
and exhibitions, with most of the remaining tests coming from referrals from Germany's
comparative product testing organization, Stiftung Warentest, from industry works
councils (Betriebsrate), or from other product testing laboratories.52 7 The Stiftung
Warentest and product testing organizations such as those that grant the GS accreditation
are required by law to refer non-conforming products to the Trade Supervisory Offices
for further testing.
If the danger of a product is deemed particularly acute, the GSG does permit the
use of a prohibition decree (Untersagungsverfiigung). These notifications, however, are
only published in the GSG's own technical journal, which has a circulation of only 500
copies. Since 1981 they have been allowed to distribute these notifications more widely,
but have done so in only about 10 cases each year.2 8 Moreover, the GSG has no
authority to force companies to recall products. Indeed when a Directive on product recall
was proposed at the European level, the idea was quickly quashed by Germany. This kind
of recall action has been forcefully opposed by industry and labor alike on the grounds
527 Josef Falke, "Post Market Control of Technical Consumer Goods in the Federal
Republic of Germany," in Post Market Control of Consumer Goods, ed. Hans-Wolfgang
Micklitz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), pp 359-369.
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that the process of safety evaluation necessary to product recall, currently managed by
technical experts in standard setting organizations and the Gewerbeaufsichtamter, would
become politicized and transferred to experts in other fields.529
528 Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Gert BrUggemeier, Die
Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp 161-167.
529 Micklitz, Hans-Wolfgang, "Comparative Analysis of the National Country Reports on
Post Market Control and Perspectives for a European Setting of Post Market Control," in
Post Market Control of Consumer Goods, ed. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz. Schriftenreihe
des Zentrums fr Europaische Rechtspolitik an der Universitit Bremen (ZERP), Band 1 1
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), pp 415-8.
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Chapter 8. Consumer Protection Through Direct Product Regulation
Governments in France and Germany were not satisfied merely to set the
information and risk context in which consumer purchases occurred. For many areas of
the economy they actively intervened to set specific features of products on the market in
a way that would be more friendly to consumers. France and Germany both have
attempted, for example, to incorporate consumer interests into the design standards for
particular kinds of products. Product price was another area of potential intervention. In
price policy, France intervened strongly to set product prices for a broad range of goods,
while Germany granted a high degree of pricing prerogative to producers. Finally,
governments in both countries intervened to place restrictions on the terms of sale for
products in the marketplace, thereby standardizing the contractual terms of consumer
purchases.
One of the striking findings from these cases of direct product regulation is that
Germany has proven surprisingly willing to infringe on private contractual and economic
autonomy when such intervention was felt to work in the interest both of consumers and
of Germany's industrial producers. The surprise in the French case is not that the
government has been willing to intervene in the economy on behalf of consumers-a
deep itatist tradition has made such intervention a hallmark of French industrial policy-
but that this intervention has reflected a specific strategy of consumer protection.
Whereas Germany has proved more willing to interfere in restricting the terms of sale for
products, France has shown a far greater willingness to interfere in the realm of product
pricing. In the area of product design, Germany has forced industry to accept consumer
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input into design specifications for consumer products, while the French government has
merely encouraged discussions among consumers and producers concerning product
design. These cases suggest that French and German approaches to direct product
regulation cannot be understood by reference to national traditions of state intervention in
the economy. Rather, French and German approaches to direct product regulation must
be understood in terms of their national conceptions of the consumer interest and the
institutional context in which the issues of consumer protection first arose.
In Germany, where the consumer was perceived primarily as an economic actor,
direct product regulations sought both to overcome market failures and to improve the
quality of products available in the marketplace. In the area of product design, for
example, consumers were granted a consultative role in setting industry technical
standards for consumer products. Strict limitation on the terms of sale in Germany also
ensured that consumers would not be surprised by the terms of their purchases. Finally,
regulations focusing on product pricing had the central goal of maintaining price
transparency for consumers so that they might more easily compare product prices.
In France, by contrast, the consumer was perceived more as a political actor.
Direct product regulations thus sought to protect the consumer against industry
malfeasance. In product design, consumer groups were empowered to negotiate product
standards directly with producers. Terms of sale in France were regulated directly by the
government. While this approach ensured that consumers retained their rights to legal
recourse against producers, the regulatory approach failed to establish a high standard for
consumer contracts. Finally, regulation of product price were designed specifically to
protect consumers against "unjust" pricing practices. In this sense, the French approach to
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direct product regulation was consumer-oriented, while the German approach was really
industry-oriented.
Consumer Participation in Product Design
Beyond simply informing consumers about product quality and distributing
product-related risk, politicians in both France and Germany also pushed for greater
consumer participation in the product design process. Germany did so by introducing
consumer representatives into its organization for technical standards formation,
Deutsche Industrie Normung (DIN). France, by contrast, attempted to promote collective
accords between consumer associations and producer interest groups in which acceptable
standards of quality and design were negotiated. In the end, Germany's system succeeded
because it drew on the capabilities embodied in Germany's production institutions.
France's approach, by contrast, created an entirely new forum for negotiating product
quality, but one in which producers were extremely hesitant to participate.
In Germany, where standard-setting was highly centralized in the DIN, consumer
representatives were able to participate in product standard-setting through the creation of
a consumer advisory council within the DIN. This kind of participation was possible in
part due to the high level of technical competency among German consumer
representatives, which allowed them to engage usefully in technical committee meetings
for products of particular relevance to consumers. In France, by contrast, consumer
organizations were encouraged by the government to negotiate directly with the sectoral
business groups, and later with companies individually. This approach was necessary in
part due to the weaker position of the French standard setting organization, AFNOR. It
was also better suited to the capacities of consumer organizations in France, as their wide
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grass-roots support gave them a claim to negotiate legitimately on behalf of all
consumers.
German Consumers in Industry Standard Setting
On 8 October 1974, the German Standards Association (DNA) 530 decided in an
agreement with the Economics Ministry to accept public funds to create a Consumer
Council (Verbraucherrat, or VR) within DNA to represent consumer interests. While
industry, lead by its peak trade association, the Bund Deutscher Industrie (BDI), opposed
this so-called "partnership in-house solution"531 to the problem of consumer access to
setting standards, the decision was reached as part of a larger negotiation between DNA
and the government. Beginning at the end of 1973, the government had approached the
DNA for an agreement to provide significant federal funding in exchange for taking on
duties that the government felt were central to the standardization process. One of these,
as affirmed in the governments First Consumer Report of 1971, was to incorporate
consumer interests into the standard-setting process.53 2 As a result of these negotiations,
on 1 September 1975, DNA signed an agreement with the government making it the
exclusive standard setting organization in Germany. It also changed its name to the
current German Institute for Standards (Deutsches Institut fur Normung, or DIN).
According to the terms of this agreement, set out in DIN standard 820, which governs the
530 Renamed DIN in 1974.
531 "partnerschaftliche Im-Hause-LUsung"; Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-
Wolfgang Micklitz, and Gert Bruggemeier, Die Sicherheit von Konsumgutern und die
Entwicklung der Europdischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p 186.
532 Verbraucherbericht. Bundestagsdrucksache VI/2724, 1971.
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operations of the organization itself, consumers would sit on an equal footing with
producers on the Consumer Council.533
The new Consumer Council had three goals: to oversee the standards process, to
help select cases of interest to consumers for standardization, and to organize consumer
representation on relevant DIN technical committees. The five members of the Consumer
Council were selected, each for a term of three years, by the president of the DIN in
consultation with the peak consumer association (AgV) and the Economics Minister. The
Council then appoints individual consumer representatives to sit on standard-setting
committees for products of particular interest to consumers. The work of the consumer
council has been very successful. Government financial support grew from 328,000 DM
in 1975 to 451,000 DM in 1980, while the number of consumer representatives
participating in DIN technical committees grew from 370 in 1976 to over 600 in 1980.534
In 1982, 1,884 of 21,400 standards issued by DIN were found to be relevant to consumers
according to Consumer Council criteria.535 By 1989, about 2,400 of DIN's 25,700
standards were found by the Consumer Council to be relevant to consumers.5 36
Consumer-relevant technical standards have consistently accounted for 9 percent of all
533 In 1962 the DNA established a committee for product usefulness (AusschuB
Gebrauchstauglichkeit, or AGt) on which consumer representatives held four seats, but
their influence was little, and the committee was eliminated after the formation of the
VR.
534 Bopp-Schmehl, et al., p 214.
535 Annemarie Bopp-Schmehl, Uwe Heibiilt, and Ulrich Kypke, Technische Normung und
Verbraucherinteressen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (Frankfurt am Main: Haag &
Herchen Verlag, 1984), p 216.
536 Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Gert Briiggemeier, Die
Sicherheit von Konsumgtern und die Entwicklung der Europdischen Gemeinschaft
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), p 187; Jr6ome Darigny, Normalisation-certification-
essais: leur devenir, leurs enjeux industriels dans l'Europe du marche unique (Paris:
University of Paris I (Sorbonne) Thesis, November, 1989), p 16.
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technical standards issued by DIN. Germany's "partnership in-house solution" has proved
itself an effective tool for promoting the consumer interest in product design.
French Consumer Accords with Industry Associations
The third Barre government, inaugurated in 1978, pursued a different strategy for
involving consumers in the process of product design. Rather than trying to pursue the
consumer interest through standard setting, the Economics Minister Ren6 Monory called
instead for consumer associations to function as an equal counter-force to industry.537 To
this end he called for the quadrupling of State funding to consumer associations, from 1
million francs in 1978 to 4 million francs in 1979.538 He also eliminated the position of
Secretary of Consumption, which under the previous government had focused
administrative intervention on information strategies of consumer protection. While
Monory liked to call himself the "Minister of Consumption," the actual administration of
consumer affairs was taken up instead by a newly created 'Mission consommation', lead
by Daniele Achach, of the newly renamed Direction de la concurrence et de la
consommation (formerly the Direction de la concurrence et des prix) in the Economics
Ministry. 53 9 This shift emphasized Monory's view that product specifications should be
set through a process of negotiations between representatives of producers and their
consumer counterparts.
537 Ren6 Monory, Inauguration des Locaux de L'institut national de la consommation
(Paris: Ministre de economie, Service de l'information, March 1979), p 3.
538 "Ren6 Monory: davantage de moyens pour informer les consommateurs," Dimocratie
Moderne, 22 Nov 1979.
539 Jean Marchand, "Une 'mission consommation' au ministere de l'Economie," La Croix,
17 Jun 1978.
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The idea of negotiating directly with consumer groups had long been favored by
much of French industry as an alternative to direct government intervention. In 1975 the
CNPF appointed Paul Simonet head of a new Committee on Industry, Commerce, and
Consumption (Comit6 industrie commerce comsommateur, or CICC) with the goal of
presenting a united front to consumer organizations. The CNPF was, in the words of
Simonet, "...very open to all forms of concertation, especially in the domain of
information..." 540 The Consumption Committee of the Seventh French Plan in 1976
advocated just such a dialogue between consumers and producers, although members of
the business contingent noted a 'certain climate of hostility' among the consumer
representatives.54 The director of customer relations at Air France, Jean-Georges Marais,
echoed in 1977 that such a concertation was indispensable.54 2 And a survey conducted by
the Ecole sup6rieure de commerce of Lyons in 1976 found that 24 percent of French
companies had already engaged in dialogues with consumer associations.54 3
The effect of the 1978 Monory program on these earlier efforts was to encourage
collaboration on all aspects of the production process, something that the CNPF had long
opposed. Monory charged the formerly neutral National Consumption Institute (INC) to
support consumer associations in cultivating a "consumer counter-force to counterbalance
540 "...nous sommes tres ouverts a toute forme de concertation, plus particulierement dans
le domaine de l'information..."; "Opinions sur la fonction consommation et la libre
entreprise," Humanisme et Entreprise 102 (April 1977), p 16.
541 Commisariat General du Plan, Rapport du comite Consommation: Preparation du 7e
plan (Paris: Documentation Frangaise, 1976), p 16; Jacques Dubois, "Les consommateurs
dans le 76me plan," Information Consommation OR-GE-CO 15 (March-April 1976), pp
1-2.
542 "Je voudrais affirmer qu'une concertation est indispensable." Jean-Georges Marais,
"Le consommateur, cet inconnu?" Humanisme et Entreprise 102 (April 1977), p 69.
543 "Le Consumerisme," Libre Service Actualitds 632 (30 June 1977), p 134.
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the technical advantage of producers and the effects of advertising."54 4 The CNPF's
Committee on Industry, Commerce, and Consumption) CICC held regular meetings with
consumer associations from November 1979 to March 1981.545 In the context of these
meetings, consumer representatives met with representatives of industry sectors to
negotiate standards of quality and use that were felt to suit consumer needs in that field.
While such partnerships were voluntary, companies that accepted negotiated standards
could advertise this as a selling point. By 1989, 49 voluntary accords had been signed
between consumer associations and professional associations. Of these, 36 percent treated
house construction, 20 percent used car sales, 18 percent small retailing, 8 percent
furniture, and 6 percent dry cleaning.546
One such voluntary agreement was signed between consumer associations and
France's largest retail store association (UDAC). According to the agreement, retailers
following a set of negotiated guidelines would be allowed to post in their store-front a
sticker of a blue, white, and red fleur-de-lis that read: "I adhere to the retail
agreement. " 547 The guidelines included marking rebates as a percentage of the proper
price, indicating prices including services and other charges "tout compris," posting clear
information about service after sale, and a guarantee to replace goods that did not
function properly or were damaged in delivery. Like many such accords, the program was
544 "pouvoir consommateur [pour] contrebalancer la technicite des producteurs et 'action
de la publicit6."; Gisele Prevost, "Consommation: ''agressivit6' de l'INC pr6occupe de
plus en plus le CNPF," Les Echos, 28 May 1979.
Jean Marchand, "M. Monory veut des consommateurs puissants," La Croix, 28
September 1979.
546 "Accords n6gocies entre associations de consommateurs et professionels," INC Hebdo
624 (3 February 1989), p 14.
547 "Engagement du commerce, j'adhere.""La charte 92," 50 Millions de Consommateurs
122 (February 1981).
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well received but not very widely employed. A 1981 survey of 663 stores in Marseilles
found that only 27 (4 percent) had placed the 'fleur tricolore' in their windows.548
France's Corporatist Gambit
The victory of Mitterrand's socialist party in 1981 put a new emphasis on such
collective agreements. Their goal was to make agreements negotiated between consumer
and professional groups legally binding. The Socialists signaled the importance of this
initiative by creating a Ministry of Consumption, to which it appointed Christine
Lalumiere as minister.5 4 9 The project was explicitly modeled on the 1936 labor law,
which had granted labor unions the right to negotiate contract terms at the sectoral level.
Moreover, because a corporatist strategy of this kind would have ramifications for many
other areas of consumer regulation, Lalumiere created a committee to rewrite the full
body of consumer law in France. It was headed by the lawyer and consumer advocate
Jean Calais-Auloy. Significantly, no representatives of industry were included on the
committee.5 50
This corporatist agenda was strongly supported by consumer associations, which
by 1981 had become so frustrated with the imbalance in their discussions with industry
that they were boycotting further talks until the government intervened in the negotiation
process. They felt that only binding sectoral agreements would give them sufficient
influence.s55 Jacques Ghestin, a lawyer and spokesman for consumer groups, argued that
548 Consommateurs Actualit6 282 (3 April 1981).
549 Created by decree 81-704 of 16 July 1981.
5 50 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris, La Politique de la Consommation,
rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par Messieurs
Lefeubvre et Blat (adopted 14 January and 11 March 1982).
551 Didier Ferrier, La Protection des Consommateurs (Paris: Dalloz, 1996), p 80.
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the government should assign authority over product quality, including the terms of
consumer contracts, to professional associations. "In reality," he argues, "I don't see why
professional organizations that are able to speak legitimately for their members about
work conditions could not do the same in relation to sales conditions." 55 2
But this move toward a corporatist solution to consumer demands was opposed
both by the business community and by the Ministry of Justice. The business community
argued that the analogy with labor contracts was a false one. They felt, first, that
consumers were not dependent on producers in the same way that employees were
dependent on their employers, since consumers face few obstacles to shopping around.5 3
Second, the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry argued that the variety of interests
in the professional community, which encompassed producers, wholesalers, retailers, and
service providers, would put them at a disadvantage in negotiating binding agreements
with consumers. 55 4 Jean Levy, who succeeded Paul Simonet in 1982 as head of the CICC,
felt that binding collective conventions of this kind could only hurt production. In
response to a proposal that retailers post the price-per-kilo and price-per-liter for foods,
for example, he argued that this would hurt the quality of products in the market by
552 "En realit6 on ne voit pas pourquoi les organizations patronales qui peuvent engager
valablement leurs adherents quant aux conditions de travail, ne pouraient pas le faire
quant a leurs conditions de vente." "Negociation collective: le point de vue des juristes,"
Que Savoir 43-44 (June-July 1982), p 53.
553 Josee Doy6re, "Des 'conventions collectives' de la consommation rendront obligatoires
les engagements des professionnels," Le Monde, 5 December 1981.
554 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris, La Creation du Conseil National de la
Consommation, rapport presente au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par
M. Gaucher (adopted 19 may 1983), p 10.
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focusing consumer attention on price. The result, he argued, "would be an invasion of
mediocre and low quality products."55 5
The Ministry of Justice also opposed a corporatist approach to consumer
regulation. While it felt that agreements between consumer groups and professional
associations should be encouraged, it emphasized that these must remain voluntary.
Consumer groups, it argued, were not adequately similar to trade unions. Whereas
workers had a "unity of life, unity of training, class consciousness, and direct impact on
their work environment," consumers remained necessarily dispersed and disunited.55 6
Furthermore, corporatist devolution of control would undermine existing administrative
authorities such as the Commission on Abusive Clauses, which regulated retail contracts.
Instead of a corporatist devolution of authority, the Ministry of Justice advocated non-
legal means of enforcement such as labeling and advertising. They argued that consumer-
friendly brands such as FNAC and Leclerc, for example, had done very well in the
marketplace.
In 1983, under mounting fiscal pressure, the government underwent a radical
change of orientation towards business that caused it to dismiss the Calais-Auloy
committee that had been created to rewrite the consumer law. It opted instead for a
middle way, creating a forum in which consumer and professional groups could meet in
the presence of the government administration, but without making agreements binding
on producers. In 12 July 1983 the government transformed the National Consumption
55 "Ce serait l'envahissement par des produits mediocres et de mauvaise qualite";
Elisabeth Rochard, "Le CNPF ne veut pas de conventions collectives de la
consommation," Le Matin, 19 February 1982.
556 Ministere de la Justice, "Observations sur l'eventualit6 de conventions collectives entre
les organizations de consommateurs et les professionnels," (Paris, 14 March 1980), p 2.
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Committee (Comit6 national de la Consommation, or CNC), which had been created in
1960 as a forum for consumer associations to express their interests to the government,
into the National Consumption Council (Conseil national de la consommation, also
CNC), a body in which professional associations would participate on an equal footing
with consumer groups. The body's new goal was "...to permit the confrontation and the
concertation among the representatives of professionals, the public services, and the
public powers." Composed of a consumer and a producer college, the body meets four
times per year.557
Quality Contracts
In December 1982 the newly created Minister of Consumption under the Socialist
government, perceiving the probable failure of binding consumer accords, initiated a
program to improve product quality by encouraging individual companies and consumer
groups to enter into "contracts for the improvement of quality" ("contrat pour
l'am6lioration de la qualit6"). Unlike consumer accords, these quality contracts were
negotiated for a short time and on a company-by-company basis, and were considered
binding on participating companies. Products or services that had been approved in a set
of contract negotiations with officially recognized consumer groups could be indicated
with the mark "Approved" ("marque 'approuv6"').5 5 8
557 The producer college had been moved from the board of directors of the INC, where
they had been before, facilitating the more confrontational role of the INC. Chambre de
commerce et d'industrie de Paris, La Creation du Conseil National de la Consommation,"
rapport pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission du Commerce Int6rieur par M. Gaucher
(adopted 19 May 1983), pp 4-5.
558 Jean Calais-Auloy, Droit de la Consommation (Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey, 1992), pp
49-50.
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These quality contracts had a mixed reception among consumer groups. The
socialist and communist consumer groups strongly favored quality agreements, and some
companies even negotiated them through their own labor unions. The Communist
consumer group INDECOSA-CGT even complained that the government was not
applying sufficient pressure on the large nationalized companies to sign quality
agreements with consumer associations.5 59 The independent consumer group UFC, on the
other hand, remained critical of the 'approuvd' program because they felt that it produced
few results for consumers and had supplanted the more effective 'Quality Certificates"
program attempted by the previous government.
By 1985, 59 companies had signed quality contracts with consumer associations
for a duration of one or two years.560 Of these, 33 companies signed contracts to improve
the quality of services, and 26 companies signed quality contracts on a total of 305
different products. By 1986, 134 quality contracts had been signed.5 61 But a survey in
1986 also showed that only 16 percent of the population recognized the 'approuv6'
certification.56 2 In hindsight, this system of quality contracts appears to have been largely
ineffectual. 5 63
In sum, while France and Germany both attempted to introduce consumer
interests into the product-design phase of production, the solutions they chose were very
559 "Contrats de qualit6," Consommateurs Actualitis 498 (28 February 1986), p 17.
560 "Contrats d'am6lioration de la qualite," Consommateurs Actualits 501 (21 March
1986), p 17-19.
561 "Contrats de qualit6, quatre ans apres...," Consommateurs Actualitds 530 (5 December
1986), p 17.
562 "Qualit6: les consommateurs veulent un label unique europ6en," Consommateurs
Actualitds 604 (9 September 1988), p 20.
563 Jean Calais- Auloy, Droit de la Consommation (Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey, 1992),
pp 49-50.
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different, as were the levels of success they achieved. Their divergent approaches were
driven primarily by the capacities of the producer and consumer groups involved. In
Germany, product standards were widely promulgated and accepted by producers, and
consumer groups embodied a high degree of technical competence. In France, by
contrast, consumer groups had a broad legitimacy but little specific technical expertise,
and negotiated product standards were not used by a sufficient number of producers to be
an attractive target for asserting consumer interests. The German strategy appears to have
been both simpler and more effective than the elaborate collaborative efforts attempted in
France.
Terms of Sale
Terms of sale specify the conditions to which shoppers assent when they purchase
products or services. They generally cover terms of warranty, conditions that affect the
liability of the producer, guarantees as to product price and conditions of delivery, the
cost and availability of repairs, and many other post-purchase eventualities.5 4 When the
terms of sale are prepared in advance by a producer or retailer - often with the help of a
lawyer - they are called standard form contracts. Standard form contracts that cannot be
renegotiated by the consumer at the point of purchase are called adhesion contracts.
Adhesion contracts have become the norm for most product sales. Printed unobtrusively
on sales slips or accompanying documents, they constitute the fine print of any purchase.
While many countries now subject terms of sale to a standard of clear writing, a recent
survey of adhesion contracts in Germany found that they require an average of seventeen
564 Erika Schork, "Geschift mit den Gesch'ftsbedingungen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 13
July 1972.
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minutes to read. In practice, consumers commonly do not learn the implications of the
terms they agree to until long after they have purchased a product.
Use of standard term and adhesion contracts burgeoned in the 1960s as a
counterpart to the growth of mass production in manufacturing. Just as rational
manufacturing depended on standardized parts and worker functions, rational financial
management of the large firm also required standardized contractual relationships with
both suppliers and consumers. Adhesion contracts offered three specific advantages over
ad-hoc contracts or those negotiated at the point of sale. First, pre-written contracts
reduced the costs of individual contract negotiations and subsequent legal fees. Second,
companies using standard term contracts could accurately evaluate and control their risk
exposure. Third, standard contracts could also work to the advantage of consumers, who
could purchase branded products with the certainty of finding the same contract
conditions everywhere. This meant that manufacturers and distributors that could provide
this kind of contractual uniformity were likely to be favored by consumers. Companies
today still commonly employ standard form contracts in their relations both with
consumers and with suppliers. This paper focuses exclusively on the use of adhesion
contracts in sales to the final consumer. 565
In the context of growing competition among producers, many companies
increasingly looked to standard term contract as a means of increasing their price
competitiveness. By rewriting adhesion contracts so as to limit risk exposure, a company
could reduce the unit sales price of products without making any changes to production.
565 Standard form contracts have also played an important role in distributing contractual
responsibilies between producers and their suppliers. See Steve Casper, Reconfiguring
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This strategy should not have posed a problem for consumers, as they could in principle
shop around for the combination of product quality and contractual terms that best fit
their needs. So long as an industry did not suffer from monopoly, market forces would
create competition for an appropriate level of contractual security.
Two parallel developments, however, made this sort of market competition for
contract terms infeasible. First, an extraordinary growth in the number and complexity of
products in the 1970s meant that consumers often did not know enough about them to be
able to judge the value of the sales terms that accompanied them. What was the likely
lifetime and repair schedule for a microwave oven, for example? In many cases not just
consumers but also producers themselves did not know what to expect from new kinds of
products. Second, the parallel growth in self-service shopping made it difficult for
consumers to seek professional sales advice. 56 6 Sales staff who might have been able to
share customer experiences with different contract kinds were giving less and less advice.
Taken together, these two trends meant that companies could dilute their contractual
responsibilities without consumers being able to detect the difference. This prospect was
particularly worrisome because of its distributional implications: those consumers less
capable of discerning often complicated differences among competing contract terms
were more likely to be hurt by the practice.
By the mid 1970s, political pressure to regulate the terms of consumer contracts
had risen all over Europe. Sweden had already made provisions for its Consumer
Institutions: The Political Economy of Legal Development in Germany and the US. Ph.D.
Dissertation, Cornell University, 1997.
566 Michel Trochu, Yannick Tremorin, and Pierre Berchon, "La protection des
consommateurs contre les clauses abusives: tude de la 1egislation frangaise du 10-1-
1978," D.P.C.I. 7/1 (March 1981), pp 37-38.
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Ombudsman to negotiate consumer contracts in 1971. Germany's Justice Minister
suggested the need for analogous regulation in Germany in 1972.567 France advocated
similar regulation in its Seventh Plan beginning in 1974.568 Britain disallowed personal
injury exemptions in consumer contracts in 1973. By 1975, the topic had become so
pervasive that the European Economic Community proposed a directive for a Europe-
wide approach to regulating consumer contracts.
This move to regulate cannot be understood exclusively as an outpouring of
government compassion for a dispossessed consumer, although this was also a factor.
Policy-makers also believed that regulating the content of consumer contracts could
improve the knowledge with which consumers shopped and thereby introduce greater
efficiency into the larger economy. So long as consumers did not fully understand what
they were buying, the argument went, they were likely to make inefficient purchases.
Indeed the greater their uncertainty about the quality of a product, and in particular about
the services that accompanied the product, the less likely they were to attempt to purchase
high quality goods.56 9 This shift in demand would, in turn, have an effect on company
product strategies. In 1976 Germany's Justice Minister Held of Bavaria, in advocating
contract regulation, stressed the economic benefit of greater contractual clarity: "Under
somewhat more honest, more comparable, and more transparent sales conditions market
transparency will be improved; better application of legitimate consumer interests can
567 "Die Parteien entedecken die Verbraucher," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 31 October 1972.
568 Jacques Dubois, "Les consommateurs tlans le 7ime plan," Information Consommation
OR-GE-CO 15 (March-April 1976), pp 1-2.
569 Joachim Beimowski, Zur okonomischen Analyse Allgemeiner Geschdftsbedingungen
(Munich: Verlag V. Florenz, 1989), p 18-19.
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lead to greater quality competition."570 This might, he warned, generate higher prices,
especially in cases where previous warrantee exclusions are eliminated, but it would be
accompanied by an increased consumer confidence in what they were getting for their
money.
Although the move to regulate consumer contracts became politically popular, it
was not necessarily easy. First, regulating something so numerous and diverse as
consumer contracts was a daunting task for even the most accomplished government
administration. Regulation applied in an arbitrary way could hurt business by creating
uncertainty about enforcement. Conversely, too much surveillance was likely to be
oppressive to business. Second, most European countries held the sanctity of contracts as
the core principle of their legal doctrine. In France, for example, Article 1 134 of the Code
Civile states explicitly that "legally formed conventions take the place of law for those
who have made them."57' Regulating contracts was therefore inimical to the legal
principles of most countries' basic law. Of course, this sanctity of contract had already
been abrogated in the case of labor contracts, first regulated at the turn of the century.
French advocates of consumer protection drew extensive analogies between labor
contract reform and consumer contract reform. But sales contracts were also palpably
different from labor contracts, and any move to regulate them was constrained by the
need to establish a clear legal basis for government interference.
570 "Unter etwas redlicheren, gleichmiligeren und durschsichtigeren
Rahmenbedingungen wird die Markttransparenz eher verbessert werden; bessere
Durchsetzbarkeit berechtigter Verbraucherinteressen kan den Qualitatswettbewerb
stairken." Johann Georg Helm, "Privatautonomie und zivilrechtlicher Verbraucherschutz,"
Verbraucherschutz in der Marktwirtschaft, ed. Erwin Dichtl (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1976), p 79.
571 "Les conventions legalement formees tiennent lieu de loi a ceux qui les ont faites."
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Conceptually, three kinds of solutions seemed feasible given these problems. The
first solution, modeled on the Scandinavian experience, was to encourage negotiated
agreements between sectoral professional associations and consumer associations
regarding the content of standard adhesion contracts in that sector. Such agreements
could be mandatory, as in Sweden, or adopted as professional norms, as was done for
several service sectors in England.5 72 In the Netherlands, such accords could be enforced
by royal decree (according to Article 6.5.1.2 of book 6 of the civil code) at the request of
a joint committee of consumers and professionals.5 7 3 Such negotiated agreements had the
dual advantage both of facilitating enforcement and of side-stepping the problem of
contractual regulation. Enforcement was relatively easy because the number of negotiated
contracts would be low. Sweden, for example, had by 1982 negotiated standard consumer
contracts covering 50 different sectors.57 4 And because companies were free to deviate
from the negotiated agreements when they were contracting on a one-on-one basis, this
approach avoided the legal problem of restricting contractual rights.
The second solution was to enact legislation placing specific restrictions on the
content of standard form contracts. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and later Spain
572 Thomas Wilhelmsson, "Control of Unfair Contract Terms and Social Values: EC and
Nordic Approaches," in European Consumer Policy after Maastricht, ed. Norbert Reich
and Geoffrey Woodroffe (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1994).
573 Thierry Bourgoignie and Jean Gillardin, Droit des Consommateurs: Clauses abusives,
pratiques du commerce et reglementation des prix (Brussels: Facult6s universitaires
Saint-Louis, 1982), p 129.
574 Elisabeth Maillot Bouvier, "L'Ombudsman dans la Politique de Concurrence et de
consommation en Suede," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 17 (1982), pp
40-42.
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and Portugal, have used this approach. 575 The goal of these provisions was to ensure that
the party initiating the contract did not do so to the disadvantage of the contractee. Like
the negotiated approach, this legislative answer avoided problems of contractual
sovereignty b:cause it did not apply to non-adhesion contracts negotiated freely between
individuals. Whereas negotiated contracts offered a positive description of contracts, the
negative prescriptions employed by the legislative approach left room for a much larger
variety of contracts that would have to be policed. It has been estimated, for example, that
200,000 to 300,000 such contracts were in use in Germany in 1984.576
The third kind of approach, used in France, Luxembourg and Scandinavia, relied
on administrative oversight. This approach, because it functioned largely outside of the
legal system, did not have a legal reason to draw a distinction between standard form and
individually negotiated contracts. This freedom from legal formalism gave administrative
regulation two apparent advantages. First, it seemed to offer a stronger kind of protection
for consumers by emphasizing the fairness of all contracts rather than focusing
exclusively on those employing standard terms. Second, it appeared to offer a more
flexible response to what was after all a very new kind of regulation. The problem
remained, however, that the enormous number of contracts to be policed - including
adhesion and individual contracts - would severely tax administrative capabilities.
575 European countries have often employed more than one strategy to regulate consumer
contract terms. The Netherlands attemped both negociated and legislative regulations.
Scandinavian countries employed both administrative and negociated approaches. Indeed,
it appears that the highest level of protection may require overlapping regulatory regimes.
576 Les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec des consommateurs, Bulletin des
Communaut6s europ6ennes, Suppl6ment 1/84 (Luxembourg: Office des publications
officielles des Communaut6s europ6ennes, 1984), p 14.
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Germany adopted the legislative approach, in the form of the 1976 Law on
General Business Conditions (Allgemeingeschliftsbedingungen Gesetz or AGB-Gesetz).
France adopted the administrative approach, in the form of the Second Scrivener Law
('deuxibme lois Scrivener') of 10 anuary 1978. This paper analyzes the political forces
behind French and German moves to regulate consumer contracts in the late 1970s in
order to understand their divergent policy decisions.
French and German approaches to regulating consumer contracts differ in four
important ways. First, the German law regulating consumer contracts was written to
apply only to adhesion contracts (standard form contracts) whereas the French law
targeted all contracts whether individually negotiated or based on standard terms. Second,
the German law was extremely detailed, providing, in addition to a general statement of
principle, a black list of 17 terms that could never be used in contracts and a gray list of
23 terms that had to be specifically justified. In France, by contrast, the law regulating
consumer contracts was extremely general. It created an administration to make decisions
about what kinds of contracts should be legitimate. Third, the German law applied to
contracts between all parties, whether end consumers or not, whereas the French law
applied only to end-user contracts. Finally, the German law was enforced primarily by
legal action of producer and consumer associations, both of which had the right to file
legal suits against companies employing illegal contract terms. The French law by
contrast was enforced by government decree, a power that the government in fact rarely
used. 577
577 Gilles Paisant, "Le point sur les clauses abuives des contracts," in Apres le Code de la
consommation, grands problkmes choisis: Actes du colloque du 24 fdvrier 1994 de
l'Universit de Rheims, ed. Jean Calais-Auloy and Herv6 Causse (Paris: Litec, 1995).
325
When the European Economic Community convened an expert committee in
1976 to discuss a Europe-wide standard for terms of sale, the schism between the French
and German approaches was already apparent. Germany, along with Ireland and the
Netherlands, argued that contractual restrictions should be limited to adhesion contracts.
France, along with Belgium and Luxembourg, argued for the need to regulate the terms
of all consumer contracts.57 8 Why did France and Germany, confronted with the same
problem at roughly the same time, advocate such different regulatory approaches? In
order to answer the question we need first trace the historical development of the policy
debate in the two countries.
The French experience
France's 'Loi Scrivener', named after the newly appointed Secretary of
Consumption (Secr6taire d'Etat a la Consommation) Christiane Scrivener, took shape
after two years of negotiation between the Ministry of Economics and Finance and the
professional associations. By the end of 1977, Scrivener had formulated and submitted
for parliamentary discussion a proposal for the creation of an administrative commission
to evaluate and control the use of abusive contract clauses in consumer sales. This
"Improper Clauses Commission," created 31 January 1978 and installed in February, had
15 members, each named for three years, including 3 magistrates, 3 legal consultants, 3
representatives of the administration, plus 3 representatives each from professional and
578 "Compte rendu de la r6union concernant les 'clauses abusives des contrats conclus
avec les consommateurs'." (held in brussels 27 and 28 Sept 1976. ENV/569/76-F.)
Brussels: Service de l'environnement et de la protection des consommateurs, Division
'Protection des consommateurs,' November 1976.
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consumer associations.5 7 9 The group went to work quickly, and in March 1978
recommended that four kinds of contract clauses be prohibited immediately: limitations
on product warrantees (defined by articles 1641 and 1645 of the civil code protecting
against vises caches), changes in price between the time of sale and the time of delivery,
the use of open delivery dates, and restrictions on access to justice.
One problem of the French legislation, however, was that it gave the Commission
itself little power. Clauses that the commission found to be unfair could be found null and
void ('r6pute non 6crite') in court, but this provided no basis to have them removed from
contracts. Only the government had the right, based on a recommendation of the Conseil
d'Etat, to prohibit the use of certain kinds of clauses by companies. Indeed, on 23 March
1978 the Conseil d'Etat issued a decree targeting thee of the four kinds of contract terms
recommended by the Commission.58 0 After this first move, however, the government
was, in the words of Jean Calais-Auloy, "extremely hesitant to use this regulatory
power." 58 1 Only one other decree was issued in the next ten years, targeting warrantees
accompanying white goods (22 December 1987).582 Efforts by the Commission to call for
penal sanctions against professionals who continued to use contract terms that they had
declared abusive were not successful.58 3 Because the Commission on abusive clauses was
not successful in having its recommendations turned into executive decrees, most of the
clauses that they recommended against could still legally be included in contracts. Only
579 Jean Marchand, "Le consommateur mieux prot6g6 contre les pieges des contrats," La
Croix, 1 Feb 1978.
580 Jean Marchand, "Contrats commerciaux: La Commission demande des sanctions
penales contre les clauses abusives," La Croix, 15 Jun 1979.
581 Jean Calais-Auloy, "Towards New Laws for Consumer Protection: Proposals of the
French Reform Commission," Journal of Consumer Policy 8 (1985), p 63.
582 "La Commission de clauses abusives a dix ans," INC Hebdo 597 (10 June 1988), p 4.
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in particular cases of consumer grievance could the consumer have such clauses, on
evidence of the commission's recommendations, voided. Given the government's
unwillingness to decree particular clauses illegal, pressure mounted for the Commission's
recommendations to be applied directly through the courts.
Consumer groups also had little ability to fight against abusive standard contract
terms. In principle, article 46 of the "loi Royer" of 27 December 1973 introduced
"actions in the consumer interest" ("action d'int6ret collectif'), granting registered
consumer associations the right to take civil action in all jurisdictions against activities
that prejudice, directly or indirectly, the collective interests of consumers. Associations
that wished to bring legal suit required a special accreditation, as defined by the
regulation of 17 May 1974, which required that the organization be oriented toward
consumers and have an active membership of at least 10,000 members. By 1978, 9
national organizations and over 50 departmental organizations were registered.5 84 The
problem was that the collective interest provisions of the loi Royer limited their right to
recover claims only to the collective interests of consumer organizations, not those of
consumers.58 5 Hence consumer associations could bring suit in support of individual
claims of abusive contract terms, but could not bring a suit on behalf of all consumers
injured by a particular kind of standard contract. This meant that abusive contract terms
could not be eliminated in all of their occurrences, only nullified one at a time.
583 Jos6e Doyere, "Les clauses abusives dans les contrats," Le Monde, 21 Jun 1979.
584Rosemonde Pujol, "Securite, protection, information: depuis 1970 une nouvelle
legislation et nee," Le Figaro, 1 December 1978.
585 Jean Calais-Auloy, "Towards New Laws for Consumer Protection: Proposals of the
French Reform Commission," Journal of Consumer Policy 8 (1985), p 65.
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By the mid- 1980s the failure of the French approach had become evident. The
limitations of the system as originally conceived were highlighted by the commission
established in 1987 to systematize and rewrite the French consumption law (Commission
de Refonte du droit de la consommation). They recognized the failures of the regulatory
approach, but feared the arbitrary aspects of separate judicial decisions. They therefore
proposed to create a red and a pink list similar to the black and gray list that Germany had
adopted in 1976. The red list would specify clauses that were absolutely forbidden,
whereas the pink list would include clauses that must be explicitly justified before the
judge as not abusive.58 6
The government disbanded the commission to rewrite consumer law in 1988
without implementing their proposals, and the red and pink list proposals were dropped.
In their place the legislature passed a law of 5 January 1988 (translated as articles L. 421-
I to 421-9 of the new Code de la consommation) which extended the rights of consumer
associations to take civil action to have abusive retail clauses suppressed, even if
consumers have not themselves brought a complaint. The law also specified that contract
terms not brought to the attention of the consumer at the time of signing would be
considered invalid. Clauses cannot be written on the back of the contract, for example, or
on a sign, in a brochure, or unsigned annex documents. 58 7 The law did not, however,
specify whether the courts had the right to interpret article 35 of the law of 10 January
1978 that laid out the principles by which abusive clauses should be judged. Some judges
began doing so without specific reference to the recommendations of the Commission on
586 Jean-Michel Rothmann, "Clauses abusives: a revoir...," Consommateurs Actualits
543 (20 March 1987), p 14.
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Abusive Clauses. In the absence of legislative opinion on this point, the French Appellate
Court (Cour de cassation) affirmed in the Lorthioir case, of 14 May 1991, the right of a
judge to autonomously declare a consumer contract clause abusive.588 A subsequent
government decree of 10 March 1993 affirmed this decision, although not explicitly, in
granting judges the right to seek advice from the Improper Clauses Commission,
including expert testimony in court.589
The final transition in French law came as law 95-96 of I February 1995 that
brought French law into compliance with the EU Directive on Consumer Contracts. This
modification extended the scope of legal suits to include professional associations that
promulgate standard terms, and requires that all users of these terms retract them if they
are found to be abusive. The law explicitly recognizes the autonomy of judges in
applying standards of abusiveness to consumer contracts, although it still retains the
possibility of interdiction by decree. Absent from the new legislation is a definitive list of
proscribed clauses, whether adapted from the recommendations of the Improper Clauses
Commission or taking over the German approach which has been included as a
'provisional gray list' in the EU directive.590
587 Jean Beauchard, Droit de la distribution et de la consommation (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1996), p 325.
588 "Les clauses abusives et la presentation des contrats dans la loi n° 95-96 du ler fWvrier
1995," Receuil dallloz Sirez 14 (1995), pp 99-108.
589 OECD, Consumer Policy in OECD Countries: 1991-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), pp
101-102.
590 "Les clauses abusives et la presentation des contrats dans la loi n° 95-96 du ler fWvrier
1995," Receuil dallloz Sirez 14 (1995), pp 99-108.
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German Intervention in Consumer Terms of Sale
In contrast to France's progressive policy modifications, Germany's Unfair
Contract Terms Act (Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen
Geschiifsbedingungen, or AGB-Gesetz) sprang full formed from legislation passed on 9
December 1976, and became binding on I April 1977. Its general goal was to ensure that
information and power asymmetries between contracting parties would not cause them to
reach agreements that represented the interests of one side more than the other. This goal
was implemented in two ways. On the one hand, the AGB-Gesetz imposes a requirement
of clarity in standard contracts that rules out surprising conditions that are not
immediately obvious from the text of the contract (AGB-Gesetz §3). On the other hand
the AGB imposes a standard of appropriate content matter to which standard contracts
must conform. As expressed in the General Clause (AGB-Gesetz §9), standard contract
terms are inappropriate if they unreasonably prejudice the contracting party against the
command of good faith. The AGB-Gesetz goes further, however, listing in a so-called
'black list' of 17 specific kinds of contract clauses that are expressly forbidden (AGB-
Gesetz § 1 1). A second list contains 23 kinds of contracts that are provisionally forbidden
unless the consumer explicitly agrees to them (AGB-Gesetz § 10). Most of these terms are
designed to ensure that contract terms are not used to reduce rights ensured by other
provisions of the Germany Civil Code. The most common of these exclusions include
reduction of the GBG right to warranty, reduction in liability, freedom of delivery, and
specification of location for legal justice (Gerichtsstand).5 91
591 Erika Schork, "GeschAft mit den Geschiftsbedingungen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 13
July 1972.
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The scope of application of these restrictions is different from that in France. The
AGB-Gesetz applies only to so-called 'adhesion' or standard form contracts, meaning
those that have been formulated in advance of the sale and are not negotiable as a part of
the sale. This means that individual agreements struck between a buyer and seller are not
subject to AGB-Gesetz control. Moreover, the AGB-Gesetz applies equally to consumer
as well as to professional contracts. Indeed 30 percent of AGB-Gesetz litigation is
between professionals. 5 9 2 There are also some sectoral exclusions from the AGB-Gesetz.
It applies only in limited cases to contracts with the administration or state owned
industries such as transportation.593 The German automobile industry has been granted an
exemption in order to be able to negotiate contract terms with consumer associations.5 94
The method of enforcement of the German law is also very different from the
administrative approach adopted in France. The primary form of enforcement is by legal
suits filed by consumer associations, although the anti-trust commission
(Bundeskartellamt) also retains this right. Section 13 of the AGB-Gesetz grants consumer
associations with more than 75 members the right to file such law suits. Cases are
brought not on behalf of a single consumer but in the collective consumer interest.
Companies found guilty are required to modify or stop using the offending adhesion
contract, and face fines of DM 5,000 per offending clause, DM 10,000 for super-regional
592 Anne Fily, and Philippe Guillermin, "Les politiques de la consommation dans les tats
membres de la CEE," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 70 (November-
December 1992), pp 43-50.
593 "Jetzt wird 'Kleingedrucktes' der Verwaltung iiberpruft," Der Tagesspiegel, 13
September 1977.
594 Les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec des consommateurs, Bulletin des
Communaut6s europennes, Supplement 1/84 (Luxembourg: Office des publications
officielles des Communaut6s europennes, 1984), p 8.
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firms, and DM 20,000 for particularly important infractions.595 Most contraventions of
the AGB-Gesetz do not result in court cases, however, because consumer associations are
able to negotiate with the offending company to make appropriate modifications. A 1979
study of 98 cases in Baden-Wiirttemberg and Stuttgart, for example, revealed that only 27
went to a law suit. The remaining cases were resolved out of court when the offending
companies were given notice by consumer associations.596
One reason why Germany focused specifically on adhesion contracts rather than
all consumer contracts is that such contracts had long been a matter of scrutiny on anti-
competitive grounds. Until the legislation of 1976, they had been regulated primarily as
impediments to fair competition under Article 3 of the law of 1909 prohibiting unfair
competition (Gesetz gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb, or UWG). This treatment of standard
contracts as a competition policy under control of the Cartel Office was premised on the
idea that large companies with strong market power were imposing contractual terms on
consumers without the threat of competition to hold them in check. In the 1960s,
however, there was a gradual transformation from this competition view of standard
contracts and toward a contractual view.597 The shift was driven by the growing
perception that smaller firms, who did not enjoy the economies of scale of large
companies, were increasingly resorting to restrictive standard terms as a means of
reducing their responsibility so as to lower their overall product costs. The problem, on
595 Walter Stillner, "Praktische Erfahrungene mit dem AGB-Gesetz," Zeitschriftfiir
Verbraucherpolitik 4/2 (1980), p 148.
596 Walter Stillner, "Praktische Erfahrungene mit dem AGB-Gesetz," Zeitschriftfiir
Verbraucherpolitik 4/2 (1980), p 143. '
597 Christoph Hebestreit, Transparenz im AGB-Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?
Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Vertrag, Delikt und Markt
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), p 35.
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this view, was that the variety and complication of modern goods created an information
asymmetry that rendered consumers effectively incapable of judging the real qualities and
problems with what they purchase. The 1976 AGB-Gesetz was grounded in this new
analysis. Not only did this make shopping less of a science, it also risked to lower the
overall quality of goods on the market over time.598 This concern about information
asymmetry in contracting became the basis for a contractual treatment of adhesion
contracts, grounded in Germany's Roman Law provision that contractual risk must be
divided equally between contracting parties.
The Policy Process
The first effort at restricting the contents of contract terms in France came not
from the government but from its leading business association, the Conseil National du
Patronat Franqais (CNPF). A study commissioned on the topic by the CNPF's Working
Group on "Enterprise and Consumerism" proposed on May 6 1976 that the CNPF work
together with France's largest consumer organization, the National Institute of
Consumption (INC), to study contracts between professionals and consumers. One goal
of the project was to help to restore consumer confidence in the wake of the first oil
shock. "Even if, with rediscovered growth," the president of the CNPF wrote, "the French
have returned for a time to their old habits, producers and distributors should not be
deceived. The consumer in crisis is the consumer of tomorrow."599 Such a discussion of
terms of sale was also felt to be good for businessmen, who would profit from a
598 Joachim Beimowski, Zur okonomischen Analyse Allgemeiner Geschdafsbedingungen
(Munich: Verlag V. Florenz, 1989), p 15.
599 "Accord Patrons-Consommateurs," Information Consommation OR-GE-CO 16 (May-
June 1976), p 6.
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clarification of what they could and could not do. Hence in 1977 five professionals and
five representatives of consumer groups met under the auspices of the CNPF to put
together a list of abusive clauses that the CNPF distributed to its members. Paul Simonet,
president of the CNPF's Commission on Industry, Trade, and Consumption, wrote that
"for the present, concertation offers the best hope of solution."600 The goal appears to
have been to demonstrate that industry was capable of regulating itself without
government interference.
Most economic interest groups also appear to have favored the strategy adopted
by the CNPF. Consumer associations argued that all contracts should contain clauses
guaranteeing consumer rights, but felt that this could be achieved through negotiations
between industry and consumer associations. Even the communist consumer association
Indecosa-CGT argued that contracts should be negotiated in this way.60' The Paris
Chamber of Commerce and Industry also supported negotiated contracts, arguing against
government intervention on the grounds that it was likely to be incomplete, and against
court enforcement as adopted by Germany on the grounds that it would result in arbitrary
treatment. They felt that consumer groups and sectoral industry associations could draw
up model contracts that, although optional for businesses, could be advertised to
consumers by a special label.602
600 Paul Simonet, "La Commission des Clauses Abusives." Position paper (1976), p 11.
601 "39 clauses abusives a liminer," Informations Indecosa-CGT 12 (January 1986), p 2.
602 Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris. "Les clauses abusives dans les contrats
de consommation," rapport present au nom de la Commission du Commerce Intrieur
par M. Gibergues (adopted 8 April 1976), pp 7-11.
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How did direct government regulation arise if, as it seems, it was contrary to the
interests of most parties involved, including both manufacturers and consumers?603 One
explanation is that, following a deep French tradition, the legislative branch was unable to
make a decisions and so handed over responsibility to the executive.6 4 The
administrative approach did have arguments in its favor. It was felt to be faster than legal
treatment, it would permit a uniformity of application not possible through the courts, and
it was hoped that this would give the administration proficiency in developing regulation
in a new area of law. Its problems were also great, however. Underfunding made for slow
response times, which in turn gave the impression that the administration was acting in
bad faith and favoring industry interests over those of consumers.605 But the more
fundamental problem was that individual companies were simply not committed to a high
standard of consumer contracts. The French approach required that government ministries
ban consumer contract clauses one at a time. Yet individual companies were able to wage
a campaign effectively to oppose new bans. Whereas German industry saw rigorous
contract terms as a form of protection against low-quality competitors, French industry
felt that similarly rigorous terms of contract would disadvantage France's own producers.
Germany's regulatory strategy emerged from a protracted debate on standard
contract terms. Political support for a regulation of standard contract terms in Germany
was bipartisan, and crystallized in 1972, when Bavarian Minister of Justice Held (CDU)
603 Michel Trochu, Yannick Tremorin, and Pierre Berchon, "La protection des
consommateurs contre les clauses abusives: tude de la legislation frangaise du 10-1-
1978." D.P.C.I. 7/1 (March 1981), pp 37-76.
604 Maurice Prelle, "Libre propos sur la defense du consommateur contre les clauses
abusives," Gazette du Palais (22-23 September, 1978), p 3.
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proposed to the Federal Justice Ministry a legal protection of consumers against adhesion
contracts.606 Held's concern was that court treatment of adhesion contracts was so diverse
within Germany as to create uncertainty that could be damaging to the economy. He
wrote in May 1972: "We can say without exaggeration that standard form contracts have
threatened both legal security and legal equality. I have no doubt that, in view of this
situation, lawmakers must take action." 607 In 1974 the Economics Minister concurred that
"Freedom is the choice among alternatives. When I do not or cannot know the
alternatives, then the room for freedom becomes limited. Freedom is even further
restricted, when anti-competitive sales practices attempt to push the choice of consumers
in a particular direction."608 Trade and labor associations also recognized the value of
reducing the legal uncertainty associated with adhesion contracts.6 9 But different policy
actors had very different ideas about what such regulation might look like.
The ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD) decided at a legal-political congress of
their party in 1972 that the best solution would be a government-run administrative office
605 Fr6d6ric Jenny, "Les Commissions Specilis6es et le droit de la consommation," in
Communication auxjournes nationales de la consommation, December 1981. (draft) pp
3-8.
606 "Die Parteien entedecken die Verbraucher," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 31 October 1972.
607 Cited in "Die Parteien entdecken das Kleingedruckte," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 24 May
1972.
608 "Freiheit ist die Wahl unter Alternativen. Wenn ich die Alternativen nicht kenne oder
nicht kennen kann, verkiirzt schon den Freiheitsspielraum. Und er wird noch starker
eingeengt, wenn unlautere Geschiiftspraktiken die Wahl des Verbrauchers in bestimmter
Weise festzulegen suchen." Dr. Hans Friderichs (Bundesminister fr Wirtschaft),
"Aufgaben der Verbraucherpolitik," in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der
Bundesregierung 146 (5 December 1974), p 1465.
609 Marianne Schatz-Bergfeld, Verbraucherinteressen im politischen Proze: das AGB-
Gesetz (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1984), p49.
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to certify adhesion contracts before they were promulgated.610 Labor unions affirmed the
need to certify contracts, but called instead for an independent association (Bundesanstalt
fur Verbraucherschutz) to certify standard form contracts. The SPD coalition partner, the
Free Democratic Party (FDP), did not agree with this approach. In March 1974 the
Economic Committee (Bundesfachausschuss fir Wirtschaftspolitik) of the FDP opposed
the idea of contract certification. In October 1973, the Consumer Committee in the
Economics Ministry (Verbraucherbeirat beim Bundesminister fUr Wirtschaft) also
rejected the SPD proposal. They proposed instead a strengthened judicial control of the
contents of AGBs, and a new right for consumer groups to bring law suits against unfair
contract clauses. In response, on March 1975, the Committee of the SPD Legal Working
Group (Bundesausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Juristen, or ASJ)
proposed that the certification process should be undertaken instead by the Kartellamt,
with the help of consumer associations. 61 1
The opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) also opposed the idea of a
certification office because they felt it was incompatible with the precepts of a social
market economy. Their fear was that regulation would lead to a form of price control, as
companies were increasingly monitored to ensure that they indeed offered reduced prices
for any reduction of their liability through adhesion contracting.61 2 The Technical
Commission on Consumer Protection of the Legal Working Group of the CDU
(Fachkommission Verbraucherschutz des Bundesarbeitskreises Christlich-
610 Gerd Rinck, "Die Empfehlung Allgemeiner Geschaftsbedingungen, deren Kontrolle
und Registrierung," Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 5 (1974), p 293.
611 Schatz-Bergfeld, pp 65-71.
612 Gerd Rinck, "Die Empfehlung Allgemeiner Geschiftsbedingungen, deren Kontrolle
und Registrierung," Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 5 (1974), p 293.
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Demokratischer Juristen, or BACDJ) proposed, at their meeting at of the end of 1973,
seven "Theses on the reform of standard term contracts" ('Thesen zur Reform des Rechts
der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen") in which they argued for a general legislative
clause to nullify AGBs in which the drafter abuses his freedom of contract to the
disadvantage of the buyer. Enforcement of this legal formulation would be through
granting the right to legal suits to consumer associations.
Economic interest groups in Germany also opposed the SPD project. The leading
industry group, Bund Deutscher Industrie (BDI), proposed a system for industry self-
control, and created to this end an Oversight Committee for adhesion contracts
(Gutachterausschusses fuer AGB) in December 1973 that would help to resolve consumer
disputes. The Association of German Retailers (Hauptverband Deutscher Einzelhandel, or
HDE) was concerned that regulations focused solely on consumer contracts would hurt
retailers, who would be placed at a disadvantage in relation to consumers but be given no
advantage in relation to manufacturers. The HDE proposed that each consumer center
should simply be given a lawyer in order to help settle consumer claims.613 Industry
associations (BDI and DIHT), predictably, favored restricting contract regulation to
relations with consumers.61 4 Even the central consumer association, the AgV, opposed
the SPD plan of a certification office in favor of greater legal rights to consumer
associations to pursue companies using unfair adhesion contracts, including the right to
sue companies that did not comply. 615
613 Heribert Schatz, Verbraucherinteressen im politischen Entscheidungsproze (Frankfurt:
Campus Verlag, 1984), p 66.
614 Schatz-Bergfeld, p92.
615 Erika Schork, "Geschaft mit den Geschaiftsbedingungen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung,
Thursday, 13 July 1972.
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group France Germany
Business negotiated contracts self-regulation
Government administrative review (right) administrative certification
(left)
Opposition negotiated contracts (left) legal enforcement (right)
Trade unions negotiated contracts administrative certification
Chamber of industry negotiated contracts (CCIP) negotiated contracts (DIHT)
Consumer Groups negotiated contracts legal enforcement
Outcome: administrative review legal enforcement
Figure 24. Interest group preference for consumer contract regulation in France
and Germany.
Policy formation for consumer contracts offers a microcosm of consumer interest
representation in France in Germany. Figure 24 above summarizes the preferences of
different interest groups in France and Germany on approaches to consumer contract
regulation. The most striking finding is that German economic actors were able to come
to a solution that was much closer to their own interests than were French economic
actors. The French case demonstrates the extraordinary degree of independence that the
Economics Ministry enjoyed in consumer policy formation, and the relative impotence of
producers. Even though all other interest groups agreed that negotiated contract terms
would be the best strategy, nonetheless the government proceeded with an administrative
solution.
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Product Pricing
The oil embargo in 1973 caused the French and German governments to rethink
the way in which consumer prices were set. The French government responded by
increasing the level of administrative regulation of product prices. The German
government, by contrast, left price setting largely in the hand of producers. And whereas
both governments also attempted to initiate programs to better inform consumers about
price, only France was able to mobilize political and social actors to pursue this goal
forcefully. The result has been a high level of administrative intervention in price
formation in France, and relatively great producer autonomy in Germany.
French price fixing
France has a long history of government price regulation. Authority for
government intervention in price setting is grounded in ordinances 45-1483 and 45-1484
of June 1945, which were themselves restatements of the Code of Prices ("Code des
prix") established under the occupying government in October 1940.616 These ordinances
were unusual in that they placed absolute authority over prices in the hands of the
administration, as well as full authority to deploy police or military forces to apply any
price restrictions. In principle, at least, the government could even have enforced prices
far below production costs. Although the scope of administrative prerogative in France is
uncommon, the use of price controls is by no means unusual. Sweden has applied
616 Herv6 Dumez, and Alain Jeunemaitre, Diriger lconomie: L'Etat et les prix en
France, 1936-1986 (Paris: Harmattan, 1989).
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extensive price restrictions over much of the postwar period, and even the United States
experimented with a price freeze under the Nixon administration in 1974.617
Price regulation in France began in earnest with the first burst of inflation in 1957,
and ended in 1986. During this time, two major shifts were made in the nature of price
regulation, resulting in three distinct approaches to price control. In the first period, from
1957 to September 1974, price regulation imposed a minimal burden on producers. While
the price of products already on the market could only be increased subject to direct
approval from the Ministry of Economy and Finance's Office on Competition and Price
(Direction de la concurrence et des prix), new products, by contrast, could be priced at
the discretion of the producer and required no justification based on the actual costs of
production. Producers of new products had simply to register their intended price list with
the government at least two weeks before actually putting their goods up for sale. This
permissive stance towards new products, designed to promote innovation, also had the
effect of encouraging companies to drop traditional products and reintroduce them under
new names and with slight modifications in order to be able freely to increase their
prices.
Under pressure of high inflation, new legislation in 1974 sought to fill this
innovation loophole by requiring that all new products be registered with the Office on
Competition and Price, including a justification for the proposed price. The Office then
had one month to object to the proposed price. If the company heard nothing within one
month of submission, it was free to proceed with is proposed pricing. The problem was
that the 1970s saw an extraordinary growth in product kind and number, and it quickly
617 Lars Jonung, The Political Economy of Price Controls: The Swedish Experience 1970-
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became clear that the administrative burden of this new approach was overwhelming to
both companies and the government. The government simply could not evaluate enough
proposals to have an over-all impact on inflation.
A final change was made in December 1976.618 According to the new scheme,
producers could sign a moderation agreement ("engagement de mod6ration") consenting
to price ceilings that had been previously negotiated between trade associations and the
government. These ceilings were set based on sectoral growth rates determined by the
Office on Competition and Price from production information provided by companies in
the sector. In more concentrated sectors, companies were commonly able to negotiate
price ceilings individually with the government.6 19 These agreements were not legally
binding, in the sense that companies were free to sell products above the negotiated
ceiling, but in this case they needed to apply for permission for their proposed price with
the Office on Competition and Price, as they had done before the 1976 reform. As an
increasing number of sectors agreed to moderation agreements, the total volume of price
regulations issued by the administration declined, from 137,000 in 1978, to 91,500 in
1979, to 61,300 in 1980.620
The French embrace of price control signaled a clear superposition of popular
interest over the interests of the business community. France's largest business
association, the Conseil national du patronat francais (CNPF) had long called for the
1987 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990).
618 Reinhard Angelmar, and Bernard Yon, "New Product Price Controls in France" in
Journal of Consumer Policy 2/1 (1978), pp 43-49.
619 How this information should be used in setting price levels was evidently problematic,
and higher officials in the Office on Competition and Price reportedly watched Germany
price levels closely. Jeunmaitre, pp 53-54.
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abolition of administered prices. They also opposed the negotiated ceilings introduced by
the Barre government in 1976, which they felt gave government control of prices the
spurious legitimacy of contractual consent. French unions, represented by their consumer
association OR-GE-CO, also felt that free competition rather than price restraints was the
appropriate response to rising prices: "We insist at least that the conditions of free
competition be saved, because they are, in the current state of things, the only guarantee
of the consumer." 6 2' In their view, French companies were simply not price competitive.
In a trade union survey conducted in 1969 they had found that of 8,000 companies
operating in France, only 500 had competitive prices. The rest were, in their words,
"deplorably organized."6 22 In 1976 they approved of the Barre plan to created negotiated
ceilings, which at least permitted limited competition below the negotiated level. But they
also stressed the need to attack the structural causes of inflation, which they felt meant
establishing true competition in distribution and price formation.62 3
Given that labor and management both opposed administered prices, why did
successive governments, first on the right, then on the left, support the policy? The
legitimacy of price controls derived, in part, from popular support for their use. A series
of public surveys on inflation conducted in the 1970s showed that support for price
controls increased with the growth in inflation. In 1970, 27 percent of the population
supported price controls as a means of protecting the value of the franc. Support rose to
620 "L'activit6 de la Direction G6n6rale de la concurrence et de la consommation en
1980," Revue de la concurrence et de la consommation 15 (1981), p 4.
621 "Nous insistons pour que soient au moins sauvegardees les conditions d'une libre
concurrence qui reste, dans l'etat acutel des choses, la seule garantie du consommateur."
Jacques Dubois, "Reparlons des prix...," Information Consommateur 1 (1971), p 3.
622 "Editorial," Information Consommateur 69/2 (1969), p 2.
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35 percent in 1974, 47 percent in 1976, and a peak of 76 percent in 1982. Their continued
use was also grounded, however, in a French intellectual tradition of just prices ('prix
juste'), and the economic entitlement that this implied. Price increases in 1911, for
example, led to consumer boycotts that resulted in three deaths, 136 injuries, and 396
arrests.62 4 History showed that price increases in France were likely to be attributed to a
lack of government action rather than to shifting conditions of supply and demand.
German Price Maintenance
Unlike France, Germany has traditionally granted producers extraordinary powers
to set the retail sales prices of their goods. The core of this tradition was resale price
maintenance (Preisbindung), a practice permitted in Germany until 1973, that allowed
producers to stipulate in their distribution contracts the final sales price of branded goods.
Because resale price maintenance effectively eliminated price competition among
retailers, it helped producers to establish and maintain a stable level of profitability, both
for themselves and for their distributors. While in principal such vertical collusion fell
under the scrutiny of the Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, or BKA), with whom
companies were required to register resale price maintenance contracts, the practice was
in fact rarely restricted. 62 5
With the threat of price increases from the first oil shock in 1973, the Bundestag
amended Germany's competition law (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrainkungen, or
623 Jacques Dubois, "Le plan Barre et le consommation," Information Consommation OR-
GE-CO 18 (September-October 1976), p 1.
6 2 4 Luc Bihl, Une histoire du mouvement consommateur (Paris: Editions Aubier
Montaigne, 1984), pp 214-216.
625 Norbert Reich, "Neue Tendenzen des kartellrechtlichen Verbraucherschutzes in der
BRD," Zeitschriftfiir Verbraucherpolitik 1/3 (1977), p 236.
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GWB) to prohibit resale price maintenance. This move was particularly championed by
the Ministry of Youth, Family, and Health in the expectation that retail competition
would help to hold down prices for consumer products.6 26 A similar effort had been made
in France twenty years before, in 1953, when resale price maintenance was proscribed in
conjunction with the Pinay stabilization plan to hold down consumer and industry costs.
French producers quickly found that they could effectively control resale prices, even
without resale price maintenance, through selective distribution practices. In France, the
'Fontanet' circular of March 1960 responded to this problem by advocating that
companies be prohibited from taking punitive actions, such as refusing distribution (refus
de vente), against retailers wishing to offer discounts on their products. Enforcing vertical
contractual freedom of this kind has remained a mainstay of French competition
policy. 6 27
In Germany, by contrast, the government has retained a variety of legal provisions
that continue to assist companies in influencing the sales price of their goods in the
absence of resale price maintenance. First, the 1973 amendment to the GWB amendment
did not explicitly prohibit the use of recommended prices (unverbindliche
Preisempfehlungen) as labor unions and consumer groups had called for. Two kinds of
recommended prices are still commonly used in Germany: those printed onto product
packaging (Verbraucherpreisempfehlungen), and those presented in the form of a list for
exclusive use by the retailer (Handlerpreisempfehlungen). While prices printed on
626 Katherina Focke, (Bundesminister fuir Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit),
"Verbraucherpolitik in der Marktwirtschaft," Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes
der Bundesregierung 65 (30 May 1973), p 643.
627 F. D. Boggis, "The European Economic Community," in Resale Price Maintenance,
ed. B. S. Yamey (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).
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packaging could arguably help consumers to compare prices for the same product among
several retailers, unions and consumer organizations argued that prices presented in the
form of price lists that are not seen by consumers do not offer this benefit, and instead
abet price collusion. 628
This assessment is reinforced by producer reactions to the banning of resale price
maintenance. Between 1973 and 1975, retailers report that while the overall use of
recommended prices remained nearly the same, the use of retailer price lists grew from
22 to 37 percent of their total stock, while the use of recommended prices targeted at the
consumer fell from 30 to 14 percent. The shift was most dramatic for small shops (those
with annual sales below 250,000 DM) for whom the use of retailer price lists nearly
doubled, from 22 to 42 percent of their inventory, while consumer price
recommendations fell by half, from 45 to 22 percent of inventory.629 Unable to stipulate
sales prices in their contracts, manufacturers appear to have moved to a less direct means
of enforcing price levels. Indeed the Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, or BKA), which
tracks the use of recommended prices, has essentially recognized that retail list
recommendations are tantamount to resale price maintenance. 630 But legal provisions for
restriction of effective resale price maintenance (GWB § 18 and §26 II) have been
interpreted by the BKA largely to the advantage of branded goods producers: "Protection
628 Verbraucherbeirat Jahresbericht, 1977.
629 Erich Batzer, Erich Greipl, Eugen Singer, Handhabung und Wirkung der
unverbindlichen Preisempfehlung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976), p 121.
630 Kartellamt Jahresbericht, 1975.
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of brands and distribution, not protection of the consumer, is...still the predominant
criterion for interpreting GWB regulation."631
A second group of laws restricting retail sales practice has also worked to reduce
retailers' ability to exert downward price pressure on producers. Typical of these is the
Discount Law (Rabattgesetz), enacted first in 1933, which prohibits discounts or in-kind
gifts of value greater than 5 percent of the cost of the product. The law does not prohibit
sales on, for example, over-stocked or seasonal goods--these are regulated by another
restrictive law, the Zugabeverordnung-but it does require that retailers sell goods for no
less than 95 percent of their labeled value. Practices not permissible for German retailers
under the Rabattgesetz include volume or loyalty discounts, sales inducements, coupons,
or inflated price labeling.632 The original goal of the law appears to have been to
discourage the cooperative movement and repress immigrant shop-keepers who were
willing to compete on narrow profit margins.633 More recently the law has been upheld as
a protection for consumers who might otherwise face price discrimination because they
were less able or willing to haggle with sales staff for better prices.634
The effect of the Rabattgesetz on retail pricing is two-fold. First, the Rabattgesetz
makes it easy for distributors to monitor the actual retail sales prices retailers are using.
631 "Schutz der Marke und des Vertriebsweges, nicht Schutz der Verbraucher ist, wie in
vielen Vorschriften des UWG immer noch 'vorverstandenes' Auslegungskriterium ffir
diese Vorschriften des GWB"; Norbert Reich, "Der Schutz des Verbrauchers vor
iiberh6hten Preisen und einseitigen Preiserh6hungen - das GWB als Verbrauchergesetz,"
in Verbraucher und Recht, ed. Norbert Reich, Klaus Tonner, and Hartmut Wegener
(Gottingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), pp 73-74.
632 Georg Klauer, and Helmut Seydel, Zugabeverordnung und Rabattgesetz Kommentar
(Miinchen: Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1993), pp 100-103.
633 Reuters New Service, Western Europe, March 2 1994.
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Second, producers cannot use volume or loyalty discounts to reward their good
customers-tactics that have helped retailers in other countries to consolidate their
customer base, giving them greater power in negotiating contracts with producers.
Germany's policy of industry price setting, deployed through recommended
prices and retail restrictions, was grounded in an apparent consensus of industry and
consumers. Industry, not surprisingly, strongly favored recommended prices. But
consumers, too, found them useful. A 1973 survey found that 87 percent of men and 82
percent of women favored recommended prices printed on packaging. Those who favored
it felt that it helped them to compare product prices and that it protected them against
over-reaching by retailers.635 Moreover, the peak association of German retailers
(Hauptgemeinschaft des deutschen Einzelhandels, or HDE) has argued that list
recommendations, which are not made public to consumers, assist retailers in calculating
what prices they should charge.6 36 The German parliament, in a move to appease all
parties, permitted recommended prices of both kinds.
Why, however, has the Cartel Office acquiesced to what amount to collusive
practices? A second source of legitimacy for these pricing policies derives from
Germany's dominant model of consumer protection through information. The goal of
government regulation, on this view, was to optimize economic transactions by balancing
634 Olaf Sosnitza, Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen durch die Rechtsprechung:
Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen auf dem Gebiet des Lauterkeitsrecht (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), p 144.
635 "Einstellung der Verbraucher zur Preisempfehlung," Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (May
1973), p 325.
636 The HDE also opposed recommended prices printed on packaging on the grounds that
they were damaging to retailers because they restricted their freedom.Norbert Reich,
"Neue Tendenzen des kartellrechtlichen Verbraucherschutzes in der BRD," Zeitschriftfiur
Verbraucherpolitik 1/3 (1977), pp 237-241.
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the position of market actors through increased transparency.5 7 Consistent with this
view, the central concern of the BKA in respect both to recommended prices and to the
Rabattgesetz has been price transparency. Their concern with recommended prices was
primarily been manufacturers would label product packaging with artificially elevated
recommendations ('Mondpreisen'), thereby permitting retailers to offer apparently
attractive reductions from the manufacturer's price.638 The confusion that this would
cause for consumers was seen as dangerously misleading for consumers.
Similarly, he predominant argument in favor of the Rabattgesetz was that without
it, retailers would increase products' labeled prices so that they could offer consumers
greater nominal discounts without affecting their profitability. Even the peak consumer
association, the AgV, which might normally be expected to oppose the restrictive
Rabattgesetz, argued that its elimination could result in an 20-30 percent increase in
consumer prices. In the words of the head of Germany's peak consumer association
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher, or AgV) Helmut Lenders, "that would be totally
impenetrable for the consumer." 639 Arguments for the consumer interest in Germany
were grounded on the concept that market transparency was the best means to secure
consumer protection.
Consumer Activism over Product Price
France and Germany both imposed regulations in the 1970s to ensure that all
consumer products were displayed with their prices in order to facilitate comparative
637 Frangois Souty, La Politique de la concurrence en Allemagne Fidrale (Paris: Presses
Universitaire de France, 1996), pp 110-115.
638 "Verbraucherpolitik nicht nur als Feuerwehr'," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 13 March 1973.
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shopping. In Germany, the 1973 Price Information Act (Preisangabenverordnung)
accompanied the prohibition on resale price maintenance, as retailers were in principle
allowed to offer the same goods for different prices. In France, product labeling was
required by administrative decree in 1971 and reinforced through supporting regulation in
1976. In both countries, clear price labeling was seen to be a key in holding down retail
prices. But whereas in France this new emphasis on comparative price shopping enjoyed
enthusiastic endorsement from both government and consumer organizations, similar
efforts by consumer organizations and the government in Germany were quickly faltered.
Price Activism in France-In France, the move in 1976 to a system of free price
competition below negotiated price ceilings opened the way for greater price competition
between companies operating below those ceilings. To emphasize this, the government of
Raymond Barre undertook a number of projects to ensure that consumers had access to
adequate information about product prices. In November 1977, for example, Barre
announced a four-month series of state-sponsored radio shows that would provide a
forum for callers to report on their strategies for finding inexpensive products. The goal
was to help consumers shop more wisely in order to put a check on abusive increases in
prices. In the words of the newly-appointed Secretary of Consumption: "Every idea helps
us to better defend your budget."64 The theme was repeated in 1979 when the Economics
Minister, Michel Monory, called on consumers to compare prices before buying in order
to help hold down inflation.641
639 "Das wird fUr den Verbraucher v1llig undurchsichtig." Wulf Petzoldt, "'Mondpreise'
mit schwindelerregenden Rabatten," Vorwarts 13, 22 March 1984.
640 Rosemonde Pujol, "Campagne d'information: "Acheter mieux - deposer moins,"
Figaro, 15 Nov 1977.
641 Luc Bihl, "Le contre-pouvoir des consommateurs," Le Monde, 5 Dec 1979.
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Consumer groups in France were enthusiastic supporters of price labeling and
comparative price shopping, and they frequently mobilized their participants to visit
stores in order to evaluate the extent to which the pricing regulations were being heeded.
A study conducted in Paris in June 1976 found that 28 percent of retailers and 30 percent
of service providers failed to display the price of their goods or services. The worst
offenders included furniture stores (52 %), florists (56 %), and pharmacies (74 %).642 The
scale of these price surveys ('relev6s de prix') could be enormous. During the week
beginning on 20 November 1979, for example, 1 10 local affiliates of the Federal
Consumers Union (Union fd6rale des consommateurs, or UFC) surveyed 27,735 stores
in 160 cities in France. Mobilized under the slogan 'not seen not bought' ("Pas vu pas
pris"), they found that 38 percent of the stores they visited had not displayed prices on
their products.643
Unsatisfied with the level of consumer awareness of product price, the Ministry of
Consumption under the new Socialist government in 1983 initiated a pilot project in the
Region Nord-Pas de Calais to offer consumers objective comparative information on
product prices. Cooperating with the Regional Council on Consumption (Conseil regional
de la consommation, or CRC) in Lille, they established 100 computer terminals
accessible to the public on which product price information was made available to
consumers. These local centers for price information (Centres locaux d'information sur
les prix, or CLIP) accounted for 60 percent of the Ministry of Consumption's yearly
budget. They were also relatively well received by consumers. A survey conducted in
642 "La publicit6 des prix a l'6gard des consommateurs," Note Documentaire, Direction
g3nerale de la concurrence et des prix, 4 June 1976.
643 "Une enquete de l'Union f6ddrale des consommateurs," Le Monde, 12 Dec 1979.
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1986 by the CRC of Lille found that 85 percent of the population of the region knew of
the program, compared with only 30 percent in 1984. Of those, 40 percent stated that they
used the information for purchases (33.6 percent of the total population). Furthermore, 22
percent of the users reported shifting to products that were less expensive, and 18 percent
reported shifting to retailers that were reported to be less expensive.644 A survey of
retailers found that 64 percent favored the program, 54 percent felt the price information
was useful for their business, and 13 percent reported using CLIP information to set their
own sales prices. Over half of the retailers felt that CLIP had an impact on their
consumers, although only 34 percent reported that consumers used this information
directly in their product choice.645 Five new CLIP regions were included in France's five
year plan of 1984, with each of these sites offered a grant of 5 million francs from the
federal government to be matched by an equal contribuzion from the regional
governments.646 These centers still function today.
German Consumer Education - Germany in 1973 saw the beginnings of a similar
collaboration between the government and consumer groups to raise public awareness
about price, but unlike France this effort quickly faltered. In one such effort, in the
summer of 1973, Germany's Social-Democratic Party (SPD) launched a program for
consumer education ("Verbraucheraufldarung") with the goal of better informing citizens
about prices and price formation. As a part of this program Germany's peak consumer
association (Argeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher, or AgV) sponsored two busses to
travel to sixty cities in Germany under the slogan "Together for Reasonable Prices." They
644 "CLIP de Lille," Consommateurs Actualitis 523 (17 October 1986): 16.
645 "CLIP: Impact sur les commerqants," Consommateurs Actualitis 538 (13 February
1987), p 2 5.
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handed out brochures, showed films, and offered computerized tests that measured
consumers' knowledge of prices.
More controversial was the project "Aktion gelber Punkt" (yellow dot protest)
which was initiated by the publicity department of the SPD and pursued most
enthusiastically by the SPD's Young Socialists faction.647 The yellow dot referred to
yellow stickers that were attached, as a call to boycott, to the display windows of stores
that offered particularly high prices. The program had been modeled on the "Rote-Punkt-
Aktionen" of the late 1960, in which leftist community organizations used red labels to
protest price increases in local transportation. Memory of these "Rote-Punkt-Aktionen,"
which had called out the first consumer boycotts in post-war Germany, lent a radical tone
to the SPD's new project.648
This attempt to create a politics of price in Germany was supported by labor but
strongly opposed by business. Retailers felt particularly threatened by the SPD action,
and in what was called the "greatest ever sign of retail solidarity" launched a counter-
campaign against the government's program. Retailers carried posters that read,
"Retailers also oppose rising prices. We favor stability!" 649 The association of branded
products called the Aktion Gelber Punkt "Consumer politics in the mode of class
conflict" ("Verbraucherpolitik in Klassenkampfmanier"). The peak employers association
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbainde, or BDA) launched a campaign
against the SPD program under the slogan "Gelber Punkt - roter Markt - toter Markt'
646 "Le prix de l'information," Consommateurs Actualitds 517 (5 September 1986), p 4.
647 Herbert Kremp, "Zielpunkt Unternehmer," Die Welt, 11 October 1973.
648 "Autofahrer gegen 1lkonzerne -- Boykott letzte Waffe der Konsumenten," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 24 July 1982.
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("Yellow dot - red mark - dead market"), in which they claimed that the goal of the SPD
was to dismantle the free market altogether: "The goal of the yellow dot is apparently to
eliminate the market economy."650
By the fall of 1973, under strong business attack, the SPD began drawing away
from price as a political issue. In October 1973, SPD leader Holger Bmrner assured the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag, or DIHT) that
the "Aktion Gelber Punkt" was not an attack on the market system. He explain that the
party had switched from wage formation as the cause of inflation and towards price
formation because they felt that companies had increased prices more than was required
by wage increases. 65 At the same time, Martin GrUner, the Parliamentary State Secretary
for the Economics Ministry, confirmed that price controls were not compatible with
Germany's market economy. He did, however, affirm the usefulness of protests that have
the goal of informing consumers about price increases and alternative product choices.65 2
Nonetheless SPD support for price boycotts ended with the start of 1974.
Why did price politics flourish in France but miscarry in Germany? The
explanation lies in part in the different strategies of consumer organiz:ions in the two
countries. Whereas French consumer groups enjoyed a broad and activist local
membership, the key German consumer groups had, and continue to have, only a token
number of individual members. French groups, therefore, were able to mobilize an
649 "Auch der Einzelhandel ist gegen steigende Preise Wir sind fr StabilitAt!" Wolfgang
H. Glockner, "Aktion 'Gelber Punkt' - Ins Rote verflscht," Vorwdrts, 18 October 1973.
650 "Der Gelbe Punkt jedoch will offenbar weg von dieser Marktwirtschaft, will sie
umstrukturiem, aushohlen, verplanen!" "SPD beschwichtigt Unternehmer," Siddeutsche
Zeitung, 13 October 1973.
651 Ibid.
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enormous membership to undertake the daunting task of price surveys. German consumer
groups, because they could not hope to mobilize consumers on this scale, quickly found
that the politics of price lay outside of their organizational capacities.653
For the governments, the difference appears to stem most strikingly from different
conceptions about the role of the government in securing low prices for consumers. In
France, governments on both the right and left were willing to inform consumers about
price with the idea that consumers themselves could play a role in holding down inflation.
Since price had always been an arena of government action in France, providing
comparative price information was seen merely as an extension of this responsibility. In
Germany, by contrast, the goal of the SPD in launching their Consumer Education
campaign appears to have been to convince the general public that prices were being set
by business and not by the government. Rather than trying to control price increases, in
other words, the SPD was trying to distance itself from blame for growing inflation. An
internal document of the SPD made this argument clearly: "The state does not create
prices. Industry decides about at least 80 percent of price creation. In addition we must
consider the multiple anti-competitive practices, that have been common up until now.
Both of these facts should make it clear, who really sets prices."6 54 Prices in Germany, in
652 "Auch Verbraucher k6nnen Stabilitatsbeitrag leisten," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 9 October
1973.
653 Hartwig Piepenbrock, "Die Legitimation der Verbraucherverbainde zur Wahmehmung
von Verbraucherinteressen," inVerbraucherpolitik Kontrovers, ed. Hartwig Piepenbrock
and Conrad Schroeder (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987), p 101.
654 "Der Stadt macht im wessentlichen die Preise nicht. Die Unternehmer entscheiden
,ber mindestens 80 prozent der Preisentwicklung. Zusatzlich hat man dabei die Vielzahl
von wettbewerbsfeindlichen Praktiken zu bedenken, die bisher ,blich sind. Beides sollte
endgltig klarmachen, wer die Preise wirklich macht." "SPD bereitet eine Kampagne
gegen Unternehmer vor," Die Welt, 7 September 1973.
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other words, were set in the production sphere, through the process of wage negotiation
and concerted action, not through any policy under control of the government.
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Conclusion. The Political Economy of Consumption
This research has explored a large and growing body of regulation that governs
the consumer marketplace for products. These regulations set the terms on which product
information and risk are distributed between producer and consumer. They also impose
standards for specific aspects of consumer products such as design, pricing, and the terms
of retail sale. This research, which focused on eight kinds of product market regulation in
France and Germany, has found that these countries have adopted coherent but distinctive
national strategies for regulating product markets. France has adopted a strategy of
insulating consumers from product market risk that corresponds to the legal principle of
caveat venditor, let the seller beware. Germany has adopted a strategy of providing
consumers with highly accurate information in order better to protect themselves in the
marketplace. This approach corresponds to the legal principle of caveat emptor, let the
buyer beware. These systematic approaches to product market regulation constitute
national consumption regimes.
French and German approaches to regulating the consumer marketplace have
been driven in turn by ideas that emerged in both countries in the 1970s about the role of
consumers in society. In Germany consumers were perceived primarily as economic
actors, on a par with producers and suppliers in the marketplace. This view of the
consumer identity led Germany to pursue the consumer interest by working to eliminate
market failures. To this end they increased consumer information, imposed fair
conditions of market exchange, and ensured an equal distribution of market risk. In
France consumers were perceived primarily as political actors, enjoying political rights
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on a par with worker rights. This view of consumer identity led France to pursue the
consumer interest by creating and enforcing new political rights, encouraging the
mobilization of consumers, and intervening to protect consumers from market
externalities. For Germany, the consumer was perceived essentially as another producer;
for France, the consumer was perceived as a new political constituency.
These conceptions of the consumer identity and role in society did not emerge
from deep national traditions, but instead had their origins in the political debate that
arose beginning in the early 1970s around consumer protection policies. At this time,
three different ideas about the role of the consumer in society contended for control of the
policy discourse in each country. One model, based roughly on the experience of the
United States, saw the consumer as citizen with strong political rights to protection
against the negative consequences of modern products and production. This protection
model came to dominate in France. A second model, based roughly on the Swedish
experience with consumer protection in the 1960s, saw consumers as a new interest group
in society that could negotiate on its own behalf with industry. This negotiation model
was considered as a policy model in both France and Germany but was eventually
rejected by each. The third model, based roughly on the British experience in the 1960s,
saw the consumer as an economic actor whose problems emerged from market failures.
This information model emphasized the need to better inform consumers so that they
could act knowledgeably in the consumer marketplace. In the initial stages of the
consumer protection movements in France and Germany, all three of these policy models
were in play.
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Which policy model came to dominate in France and in Germany depended on the
organization and interplay of consumer and producer interests. In France, where
consumer groups were highly mobilized and industry interests were poorly coordinated,
consumers enjoyed greater political leverage than producers. They were in general able to
push for their preferred protection policy against the interests of industry. In Germany, by
contrast, consumer groups did not cultivate a strong grass-roots mobilization, and
industry was extremely well organized to pursue its policy interests. Hence German
industry was able to push its preferred policy model over the policy preferences of
consumer groups. In the ensuing struggle over which policy model would dominate
product market regulation, French consumer groups and German industry organizations
came to dominate the debate in their respective countries.
The different national consumption regimes that emerged from these political
struggles are likely to have an enduring impact, not only on consumers but also on
producers. Germany's strategy of emphasizing accurate consumer information, for
example, gives consumers the capability to purchase higher quality goods. France's
strategy of insulating consumers from the risks inherent in consumer product markets has
diminished the need of consumers to purchase high quality goods, while increasing their
willingness to experiment with radically new kinds of products. Furthermore, because
producers look to the nature of consumer demand in making decisions about product
development, the difference in consumption regimes in France and Germany places a
pressure on producers in each country to pursue differing product strategies. The result
has been to push French producers towards lower quality but more innovative products,
while pushing German producers towards higher quality but less innovative products.
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Implications for Public Policy and Comparative Politics Research
The distinctiveness of national patterns of product market regulation suggests a
significant departure from conventional thinking in contemporary political economy in
three respects. First, industry decisions that had previously resided entirely in the private
sphere, including strategies of innovation and product quality, have now come under the
indirect influence of government regulation. This finding is at odds with conventional
accounts of the deregulation of industry. Indeed what we see as deregulation might more
accurately be interpreted as a shift in regulation away from the conditions of labor and
capital markets and towards the conditions of products and product markets. Far from
retracting, political intervention in the economy may, from this perspective, actually be
growing. Industries that we commonly consider to be dynamic and competitive, such as
the automobile or drug industries, in fact work within a dense system of product market
regulations that shape and stabilize the domestic markets for their goods.
A second implication of this research is the growing impact of national product
market regulations on the trade of goods and the flow of capital. Nationally distinctive
product market regulations pose significant non-tariff barriers to trade. Their
distinctiveness arises primarily from domestic economic and political concerns rather
than from a specific effort to block trade. This means that even countries intent on free
trade are likely to face difficulties in harmonizing their consumption regimes. This poses
a particular challenge for the European Union, which has attempted to harmonize national
product market regulations through a panoply of directives. To date, domestic
constituencies of European Union member states have generally proved unwilling to alter
significantly the nature of product market regulations within their countries.
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Finally, because the politics of product market regulation is overwhelmingly a
domestic issue, the distinctive national consumption regimes that emerge within each
national regulatory framework will probably continue to drive a wedge between national
strategies of production. Producers' priorities are increasingly set by the customers they
serve. Most companies still design and market their products overwhelmingly for
domestic consumers. And the market behavior of domestic consumers is shaped by the
regulatory framework in which they function. This means that increasingly global trade in
goods and services will not necessarily entail a convergence in production strategies
across countries. Each country may rather come to specialize in the kind of production
favored by the conditions of its local markets, as distinctive domestic demand conditions
become the source of comparative advantage for producers in that country. Not only can
distinctive national consumption regimes be expected to impede globalization by posing
enduring non-tariff barriers to trade, but they also may tend to perpetuate the
distinctiveness of national production strategies in the face of more fluid labor and capital
markets.
Beyond its relevance for our understanding of business-government relations in
an age of globalization, this project also suggests some important research possibilities
for the study of comparative politics in general. First, for researchers studying national
industrial strategy and national varieties of capitalism, my findings emphasize the need to
focus not only on the supply side of production, including the institutions of labor and
capital provision, but also to look more closely at the channels and regulatory form of
retailing and consumption. The distinctive form of post-production regulations in any
sector may play a contributory or even decisive role in setting the strategic priorities of
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producers. The independent impact of demand-side regulatory institutions will be
especially important as the distinctiveness of national supply-side features (labor and
capital) erode under the homogenizing pressures of globalization.
This suggests at least three potentially fruitful directions for future study. First,
research into national consumption regimes might usefully incorporate other institutions
that help to structure national consumption, including consumer payment and borrowing
systems, and a more detailed analysis of product distribution channels. Second, because
economically powerful industrial sectors such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals have
typically been able to create their own dedicated regulatory frameworks, research into the
regulation of these specific product markets could help to deepen our understanding of
the coherency and potential variation within national consumption regimes. Finally,
European efforts to harmonize a wide range of product market regulations in the context
of the European Union offer a natural experiment to test the rigidity or plasticity of
national consumption regimes.
The second contribution of this research to the study of comparative politics more
broadly is the emphasis it places on the mechanisms of radical policy change rather than
on the mechanisms of policy continuity. Through analysis of the emergence of product
market regulations beginning in the 1970s, this research proposes a methodological
counterpoint to the emphasis of conventional institutional analysis on explaining
continuity. It posits that some-although certainly not all-kinds of policy change occur
in a discontinuous way, and that in radically new areas of policy ideas become politically
contested. This kind of radical policy change has been noted in past research by Anne
Swidler, Hugh Heclo, Stephen Krasner, and others, but these authors have taken it as a
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justification for discarding, rather than extending, institutional analysis. My research
finds that institutions and interests continue to play a formative role even in instances of
radical policy innovation. In cases of radically new policy, competing ideas about how
the new policy area should be regulated become politically contested. Interest groups then
compete over which idea will come to dominate policy formation. Thus in new areas of
policy, conflicting interests focus on which policy model will come to dominate the
regulatory discourse once the period of radical innovation has passed.
This contested ideas approach to comparative policy analysis captures the
political dynamics of radical policy change more faithfully than do traditional interest-
based or institutional explanations. First, by focusing on the role of ideas, this approach
underscores the extraordinary capacity for creativity in the implementation of new
policies. Innovative thinkers can play a central role in pushing for policy change. The
ideas they generate about possible avenues of change can convince other social actors
that constructive change is possible or necessary. Second, however, this approach
emphasizes the institutional limits on what ideas for policy change are likely to succeed
within a given national context. This means that good policy ideas are highly contextual,
and depend on the interplay of domestic interests and institutions. Ideas for policy change
that work well in one country may fail in another, not because they are misunderstood,
but rather because they do not conform to the play of organized preferences in the new
institutional context.
The Impact of Product Market Regulation on Traditional Production
This dissertation has documented a rapid growth in government creation of
product market regulations in France and Germany. Such regulations have become a
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pervasive and apparently permanent feature of the production environment in which
companies operate. Moreover, these new regulations are likely to have an economic
impact, both on trade-in the form of non-tariff barriers to trade-and on production
strategies-through their impact on the market choices of consumers. The growth of
product market regulation thereby poses significant obstacles to what Konichi Omae has
described as the "borderless world" of global capitalism.6 55 But what does the growth and
persistence of product market regulation mean for industrial production?
One possibility is that it signals an entirely novel mode of production, one
characterized by a growing emphasis on consumers as a source of product design and
innovation and a corresponding decline in attention to managerial or technology-driven
production strategies. One sign of this change is that industries oriented towards
consumer markets-retailing, advertising, marketing-have become increasingly
important and powerful in the modern product value chain.656 Ben Fine, for example, has
argued that the knowledge and experience that consumers bring to the marketplace
should be considered a central component of the production process. This consumer input
to the production process he labels "consumer capital," putting it on a par with labor
capital and investment capital as an input to production. 6 57 Wesley Cohen, in a 1995
survey of innovation in US companies, found that over 70 percent of product design
departments identified consumers, usually end consumers, as the single most important
655 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked
Economy (New York: Harper Business, 1990).
656 Frank Mort, "The Politics of Consumption," in New Times: The Changing Face of
Politics in the 1990s, ed. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1989), p 166.
657 Ben Fine, "From Political Economy to Consumption," in Acknowledging
Consumption, ed. Daniel Miller (London: Routledge, 1995), pp 131-139.
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source of new product ideas.658 The implication is that consumer demand, like labor and
capital, has become an important factor of production.
As corporate strategies have gradually refocused on consumer preferences, actual
product manufacturing has increasingly been outsourced to manufacturing specialists.
Michael Borrus and John Zysman have found that high technology firms increasingly
contract out the entire product design and manufacturing function, relying for their
competitive advantage on "open-but-owned" product standards. In their view,
manufacturing has become a turn-key operation that can be hired out by any firm, since
competitive advantage lies in product standards.65 9 Similar trends have been observed in
lower technology industries such as clothing and food, where management policies are
increasingly dictated by retailers and marketers, whose authority derives from their
proximity to the consumer.660 Bennett Harrison notes that such corporations typically
adopt a two-tier system of production in which small sub-contractors in low wage
countries undertake actual manufacturing, while high-paid managers in global companies
manage design, distribution, and innovation-i.e., those functions relating to consumer
market creation and maintenance.661
This integration of consumer markets into production itself suggests a broader
historical interpretation of the role of product market regulations addressed in this
658 Wesley Cohen, Presentation at the Faculty Seminar Series of the Industrial
Performance Center, MIT, Spring 1996.
659 Michael Borrus, and John Zysman, "'Wintelism' and the Changing terms of Global
Competition: Prototype of the Future," BRIE working paper (February, 1997).
660 Frank Mort, "The Politics of Consumption," New Times: The Changing Face of
Politics in the 1990s, Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques eds. ( London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1989), p 166.
661 Bennett Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in
the Age of Flexibility (Basic Books, New York, 1994).
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research. In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi argued that the notion of free
markets for the factors of production-labor, capital, and raw materials-rested on the
fiction that these inputs to production were commodities.662 Because the idea of treating
labor or capital as a commodity rested on a social fiction (labor was never really a
commodity) Polanyi argued that the creation of free labor and capital markets also
necessarily evoked a counter-movement in favor of re-regulation. My research suggests
that a similar analysis may hold true for product markets. From this perspective, the
attempt to create free product markets in the immediate post-World War H period appears
to have evoked a regulatory counter-movement intended to protect consumers and
producers against the adverse consequences of treating consumer products as simple
commodities. The resulting growth in government regulation of product markets, and the
national consumption regimes that these regulations have created, have helped to
structure and stabilize product markets while also protecting consumers from the dangers
of unregulated markets for goods.
This shifting conception of the consumer in the marketplace emerges clearly from
the intellectual tradition of post-war consumption. Prior to the 1970s, consumers were
seen to play a largely passive role as receptacles of production.663 John Kenneth Galbraith
warned that as consumers became more wealthy, and therefore more removed from
662 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1944), pp 130-
162.
663 See for example: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, "The culture industry:
enlightenment as mass deception" in Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum,
1944), p 142. "What is decisive today is...the necessity inherent in the system not to leave
the customer alone, not for a moment to allow him any suspicion that resistance is
possible. The principle dictates that he should be shown all his needs as capable of
fulfillment, but that those needs should be so predetermined that he feels himself to be the
eternal consumer, the object of the culture industry."
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physical need, they would also become more susceptible to management through
advertising and marketing by producers. Faced with saturated markets and falling
demand, Galbraith argued that companies could create new "false needs" that would
serve to maintain a stable level of consumer demand. Indeed he saw advertising as a
useful method of market control, a sort of privately managed Keynesianism. "The
consequence [of advertising and marketing] is that while goods become ever more
abundant, they do not seem to be any less important."664 Keynesian demand management
itself was grounded on the premise that consumer demand was manipulable, not only by
companies but also by the government.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the work of neo-classical economists led by
Gary Becker had begun to unravel Galbraith's image of the docile consumer. Instead of
treating consumers as the receptacles of industrial production, Becker reconceived
consumer decisions as analogous to production decisions. In the same way that
companies made strategic choices about the optimal combination of labor and capital
necessary for each product, so did the consumer, in Becker's view, make strategic
choices about how to dispose of his or her own basic resources of money and time.665
This view implied that consumer decisions about products were not simple reflections of
advertised goods, but resulted instead from an effort by consumers to maximize basic
values such as happiness and prosperity given their personal resource constraints.
Michel de Certeau has suggested that consumers may be able to subvert the goals
of producers even in the case of mass-marketed goods through creative approaches to
664 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1985), pp 210, 218.
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everyday practice. The central insight for de Certeau, similar to Gary Becker's
reconception of the consumption function in economics, is that the consumer undertakes
an activity of clandestine production in the creative use of a product that is distinct from,
but identical in its social meaning to, the construction of the product and its market space
by industry.666 His argument suggests that the consumer space can never be fully mapped,
and therefore never dominated by producers. Consumer's subvert the structure and power
of the productive economy by a strategic, interpretive use of everyday products. The
French baguette, to take only one example, appeared first only in the 1950s in response to
consumer protest against manufactured foods and a growing consumer taste for crusty
breads. Product market regulations have in many cases helped to make this kind of
experimentation possible. French product safety regulations, for example, require
producers to ensure the safety of their products under any foreseeable use of the product.
This new focus on the productive role of consumers has generated an academic
cottage industry for re-evaluating traditional productionist arguments in terms of
consumer innovations. Colin Campbell revisits Max Weber's analysis of the Protestant
ethic to ask who purchased the goods that were produced by early Calvinists. He finds
that the ascetic revolution caused by the Protestant ethic that Weber describes was
accompanied by a romantic revolution in tastes that helped to drive consumer derr- ad for
ostentatious goods. The roots of industrialization, in other words, must be understood not
only as a fundamental shift in attitudes toward production, but also as a similarly
665 Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976).
666 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, translated by Steven Rendall
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p 31.
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fundamental shift in attitudes toward consumption.667 Grant McKracken has argued that
an influx of consumer goods in the 16'h century created an inflation in consumption that
was analogous to the monetary inflation caused by the influx of gold from the
Americas.668 Rosalind Williams, in her study of 19'h Century France, has argued that the
picturesque expositions, department stores, colonial displays, and other forms of
exoticism all stimulated consumer demand for new kinds of products.669
What these accounts share is a vision of the consumer as an active participant in
economic life, one whose actions can neither be imputed to outside causes nor understood
simply as the receptacle of industrial commodities. Like labor and capital, they add value
to production through creative or informed decisions about product choice. Moreover,
like the market for labor and capital, the market for consumer goods is also only
apparently a free market. So long as demand for consumer goods remained high and
consumers were relatively undiscriminating, consumer products could be traded as if they
were commodities in a genuinely free marketplace. Yet growing market saturation
combined with an increasing apprehension about the safety and utility of new products
revealed the risks of treating consumer products merely as commodities. Consumers
could simply refuse to purchase new products, or alternatively purchase products from
foreign manufacturers.
667 Colin Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modem Consumerism (New
York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p 130.
668 Grant McKracken, Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic
Character of Consumer Goods and Activities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1988), p 5.
669 Rosalind Williams, "The Dream World of Mass Consumption," in Rethinking Popular
Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies, ed. Chandra Mukerji and
Michael Schudson (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), pp 204-
205.
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From this perspective, the growing importance of consumers to the continued
profitability of industry worked to increased the political weight behind the consumer
movement. On the one hand, producers in the 1970s came to realize that if consumer
demand for new kinds of products was to be sustained, it had to be regulated in some
way. On the other hand, consumer groups, especially in the wake of the first oil shock,
came to be regarded as critical participants in the industrial economy. Industries that had
previously created their own rules now faced growing political pressure to conform to
new legal standards of consumer protection and information. In this sense, national
product market regulations emerged as the logical counterpart to the increasingly
important role of consumers in production.
Product market regulation might therefore be understood as a set of neo-
Keynesian mechanisms of demand manipulation. Relying on micro-institutions rather
than macro-economic controls, these new forms of demand management exert an
unprecedented level of government control over industry decisions in strategic areas such
as product design, labor practices, and innovation. As this research has shown, the nature
of these product market institutions has, to date, been dictated largely by country-specific
conceptions of the consumer identity that grew in turn out of the organization of
consumer and producer interests in the country. Yet the growing impact that these
product market regulations have on production strategies suggests at least the possibility
that they could be employed to serve as delicate tools of a new demand management at
the sectoral level. Any step in this direction must begin with the understanding that
product market regulations are nationally distinctive, economically powerful, and
politically constructed.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Timeline of Events
Year Date Country Event
1891
1896
1905
1919
1935
1 Aug
1936
1953 Sep
1956 28 Nov
1959
1960 Mar
1962
1963 Apr
1964
1964 4 Dec
1964
1965
1966
1966 22 Nov
1968 9 Feb
1968
1968 Jan
1971
1972
1972 27 Oct
1972
1972 Feb
1972 22 Dec
1973
1973
1973 3 Aug
1973 10 May
1973 27 Dec
Germany
Germany
France
Germany
France
US
Germany
Germany
France
France
US
France
UK
Germany
France
Germany
US
Germany
Germany
Germany
France
France
Germany
US
US
France
France
Japan
UK
Germany
Germany
France
First Sunday and Holiday prohibition on store opening
Gesetz zur Bekaimpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs
Act of 1905 on fraud and falsification
Stores open Mon - Sat until 7pm
founding of the Bureau de Verification de la Publicit6
(BVP)
Consumer Union created
Verbraucherzentrale created under name 'Neue
Hauswirtschaft'
Ladenschlussgesetz enacted
opening of the first supermarkets
'fontanet' circular proposes interdiction of refus de vente
President Kennedy's speech
prices fixed on 80 industrial and food products
abolition of Resale Price Maintenance
Warentest Stiftung Created
opening of first hypermarket (2600 m2)
consumer associations given Klagerecht to enforce the
UWG
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sect 402 A - strict liability
under tort law
Verbraucherschutzverein e.V. founded
Deutsche Normungausschuss (DNA) created
Geratesicherheitsgesetz (Equipment Safety Act)
value added tax extended to commerce
BVP board of directors broadened
Deutscher Werberat created
Consumer Product Safety Act
U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
product prices must be posted in stores
loi de d6marchage et falsification
Consumer Product Safety Law
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
Novellierung des Kartellrechtes
Verordnung uiber Preisangaben
Royer Law on Consumer Protection and Information,
including art. 44 on publicit6 trompeuse
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I
1973
1974
1974
1974 Sep
1975
1975 9 Dec
1976 24 Aug
1976
1976 16 Sep
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1978
Feb
1 Apr
Nov
10 Jan
1978 23 Mar
1978 Jun
1978
1980 Jun
1980
1981
1981 Aug
1983 21 Jul
1984
1985
1986
1988
1989
25 Jul
1 Dec
5 Jan
Oct
1990 1 Jan
1993 Apr
1993 26 Jul
1994 1 Jul
EU International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) created the
International Code of Advertising Practice
Germany Lebensmittel- und Bedarfgegenstande-Gesetz (Statute
concerning food and other goods of general use
Germany Abzahlungsgesetz (allows consumers to return products)
Germany Textilkennzeichnungsgesetz - clothes labeled by content
US Consumer Goods Pricing Act signed by Ford
Germany Bundesgerichthof decides for Warentest in Ski binding
evaluation
Germany Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts
France development of distributor brands in hypermarkets
France prices of all products and services fixed, to fight inflation
(plus salary limits)
UK Unfair Contract Terms Act
France Group Interminist6iel de la Consommation formed
Germany AGB in force
France Price controls placed on Croissants
Germany Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Produktinformation, DPGI
UK Consumer Safety Act
France lois 'Scrivener': 78-22 on consumer credit; 78-23 on
clauses abusives
France Decree making illegal 4 abusive contract terms
France almost total liberalization of the price of industrial and food
products
France opening of first 'maxidiscomte' (hard discount) stores
France creation of the Commission de Concertation
Consommateurs/CNP by the CNP
France boycott of 'viande de veau' led by l'Union Frangaise des
Consommateurs (UFC)
EU Second Consumer Action Program
France loi "Lang" instituant un prix unique pour le vente des livres
France loi on scurit6 des consommateurs
France French bank networks sign accord launching the Carte
Bleue
EU Product Liability Directive (95/374/EEC)
France abbrogation of 1945 ordonnances, price freedom confirmed
France law on the actions of consumer associations
EU EC Commission Proposal for a Directive on General
Product Safety
Germany German Product Liability Act (Dec 1989, passed)
EU EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
adopted
France Code de la consommation
Japan Product Liability Law enacted (1 July 1995 in force)
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Appendix 2. French Consumer Publications and their Circulation, 1972-1980.
(thousands)
group journal name 1972670 1974671 1980672
AFOC Les cahiers de I'AFOC - - 750
APF syndicale 20
CNAPF Combat familial fiches 3 35
CNFR Families rurales 5
CSCV Cadre de Vie - - 60
CSF Nous 20 20 22
FFF Families de France 40 40 54
FNCC Le cooperateur de France 400 1,500 800
FNAFR Flash - - 40
INC 50 millions de consommateurs 250 280 350
Labocoop Bulletin d'information du labo-coop 7.5 12 15
ORGECO Objectif mieux vivre67 6 8
Information Consommateur 30
UFC Que Choisir? 100 200 300w
UFCS Dialoguer 15 15 15
UNAF Bulletin de liaison mensuel 6 8 10
total 772.5 2,123 2136
( 1979)
670 Dominique Pons, Consomme et tais-toi (Paris: Epi, 1972), pp 119-123.
671 Michel Bernard, and Jacqueline Quentin, L'avant-garde des consommateurs: Luttes et
organisations en France et a l'etranger (Paris: Editions ouvrieres, 1975), p 87-91.
672 Un monde en mouvement: les organisations de consommation (Paris: Ministere de
l'6conomie -- comit6 national de la consommation, September, 1980), pp 16-71.
673 Formerly Information-Consommation.
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Appendix 3. Federal and State Support for Consumer Centers
(Verbraucherzentrale) in Germany, 1981.
Federal Expenditur
Founding Advisory support State support e per
date sites (millions (millions resident
DM) DM) (DM)
Baden 1958 7 0.96 1.04 0.24
Wurttemberg
Bayern 1959 14 0.98 1.03 0.19
Berlin 1953 1 0.56 0.63 0.67
Bremen 1964 2 0.46 0.47 1.28
Hamburg 1949 1 0.51 0.61 0.90
Hessen 1958 9 0.88 1.08 0.37
Niedersachsen 1958 17 1.08 1.18 0.42
Nordrhein- 1958 36 1.30 7.46 0.59
Westfalen
Rheinland-Pfalz 1960 8 0.60 0.75 0.39
Saarland 1961 6 .043 0.05 0.49
Schleswig- 1959 20 0.57 0.83 0.52
Holstein
Total 121 7.943 15.13 0.55
(mean)
(source: Handbuch der Verbraucherinstitutionen.)
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Appendix 4. Government Support to Consumer Groups in France, 1974-1987.
(thousands of francs)
(thousand
francs) 1974674 1979675 1980676 1981 19 8 2 67 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
consumer
groups
ADEIC-FEN 100 102 225 157
ANC 155 248 214 - 200 210 214 648 518
LEO 80 82 204 143
LAGRANGE
UFC 80 237 377 438 530 572 620 633 775 582
CSCV 182 280 341 480 550 620 633 879 659
union groups
ORGECO 35 142 248 226 260 280 294 300 654 523
AFOC 187 377 438 525 567 595 608 952 714
INDECOSA- - 150 335 400 458 468 773 541
CGT
ASSECO- - 150 225 400 458 468 713 570
CFDT
family groups
CGL 152 280 300 335 362 380 388 687 515
CNAFAL 150 153 276 193
CNAPF 48 125 288 335 410 442 465 475 515 361
CNL 70 335 362 380 388 687 515
CSF 35 182 296 345 480 530 600 613 931 698
FFF 42 142 287 316 390 421 442 452 623 467
674 Michel Bernard, and Jacqueline Quentin, L'avant-garde des consommateurs: Luttes et
organisations en France et a l'tranger (Paris: Editions ouvrieres, 1975), pp 78-91.
675 Marie-Elisabeth Bordes, and Sylvie George, Politique de la Consommation dans la
Communaute Europ6ene (Memoire, Universite de Droit, d'Economie et de Sciences
Sociales de Paris, 1982), p 101.
676 Nolle Marotte, Bilan et perspectives de la politique francaise a l'egard des
consommateurs (Paris: Conseil Economique et Social, 1984), p 20.677 Inc Hebdo 574 (18 December 1987), p 2.
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FNAFR 182 305 353 430 464 488 498 807 565
UFCS 50 162 272 304 370 400 419 429 731 585
UNAF _ 133 106
cooperative
Labo Coop 15 87 284 330 400 432
(FNCC)
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